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Abstract 
 
Despite the many benefits that good governance brings to investors, academics 
contend that individual investors have no significant role to play in governance as it 
is economically unviable and too time consuming for them. On the other hand, 
regulators encourage and seem to expect individual investors to be governance 
interested, especially in exercising their ownership rights and making use of 
governance redress mechanisms whenever the need arises. Are such 
expectations of how these investors should behave at all reasonable? More 
importantly, there is anecdotal real-life evidence that at least some individual 
shareholders in Malaysia do play a role in governance such as attending AGMs. If, 
as assumed by academics that it is not viable for them to do so, what is the logic 
and/or motivations behind such observed behavioural tendencies?  
 
This study explores the many possible ways by which investors take governance 
into account (including harder-to-observe treatments – e.g. governance featuring 
in the form of share investment evaluation criteria). Yet unidentified, important 
actual motivations and justifications for all reported governance-related tendencies 
are studied as well. The actual relevance and also prevalence of such treatments 
and reasonings are largely unexplored in the empirical literature.  
 
Essentially, the study considers all governance-related attributes (both firm-level 
and country-level) that are potentially important to individual investors as well as all 
governance-related actions/tendencies exhibited by them throughout the typical 
share investment cycle. Each action/tendency is viewed and made sense of (i) as 
an integrated part of the sets of behaviours identified, (ii) within the governance 
environment and investment context where it takes place and (iii) from the 
standpoint of individual investors. 
 
Individual investors‘ relative propensities toward considering governance and/or 
undertaking governance-related actions are found to be (i) affected by, and are 
thus rational responses to, the governance-related institutional, environmental, 
cultural constraints they face and (ii) influenced by their personal investment 
inclinations, stylistics and preferences such as their primary investment strategies. 
These entail a number of implications that inform both policy and practice.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 1 begins with a description of the wider background to the study so as to 
provide the necessary overall research context. Major themes include the 
relevance of good corporate governance to capital markets and investors around 
the world and the interplay between governance and individual investors (as 
theorised by academics, as encouraged and/or expected by government 
regulators and as apparent from anecdotal evidence/real life observations of 
practitioners). The need for more research on individual investors‘ actual roles and 
nature of involvement in corporate governance (by exploring their governance- 
related behavioural tendencies) is then highlighted.  
 
The earlier sections of the chapter above lead to a concise breakdown of the 
study‘s main research questions. This is followed by the establishment of the major 
objectives of the research. The researcher then describes his initial motivations for 
carrying out a study of this particular nature.  
 
The later sections of the chapter are devoted to brief description of the underlying 
foundations of the study in terms of its major elements, conceptions and general 
design. This concise and integrated description begins in Section 1.6 which 
contains an account of the main ideas and contributions of the study as well as its 
distinctiveness compared to previous empirical research. Essentially, the various 
drawbacks of past studies are explored with the aim of showing how they influence 
the current study‘s overall approach in tackling the research questions posed, the 
various elements/variables to be considered and more importantly, how such 
elements are considered.  
 
The overall design of the study itself is then elaborated upon with particular focus 
on the notion of exploring investors‘ governance-related behavioural tendencies 
over the entire share investment cycle. A conceptual framework is then established 
to provide additional guidance and also structure to the study. Using this 
framework, the major elements of the study are explicitly illustrated in terms of how 
each element interacts and fits alongside others.  
16 
 
Lastly, a breakdown of the main chapters of the study is given. 
 
 
1.2 Wider Background to the Research 
 
Corporate governance generally refers to the ways and means by which 
publicly-listed companies are run, controlled and directed (Charkham, 2005). It 
deals with a wide range of basic yet key issues such as the kinds of corporate 
objectives that these entities should pursue; the organisational structures and 
processes adopted; the division of corporate roles and responsibilities 1 ; the 
various checks and balances established2; and the demonstration of corporate 
accountability. It ensures that corporate managers/directors have the right 
combination of qualifications, experiences and incentives to run such entities.  
 
In addition, good governance lowers the likelihood of corporate abuses and/or 
fraud (for indications supporting such a claim, see, for example, Uzun et al., 2004 
and Farber, 2004) that result in significant destruction of shareholder value3. Put 
simply, the core concern of corporate governance is the proper running of 
publicly-listed companies (Kean and Cheah, 2000). 
 
Traditionally, corporate governance was largely a particular concern of academics 
and capital market regulators. Widespread interest in corporate governance, 
however, developed in the last few decades (Letza and Sun, 2002), mainly due to 
major developments in capital markets around the world such as:  
(i) the major corporate scandals in the early 1990s such as the cases 
of Maxwell and Barings Bank in the UK; 
                                                 
1
 Especially between company directors and top management led by the CEO. 
2
 Such as internal risk controls and independent monitoring of corporate executives by 
non-executive directors. 
3
 The term shareholder value usually refers to the returns that shareholders ultimately get 
from their investment in the shares of public-listed firms through conventional means such 
as increases in share price and also dividends.  
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(ii) the devastating impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 4  on 
developing capital markets (see, for example, Johnson et al., 2000; 
Becht et al., 2003); 
(iii) the string of corporate scandals in the early 2000s involving firms 
such as Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, etc5 (Monks and Minow, 2004) 
and;  
(iv) the recent collapses/failings of major Western publicly-listed firms in 
the most severe financial crisis to hit the global capital markets post 
World War II6 (see, for example, Bushon, 2009).  
 
Each shares a common thread in the sense that they are claimed to be partly 
caused, or their adverse impacts exacerbated, by lapses/failings in various 
aspects of corporate governance.  
 
Apart from the major incidences above, there are a number of persistent 
governance concerns in capital markets worldwide in recent years. Prominent 
issues include managers/directors who allegedly overpay themselves (so-called 
―fat cats‖), undertake overly risky projects, make corporate decisions that are not in 
the interest of those they serve (i.e. the corporations‘ shareholders/owners), 
provide insufficient disclosures, are reluctant to communicate with or listen to their 
shareholders, and show a general lack of accountability and transparency.  
 
Upon further reflection, however, these issues have been observed since the era 
of Berle and Means (1932) suggesting that major lapses in governance in recent 
times have caused a resurgence of (see, for example, Gomez, 2004), and also 
heightened interest in, various aspects of governance. Becht et al. (2003) 
supported this claim by stating that many of the main issues debated by early 
writers remain central today. 
 
                                                 
4
 As various weaknesses in governance practices such as the lack of corporate 
transparency, lack of risk controls and also lack of corporate accountability are argued to 
have exacerbated the negative effects of the Crisis. 
5
 These incidents typically involve large scale, blatant lapses in good governance such as 
the discovery of many instances of accounting misappropriation, fraud and other 
illegal/unethical corporate behaviour. 
6
 The current Crisis is portrayed as being caused by poor corporate governance such as 
lack of risk controls, widespread executive greed, the discovery of various incidences of 
significant fraud/scandals and other corporate abuses. 
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Malaysia is no exception. In the past few years, a host of incidences involving 
combinations of issues listed above were discovered in a number of Malaysian 
publicly-listed firms such as Transmile (accounting fraud), OilCorp (inadequate 
disclosures and conflicts arising from the company‘s significantly different asset 
valuations that are disputed by their external auditors), Megan Media (fictitious 
transactions), KFC (board tussle at the expense of minority outside shareholders), 
Padiberas (insider trading), FCW (absence of its Chairman at consecutive AGMs), 
and OCI Bhd (missing or destroyed accounting books and records), amongst 
others 7. In addition, publicly-listed firms based in Malaysia were also found to be 
sorely lacking in terms of their general governance practices and were severely 
affected during the 1997 Crisis (Kean and Cheah, 2000).  
 
As a consequence of the various weaknesses/failings/concerns pertaining to 
corporate governance outlined above, numerous investors of shares in many 
Malaysian publicly-listed corporations incurred substantial financial losses due to 
poor governance 8  (Leong, 2009). These failings have caused much concern 
amongst investors and greatly shaken their confidence in capital markets (Bushon, 
2009). This is aptly described by Jaafar Sidek (2007a: no page): “minority 
shareholders have been appalled by the wave of corporate governance and 
accounting irregularities in our country [Malaysia] recently”. Searching questions 
are thus increasingly being asked regarding the actual running of publicly-listed 
corporations. 
 
Apart from the negative consequences of poor governance, good governance 
brings a number of benefits. In a more globalised economy, good corporate 
governance has become a means for differentiation and is often argued to be a 
potential source of competitive advantage (see, for example, Rubach and Sebora, 
1998). This is because good governance, as it endeavours to ensure that the right 
corporate structures and processes are established, that the right decisions are 
made in a timely manner to achieve the proper corporate objectives, is contended 
                                                 
7
 For a detailed description, please refer to the various reports, observations and articles 
compiled/posted/published by various reliable sources (practitioners and the press) such 
as the Malaysian Minority Shareholders‘ Watchdog Group‘s website at www.mswg.org.my, 
The Star newspaper‘s website at www.thestar.com.my and other business press with wide 
national readership such as The Edge Daily (www.theedgemalaysia.com). Selected 
samples of such articles are provided in Appendix 1. 
8
 This points to the significant destruction of shareholder/investor wealth mainly in the form 
of drastic falls in a firm‘s share price. 
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to result in superior corporate performance (see, for example, Klapper and Love, 
2004; Monks and Minow, 2004).  
 
As a consequence of the confluence of the many factors above, both positive and 
negative ones, governance has become a buzzword for investors, governments 
and capital market regulators alike. In fact, it assumed centre stage in driving major 
corporate and capital market reforms worldwide. Essentially, governance is 
portrayed as the solution to the many problems plaguing capital markets outlined 
above while on the other hand, paying attention to governance results in lower 
investment risks and also higher investment returns for investors 9  (see, for 
example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Investors/shareholders, as owners of 
publicly-listed companies, should therefore take governance10 into account when 
making investment decisions (Bauer and Guenster, 2003). 
 
Notwithstanding the arguments above, academics contend that most 
investors/shareholders, who collectively own these companies, themselves pay 
scant interest to the actual running/governance of such entities (Monks and Minow, 
2004; Low, 2004; Thompson and Davis, 1997). This is mainly because utilitarian 
governance theories have predicted that it is economically unviable and too time 
consuming for small individual investors to monitor the actions of corporate 
managers (Grossman and Hart, 1980).  
 
The description above applies especially to small, individual shareholders as they 
are seen to be ill-informed, disinterested and/or indifferent share owners with no 
significant role to play in governance. Such tendencies are said to be particularly 
prevalent in developing capital markets such as Malaysia (Low, 2004). In fact, 
even the many new codes and guidelines on corporate governance introduced by 
                                                 
9
 This refers to the dual aspect of corporate governance. On the one hand, it contributes to 
public policy goals such as increasing investor confidence in the workings of the capital 
markets and on the other, the benefits accruing to individual investors themselves in the 
form of greater returns (this is based on the notion that firms that are better governed 
achieve superior corporate performance over the long-term as compared to poorly 
governed ones. Agency costs are also argued to be lower in better governed firms. 
Furthermore, this superior performance will be fairly reflected in the corresponding share 
price valuations over extended periods of time. For further details, please refer to Section 
2.5 Relevance of Corporate Governance to Individual Shareholders).  
10
 This refers to the many aspects/attributes of firm governance such as the board of 
directors and disclosure practices. Individual investors‘ evaluation of ―good governance‖ 
and also understanding of its many aspects (in terms of the kinds of governance 
mechanisms/attributes that are relevant and how they should work/function) are dealt with 
in Chapter 2. 
20 
 
many governments around the world have largely ignored this particular group of 
investors. 
 
The arguments above seem persuasive but there are certain indications that this 
may not be as simple a scenario as envisaged. Consider the policies adopted by 
the Malaysian government and regulators post Asian Crisis pertaining to 
shareholder governance-related activism where an array of shareholder rights and 
redress mechanisms have been adopted (Anwar, 2007). Also, much resource has 
been expended to educate individual investors on the importance of governance 
(see, for example, The Securities Commission Development Centre Quarterly 
Bulletin [Malaysia], 2002).  
 
Instead of just expecting to be protected, investors are encouraged and expected 
to exercise their ownership rights, monitor the actions of corporate managers and 
make use of redress mechanisms whenever the need arises (i.e. to contribute to 
corporate governance as described by Allen, 2004a). Are such expectations of 
how investors should behave, which runs contrary to the academic arguments 
predicting otherwise, reflective of the actual situation? 
 
More importantly, there is anecdotal real-life evidence that some individual 
shareholders in Malaysia do play an active role in governance11. Notable examples 
include (i) the dressing down of Malton Bhd‘s board of directors by minority 
investors (who include many individual retail ones) for the absence of their 
executive chairman and executive director for two consecutive annual general 
meetings (AGMs) as well as their excessive remuneration when shareholders 
received no dividends and, (ii) investors successfully forcing the withdrawal of all 
three resolutions at the 2006 EGM of Bandar Raya Developments Bhd (or BRDB) 
after a significant group of minority retail (individual) and institutional shareholders 
voted against. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Please refer to various published articles in the national press (see, for example, The 
Star newspaper). Articles are available through its website at www.thestar.com.my and 
refer also to the articles compiled/produced by other reliable sources such as those posted 
on the Minority Shareholders‘ Watchdog Group (Malaysia) website at www.mswg.org.my, 
The Edge Daily, etc. Selected samples of anecdotal evidence (i.e. relevant articles) are 
provided in Appendix 2. 
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On a more broad and general basis, individual investors are seen to dominate the 
attendance numbers at Annual General Meetings of Malaysian publicly-listed 
companies (Allen, 2004b; Schacht et al., 2009) even though the overall attendance 
levels tend to be low. Jaafar Sidek (2006: no page) highlighted that “over the last 
one year, MSWG12 noted that minority shareholders have grown in strength either 
in persons or as proxies to vote against resolutions which are against their 
interests”. In addition, Goh (2008) has clearly described that “obviously, 
awareness of corporate governance has improved among the general public. 
There are certainly more letters being written about accounting woes by investors 
to regulators”. Overall, it is claimed that shareholder activism13 is on the rise in 
Malaysia.  
 
In some countries, individual investors have even banded together into 
associations to lobby for better corporate governance. If, as assumed by 
academics, it is not viable for these investors to do so, what is the logic and/or 
motivations behind such observed behavioural tendencies? It is apparent that 
theory-based reasoning and justifications in the extant literature which seem 
logical may, in fact, bear little resemblance to the multi-faceted, complex nature of 
actual share investment processes (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). Put simply, does governance actually matter to 
individual investors in reality? 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The MSWG (Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group) was established (specifically, 
mandated/backed and also funded by the Malaysian government and other capital market- 
related regulatory bodies) to further/promote the interests of minority shareholders (both 
individual and institutional investors), mainly by:  
 encouraging shareholder activism, especially the exercise of ownerships rights,  
 acting as a forum for minority shareholders to share investment experiences,  
 providing a platform for these investors to band together for collective governance- 
related initiatives, and  
 developing the educational aspects of corporate governance (for investors).  
 
For a detailed description of MSWG‘s history, aims, development as well as its various 
investor/shareholder-centered, governance-related activities/initiatives/services – Refer to 
Appendix 3. 
 
13
 Investors involved in proactive governance-related initiatives such as attending AGMs, 
submitting complaint letters to company management and/or capital market regulators, etc. 
The full range of governance-related activism initiatives considered is outlined in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.7.2). 
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In a related development, individual investors are said to lack consistency or are 
myopic in the sense that, when the companies that they partly own are registering 
good growth, operating performance, profits and/or the share prices are on an 
upward trend, governance is of little concern. Potential weaknesses in the actual 
running of these entities or even abuse/misuse of corporate assets are tolerated or 
ignored. Conversely, only when things go wrong do they start to question, where is 
the governance? This provides the basis for exploring if, when and how 
governance matters when circumstances change. 
 
Practically, there are a number of ways by which investors could take governance 
into account besides costly continual governance monitoring and activism. For 
example, they could simply avoid investing in poorly governed firms14 or sell out 
whenever governance concerns arise. Such treatments, if found to be practised, 
show that certain aspects of governance are indeed accounted for by individual 
investors. As these are much harder to observe/document compared to highly 
visible actions such as attending AGMs, the prevalence of such treatments has 
been largely unexplored in the empirical literature.  
 
 
1.3 Research Questions  
 
The study‘s main research questions are derived from the overall governance 
scenario and also the specific areas of interest meriting further academic research 
and enquiry, as portrayed above. They are: 
 
 Does corporate governance matter to individual investors? If it does: 
o What aspects of it are taken into account in their share investment 
practices?  
o How are the relevant governance aspects taken into account? 
 
 When or under what circumstances does governance start to matter/matter 
more15? 
                                                 
14
 Based on the firm-specific governance attributes that they may consider. 
15
 For example, when corporate fraud happens often (and presumably is reported in the 
press) or when the equity market is on a declining trend. The justifications for these 
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 What are the reasons/justifications and also influences underlying 
individual investors‘ propensities to consider governance, undertake 
particular governance-related actions and/or exhibit governance-related 
tendencies? 
o What country-specific environmental and institutional factors 
influence and also explain observed behavioural tendencies16? 
o What personal investment-related attributes, preferences and 
stylistics influence and explain observed behavioural tendencies17? 
 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
In order to address the research questions posed earlier, the following objectives 
are established: 
 
 To review the different literature streams that are relevant to the study such 
as corporate governance, individual investor behaviour, path dependence/ 
institutional complementarities, economic and political history (elaborated 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4); 
 To examine the Malaysian institutional and corporate environment as well 
as certain investment-related cultural norms and, subsequently, to gauge 
their influences on the governance-related behavioural tendencies of 
individual investors who operate within this particular context (addressed in 
Chapter 3); 
 To explore selected investment-related tendencies, preferences and 
stylistics exhibited by individual investors in terms of how each may 
influence each investor‘s relative propensities of considering governance 
and/or undertake certain governance-related actions (addressed in 
Chapter 4); 
                                                                                                                                     
scenarios alongside other potentially relevant ones are provided in Chapters 2 and 3. Other 
possible scenarios are gauged from the feedback of the study‘s interview respondents.  
16
 Notable examples include racial/ethnic influences, relationship-based business culture 
and political involvement in business. The justifications for considering these external 
characteristics alongside other relevant ones are provided in Chapter 3. 
17
 Notable examples include an individual investor‘s primary investment strategy, main 
investment objectives and other personal preferences/stylistics. The justifications for 
considering these individual characteristics alongside other relevant ones are provided in 
Chapter 4. 
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 To carry out a pragmatic, sequential mixed methods procedure in order to 
obtain the necessary data for the study (described in Chapter 5); 
 To explore, analyse and report the various investment-related 
demographic attributes, psychological tendencies and investment-related 
preferences/stylistics of individual investors (dealt with in Chapter 6); 
 To analyse, uncover and report the interplay between individual attributes 
and also the national institutional, cultural and corporate environment in 
terms of how each may affect investors‘ governance-related behavioural 
tendencies over the typical investment cycle (dealt with in Chapter 7); 
 To synthesise and also draw conclusions regarding the interplay between 
individual investors and corporate governance (presented in Chapter 8).  
 
A brief explanation of the various concepts and issues mentioned above and the 
intricate interlinks between them are given in the later sections of this chapter. 
Detailed elaborations are provided in subsequent chapters of the study. 
 
 
1.5 Initial Motivations for the Study 
 
Initial motivation to conduct the study arose from the researcher‘s earlier Masters 
Dissertation on corporate governance-related disclosures made in annual reports. 
In the course of completing the earlier piece of work, the researcher developed a 
better appreciation of the importance of good corporate governance in capital 
markets around the world. High standards of governance not only foster and 
enhance investor confidence but also serve to promote better corporate practices 
which ensure the proper working of these markets. 
 
The study is also spurred by the researcher‘s own experiences of investing in 
shares in a developing capital market (specifically, investing in the shares of 
various publicly-listed companies in Malaysia, the researcher‘s home country). 
Hence, while various issues, factors, arguments and/or incidences that are 
detailed throughout the study are mainly uncovered through a review of relevant 
literature, materials published/disseminated by market regulators and the popular 
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press, interpretation is further informed by the first-hand experiences and actual 
observations made by the researcher himself18.  
 
In producing this piece of research, the researcher has a few personal aspirations. 
Firstly, it is to improve the workings/functioning of the Malaysian capital market and 
in doing so, play a small part in improving his home country‘s economic institutions. 
As the Malaysian stock market shares a number of attributes with other developing 
markets around the world (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Rajan and Zingales, 1998), it 
is hoped that the methodology and/or findings of the study will have, at the very 
least, some applicability/relevance to these markets as well. 
 
Second, it is the researcher‘s intention to deepen our understanding of the largely 
ignored and often the most vulnerable of all investor groups, that of individual retail 
investors. This is because, unlike big institutional shareholders who typically 
possess relatively large ownership stakes and have considerable clout/say within 
publicly-listed companies (Romano, 2000), the personal share ownership sizes of 
most individual investors are negligible19. These members of the investing public 
are usually the most powerless in terms of influencing the way publicly-listed 
companies that they partly own are governed and hence, prone to being ignored, 
exploited and/or mistreated.  
 
Even so, due to their sheer numbers when seen as a collective group, individual 
investors‘ proportion of overall corporate share ownership is highly significant (La 
Porta et al., 2000). Individual investors thus merit attention. Therefore, this study is 
aimed at enriching our current understanding of investors‘ governance-related 
behavioural inclinations within specific environmental contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Mainly in terms of constructing and framing the various arguments put forth. 
19
 Considering the typical sizes of public-listed corporations where many millions of shares 
are in circulation/issued at any one time. 
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1.6 Significance of Research 
 
The primary focus of the research is to examine the investment-related 
behavioural tendencies of individual investors in a developing capital market 
setting. It is carried out from the perspective of corporate governance.  
 
The study makes a number of specific contributions. These include being:  
 
(i) The first piece of research primarily devoted to investigating the nature of 
relationships between corporate governance and individual investors. 
Previous academic work has largely ignored this particular minority 
shareholder group as they are seen to play no significant role in 
governance (Monks and Minow, 2004) and first-hand access to these 
investors has also been difficult to establish (Wood and Zaichkowsky, 
2004).  
 
(ii) The first study that attempts to make sense of various aspects of investor 
behaviours/tendencies from a distinct, unifying perspective (corporate 
governance). Previous studies have explored and described a wide range 
of somewhat disparate individual investor behaviours without reinterpreting 
or making sense of them in such a manner. See, for example, Nagy and 
Obenberger, 1994; Dorn and Huberman, 2005; Lease et al., 1974; 
Clark-Murphy and Soutar, 2004. 
 
(iii) The pioneer in considering both personal (investment-related preferences/ 
stylistics/psychological traits) and external institutional environmental 
attributes that help shape the identified behavioural tendencies. While 
considering the influences of country-specific institutional and 
environmental variables is a feature of many governance-based studies, 
this study takes a step further by also considering the influences of 
personal investment biases/preferences/stylistics concurrently. Exploration 
of individual traits in relation to governance-related investor behaviour in a 
holistic manner has never been attempted thus far.  
 
In addition, the research also has various distinctive characteristics, as outlined in 
the next section.  
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From the outline above, the study makes original contributions to knowledge 
pertaining to (i) the subject matters at hand and (ii) research methodology. The 
major themes outlined are elaborated upon in the following sections of the chapter.  
 
 
1.7 Distinctiveness of Research 
 
The study‘s distinctive aspects are derived from its attempts to address the various 
shortcomings of previous empirical studies on corporate governance and investor 
behaviour.  
 
First, past studies have focused on only one or a select few variables (to preserve 
theoretical traction and simplicity) which failed to capture/document the intricate 
interlinks and mutually influencing relationships between the various different 
governance attributes/aspects concurrently and holistically (see, for example, 
Daily et al., 2003; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004).  
 
Second, past studies were overwhelmingly quantitative, relying heavily on 
statistical outputs that have faced persistent problems of potential omitted 
variables; reverse causality (Klapper and Love, 2004); and unrealistic assumptions 
made, or explanations given, with regards to investors‘ behavioural tendencies/ 
actions and the corresponding reasons/motivations for such tendencies. This is 
also partly due to the extensive use of aggregated market-based data as gaining 
access to individual investors and also obtaining samples of adequate sizes has 
proven to be difficult (Wood and Zaichkowsky, 2004).  
 
Third, the reality of corporate governance being a culture-laden, politically- 
influenced and contextualised phenomenon is ignored or inadequately accounted 
for (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; Licht, 2001). On the other hand, 
individual investors themselves have been viewed as a fairly generic group across 
countries in past studies in terms of their behavioural tendencies and motivations. 
This obviously ignores the real-life distinctiveness of investors based in different 
countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), even within countries.  
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Lastly, there is a dearth of research focusing specifically on the individual investor 
group from the perspective of governance, especially in developing capital markets 
such as Malaysia. The few studies that exist, besides being non-governance 
focused, also make use of samples of investors based in Western developed 
countries (see, for example, Dorn and Huberman, 2005; Lease et al., 1974; 
Clark-Murphy and Soutar, 2004; Nagy and Obenberger, 1994).  
 
The various shortcomings above have resulted in calls by authors such as Daily et 
al. (2003), Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) and Huse (2005) for researchers to adopt 
new approaches to the study of governance, especially since past studies have 
yielded inconclusive/conflicting findings. Researchers are encouraged to 
conceptualise and also design governance-based studies in a more holistic, 
flexible, integrated yet contextualised manner (Huse, 2005; Daily et al., 2003).  
 
In response, the study explores all governance-related attributes (both firm-level 
and country-level) potentially important to, and all governance-related actions/ 
tendencies exhibited by, individual investors. Each attribute/tendency is viewed 
and made sense of (i) as an integrated part of the set of behaviours/tendencies 
identified, (ii) within the governance environment and investment context where it 
takes place and (iii) from the standpoint of individual investors. 
 
Investors‘ investment-related behavioural tendencies are posited to be profoundly 
affected by, and are thus rational responses to, the governance-related 
institutional, environmental, cultural constraints that they face (Huse, 2005; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Besides environmental 
influences, the study also investigates the influences of investors‘ personal 
attributes (for example, individual preferences such as chosen primary investment 
strategies) on their relative propensities toward undertaking governance-related 
actions. In addition, the study focuses on individual investors from a culture that is 
distinct from the West (Kim and Nofsinger, 2003).  
 
Academic theories and predictions of investor motivations/actions/tendencies that 
are argued to bear little resemblance to real-life practices are evaluated by 
comparing and contrasting them with actual motivations/actions/tendencies, as 
reported by the investors/practitioners themselves. This also enables the 
identification of yet undocumented potential key reasoning, justifications and/or 
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motivations that compel investors toward or away from considering governance or 
exhibit particular governance-related behaviours. In fact, the study is the first to 
solicit first-hand responses of actual individual investors on a wide range of 
governance-related behavioural tendencies and issues within a single study.  
 
Essentially, the researcher adopts a two-stage, sequential mixed methods 
procedure where individual investors are interviewed to uncover the key issues/ 
tendencies/actions and the underlying motivations for each. Subsequently, a 
questionnaire based on the obtained feedback is distributed to explore the 
indicative prevalence of each potentially important tendency/action/motivation 
identified. Pragmatic understanding of the governance phenomenon as it is being 
practiced is emphasised. 
 
Rather than sophisticated statistical models, the study makes use of simple 
contingency tables enriched by extracts of investors' first-hand accounts of the 
governance phenomenon which enables easier dissemination to the wider 
investing public. Since this research is aimed at improving our understanding of 
individual investors' investment-related behavioural tendencies, practical 
improvements and understanding should also benefit this particular investor group. 
Looking to improve actual investment practice is consistent with the study‘s 
pragmatic philosophy.  
 
 
1.8 Overall Design of Study 
 
Consistent with the study‘s holistic approach, investors‘ behaviours/actions/ 
tendencies are cast into distinct stages of the typical share investment cycle (i.e. 
before, during and after a tranche of shares is held). This is because different 
governance related factors and/or behaviours feature at different parts of the 
investment cycle. For example, shareholder activist behaviour such as attending 
AGMs take place post-purchase of shares while evaluations of firm-specific 
governance factors take place pre-investment. Such a procedure enables each 
action/tendency to be better appreciated alongside others. Each of the 
governance-related actions/tendencies is segregated into the specific stages of 
the cycle where they are likely to feature.  
30 
 
This concept of considering investment behaviour in stages is consistent with 
Lewellen et al.‘s (1977) study which divided investment activity into broad, 
chronologically-driven elements moving “from goals to analysis to choice to 
evaluation” (Lewellen et al., 1977: 300). Based on the author‘s own share 
investment experience spanning a number of years and also indications obtained 
through a preliminary review of established literature, the study divides the typical 
share investment cycle into (i) Pre-Purchase, (ii) Post-Purchase, (iii) Exit/Sell Out 
and (iv) Post-Investment stages. 
 
Even though a few past studies (see Lease et al., 1974; Schlarbaum et al., 1978; 
Clark-Murphy and Soutar, 2004; Dorn and Huberman, 2005) did examine various 
decision-making processes and tendencies exhibited by individual investors over 
the investment cycle, these studies considered a collection of somewhat disparate 
concepts/issues. On the contrary, as mentioned earlier, the current study is the first 
to view all investment-related actions from a unifying perspective (corporate 
governance).  
 
Combining the many different aspects of the research, the researcher has 
developed a unique conceptual framework to act as a guide and also to provide 
overall structure to the study. This framework is the culmination of (i) extensive 
reviews of a number of diverse literature streams (for example, the corporate 
governance, behavioural finance and political economy streams), (ii) the linking/ 
integration of various concepts, arguments and issues after much personal 
reflection on established academic and practitioner knowledge and (iii) attempts to 
address as many gaps and also shortcomings of previous empirical studies as 
reasonably possible. A visual representation is given below.  
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Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework of Study 
 
The Malaysian Governance Institutional, Cultural and Political Environment 
 
. 
                                                 The Share          Investment Cycle 
 
Stage 1: 
Pre-Purchase 
 
Stage 2: 
Post-Purchase 
 
Stage 3: 
Exit/Sell Off 
 
Stage 4: 
Post-Investment 
 
Individual Investors’ Propensities to Consider Governance and/or Undertake 
Governance-related Actions/Initiatives 
 
 
 
Investors’ Personal Attributes 
Motivations/Objectives/Preferences/Stylistics 
. 
 
By referring to Figure 1.1, the study generally progresses by the following 
chronological order.  
 
As little is known regarding which governance-related actions/tendencies are 
relevant/important in reality, the study first identifies and compiles all possible 
governance-related tendencies/behaviours (combining theoretical explanations/ 
predictions in the extant literature, the expectations of regulators and certain 
anecdotal real-life observations). All such governance-related actions/tendencies 
are placed within The Share Investment Cycle in Figure 1.1. Specifically, they are 
cast into the ―Individual Investors‘ Propensities to Consider Governance and/or 
Undertake Governance-related Actions/Initiatives‖ section that runs through all 
four distinct stages of the cycle. 
 
The treatment above is deemed suitable as, even though the governance 
institutional context is argued to be distinct for every country, the possible 
actions/tendencies of investors are actually fairly confined and generic. For 
example, in terms of attending AGMs of publicly-listed firms, investors could only 
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opt to either attend or not attend. Similarly, investors could only opt to either avoid 
or not avoid investing in poorly-governed firms.  
 
Once the possible range of behaviours/tendencies has been compiled, the 
corresponding explanations and/or justifications for undertaking/not undertaking 
each governance-related action/tendency are explored. To achieve such an aim, 
important aspects of the Malaysian governance and institutional environment are 
first described in detail. This is because environmental variables are seen to (i) 
provide the overall context within which investors‘ investment activities take place 
and (ii) act as constraints or facilitators of investors‘ behavioural tendencies. In 
Figure 1.1, they collectively make up ―The Malaysian Governance Institutional, 
Cultural and Political Environment‖ section that forms the backdrop to The Share 
Investment Cycle. 
 
In essence, the study contends that certain relevant country-specific, governance- 
related environmental variables provide the underlying motivations/justifications 
for empirically-observed governance-related investor propensities (i.e. the relative 
likelihood of undertaking each considered tendency/action). Hence, predictions 
are subsequently made regarding each chosen external factor‘s likely influence on 
investors‘ governance propensities within the Malaysian context (such predictions 
are not explicitly shown in Figure 1.1).  
 
Third, a number of personal investment-related attributes/preferences/stylistics 
exhibited by investors is considered (as represented by ―Investors‘ Personal 
Attributes Motivations/Objectives/Preferences/Stylistics‖ section in Figure 1.1). 
Similar to environmental variables, personal/individual variables are explored in 
terms of how each impact and also explain investors‘ governance-related 
propensities (again, predictions are not explicitly shown in Figure 1.1).  
 
In terms of predictions, taking the previous example of AGM attendance, perhaps 
certain environmental constraints discourage some from attending (such as the 
existence of powerful, politically connected majority shareholder/owners that could 
disregard the interests of other investors with minimal sanctions, rendering their 
presence inconsequential) or certain personal investment preferences such as 
primary investment strategies adopted that make governance relevant/irrelevant to 
some of these investors. Previously unidentified important motivations/ 
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justifications that explain identified investor actions/tendencies are also solicited 
from the investors themselves.  
 
 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The study comprises of eight chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews current literature and other relevant sources that guide our 
understanding of individual investor behaviour from the perspective of corporate 
governance. It provides the overall context, interplay and also discrepancies 
pertaining to the governance-related behavioural tendencies of investors between 
three distinct sources, that is, (i) the dominant academic theoretical and empirical 
literature, (ii) the expectations, policies and assumptions of capital market 
regulators and, (iii) anecdotal real life evidence of investors‘ actual behaviour.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the corporate governance environment specific to Malaysia. It 
gauges the influences of distinct cultural and institutional attributes on the 
behavioural tendencies of individual investors investing within that particular 
context.   
  
Chapter 4 is an elaboration of investors‘ investment-related preferences/stylistics/ 
tendencies that are posited to impact their relative propensities to consider 
corporate governance. 
 
Chapter 5 explicates the pragmatic philosophy that informs the overall stance of 
the study. The research methodology and methods utilised are then discussed in 
detail. Practical steps taken in carrying out the actual research are outlined along 
with the relevant data analysis procedures adopted. Lastly, research limitations are 
outlined.  
  
Chapter 6 presents the study‘s various findings pertaining to individual investors‘ 
investment-related demographic, psychological, preferential and stylistic 
attributes. 
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Chapter 7 reports the various governance-related findings that are linked to the 
different stages of the typical investment cycle.  
  
Chapter 8 offers an overall conclusion to the study. The primary stages of the 
study are revisited through a brief summary of each main chapter and/or stages of 
the research.  
 
In the next chapter, the study reviews (i) established academic literature, (ii) 
government/capital market regulator policies and (iii) selected anecdotal evidence 
pertaining to all aspects of corporate governance that is relevant to individual 
investors. The primary aim is to identify (i) the many country- and firm-level 
governance attributes, (ii) the range of possible governance-related investor 
behaviours/action and (iii) the likely underlying motivations for individual investors 
to undertake/not undertake all such action.  
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Chapter 2 Review 1: Corporate Governance and 
Individual Investors 
2.1  Chapter Outline 
 
The review begins by describing the basic underlying concepts and thinking behind 
corporate governance. This is followed by an outline of the many aspects of 
governance, at both country and firm levels. Next, the theoretical underpinnings of 
the study are established, especially in justifying the reasons why the agency 
perspective is adopted for a governance-centred, investor study based in Malaysia. 
The study also attempts to make the case for its exclusive focus on the individual 
shareholder/investor group. An outline of the many benefits of good corporate 
governance to individual investors is then presented. 
 
Moving to the next major section of the chapter, the study explicates the differing 
viewpoints regarding the relevance of corporate governance to individual investors 
and also the possible means by which they take governance into account. The 
primary aim is to highlight certain inconsistencies between the dominant academic 
viewpoint20 that these investors have no active role to play in governance; the 
viewpoint of government regulators in terms of their expectations of how 
shareholders should behave; and some anecdotal evidence/observations showing 
that at least some individual investors do take governance factors into account as 
well as undertake certain pro-active governance-related initiatives21. Essentially, 
the study aims to build the case that it is compelling to investigate the prevalence of 
governance-related considerations and behaviours of individual investors as well 
as the underlying motivations for such behaviours.  
 
Consequently, all possible means by which individual investors could take 
governance into account, be it theorised, predicted, expected and/or observed, are 
compiled. This is to facilitate investigation of the yet unknown relevance and also 
prevalence of each tendency/action in reality. Second, all major underlying 
                                                 
20
 i.e. the agency theory perspective, mainly applicable to capital markets with 
Anglo-Saxon structures. 
21
 This refers to the range of activities that are popularly known and categorised as forms of 
shareholder activism. Included are initiatives such as attending AGMs, submitting 
complaint letters to company management and/or capital market regulators, etc. The full 
range of governance-related activism initiatives considered is outlined in Section 2.7.2. 
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motivations and/or justifications for the range of behaviours/tendencies identified 
are also explored.  
 
In terms of the conceptual framework established, the relevant aspects being dealt 
with are highlighted (shaded) in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1 Focus of Chapter within the Conceptual Framework of Study (I) 
 
The Malaysian Governance Institutional, Cultural and Political Environment 
 
. 
                                                 The Share          Investment Cycle 
 
Stage 1: 
Pre-Purchase 
 
Stage 2: 
Post-Purchase 
 
Stage 3: 
Exit/Sell Off 
 
Stage 4: 
Post-Investment 
 
Individual Investors’ Propensities to Consider Governance and/or Undertake 
Governance-related Actions/Initiatives 
 
 
 
Investors’ Personal Attributes 
Motivations/Objectives/Preferences/Stylistics 
. 
 
In the final section of the chapter, the many governance-related elements/variables 
discussed throughout the chapter are integrated by the use of the study‘s main 
research questions as well as the typical share investment cycle. This is to show 
the underlying logic for the progression and also groupings of questions posed 
subsequently to both interview and questionnaire respondents. 
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2.2  Corporate Governance: The Agency Perspective 
 
Public-listed corporations are of immense significance as, over the course of the 
20th century, these entities have risen from relative obscurity to become the world‘s 
dominant economic institutions (Berle and Means, 1932; Bakan, 2005). Typically, 
modern corporations are collectively owned by combinations of up to many 
thousands of investors/shareholders (Bakan, 2005; Monks and Minow, 2004). As 
fragmented ownership is a primary feature of such entities (Berle and Means, 
1932), their increasing numbers and sizes point to the rising proportions of people 
owning shares worldwide.  
 
With extensive economic and social impact around the globe, the proper running of 
these enterprises becomes of huge interest. This is where the subject of corporate 
governance arises. At the most fundamental level, corporate governance refers to 
the ways and means by which publicly-listed corporations are directed and 
controlled (Arsalidou and Wang, 2005; Charkham, 2005).  
 
The very relevance of corporate governance is argued to stem from the separation 
between ownership (finance) and management (control) of public-listed firms 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Davis et al., 1997; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Due to 
such a separation and also with ownership itself being highly fragmented, 
shareholders (i.e. owners) are unable to influence managerial decisions (Berle and 
Means, 1932). This is because individually, investors‘ powers are too diluted22. In 
addition, there are also formidable barriers for them to form significant coalitions 
(and, act collectively) since they are anonymous to one another and are also 
broadly spread out geographically (Becht et al., 2003; Clarke, 2004; Bakan, 2005).  
 
Consequently, managers‘ positions become entrenched as they end up with much 
discretion to run such entities in their own best interests rather than that of the 
shareholders. Descriptions of helpless shareholders facing strong, knowledgeable 
and entrenched managers are commonplace (Chirinko et al., 2004; Monks and 
Minow, 2004; Berle and Means, 1932). This conflict is the classic dilemma that the 
field of corporate governance is trying to address (Daily et al., 2003). 
 
                                                 
22
 This is because their individual ownership share/stake is typically a negligible fraction of 
the total amount of shares issued. 
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The many streams of traditional governance research are profoundly influenced by 
the theory of agency, which is by far the most dominant theoretical perspective 
applied (Daily et al., 2003; Davis et al., 1997). Propounded by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), agency theory provides an explanation for the classic 
governance dilemma23. It views corporate managers/directors as agents running 
the corporations on behalf of shareholders who collectively own such entities 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Blair, 1995; Clarke, 2004). The sole objective of publicly-listed 
firms is to maximise the wealth of their shareholders (i.e. to maximise shareholder 
value24) (Letza and Sun, 2002). Shareholders, being the suppliers of capital, are 
also known as principals and viewed as the primary constituents of the firm (Stovall 
et al., 2004). 
 
Both agents and principals are assumed to be self-utility maximisers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Letza and Sun, 2002) and hence, agents would always seek to 
enhance their own private benefits (even at the expense of their principals) if 
inadequate mechanisms25 are in place to align the interests of both groups (Mallin, 
2007; Davis et al., 1997). Authors such as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) have highlighted that managers pursuing their self interests 
may lead to a range of behaviours such as the misuse of corporate assets or 
pursuing overly risky/imprudent projects, amongst others.  
 
Therefore, the primary function of corporate governance is to mitigate the conflicts 
within this core agent-principal relationship. The costs of interest alignment 
between the two parties are known as agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Again, these mainly arise due to the significant discretion (control rights) that 
managers end up with alongside information asymmetries, since dispersed 
shareholders are outsiders with limited knowledge of what actually goes on inside 
the firm (Letza et al., 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
 
                                                 
23
 The separation between ownership and control phenomenon originally described by 
Berle and Means (1932) is consistent with the ideas propounded within agency theory, 
barring the use of the term itself which was coined a few decades later by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). 
24
 According to Becht et al. (2003), ―shareholder value‖ refers to the stock market valuation 
of the corporation. 
25
 The term ―mechanisms‖ refers to a range of checks, balances, sanctions and incentives. 
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Theoretically, the agency perspective subscribes to the contractarian approach 
that views the firm as a nexus of contracts (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994). These contracts (connecting the suppliers of capital, labour, 
materials and other inputs) specify where decisions are made and how the 
proceeds from the firm‘s operations are divided up among the various corporate 
participants, with shareholders getting what‘s left after the other participants are 
paid off (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Thompson and Davis, 1997). In short, 
shareholders are relatively less protected compared to other constituents due to 
their open-ended contract (Williamson, 1984; Williamson, 1985a).  
 
From a more technical academic conception then, shareholders/investors take 
precedence because they are the ones taking a risk on the residue (leftover 
profits/earnings) rather than for being owners per se, leading some to refer to them 
as residual risk takers (see, for example, Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Learmount, 
2002; Clarke, 2004).  
 
Regardless of whether investors are seen as owners or the more technical residual 
risk takers, the salient point is that shareholders are a core concern from the 
viewpoint of governance. In fact, many academics and policy makers are of the 
opinion that the main purpose of corporate governance is to safeguard the 
economic welfare and interests of shareholders (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999; 
Thompson and Davis, 1997).  
 
The claim above has led authors such as Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990: 72) to 
regard governance as “the integrated set of internal and external controls that 
harmonise manager-shareholder (agency) conflicts of interest resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control”.  
 
Essentially, a combination of internal (such as the board of directors who have the 
right to hire, dismiss, and compensate managers) and external (such as takeovers 
and disclosure regulations) control mechanisms are utilised for such a purpose 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Gillan and Starks, 1998). 
These governance mechanisms or ―ways‖ (Gibson, 1999) are geared towards 
overcoming/mitigating agency problems as efficiently as possible (Thompson and 
Davis, 1997). This is typically achieved by increasing the monitoring of 
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management‘s actions, limiting managers‘ opportunistic behaviour, and/or 
reducing the information risk borne by shareholders (Skaife et al., 2004).  
 
The various mechanisms/aspects of governance are typically divided into two 
distinct levels that is, firm-level and country-level (see, for example, Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Becht et al., 2003; Arrarat and Ugur, 2003; 
amongst others).  
 
At the country-level, important aspects of corporate governance that are relevant 
to Malaysia include (as listed by authors such as Klapper and Love (2004) who 
conducted their research on 14 emerging markets – including Malaysia. See also 
Thillainathan, 1999 and Low, 2004): 
 
 General corporate ownership structures (this largely determines the 
general nature of corporate control at the firm-level. For example, the 
prevalence of significant and/or majority ownership by powerful families or 
big institutions. Please refer also to the description regarding firm-specific 
ownership structure given below). 
 Legal and regulatory infrastructure (this is inclusive of the corporate laws 
and regulations that are in place to regulate the behaviours/structures/ 
functions of market participants and legal as well as capital market 
institutions such as the courts, the Securities Commission and other capital 
market regulatory bodies that enforce established rules and regulations). 
 Basic shareholder rights (referring to shareholders‘/investors‘ rights and 
entitlements as owners of the corporations such as their basic right to vote 
at AGMs in relation to the election of directors and also major corporate 
decisions such as significant mergers and acquisitions). 
 Disclosure regulations and international accounting standards (in 
determining the kinds of essential company-related information that the 
corporation must provide to shareholders and other stakeholders).  
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On the other hand, firm-level attributes include (Thillainathan, 1999; Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Low, 2004; Walsh and Seward, 1990): 
 
 Experience, qualification and independence26  of the board of directors 
(acting as monitors of management on behalf of shareholders. See, for 
example, Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 Top management quality, capability and accountability (especially the 
Chief Executive Officer – to run the firm to generate good returns for 
shareholders in a transparent and accountable manner). 
 Firm-specific ownership structure (especially the existence of powerful 
majority shareholder/managers and/or politically-connected large owners 
who may be proxies for political parties that are likely to possess significant 
scope to expropriate from minority shareholders). 
 Top management compensation (particularly performance-linked pay 
which rewards managers for good corporate performance. See also Cheng 
and Firth, 2005; Dorff, 2005). 
 The company‘s internal risk management and control systems. 
 Amount, quality and timeliness of disclosures (to enable investors to make 
better informed decisions. See also Nestor, 2004). 
 Takeover defences (such defences are expected to be minimal so as to 
better enable takeovers when the current management is not performing. 
Takeovers act as an external monitoring mechanism to ensure alignment of 
interest with shareholders and exertions of sufficient managerial effort 
since managers are otherwise faced with the threat of removal/ 
replacement by stronger outside managers, in theory).  
 Reputable auditors (to serve as a check mechanism for the accuracy of the 
firm‘s published financial statements. See, for example, Goodwin and 
Seow, 2002). 
 
 
                                                 
26
 The term independence refers to two related notions. Firstly, it refers to the proportion of 
the board of directors that comprises of independent, non-executive directors. This is 
because the typical Malaysian board consists of both inside and outside directors. The 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance recommends at least two directors or one third 
of the board to be independent. As an extension to the first notion, the focus is on the 
interpretation of the term ―independence‖ itself – specifically, the attributes/criterias that 
makes a director truly independent of the insider/executive directors/managers. 
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As described in Chapter 1, the various aspects of governance above ensure that (i) 
corporations pursue their stated corporate objectives, (ii) organisational structures, 
processes and resources are suitably geared towards achieving the stated 
corporate goals (for example, employing suitably qualified top managers and 
directors), (iii) the proper internal risk control systems and practices are 
established, (iv) the appropriate checks and balances are in place, partly for 
effective demonstration of corporate accountability and transparency (for example, 
providing adequate disclosures of important corporate information to investors and 
employing reputable external auditors), and (v) to minimise the occurrence of 
corporate frauds and scandals.  
 
The outline of various country-level and firm-level governance aspects, attributes 
and issues is not meant to be an exhaustive definition or neat 
compartmentalisation of the governance phenomenon into rigid facets. 
Furthermore, the study also does not attempt to propose, argue or even speculate 
on what the appropriate forms, structures and also working mechanisms of the 
different aspects of governance are or should be (as theorised in academic 
literature, as stipulated by various codes and guidelines on corporate governance 
and/or as implemented by market regulators27). Such structures/forms/working 
mechanisms include, for example, the appropriateness and also degree of 
compliance of certain public-listed companies with regards to the requirement that 
a certain proportion of their board of directors should be made up of non-executive 
and independent members.  
 
Instead, the study identifies and considers all major aspects of governance that 
may be potentially important from the standpoint of investors. Rather than defining 
what governance means, includes and entails, the study gauges how governance 
is viewed and perceived by the investors themselves by scrutinising which aspects 
of it that they do consider, respond to or are simply of particular concern to them 
(as well as the underlying justifications/reasoning for such viewpoints/treatments).  
 
                                                 
27
 See, for example, the various provisions and guidelines detailed in Bursa Malaysia‘s (i.e. 
The Malaysian Stock Exchange) Listing Requirements and also The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (2000; Revised, 2007). Included are stipulated Board of Director 
characteristics such as the minimum number of independent, non-executive directors, 
corporate disclosure requirements, internal risk controls, etc. 
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The various firm- and country-level aspects of governance will be further 
elaborated upon, integrated with related concepts (for example, how they feature 
in investor‘s actual practices such as being accounted for in the form of 
pre-purchase share evaluation criteria) and subsequently, operationalised for the 
empirical phase of the research throughout Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
 
 
2.3  The Agency Perspective and Malaysian Corporate 
Governance 
 
Corporate governance became a very prominent issue after the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis when various weaknesses in governance practices were widely 
perceived to be a major contributory factor (Johnson et al., 2000; Jomo, 1998; 
Claessens et al., 2002; Gibson, 1999; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). More importantly, 
such perceived weaknesses triggered major and sustained governance reforms in 
developing countries such as Malaysia. This is described by Anwar (2007), 
Chairman of the Malaysian Securities Commission, in her welcoming speech at the 
Launch of Malaysia‘s Corporate Governance Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC: no page): 
 
…challenges and weaknesses in our corporate governance 
framework… was aptly demonstrated during the Asian Financial 
Crisis when pressures on the ringgit and the stock exchange 
exposed latent corporate governance weaknesses in the corporate 
sector… the crisis certainly galvanised governments, regulators, 
corporates, NGOs and the media to place corporate governance in 
the public spotlight and precipitated widespread reform.  
 
Since 1997, the Malaysian government has been promoting better standards of 
corporate governance through the introduction of a myriad of governance-related 
regulations, codes, principles and best practices28. Most governance measures/ 
mechanisms introduced are based on Western principles, concepts and practices, 
especially those of the UK, US and Australia (Arsalidou and Wang, 2005; Lu and 
Batten, 2001).  
 
                                                 
28
 See, for example, The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2000; Revised, 
2007). 
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The design of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance itself was largely 
modelled after the UK‘s Combined Code, especially recommendations of the 
Hampel Committee29 (Kean and Cheah, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In fact, 
the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance charged with 
drafting the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance stated within the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance (2000: 4) that they “considered the Hampel 
approach to be the most suited for Malaysia”  
 
The High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (Malaysia) in its 
Report on Corporate Governance (Revised 1999: 3) stated that ―corporate 
governance has the ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholder value”30. 
Clearly, even fundamental issues such as the objectives that corporations should 
pursue31 are also based on Western ideals.  
 
Even so, the wholesale adoption of Anglo-Saxon governance mechanisms in 
Malaysia must be considered alongside the following recent empirical findings. 
Specifically, the proliferation of governance research worldwide post Asian Crisis32 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Gibson, 1999) show that the classic governance scenario 
of entrenched managers and dispersed, powerless shareholders do not hold true 
in corporate East Asia (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000) as most 
public-listed firms have highly concentrated shareholdings by family and state 
interests (Thillainathan, 1999; Wiwattanakantang, 1999). In fact, more than 
two-thirds of East Asian firms are controlled by just a single shareholder 
(Claessens et al., 2000). 
 
As most majority shareholders also assume the role of the managers who 
manage/control such firms (La Porta et al., 1999; Sycip, 1998), agency concerns of 
a different form are derived. They centre upon the potential conflicts of interests 
between powerful majority owner/managers and other minority shareholders/ 
                                                 
29
 With a number of explicit references being made to the Hampel report itself. 
30
 Typically measured by the amount of investment returns to shareholders in the forms of 
share price appreciation, dividends, etc. 
31
 Specifically, the sole corporate objective is shareholder wealth maximisation. 
32
 Pre Asian Crisis, there was a dearth of research on corporate governance outside of the 
four developed countries of the US, UK, Germany and Japan. As reported by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), even as recent as the late 1990s, not much is actually known about the 
nature, characteristics, and issues regarding corporate governance in most countries 
worldwide. 
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outside investors33 (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Claessens et 
al., 2002). The paramount focus of corporate governance in East Asian markets 
such as Malaysia, therefore, lies in resolving the conflicts between them (Du and 
Dai, 2005; Low, 2004; Claessens et al., 2002).  
 
These findings, when considered within the context of governance reforms 
undertaken, raise an interesting issue. Basically, most implemented governance 
principles and measures are designed to address problems that are more peculiar 
to the classic entrenched agent, numerous dispersed owners scenario rather than 
that of entrenched large owner/managers with many small outside owners (see, for 
example, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Arsalidou and Wang, 2005; Berglof and von 
Thadden, 1999). Wholesale adoption was carried out regardless because these 
East Asian countries (i) lacked an Asia-specific governance model to base their 
urgently needed corporate reforms on post Crisis and (ii) are mostly interested in 
attracting investments from the West again 34  (Arsalidou and Wang, 2005; 
Claessens and Fan, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, even though some such mechanisms may be less suitable, there is 
at least partial or apparent applicability/relevance as they all address the general 
problem of the separation of ownership and control35. In the case of Malaysia, 
Western influences can be detected in reforms that aim to inject more 
independence into the board of directors, regulations aimed at facilitating 
corporate takeovers and the one-share-one-vote concept (The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance, 2000)36.  
 
                                                 
33
 Referring to the potential differences (in terms of objectives and/or motivations) between 
shareholders with control and those without. Put simply, majority shareholder/owners may 
pursue their own interests which need not coincide with those of other investors in the 
corporations. 
34
 In order to allay Western investors‘ fears of East Asian capital markets being risky places 
to invest in - responding to pressures exerted by Western investors, governments and 
other international financial institutions such as the IMF to carry out governance reforms 
that they deem to be necessary and also appropriate (which is, of course, based on their 
ideals). 
35
 This implies the existence of different variations, forms and degrees of the same basic 
concern/problem. 
36
 Even though the established business culture is based on relationships and co-operation 
and not on arms-length, transaction-based independent monitoring. Secondly, corporate 
takeovers are very rare due to the prevalence of majority share ownership. Further 
explanation and examples are provided in Chapter 3. 
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Even though more emphasis was indeed given to a few solutions that are more 
relevant to the country‘s distinct governance characteristics such as excluding 
majority shareholder/managers from voting/deciding in related-party transactions, 
the overall situation has led to much criticism from various quarters. Such 
criticisms ranged from questioning the effectiveness/suitability of such measures 
(see, for example, Arsalidou and Wang, 2005; Lu and Batten, 2001; Allen, 2004a) 
to explicitly labelling them as ―glib prescriptions‖ (Phan, 1998).  
 
Allen (2000: 3) provided a succinct description: 
 
It is worth noting that most governments in Asia have shown little 
interest in addressing the fundamental contradiction between the 
new corporate governance principles they are espousing and the 
deeply entrenched ownership structure of Asian companies... 
ignoring the cultural context in which companies operate.   
 
The Malaysian governance system is clearly shown to be heavily based on the 
Anglo-American system which justifies the outlining of various Western 
governance mechanisms/aspects (both country-level and firm-level) and also the 
classical agency perspective informing these mechanisms described earlier in the 
chapter. Also, shareholder wealth maximisation is the sole corporate objective, the 
core contractual relationship is that of principal-agent (as per Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2005) and hence, the primary market constituent that merits consideration is 
minority shareholders/investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
As the study aims to explore and interpret the behavioural tendencies of individual 
investors operating under the prevailing governance system, a pragmatic stance is 
taken. In keeping with the status quo the agency perspective is adopted as the 
study‘s theoretical core37 (but only with regards to the aspects detailed above). 
 
It must be noted that the study‘s intention is not to evaluate the chosen capital 
market‘s philosophical underpinnings per se or to provide justifications for or 
against particular governance systems or for how capital markets should function. 
Instead of attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of the described governance 
aspects, the objective here is strictly to demonstrate that the various governance 
measures discussed (i) are applicable to Malaysian publicly-listed firms and (ii) are 
                                                 
37
 This theoretical underpinning will act as a base theory to be expanded upon as the study 
progresses. 
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established elements within the Malaysian capital market. The various firm- and 
country-level aspects of governance outlined essentially form the initial list of 
variables that investors may consider to be important.  
  
 
2.3.1  Other Theories and Perspectives 
 
Even though the researcher has provided a number of valid reasons regarding the 
choice to conduct the study through the standpoint of agency perspective, an 
evaluation of selected alternative theories and perspectives is necessary.  
 
One of the main alternative perspectives that merits particular attention is the 
stakeholder view of governance which is often portrayed to be in opposition to the 
agency standpoint38 (see, for example, Shankman, 1999; Letza and Sun, 2002). 
For a detailed explication of its major attributes and nuances, see Solomon (2007), 
Clarke (2004) and Letza et al. (2004). Here, this perspective is only discussed 
within the context of pertinent concerns impacting the choice of theory, as 
applicable to the current study.  
 
According to authors such as Davis et al. (1997), Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
and Freeman (1994), as described by Freeman et al. (2004: 365) 
 
Stakeholder theory claims that whatever the ultimate aim of the 
corporation or other form of business activity, managers and 
entrepreneurs must take into account the legitimate interests of 
those groups and individuals who can affect (or be affected by) 
their activities. 
 
Put another way, Sternberg (1998: 95) explained that it is the doctrine where  
 
organisations, including corporations and particularly businesses, 
should be run not to serve the interest of their owners, but for the 
benefit of all their stakeholders. It is an essential tenet of 
stakeholder theory that organisations are accountable to all their 
                                                 
38
 Agency theory is widely recognised as a shareholder-based theory. 
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stakeholders, and that the proper objective of management is to 
balance stakeholders‟ competing interests.  
 
Similarly, Donaldson and Preston (1995: 67) stressed that “each group of 
stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake and not merely because of its 
ability to further the interests of some other groups, such as shareowners.”  
 
The stakeholder perspective has been well explored and developed in the 
academic literature with a range of theoretical proposals, conceptions and/or 
justifications attempting to define, set boundaries and also map its scope (see, for 
example, Davis et al., 1997; Freeman et al., 2004). However, there are no widely 
agreed standards/boundaries to date. This includes even basic yet fundamental 
components such as which stakeholder groups to be included or considered. In 
fact, even defining the members of one particular stakeholder group is open to 
much debate (see, for example, the detailed arguments and examples by authors 
such as Moore, 1999; Sternberg, 1998).  
 
In fact, Sternberg (1998: 96) offered a critical summary by stating “some 
non-arbitrary criterion needs to be found… but stakeholder theory offers none”. 
She further highlighted that (i) individuals are often members of more than one 
stakeholder group, making classification difficult, (ii) the theory does not explain 
what should count as a benefit for the purposes of balancing benefits and (iii) the 
absence of guidance as to how balance is to be achieved. In fact, the only common 
denomination is that the nature of all such relationships is one of ―exchange‖ 
(Solomon, 2007). Consequently, it is difficult for a practical, pragmatic study to 
adopt this perspective as it is not entirely clear how the various concepts should be 
operationalised.  
 
Second, even though the stakeholder perspective may seem rather appealing in 
the distributive justice sense (in its idealistic, multi-fiduciary argument that the 
welfare of all corporate constituents are equally important and must be sufficiently 
catered for. See, for example, Moore, 1999; Davis et al., 1997), the study is 
compelled to consider actual beneficiaries rather than potential/supposed ones. 
The practical reality is that publicly-listed firms in Malaysia are run to maximise the 
profits of their owners/shareholders (especially in firms with majority shareholder/ 
owners, many of whom are powerful families or proxies/clients of political patrons 
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whose objectives are to extract maximum value out of such entities)39. Scant 
attention is given to other stakeholders. Even minority outside owners are often 
victims of mistreatment/expropriation (see, for example, the White Paper on 
Corporate Governance in Asia, 2003).  
 
An important supporting contention to the argument above is emphasised by 
Sternberg (1998: 21), that shareholder- centred governance “does not diminish the 
importance of stakeholders in achieving the corporate objectives, or the need to 
treat stakeholders ethically. It simply recognises the difference between means 
and ends”. Clearly, the crucial distinction is that stakeholders in Malaysian 
publicly-listed firms are treated more as means rather than ends (this contention is 
both implicitly and explicitly demonstrated in a detailed manner in Chapter 3). 
 
Third, even though stakeholder interests have been recognised in corporate 
regulations and guidelines, their actual ―existence‖ and implications are 
problematic. This is because stakeholder theory views investors/shareholders as 
only one of many constituent groups that simply need ―looking after‖ (i.e. 
―adequately satisfied‖ through financial returns, however such adequacy is 
determined). Besides providing capital, investors/shareholders seem to have no 
other roles to play.  
 
On the contrary, every other facet of established laws (with the notable exception 
of the aforementioned stated ―recognition‖ of stakeholder interests) is based on 
“fundamental features that characterise modern society” (Sternberg, 1998: 105) 
that is (i) the notion of private property and (ii) the fiduciary duties that agents owe 
to principals (i.e. to maximise long-term owner value/wealth). In fact, the law 
explicitly provides for certain ownership roles for shareholders/investors in that 
they are given specific ownership rights such as voting rights over some 
firm-specific issues. Conversely, stakeholder theory undermines all such central 
tenets (Sternberg, 1998). Being both pragmatic and practical, the study therefore 
subscribes to the agency viewpoint as it is explicitly established and accepted 
legally rather than one with only a ―conceptualized‖ and ―mentioned‖ existence. 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Detailed explanations and related examples are provided in Chapter 3. 
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It is also interesting to consider closely the wording of the Malaysian definition of 
corporate governance that is ―the process and structure used to direct and manage 
the business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity 
and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realising long-term 
shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests of other 
stakeholders” [Emphasis added] (Report on Corporate Governance by the High 
Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, The Securities Commission 
(Malaysia), 1999: 52).  
 
The stakeholder-related phrase above seems to be of secondary importance and 
is framed more as an encouragement rather than a requirement since it is not 
specifically classed as an objective. Also, stakeholders are indeed viewed and 
treated more as means rather than ends in themselves. In fact, Jamie Allen 
(Secretary General of the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA)) 
validated the study viewpoint by stating that Malaysia recognises “the social 
importance of corporations, but do(es) not emphasize stakeholders within the 
governance context” (in Allen, 2000: 2)40. 
 
The distinction above has major implications because authors such as Moore 
(1999) and Sternberg (1998) did acknowledge that traditional stakeholder 
doctrines – such as (i) recognition that people are more likely to take an interest in 
a process when they are materially involved in its outcome and (ii) a wide variety of 
interest must ordinarily be taken into account when pursuing organisational 
objectives – have long been recognised/accepted and are nothing new nor 
exceptional. It is only when force is applied by adding the specific objective that 
organisations should be run for the benefits of, and should be accountable to, all 
stakeholders, that stakeholder theory entails actual implications (as per Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). Again, by looking at the definition of governance in the 
Malaysian context above, this is certainly not the case. 
 
                                                 
40
 Allen (2000, p. 2) further stated that Malaysia encourages corporate boards to be 
“responsible for relations with stakeholders‖, but stresses that they are ―accountable to the 
shareholders‖ (this viewpoint is consistent with the High-Level Report on Corporate 
Governance published in February 1999 that formed the basis of the Malaysian Code on 
Coporate Governance. Essentially, the report states: “To define board responsibilities to 
act in the interests of a broader group than the company‟s shareholders would confuse 
board responsibilities and significantly undermine the accountability of the board. However, 
in making decisions to enhance shareholder value, boards must develop and sustain these 
stakeholder relationships”). 
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The most salient point for the current study however, is that from the perspective of 
real-life individual investors, ownership of shares is also taken to mean ownership 
of such entities. At the very least, this claim is made in the sense that they perceive 
the ultimate responsibility of corporate managers is to run such entities to their 
benefit and to maximise their investment returns. Hence, taking into account the 
study‘s intention to make sense of the governance phenomenon from the 
standpoint of the practitioners themselves (i.e. as it is understood and practised by 
investors), agency perspective is the obvious and logical choice.  
 
Sternberg (1998) further contended that, even if one were to argue the case for the 
morality of treating persons as ends rather than means, the respecting  of persons 
as moral agents is actually achieved by allowing persons (such as individual 
investors) to choose their own ends. This is where stakeholder theory falters as it 
forcibly and systematically overrides the ends freely chosen by consenting agents 
in the name of ―balancing stakeholder benefits‖ (refer also to Moore,1999). In 
reality, investors do possess the legal means to choose their own ends, as 
evidenced by their collective right to determine the firm‘s purposes and who are 
ultimately entitled to control it (Sternberg, 1998).  
 
Once again, making the case for and also critiquing the normative, instrumental, 
value, moral and ethical basis for each theory are (i) not the intention of and (ii) 
beyond the scope of, the study. For relevant criticisms and counterarguments for a 
number of the contentions above, please refer to Freeman et al. (2004) and Letza 
et al. (2004). 
 
Another relevant theory is the transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1996), which is argued to bear certain similarities to agency theory (Solomon, 
2007). Even so, the crucial difference is that the unit of analysis in agency theory is 
the individual economic agent (in this case, individual investors) while transaction 
cost theory concentrates on the nature of the transaction itself (Solomon, 2007). 
Since the study focuses on individuals, in terms of their 
motivations/preferences/tendencies/actions before, during and after such 
transactions take place, agency theory seems to be the more suitable option. 
 
 
52 
 
It is important to note that the study subscribes to the arguments by authors such 
as Gomez-Mejia et al. (2005), Huse (2005) and MacNeil (2000) that more attention 
should be given to the social embeddedness and relational nature of the 
principal-agent relationship itself. This theme is elaborated upon in a detailed 
manner in Chapter 3. However, it is important to stress that the various 
environmental and institutional influences are examined within the confines/ 
context of the principal-agent relationship itself. This is because the study concurs 
with the view of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2005: 1512) that “there must be a balance 
recognising unique contextual factors and the theory of principal-agent relations” 
so as not to make the application of agency theory/viewpoint actually become 
“a-theoretical”.  
 
 
2.4  The Focus on Individual Shareholders in Malaysia 
 
From the earlier outline of major governance characteristics of the Malaysian 
capital market, it is obvious that minority shareholders in majority shareholder/ 
manager-controlled corporations are even more prone to exploitation, 
mistreatment and expropriation than those portrayed in the classic governance 
scenario (Khan, 1999; Low, 2004; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Arsalidou and Wang, 
2005). This is aptly reflected in the White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia 
(published as a result of the five annual meetings of the G-8 mandated, 
OECD-organised Roundtable on Corporate Governance in Asia) where protection 
of minority shareholders was featured prominently as “the most serious corporate 
governance challenge” in its checklist of priorities for the reform of governance in 
East Asian countries (White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia, 2003: 15).  
 
The vast amount of effort and resource devoted to governance reforms aimed at 
enhancing the interests of minority shareholders in the past decade is another 
good indication of their central importance to developing capital markets such as 
Malaysia. This is well reflected in an excerpt from the speech by the Honourable 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Malaysia, YAB Datuk Seri Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi, made at the Invest Malaysia 2005 Conference - “...the protection 
of minority interests will, at all times, remain a critical priority of the Malaysian 
53 
 
Government to ensure confidence in the Malaysian capital market” (Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group, 2006). 
 
Taking the argument a step further, of the many minority shareholder groups, 
individual retail shareholders are usually the least protected and the most likely to 
be mistreated due to their very small individual shareholdings hence negligible 
influence on corporate managers. The contention is that individual investors merit 
attention.  
 
Malaysia is a suitable choice for carrying out the study as it is one of the biggest 
East Asian capital markets when measured by market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP (Jomo, 1998). In addition, the collective size of the individual 
investor class in Malaysia is large both in terms of sheer numbers and collective 
amounts invested (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Equity Analysis by Portfolio Size (June 2003) 
 
No. of Shares 
per Individual 
 
No. Of Shareholders 
 
Paid-Up Capital (RM) 
Malaysian Foreign Malaysian Foreign 
 
Less than 100 
 
123,917 
 
7,869 
 
7,440,989 
 
308,386 
 
100-1,000 
 
2,298,210 
 
139,528 
 
1,807,793,607 
 
80,935,309 
 
1,001-10,000 
 
3,581,493 
 
458,279 
 
12,403,823,778 
 
1,753,681,692 
 
10,001-100,000 
 
573,565 
 
158,198 
 
13,407,331,120 
 
3,611,841,314 
 
100,001 & 
Above 
 
 
58,064 
 
 
20,810 
 
 
113,804,756,139 
 
 
20,341,618,773 
 
Directors 
 
2,820 
 
244 
 
8,875,445,629 
 
613,856,355 
 
Total 
 
6,638,069 
 
784,928 
 
150,306,591,261 
 
26,402,241,828 
Source: Bursa Malaysia 
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More recently, the number of individual Malaysian shareholders/investors stood at 
5,062,049 in December 2007 (Bursa Malaysia, 200741). On other measures of 
relevance, individual investors accounted for approximately 24% of total trade 
value on Bursa Malaysia during the first six months of 2008; 37% for the whole of 
2007; and was as high as 59% back in 1999 (The Star, 2008a).  
 
The collective welfare of individual investors is, therefore, of extreme economic 
significance and bears real consequences on the growth of the Malaysian 
economy (La Porta et al., 2000). Lastly, the number of minorities will always be 
significant as listing requirements in Malaysia include minimum thresholds of 
shareholder numbers, designed to ensure a high degree of public shareholding 
(Thillainathan, 1999). 
 
Due to their significance, a better understanding of this largely overlooked, 
under-researched investor group from the lens of corporate governance is needed. 
These arguments justify the study‘s focus on exploring governance from the 
viewpoint of Malaysian individual investors, especially whether and how they take 
it into account in their share investment practices42. 
 
As most individual investors are not expected to be very knowledgeable with 
regards to the specific nuances of each governance-related attribute outlined 
towards the end of Section 2.2 earlier in the chapter43 and also considering the 
study‘s holistic perspective44, exploring each attribute as it is generally understood 
is deemed suitable and sufficient to satisfy the study‘s aims. For example, rather 
than investigating whether individual investors know or care about the specific 
mandatory disclosures stipulated by corporate regulations for publicly-listed 
companies, the study explores whether material and timely corporate disclosures 
in general are regarded as important or otherwise by them45. 
                                                 
41
 These figures are based on the latest available dataset purchased from Bursa Malaysia. 
42
 i.e. the range of governance-related investment behaviours/tendencies exhibited by 
them. 
43
 As argued in Section 2.2, the nuances are in the form of defined/established/ 
conceptualised corporate governance codes, guidelines and/or regulations as well as 
academic design/conceptions. 
44
 i.e. seeing each aspect within the wider perspective rather than close scrutiny on each 
aspect per se. 
45
 For detailed explanation, please refer to the various arguments presented in Section 2.8 
The Actual Behaviour of Individual Investors: Some Anecdotal Evidence beginning from 
Table 2.6. As for the list of firm-specific factors that may be of relevance to these individual 
investors, please refer to the list presented on page 71.  
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2.5  Relevance of Corporate Governance to Individual 
Shareholders 
 
This section explores the many reasons why corporate governance may be a valid 
concern to individual investors, scrutinising the kinds of benefits that these 
investors can obtain by taking governance-related factors into account in their 
share investment decision-making.  
 
First, recent studies that link corporate governance with corporate performance 
show that better governed firms are relatively more profitable; more valuable; and 
pay out more cash to shareholders (Brown and Caylor, 2006; and Gompers et al., 
2003). Bauer and Guenster (2003) found that portfolios of companies with high 
governance standards perform better than portfolios of companies with lower 
standards. Hence, investors who opt for better governed companies should realise 
superior share investment returns. 
 
Second, research on corporate valuations in times of financial crisis (Baek et al., 
2004; Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003) found that 
better governed firms (with higher disclosure quality, less divergent control to 
cashflow ownership, and greater transparency) experienced better stock price 
performance. These findings suggest that firms with better governance, besides 
exhibiting superior performance, are also safer/lower risk investments. In addition, 
good governance also lessens agency costs (Skaife et al., 2004). 
 
As additional evidence, Klapper and Love (2004) scrutinised the practitioner-based 
report by CLSA46 which shows that companies ranked high on the governance 
index have better operating performance and higher stock returns. On the other 
hand, studies by Giannetti and Simonov (2006), Cremers and Nair (2005), and 
Yermack (2006) amongst others, show that poorly governed companies have 
lower returns compared to well-governed ones.  
 
                                                 
46
 CLSA stands for Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (Asia-Pacific Markets), a leading 
independent brokerage and investment group. CLSA has built a reputation for unrivalled 
equity research and economic analysis, which are consistently voted as the best in Asia. 
Please refer to https://www.clsa.com/home.php  
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Bauer and Guenster (2003) contend that the findings above should convince 
minority shareholders to account for governance standards in their investment 
decision-making process. Indeed, most indications suggest that investors seem to 
attach higher relative values to well-governed companies. Black et al. (2006) found 
that firms scoring higher in a governance index have higher share prices in 
emerging markets. Klapper and Love (2004) found that, as predicted by La Porta et 
al. (1998), better governance increases investors‘ willingness to invest in a 
particular firm. Bushee et al. (2004) contended that there could be an association 
(whether it is perceived or actual) between governance mechanisms and superior 
firm performance that is not captured by other firm fundamentals.  
 
Even though many of the empirical findings above suggest that corporate 
governance is likely to have a positive impact on company performance (Tam and 
Tan, 2007), good governance is not just about improving corporate performance 
and providing investors with better investment returns. Specifically, good 
governance is of utmost importance as it enhances investors‘ trust and confidence 
in the companies that they invest in (see, for example, Gregory and Simms, 1999). 
This is because corporate governance is concerned with adopting the proper 
corporate structures and processes that are best for the creation of long-term, 
sustainable shareholder value (Monks and Minow, 2004). Put simply, good 
governance provides reassurance to investors/shareholders that the publicly-listed 
firms that they collectively own are run properly and for their ultimate benefit. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) further reasoned that corporate governance 
provides ―the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves 
of getting a return on their investment.” Governance mechanisms give this 
assurance as they compel managers to provide returns to shareholders in various 
forms (such as stable dividend payouts) and not siphon off corporate assets for 
their personal benefit.  
 
Moreover, firms with greater transparency run by responsible managers/directors 
are argued to be less prone to incidences of corporate fraud (for detailed 
elaborations on how some aspects of governance affect the likelihoods of 
corporate fraud, see, for example, Dechow et al., 1996; Uzun et al., 2004; Farber, 
2004). Nestor (2004) also attempted to show that, as corporate governance 
improves, the constraints on potential criminal behaviour by corporate agents grow. 
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Clearly, even if good governance could not eliminate corporate scandals 
altogether, at the very least, it reduces the likelihoods of such incidences. The 
occurrence of corporate scandals and fraud usually results in significant 
destruction of shareholder value and impacts negatively on investors‘ overall trust 
and confidence in the capital markets (again, affecting their willingness to invest)47.  
 
It is clear that the performance and also proper running of such entities matter to 
investors. Indeed, Jaafar Sidek (2007b: no page) argued that “proper corporate 
conduct counts and good companies do the right things to ensure performance 
and investor confidence”. 
 
A supporting indication for the ―improved investor trust and confidence‖ contention 
above is the finding by Giannetti and Koskinen (2003) that better investor 
protection generally improves investor participation rates in capital markets. 
Important empirical support are also derived from La Porta et al.‘s (1998) findings 
regarding investors‘ willingness to invest (specifically, more willing to invest when a 
firm‘s governance standards are relatively higher) being applicable not only to 
particular firms but also to the wider capital markets around the world. Specifically, 
they found that those countries that display relatively better corporate governance 
systems and standards have capital markets that are greater in breadth, depth (i.e. 
size) and are also more liquid. This is a clear indication that more investors are 
more willing to invest in capital markets that display better governance, 
presumably due to the lower perceived risks of investment. This is the public policy 
motive of governments and capital market regulators around the world in striving 
for better overall standards of corporate governance. 
 
In summary, at its core, good governance is simply a better, more transparent, 
proper and accountable way of running publicly-listed businesses. Indeed, 
according to Kean and Cheah (2000), the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance emerged from an urgent demand for businesses to exhibit greater 
transparency and accountability. The four pillars of the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance comprising accountability, transparency, responsibility and 
fairness (OECD, 1999) is an apt reflection of such ideals. 
 
                                                 
47
 A few examples of such untoward incidences are documented earlier in Chapter 1 and 
further examples are given in a later section within this chapter and also in Chapter 3. 
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Despite the arguments presented earlier that (i) corporate governance is largely 
concerned with protecting the interests of outside minority investors and (ii) 
governance brings a number of potential benefits to them; there are differing 
perspectives and also conflicting evidence regarding the desired, expected and 
actual governance-related roles/behaviours of the investors themselves. This is 
especially true for individual shareholders. Each perspective is explored in the 
following sections of the chapter.  
 
 
2.6 (I)  Academic Perspective (I) 
 
Even though corporate governance is shown to bring various potential benefits to 
shareholders/investors48, the dominant presumption in the established governance 
literature is that individual investors play a largely passive or negligible role in 
governance (Bolton et al., 2002; Monks and Minow, 2004)49. From an agency 
perspective which emphasises utility maximisation (Eisenhardt, 1989), taking an 
active interest in the running of publicly-listed firms, continual/frequent monitoring 
of corporate management and the exercise of ownership rights are simply too 
costly and time consuming to be viable for this particular shareholder group 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980; Kim and Nofsinger, 2004). An overwhelming majority 
of these investors are also individually too small and powerless50 to influence 
managerial actions, affect changes or make any discernable impact in the running 
of such entities (Claessens et al., 2002; Becht et al., 2003).  
 
In addition, banding together and acting in unison is immensely difficult as these 
investors (i) are anonymous to one another and (ii) geographically dispersed. They 
are also faced with the ―free rider‖ problem (see Gillan and Starks, 2000; Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2003) whereby any costs incurred while campaigning for better 
                                                 
48
 For the following sections, the terms ―shareholders‖ and ―investors‖ are used 
interchangeably and thus, unless specified otherwise, both terms refer to small individual 
share investors. This is because all references to shareholders in the following sections 
have been framed to specifically reflect only individual investors. The potential differences 
between the two terms will be explored in subsequent chapters. 
49
 There is, however, one particular academic study on shareholder activism by individual 
investors in the US in relation to corporate governance issues by Strickland et al. (1996) 
that deserves particular mention. This study is one of the rare exceptions to the vast 
majority of corporate governance studies that ignore this subgroup of investors. 
50
 In terms of the number of shares that each investor individually owns compared to the 
total number of shares issued by typical publicly-listed companies. 
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corporate governance have to be fully borne by the proactive shareholders while 
any benefits of such actions (for example, improved profitability or more 
transparent practices) would be distributed pro-rata to all shareholders, including 
the numerous inactive ones51 (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Clarke, 2004; Strickland 
et al., 1996). Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 741) have opined that:  
 
the free rider problem faced by individual investors makes it 
uninteresting for them to learn about the firms they have 
financed, or even participate in the governance, just as it may not 
pay citizens to get informed about political candidates and vote… 
 
Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have conjectured that individual investors 
are often too poorly informed to even exercise the ownership rights that they do 
possess. As a whole, investor indifference or disinterest in corporate governance is 
therefore theoretically rational in utilitarian terms (Skaife et al., 2004; Monks and 
Minow, 2004; Becht et al., 2003).  
 
Theoretically, an array of governance mechanisms exists to monitor, constrain 
and/or regulate managerial actions on investors‘ behalf (see, for example, Walsh 
and Seward, 1990; Becht et al., 2003). Such measures prevent managers from 
expropriating too much before it gets to the shareholders (Thompson and Davis, 
1997). For example, an efficient market for the company‘s shares52 sets stock 
price to match corporate performance. Subsequently, tying managerial share 
ownership53 and compensation54 to share prices motivates managers to improve 
corporate performance (see, for example, Morck et al., 1988; Becht et al., 2003).  
 
As a further example, shareholder-elected boards of directors provide another 
means to monitor managers more directly. If these and a few other governance 
mechanisms fail to ensure that the firm is properly managed, the firm will register 
sub-optimal performance (Thompson and Davis, 1997). The presumption is that 
the share price will then fall, and the firm will become an attractive target for 
takeover by outsiders who can then improve the firm‘s performance. Since 
takeovers almost always involve paying shareholders a premium, the market for 
takeovers provides a safety net protecting shareholders. Other typical 
                                                 
51
 This refers to those investors/shareholders who share the associated benefits at no cost. 
52
 This is where all relevant information regarding the fundamentals of the company is 
considered and also fairly reflected in its share price. 
53
 This refers specifically to managerial share ownership. 
54
 For example, stock options. 
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mechanisms are as outlined in Section 2.2 Corporate Governance: The Agency 
Perspective (specifically, pages 40-41). 
 
According to Thompson and Davis (1997), the described array of protective 
governance mechanisms absolves shareholders from taking responsibility. Once 
shareholders choose to buy shares in a firm, their governance role is surmised to 
involve not much more than voting via proxy (i.e. delegating the right to vote to 
another party, usually the company‘s top managers) for their representatives on 
the board of directors and on a few other significant decisions 55 . Individual 
investors typically do not bother to vote themselves or even bother to appoint 
proxies to do it on their behalf. They needn‘t concern themselves with monitoring 
management since other mechanisms exist to do this for them.  
 
Even so, it has been found that most conventional governance mechanisms do not 
work well in developing markets such as Malaysia (Gibson, 1999; Claessens et al., 
2002). At this point of the review, it would suffice to mention that ineffectiveness of 
governance mechanisms mainly arise from (i) poor enforcement with regards to 
compliance with governance guidelines, best practices and regulations (for 
regulations-based mechanisms) and (ii) the peculiarities of some institutional 
characteristics (for market-based mechanisms; for example, prevalence of 
concentrated shareholdings negates the possibility of hostile takeovers).  
 
An implication is that, since such mechanisms may not function well in promoting 
investors‘ interests56, there is an incentive and/or need after all for these investors 
to consider different aspects of publicly-listed firms‘ governance. Put simply, there 
are compelling reasons why there is a need for the investors themselves to discern 
between firms with good governance practices and those who exhibit poor 
governance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
55
 Examples include the winding up of the corporation or major corporate merger/takeover 
decisions. 
56
 Since the assumption is that such mechanisms will self-trigger corrective measures on 
investors‘/shareholders‘ behalves. 
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2.6.1  The Design of Capital Markets 
 
Apart from their reliance on various governance mechanisms to mitigate agency 
concern, some authors have persuasively argued that the general disinterest of 
individual investors stems from the very structure and design of capital markets 
based on Anglo-Saxon ideals/principles (since the time of Berle and Means, 1932). 
See, for example, Sykes (1994), Keasey et al. (2005), Letza et al. (2004), 
Moreland (1995).  
 
Monks and Minow (2004) explained that one of the traditional basic rights of share 
ownership is the right to transfer ownership to someone else. Since facilitating this 
right has been a core priority in the development of capital markets, much 
emphasis has been placed on ensuring that any investor wishing to sell/buy a 
share can do so, instantaneously. Two key facilitators are that investors had to 
have limited liability and shares had to trade at a fairly low rate. As explained by 
Monks and Minow (2004: 119) 
 
In order to have limited liability, shareholders had to give up 
control over any but the most basic corporate decisions. In order 
to keep trading prices low enough to ensure liquidity, 
shareholders had to allow their companies to issue millions of 
shares of stock, making it extremely difficult for any one investor 
to hold a meaningful stake. Both conditions loosened the very 
connection between ownership and control.  
 
The quote above, similar to the observations made by various academics since 
Berle and Means (1932), suggests that the nature of investor share ownership has 
evolved, from an active owner to that of a passive agent. In addition, as argued 
earlier, “dispersed shareholders, with small interests in the corporation, are 
unlikely to incur the large monitoring costs that are sometimes required to keep 
management at bay” (Becht et al., 2003: 17). See also Strickland et al. (1996), Kim 
and Nofsinger (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986). 
 
Furthermore, many individual investors are also perceived to be mostly concerned 
with the movements of share prices per se rather than the public-listed firms that 
these shares supposedly represent. Monks and Minow (2004:121) summed up the 
overall situation with the statement “it is virtually impossible to argue that effective 
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monitoring is cost-effective for investors whose profit is principally derived from 
buying and selling in the short-term”.  
 
Clearly, another key issue raised in their summary of the situation is the concept of 
short-termism. This is where individual investors are posited to adopt relatively 
short investment horizons (see, for example, Keasey et al., 2005; Letza et al., 
2004). As proactive governance is concerned with the proper running of 
publicly-listed firms in order consistently to generate superior, stable returns over 
the long-term; an investor‘s short-termist inclination provides an indication of 
his/her tendency against undertaking any activist governance-related behaviours. 
This is because short-term investors would have sold their shares long before any 
discernable improvements in governance practices and/or corporate performance 
could materialise57.  
 
Apart from being less likely to engage in shareholder activism or continual 
monitoring of firm governance, it is unclear whether investors with relatively 
short-term investment horizons actually discern between well-governed and 
poorly-governed firms when determining the subset of firms deemed worthy of 
investment or otherwise (such a possibility, however, will be subjected to empirical 
scrutiny by this study).  
 
In terms of past empirical findings regarding short-termist tendencies, some 
studies on individual investors such as those by Lease et al. (1974) in the United 
States and Jackson (2003) in Australia have found that household investors are 
more focused on long-term share investments and had little interest in speculative, 
short-term trading. However, authors such as Low (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) have argued that investors in East Asian capital markets are more prone to 
short-term, speculative/rumour-driven share investments. It is therefore intriguing 
to uncover the actual prevalence of individual investors with long-term 
shareholding timeframes as compared to those with short-term ones in developing 
capital markets such as Malaysia.  
 
 
                                                 
57
 Further elaboration will be given in the later section on Shareholder Activism.   
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2.6 (II) Academic Perspective (II) 
 
Consistent with the underlying design principles of capital markets detailed in the 
previous section, much emphasis is placed on disclosure, free exit and transfer as 
the shareholder‘s principal protection. The fact that it is both easier and cheaper to 
simply sell the shares further reduces the incentive for investors to monitor firms 
(Skaife et al., 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The main 
consequence is encapsulated in the term ―Wall Street Walk‖ which provided that 
investors should either vote with management or sell out (Kim and Nofsinger, 2004; 
Cheng and Firth, 2005).  
 
In practical terms, investors would therefore be likely to exit when they detect the 
first signs of trouble, that is, when corporate performance and/or governance 
worsen (Monks and Minow, 2004; Bhide, 1993). Hence, selling out whenever 
governance- related problems arise is one of the possible ways by which investors 
account for corporate governance. 
 
Other possible means by which individual investors could take governance into 
account when investing in publicly-listed firms (i.e. in ways that are distinct from the 
economically unviable, active and continual monitoring of managerial actions) 
have also been identified within the established literature. Such means (described 
below) are regarded as possibilities at this point in the study as they are typically 
applicable to all minority investor classes58 and thus, their actual relevance and 
also prevalence (i) amongst the individual investor class and (ii) amongst individual 
investors based in Malaysia specifically, are unknown.  
 
Besides selling out whenever governance concerns arise, another possibility has 
been identified by Claessens and Fan (2002) in their survey of pertinent corporate 
governance issues in Asia where agency problems59 are apparently anticipated 
and priced in by investors. In effect, some individual investors take governance- 
related concerns into account by ―price-protecting‖ (Skaife et. al., 2004) against it, 
                                                 
58
 This includes various institutional shareholders and also individual retail investors, 
typically with no distinctions made or indications of respective prevalence given. 
59
 For example, those arising from certain ownership structures, particularly significant 
divergences between control and cash flow rights. 
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implying that they are only willing to pay a low price60 for the shares of a poorly 
governed company. Such a treatment is termed as ―discounting‖ and the degree of 
discount is dependent upon the magnitude of governance problems that a specific 
firm exhibits, as perceived by individual investors who actually consider aspects of 
a firm‘s governance.  
 
It is unclear whether the governance awareness and/or understanding possessed 
by some individual investors are based on official guidelines of the mechanisms 
that the companies should be following61 or based on their own understanding of 
which specific attributes make up the key aspects of a firm‘s governance. 
Nevertheless, the focus is on whether investors pay less when investing in a poorly 
governed firm as compared to another similar firm that is better governed, along 
the particular aspects of governance that they do consider.  
 
Next, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) found some evidence showing that some 
individual investors are reluctant to invest in firms with weak governance. Hence, 
the third possible treatment is to simply avoid investing in firms with major 
governance issues (Bhide, 1993). The particular treatment implied here is that 
investors treat certain governance attributes as one-off investment evaluation 
criteria during the pre-purchase stage of the typical investment cycle. 
 
In the course of elaborating the academic perspective regarding the role of 
individual investors in corporate governance, the study clearly showed that many 
compelling theoretical arguments/justifications have been advanced as to why 
these individual investors should be disinterested in corporate governance. Again, 
as a direct consequence, individual investors are seen to play an insignificant 
governance role and most empirical studies have ignored them.  
 
An important and notable exception, however, is Strickland et al. (1996). In their 
study of shareholder activism amongst a big group of individual investors in the 
US, Strickland et al. (1996: 321) demonstrated that “monitoring by small 
shareholders is possible and that it can be successful”. Essentially, they 
                                                 
60
 As compared to the prices that they are willing to pay for the shares of other firms who 
exhibit a number of similarities with the firm in question but are better governed. 
61
 The various governance mechanisms, structures and processes recommended by the 
latest governance codes, guidelines and best practices such as the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (2007). 
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documented how a sizeable number of individual investors (more than 65,000 
individuals) banded together to form the United Shareholders Association (USA) in 
their attempts to influence the governance of large US corporations.  
 
From the perspective of the current study, Strickland et al.‘s (1996) article is of 
utmost importance as it is one of the very few empirical academic works that 
challenges the dominant presumptions pertaining to individual investors made by 
most academics in the field of corporate governance. They clearly showed that at 
least some individual shareholders are: 
 
(i) concerned with corporate governance (and account for different aspects of 
corporate governance in their actual investment practices), 
(ii) able to unite for collective action, 
(iii) able to and do, in fact, monitor management as well as engage in costly 
activism, 
(iv) not necessarily as uninformed as predicted/assumed by academics, and  
(v) able to earn better returns by being governance proactive (Strickland et al. 
(1996: 319) reported that “the announcement of 53 USA-negotiated 
agreements is associated with an average abnormal return of 0.9% or a 
total shareholder wealth gain of $1.3billion, suggesting that 
USA-sponsored shareholder activism enhanced shareholder value” even 
though this overall gain is shared with other non-USA shareholders who 
own shares in the same companies as well). 
 
Most importantly, Strickland et al.‘s (1996) findings support the main contentions of 
this study that (i) this distinctive investor group deserves attention, and (iii) an 
empirical study in this area is of value, academically. Relatedly, Claessens and 
Fan (2002) have highlighted the fact that little is actually known with regards to 
shareholder activism in emerging markets. The current study takes a step further 
by arguing that little is actually known about all possible ways by which investors 
account for governance throughout the entire share investment process (from pre- 
to post-purchase) and not just costly, proactive initiatives. 
 
Considering the findings of Strickland et al. (1996) (as well as some anecdotal 
evidence of minority shareholder activism in Malaysia, a detailed elaboration of 
which is given later in the chapter) and the persuasiveness of the opposing 
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theoretical predictions, the study intends to explore the actual relevance and also 
prevalence of governance-related tendencies/behaviours of individual investors in 
Malaysia.  
 
The study now moves on to consider another aspect of individual investors‘ 
behaviours that influence their governance inclinations – the contention that some 
investors are only fixated by share price fluctuations. In this regard, some investors 
are seen to be gullible as they “do not get any control rights in exchange for their 
funds, only the hope that they will make some money in the future” (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997: 749). More specifically, they have described the possibility of 
individual investors getting overly excited or optimistic about companies and:  
 
…hence finance them without thinking much about getting their 
money back, simply counting on short-run share appreciation 
…Nor is it crazy to assume that enormous volumes of equity 
financing in the rapidly growing East Asian economies are based 
in part on investor optimism about near term appreciation, and 
overlook the weaknesses of mechanisms that can force 
managers to repay investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 749). 
 
Indeed, it seems that the sole concern of some individual investors is share price 
fluctuations. They pay scant attention to the actual governance of the companies 
(in fact, all aspects of the underlying firm) that such shares are supposed to 
represent. Low (2004) further highlighted that many developing markets like 
Malaysia are driven by speculative trading as most investment decisions are based 
upon speculation, rumours and perceived insider tips, not firm fundamentals.  
 
The inclination above has also been described in a speech by the Honourable 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Malaysia, YAB Datuk Seri Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi (2004) that “it is probably true that many retail investors participate 
in the market more in the hope of making a quick profit rather than basing their 
actions on fundamentals... making investment decisions based on rumours and 
speculation…” (Source: The official Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia 
website – www.pmo.gov.my). 
 
Considering the argument above, besides scrutinising the many possible ways in 
which individual investors in Malaysia may account for governance, the study also 
investigates their relative tendency to purchase shares on the basis of unconfirmed 
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tips/insider info/speculation predicting an imminent rise in share prices. This is 
because such a tendency is argued to provide an indication of, and also helps to 
increase our understanding regarding, investors‘ propensities to make investment 
decisions that disregard corporate governance. Justification is that speculative 
investors probably do not distinguish between well-governed firms and poorly 
governed ones as long as there are profits to be made62.  
 
More specifically, the above tendency runs counter to other desired shareholder 
attributes, as conceptualised by proponents of corporate governance and 
shareholder activism, where shareholders/investors are envisaged/encouraged/ 
expected to (i) adopt longer-term investment horizons with stable shareholdings, (ii) 
be concerned with the underlying firms that the shares are supposed to represent 
and (iii) base their investment decisions on actual firm fundamentals (including 
how it is governed) rather than unsubstantiated information (i.e. rumours/ 
speculation). These are outgrowths of the governance mindset that well-governed 
firms produce good, consistent performance over the long-term which in turn is 
fairly reflected in their share prices.  
 
Alternatively, for those governance-interested investors who also report being 
influenced by such unsubstantiated information, it demonstrates that such 
attention-grabbing ―distractions‖ could compel investors away from conventional 
governance-based investment practices that are deemed to be ideal63. 
 
In summary, from an academic perspective, investors could take governance into 
account through any of the means summarised in Table 2.2 below: 
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 i.e. returns from increases in share prices. 
63
 Further elaboration on the influence of attention-based tendencies is given in Chapter 4. 
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Table 2.2 Possible Governance-related Actions/Tendencies (I) 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 1:Pre-Purchase 
 
 Disinterest/Indifference and/or Ignorance – Do not distinguish between well- or 
poorly-governed firms. 
 Avoid poorly governed firms. 
 Only invest in well-governed firms. 
 Discount the share price when investing (pay less/unwilling to pay more). 
 Engage in speculative or rumour-based short-term trading (non-governance). 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 2: Post-Purchase 
 
 Disinterest/Passivity in proactive governance (does not exercise ownership rights, 
monitor managerial actions and/or other aspects of firm governance). 
 Voting by proxy (typically, voting delegated to management). 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 3: Exit/Sell Off 
 
 Simply exit (sell the shares) when governance problems arise or when corporate 
performance declines. 
 
 
The primary underlying motivations and/or justifications for the range of possible 
behaviours above, as seen from the academic perspective, are economic 
considerations such as cost viability. Other potentially important motivations/ 
justifications are explored by (i) scrutinising the literature reviews in Chapters 3 and 
4 where environmental and personal influences are considered and (ii) 
approaching the individual investors themselves (particularly for yet to be identified 
reasons). 
 
In the following section, the study moves away from the academic perspective to 
focus on the governance-related roles and tendencies of individual investors, as 
seen from the standpoint of regulators instead.  
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2.7 (I)  Government/Regulator Perspective (I) 
2.7.1  Governance Reforms and the Role of Individual Investors 
 
Since the 1997 Asian Crisis, a range of stakeholders from stock exchanges to 
governments have endeavoured to improve investor protection through extensive 
governance reforms. Even though shareholders are often viewed as the innocent 
and helpless victims of poor governance64, an increasingly prominent opinion is 
that these investors have themselves contributed to the exacerbation of the 
situation (Kim and Nofsinger, 2004). Hence, one of the notions incorporated into 
governance reforms is that, instead of just doing nothing and expect to be 
protected, all investors should take more responsibility for the way corporations 
that they partly own are governed.  
  
Moreover, as governance reforms have resulted in the introductions of new arrays 
of investor rights and redress mechanisms (in addition to improvements to existing 
ones), there is a presumption that investors are now empowered to effectively 
impose corporate discipline through shareholder activism (Gillan and Starks, 1998). 
Activism is seen as a natural progression from the establishment of mechanisms 
aimed at mitigating governance problems, pressuring corporations to implement 
the recommendations prescribed (Gillan and Starks, 1998). It is also regarded as a 
promising new avenue for addressing governance concerns due to the persistent 
weaknesses of various established governance control mechanisms such as 
boards of directors and takeovers.  
 
According to Low (2004: 195): 
 
Reforms are urgently required to facilitate shareholder activism 
and to empower shareholders, if East Asian capital markets are 
to avoid the perception of being risky places for investment. The 
focus should be on the minimization and/or removal of legal 
impediments that prevent shareholders from the effective 
enforcement of their rights 
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 Especially when the company underperforms (referring to operating performance and/or 
share price performance) or when these investors are being exploited/mistreated/ 
expropriated. 
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(see also CG Watch: Corporate Governance in Asia (2005) by The Asian 
Corporate Governance Association in collaboration with CLSA Asia-Pacific 
Markets).  
 
Consistent with such calls, the Malaysian corporate governance reform agenda 
included the introduction of new institutional mechanisms for market activism by 
investors (Anwar, 2007). It would perhaps be fitting to first consider the following 
quote by the Securities Commission Development Centre (Malaysia) in their 
Quarterly Bulletin (2002: 7): 
 
However, rules and regulations can only achieve so much. The 
most effective discipline comes from the market itself. 
Shareholders should not sit meekly in silence and watch 
irresponsible owners or managers drive companies in which they 
invest into the ground. If they are unhappy with the way 
companies are run, they should make their feelings known, either 
through forums such as general meetings or via direct 
communication to the management.  
 
Instead of tacitly condoning continued investor/shareholder disinterest/passivity in 
governance 65 , regulators have envisaged a more active role for minority 
shareholders in governance (Jaafar Sidek, 2006; 2007b). This runs contrary to the 
passive role that is theoretically predicted, explained and justified by academics 
(see, for example, Becht et al., 2003; Thompson and Davis, 1997). Therefore, the 
study must consider the government/regulator perspective as well. This is explored 
through an understanding of the logic underpinning shareholder activism-related 
reform measures that have been undertaken in Malaysia thus far.  
 
Since regulators‘ promotion of a governance role for individual shareholders is 
influenced by the notions of shareholder activism, an outline of the many facets of 
activism is provided in the following section to enable better appreciation of the 
attributes/issues involved before developing the argument further. 
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 Taking into consideration the principles and designs of capital markets, as 
conceptualised by academics. 
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2.7.2  Shareholder Activism 
 
At one extreme, investors simply buying and selling shares (as a means of 
participating and expressing their opinions of a corporation‘s performance) can be 
considered as ―active‖ shareholders. On the other end, takeovers also reflect 
active shareholding (shareholders taking over the firm and forcing fundamental 
changes in the corporate structure) (Gillan and Starks, 1998).  
 
Even so, the term shareholder activism itself usually refers to any occasions where 
minority shareholders express their opinions to try to affect or influence the running 
of a corporation, without a change in control of the firm (Kim and Nofsinger, 2004). 
These are outcomes of actively monitoring the companies where minority investors 
have shares. The term minority shareholders refer to the many classes of 
investors66 that do not, by themselves, hold a controlling stake in a particular 
corporation. Individual investors, the vast majority of whom only hold small 
numbers of shares, are included in this ―owners with non-controlling stakes‖ 
category. 
 
It has been posited that agency conflicts between the board, corporate 
management and shareholders provide the basis for shareholder activism (Gillan 
and Starks, 1998). Normally, shareholder activism-related initiatives arise when 
minority investors are dissatisfied with the performance of the firm that they own. 
Under such circumstances, shareholders have three possible courses of action. 
They could sell their shares (exit); hold their shares and voice their dissatisfaction 
(voice); or hold their shares and do nothing (loyalty) (Hirschman, 1971).  
 
As is explicit from the explanation given above, shareholder activism is usually 
seen as a range of behaviours triggered by differences in opinion and/or 
dissatisfaction with how these publicly-listed firms are run and directed. Even so, 
this study also considers a more basic form of activism that may be undertaken by 
individual investors, that is, the general exercise of the basic ownership rights that 
they possess. For the purposes of this study, such pro-activity is embodied in acts 
like attending AGMs, posing questions to company management regarding 
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 Other classes of minority investors include institutions such as pension, mutual and 
insurance funds and also other entities such as banks, the state and also other 
corporations – these parties are classified as minority shareholders whenever they do not 
hold a controlling stake in the business. 
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company specific issues during such AGMs and/or voting on the election of 
company directors (see, for example, Kim and Nofsinger, 2004). This is because 
such practices are a few of the fundamental rights accorded to all shareholders67 
and do not specifically require any differences in opinions and/or dissatisfaction 
with corporate performance before they are exercised.  
 
Having expanded on the argument above, we now focus our attention on the brand 
of shareholder activism as it is generally known, which refers to intermediate cases 
where investors try to affect changes to the status quo through the use of ―voice‖, 
without a change in control of the firm (also known as relationship investing) (Gillan 
and Starks, 1998; Kim and Nofsinger, 2004). Such voice-based activism can be 
viewed as a continuum of responses in response to improvement of, and/or 
dissatisfaction with, the running of the corporation and/or corporate performance.  
 
As monitoring can take many different forms68 , the current study‘s scope of 
investigation is strictly confined to exploring investors‘ propensities of undertaking 
the kinds of ―active‖ monitoring conceptualised by proponents of governance and 
shareholder activism69. Primary forms of activism include activities such as (see, 
Gillan and Starks, 1998; Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Kim and Nofsinger, 2004; 
Karpoff, 1998):  
 
(i) voting/protesting/questioning managements at AGMs and EGMs,  
(ii) writing letters to management,  
(iii) submitting shareholder proposals for voting at AGMs,  
(iv) engaging in proxy battles,  
(v) initiating shareholder litigation/class action suits,  
(vi) using the media to publicly target a firm (typically to protest or raise 
awareness/support in relation to certain firm-specific issues),  
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 As established in corporate and company laws, governance-related capital market 
regulations and also governance codes/guidelines/best practices. 
68
 for example, from not monitoring at all to simply checking the latest share prices to 
frequently asking the opinions of family/friends to religious following of material company 
developments. 
69
 This treatment is based on the study‘s idea of making use of the concept of governance 
itself to provide overall focus and hence, the many boundaries for the research undertaken. 
Treatments of this nature are also evident in other parts of the study. Examples include 
considering only governance-related firm-specific variables when investigating which 
aspects/characteristics of a firm matter to individual investors. 
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(vii) directly negotiating with firms‘ managements over specific governance 
concerns,  
(viii) communicating with firms‘ investor relations departments, and 
(ix) drawing up of ―focus lists‖ and targeting of poor performers.  
 
This preliminary list of activist intitatives has been compiled to demonstrate the 
typical actions that have been utilised by shareholders in general (for both 
institutional and individual shareholders). 
 
In the case of individual investors, the study regards attendance and voting at 
AGMs as the gold standard or ideal embodiment of active shareholding. This is 
because the exercising of ownership rights and/or voicing governance concerns at 
AGMs are perhaps the most visible sign of an investor being interested and also 
concerned with governance 70 . The study thus explores the relevance of 
governance to individual investors in Malaysia in the form of ongoing concerns 
requiring monitoring/active participation by using AGM attendance as a proxy. 
 
Apart from AGM attendance, the study will also explore the propensities of 
individual investors to undertake other forms of activist-related behaviour such as 
communicating with company management (emails/letters/investor relations 
department); submitting shareholder resolutions; and publicly criticising company 
managers/directors through the media. 
 
In terms of the issues addressed by these ‗voice‘ activities, they are found to span 
a wide range of topics (for example, issues pertaining to the environment, 
corporate social responsibility, etc), but the primary focus of this study is 
specifically on corporate governance issues.  
 
As individual shareholders in general are not expected to be very sophisticated, 
only issues that are likely to be of particular interest to them are selected and 
investigated. Consequently, specific nuances and concerns within certain issues 
are combined. For example, there is a range of issues that specifically apply to the 
board of directors such as (i) the number and/or proportion of independent, 
non-executive directors, (ii) whether the CEO is also the Chairman of the board 
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 At such events, investors are envisaged to speak up/campaign for any improvements 
deemed necessary to improve the governance and/or performance of such entities. 
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(role duality) and (iii) the requirements for, and composition of, certain board 
sub-committees such as the nominations and compensation committees, etc. 
Instead of exploring investors‘ interests in relation to each, they are grouped under 
the more generic ―board of directors‘ structure and composition‖ category.  
 
The range of issues selected is derived from (i) the reviews carried out throughout 
Chapters 2 and 3, and (ii) the evaluation and extraction of issues that are deemed 
relevant to the Malaysian context from lists developed by past shareholder 
activism studies based in different countries. For example, the study included 
some of the pertinent governance issues documented by Strickland et al. (1996), 
Gillan and Starks (2000) and Romano (2000) in their studies of the kinds of issues 
raised by US investors, as submitted in their AGM shareholder proposals. 
 
More specifically, the following are issues that have been deemed to be of possible 
interest to retail shareholders who are actively concerned with the governance of 
public-listed firms in Malaysia (derived from a variety of sources including 
Strickland et al., 1996; Gillan and Starks, 1998; Romano, 2000): 
 
 Long-term corporate performance (share price or profits). 
 Unfair/questionable business decisions; mismanagement; fraud; 
negligence; etc. 
 Executive remuneration – how much/how directors/managers are paid. 
 Board of directors‘ structure and composition. 
 Appointment of company auditors. 
 Quality, amount and speed of company disclosures. 
 The existence of big shareholder managers and steps to limit their scope 
for abusing or exploiting outside shareholders. 
 Company strategy-related issues and other important corporate decisions 
such as mergers and takeovers. 
 Basic shareholder rights such as voting rights. 
 
Having explained the various shareholder activist-related initiatives, further 
explication of the regulator perspective resumes in the following section. 
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2.7 (II) Government/Regulator Perspective (II) 
 
Generally, the term ―minority shareholders‖ refers to both individual and 
institutional shareholders71 (Kim and Nofsinger, 2004). For the purposes of the 
current study, however, this term refers specifically to small, individual investors. 
This distinction is important as, when considering proactive governance initiatives, 
researchers more often than not use this term to refer to institutional 
shareholders72 (Bushee et al., 2004; Strickland et al., 1996). This is because 
institutional investors are presumed to (i) be sufficiently large73 to make it viable for 
them to take an active interest in firm governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Gillan and Starks, 1998; Becht et al., 2003) and (ii) possess considerable voting 
clout which, in turn, allows the exertion of significant influence on managerial 
actions (Bushee et al., 2004). Conversely, it is assumed that individual investors 
typically hold very tiny and insignificant ownership proportions (Monks and Minow, 
2004; Kim and Nofsinger, 2004). 
 
The explanation above is intended to highlight the prevalent notion that small, 
individual investors play a largely inactive role in governance. Notwithstanding the 
presumptions above, there seems to be an explicit governance role for individual 
investors from the viewpoint of government regulators (see, for example, Allen, 
2004a). In fact, this was succinctly expressed by Securities Commission 
Development Centre Quarterly Bulletin [Malaysia] (2002: 7): 
 
Retail investors have an important part to play… Institutional 
investors should not be the only group to practice shareholder 
activism. Retail investors in Malaysia too have an important part 
to play. Agencies such as the Securities Commission have 
allocated substantial resources to educate the investing public of 
their rights and privileges as shareholders. As such, minority 
shareholders should not hesitate to exercise their influence if their 
rights are infringed. 
 
It is apparent that apart from encouraging individual investors to assume a more 
active role in governance, the education of investors with regards to governance74 
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 The term is applicable to each individual or institution that holds a minority stake in a 
particular publicly-listed corporation. 
72
 Such as pension funds, insurance funds, mutual funds, banks, corporations and other 
institutions. 
73
 Large in terms of relative shareholding sizes. 
74
 Especially their basic ownership rights as shareholders. 
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is also another prominent feature of governance reforms in Malaysia. Hence, 
rather than being just a mere exhortation to these investors to be more 
governance-active, substantial resources have been expended and steps have 
been implemented to reinforce this line of thinking. The many investor education 
initiatives are undertaken by various quarters, especially the Securities 
Commission (more specifically, the Securities Industry Development Centre that 
focuses on educating and increasing the awareness of individual investors 
regarding all aspects of investing which include aspects of corporate governance75) 
and the government-backed Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG)76.   
 
There is also a discernible trend in Malaysia towards increasing the range of 
matters where decision making authority is allocated to the shareholders at annual 
general meetings (The Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC): Corporate Governance (Malaysia) by the World Bank, 2005).  
 
The significant measures that have been discussed are driven by a similar 
underlying logic. Each initiative is designed to spur individual investors to take 
more responsibility in their investment decision making and to consider and also 
involve themselves in the governance of publicly-listed firms. The implicit 
assumption is that shareholders should act in a certain manner – exhibiting 
long-term commitment; take an interest in the governance of corporations; 
speaking up and exercising their ownership rights.  
 
Overall, a confrontational stance is evident in the arguments above (i.e., action to 
be taken by investors only when they are being exploited or if their rights are 
infringed) rather than a co-operative relationship where managers and 
shareholders establish effective communications to improve the general running of 
such entities. This confrontational stance also points to the possibility that 
governance may start to matter/matter more to some investors under particular 
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 The Securities Industry Development Centre (SIDC) one-stop website for investors is 
available at: www.min.com.my/min  
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 It is important to note that besides investor education programmes, MSWG  also (i) 
represents/leads minority investors by attending and voicing out investor concerns at 
various AGMs of Malaysian publicly-listed firms, (ii) offer subscription services to 
individual/retail investors that include a wealth of up-to-date general and also firm-specific 
governance-related information such as governance scorecards, rankings, etc, (iii) provide 
regular write-ups of pertinent general and firm-specific governance issues in the form of 
press articles, amongst other initiatives. For selected examples of such initiatives and 
services, please refer to Appendix 3). 
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circumstances. For example, the trigger for increased governance involvement is 
when individual investors are being exploited and/or mistreated.   
 
Chakravarty and Hodgkinson (2001) have argued that the present rush to embrace 
the idea of shareholder activism especially during AGMs is simply a reflection of 
the poverty of earlier ideas about addressing the agency problem. As mentioned 
earlier, conventional governance mechanisms are not strong enough to relieve the 
agency problems in Asia (see, for example, the detailed survey of governance in 
East Asia by Claessens and Fan, 2002). Again, due to the lack of other solutions, 
investors are encouraged to be active in governance monitoring (regardless of 
whether it is viable/reasonable to actually do so or otherwise).  
 
If the whole notion of encouraging and also expecting investors to be 
governance-active is due to a poverty of ideas, is it then reasonable to assume/ 
expect that individual investors can be influenced to behave in such a manner, 
especially when the utilitarian academic perspective predicts otherwise? In this 
regard, we first need to take into account the fact that the promotion of shareholder 
activism in Malaysia, albeit from a low base, is said to be bearing fruit as there is 
now a discernable trend of rising activism (Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group, 
2006). Considering such a purported trend (anecdotal, from the viewpoint of 
academic research) that stands in contrast to academic predictions, are the 
expectations of government regulators unreasonable after all? Again, empirical 
work in this area is essential. 
 
This led the study to then ask, what reasons/motivations, perhaps non-economic 
or non-utilitarian ones, compel investors to attend AGMs77? Are such motivations 
even related to governance? Scrutiny is on the actual prevalence of (i) attendance/ 
non-attendance and (ii) each of the reasons/justifications compiled (literature 
review) and reported (responses from study‘s respondents) for both attendance 
and non-attendance.  
 
Returning to the main argument, upon further scrutiny, there are indications of 
conflicting viewpoints coming from the government/market regulators themselves. 
In a speech during the Invest Malaysia 2004 event, the Honorable Prime Minister 
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 In this instance, the AGM attendance ―gold standard‖ is used as proxy for proactive 
governance. 
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and Minister of Finance, YAB Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2004) stated 
that  “shareholders can give effect to their will by either supporting companies that 
display good governance, or by voting with their feet and abandoning those that do 
not.” (Source: The official Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia website – 
www.pmo.gov.my). 
 
Investors are advised to either avoid investing in badly governed firms or sell the 
shares of firms who display poor governance. This runs contrary to the earlier 
suggestion that investors should instead stay78, exercise their ownership rights and 
campaign for better corporate performance/governance (which is more in line with 
the conceptualisation of shareholder attributes that are deemed ―ideal‖ or 
―desirable‖ for corporate governance within the context of the shareholder activism 
literature stream even though it is mainly geared towards big institutional 
investors).  
 
Notwithstanding such differences, one consistent element is that these regulators 
expect and/or encourage individual investors to take a firm‘s corporate governance 
into account in some way. Regardless of how investors accommodate governance 
into their investment practices, the idea is that if every decision made takes it into 
account, then those decisions would contribute to the betterment of governance. 
For example, according to Jaafar Sidek (2005), active participation by institutional 
investors spurs good corporate governance practices by publicly-listed firms in 
terms of both conformance and performance. In this regard, the study contends 
that individual shareholders can contribute in such a manner as well.  
 
A number of key assumptions underpinning corporate governance must be 
emphasised as these collectively justify the relevance of governance to individual 
investors. First, good governance can only be furthered if investors base their 
investment decisions on the underlying fundamentals of publicly-listed firms (as 
opposed to speculation based on rumours and hearsay). Second, firms with good 
governance will exhibit superior performance, especially over the longer-term. 
Third, the underlying fundamentals of a publicly-listed corporation will be fairly 
reflected in its share price over the long-term. Indeed, similar assumptions were 
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 i.e. not selling out/exiting. 
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made by the Malaysian government-backed and funded, Minority Shareholders 
Watchdog Group (MSWG)79 in their official website (2008): 
 
The MSWG will adopt a culture of long-term investment and belief 
in the enhancement of shareholder value over time. It will rely on 
fundamentals, not rumours and hearsay. It appreciates that 
wealth creation is brought about by good corporate governance 
and shareholder equity, and will actively participate in general 
meetings.  
 
In summary, from the perspective of regulators/the government, individual 
investors are encouraged and/or expected to either (Table 2.3): 
 
Table 2.3 Possible Governance-related Actions/Tendencies (II) 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 1: Pre-Purchase 
 
 Avoid badly governed firms/Only invest in well-governed firms. 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 2: Post-Purchase 
 
 Exercise their ownership rights as shareholders (e.g. vote during AGMs). 
 Monitor management and be involved in ―relationship‖ investing (activism) to 
improve a firm‘s governance when corporate performance and/or certain aspects 
of the firm‘s governance are deemed unsatisfactory. 
 Complaint, seek redress and accountability by having their voice/plight heard after 
being mistreated/exploited. 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 3: Exit/Sell Off 
 
 Simply exit (sell the shares) when governance problems arise or when corporate 
performance declines. 
 
 
Once again, the range of possible behavioural responses are only identified and 
compiled in order to subsequently explore their relevance and also pervasiveness 
amongst investors in reality. In terms of investors‘ motivations and/or justifications 
for undertaking/not-undertaking the listed actions or exhibiting/not exhibiting 
identified tendencies, these will be (i) speculated upon in Chapters 3 and 4 where 
environmental and personal influences are examined and (ii) solicited from the 
responses of individual investors sampled.  
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In the next section, the study presents some real-world anecdotal evidence in 
order to obtain some indications of the actual governance-related behavioural 
tendencies of individual investors. These will be compared and contrasted with 
both the academic and regulator perspectives. 
 
 
2.8  The Actual Behaviour of Individual Investors: Some 
Anecdotal Evidence 
 
Even though the academic arguments presented in building the case for 
disinterested individual investors seem highly persuasive, the extant literature fails 
to explain/account for the actual governance-related behaviour of some retail 
investors (with the notable exception of Strickland et al., 1996). For example, The 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): Corporate 
Governance by the World Bank (2005) highlighted that attendance at AGMs of 
Malaysian publicly-listed firms is dominated by retail investors. This is also 
consistent with the actual observations of the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association, as mentioned in a presentation given by its Secretary General, Mr. 
Jamie Allen (Allen, 2004b) and more recently, Schacht et al., 2009 (from the CFA 
Institute).  
 
In fact, in some other capital markets around the world, retail shareholders have 
even organised themselves successfully thus increasing their clout as a collective 
group when engaging in proactive governance. Notable examples include:  
 
 Singapore: Securities Investors Association with almost 66,000 retail 
shareholders as members. In 2006, they even introduced a ―Model 
Shareholder Award‖, given to a chosen retail shareholder who participates 
actively in AGMs and serves as a good role model (suggesting that such an 
active role in governance should be emulated) for investors (Pulses, 2006). 
 Australia: The Australian Shareholders‘ Association (ASA) with many 
thousands of individual retail members also taking an active interest in 
corporate governance. 
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 United States: The formation of the United Shareholders Association in the 
1990s specifically for individual investors that campaigned for better 
standards of corporate governance (Strickland et al., 1996). 
 
In fact, as mentioned earlier in this study, the Malaysian government has set up the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG), an independent body funded by a 
national trust fund that is entrusted with the public mandate to inform and educate 
the investing public, be a voice for as well as act on behalf of minority shareholders. 
It has undertaken a wide range of initiatives such as attending AGMs80 to facilitate 
interaction between corporate managements and the attending shareholders 
including those from the retail sector (i.e. individual investors)81.   
 
Within the Malaysian capital market, numerous examples of governance-related 
individual investor behaviours have also been documented by the popular press, 
shareholder/investor interest groups (websites/blogs/forums), and the Malaysian 
political economy literature stream. Examples include the instances of individual 
investor involvement in well-publicised activist initiatives in scandal-ridden 
Malaysian publicly-listed firms that were outlined in Chapter 1 (see also Appendix 
2).  
 
More significantly, it is claimed by the Malaysian Minority Shareholders Watchdog 
Group that there is a rising trend of shareholder activism in Malaysia. Further 
examples are given in Table 2.4 below.  
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 MSWG typically purchase the shares of public-listed firms to attend their AGMs. Hence, 
MSWG representatives are usually present in the capacity of being proxy shareholders for 
the MSWG and also assume the role of watchdogs for other minority investors. 
81
 In fact, the MSWG offers a cost-effective corporate governance subscription service that 
is tailored specifically for retail/individual investors. Such an initiative is consistent with the 
aim of encouraging this investor group to be governance-interested, well-informed and 
ultimately, proactive (i.e. actively involved in a range of behaviours/initiatives that are 
commonly grouped under the concept of shareholder activism such as the exercise of 
ownerhips rights by voting at AGMs). Please refer to Appendix 3 for the relevant details. 
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Table 2.4 Examples of Minority Shareholder Activism in Malaysia 
 
Example 1: 
 
―…Minority Shareholders flexed their muscles and forced the withdrawal of all the three 
resolutions at the recent EGM of Bandar Raya Developments Bhd (or BRDB) on 23 
February 2006… Over the last one year, MSWG noted that minority shareholders have 
grown in strength either in persons or as proxies to vote against resolutions which are 
against their interests. Never has this growing power of minority shareholders been truer 
and effective at the EGM of BRDB to make the board accountable… Public listed 
companies are only well governed if minority shareholders take their role and voting 
seriously without fear or favour. Minority shareholders must test their courage to stand 
against unfair treatment, not to waste their votes but stay united and to appoint proxies to 
act if need be on their behalf.‖  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek, CEO of Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
Source: www.mswg.org.my  [Dated: 8 March 2006] 
 
 
Example 2: 
 
―Minority shareholders have of late been vocal in voicing out their dissatisfaction when the 
premium offered is below their expectations… Take for instance the recent proposed 
takeover of Ranhill Utilities Bhd, where the offer price was at about one-third discount to its 
NTA, which in minority shareholders‘ view, grossly undervalued the profitability, business 
potential and good prospects of Ranhill Utilities.‖  
 
Source: The Star Newspaper (Online Version), 26 Jul 2008. Available at: 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/7/26/bizweek/1660570&sec=bizweek 
 
 
Example 3: 
 
―Similarly, minority shareholders were upset with the takeover of PK Resources Bhd, where 
the offer price was below the closing price (when the proposed takeover was announced) 
and also far too low compared to the NTA of the company… Interestingly, the Board 
decision was not unanimous, with a few directors of PK Resources advising minority 
shareholders to reject the offer. 
 
At the end of the day, pricing must be attractive to ensure that the company will be 
successfully taken private. Otherwise, minority shareholders can hold out, and reject the 
privatisation plan. That happened in the proposed privatisation of Edaran Otomobil 
Nasional Berhad (EON) by DRB-Hicom Bhd. At the recent EGM held in June 2008, minority 
shareholders rejected the proposed de-listing of EON as they felt that the offer price was 
unattractive.‖  
 
Source: The Star Newspaper (Online Version), 26 Jul 2008. Available at: 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/7/26/bizweek/1660570&sec=bizweek 
 
 
The various examples and observations given in this section thus far provide some 
real life anecdotal evidence that, contrary to what utilitarian economic and finance 
theories have predicted, at least some individual shareholders do engage in 
governance-related investment behaviour and that they do seem to be playing an 
active role in the governance of publicly-listed corporations (again, Strickland et al. 
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(1996) is an exception). This ranges from attending AGMs to exercise their 
ownership rights to campaigning against corporate deals that undermine minority 
interests. Consistent with this, Thompson and Davis (1997) and Davis and 
Thompson (1994) argued that these activities severely challenge the contractarian 
perspective and its efficiency orientation which predicts rational ignorance/ 
disinterest on the part of these investors. 
 
This puzzle is even more intriguing as literature surveys on shareholder activism in 
developed economies by Black (1998), Gillan and Starks (1998), Karpoff (1998) 
and Romano (2000) have all concluded that such activities, irrespective of form or 
aim, have negligible impact on corporate performance. As mentioned earlier, if it is 
not worthwhile for individual investors to even monitor the governance of 
publicly-listed firms that they own 82 , much less engaging in such proactive 
initiatives, what economic/non-economic factors/motivations actually compels 
them to do so?  
 
Towards this end, there is currently little academic evidence on the phenomenon of 
shareholder activism in emerging markets (Claessens and Fan, 2002). As such 
motivations are as yet unexplored; the current study aims to contribute to filling this 
gap.  Even so, it does not investigate the effectiveness of such activism in terms of 
subsequent improvements in corporate performance. 
 
A key contention at this stage is that the examples above have portrayed a rather 
active governance role for individual shareholder that, as many academics rightly 
points out, are likely exceptions to the rule as the majority are not interested in 
proactive governance. This is consistent with the World Bank – ROSC (2001) 
finding that, even though the AGMs of publicly-listed firms in Malaysia are 
dominated by individual retail shareholders, attendance is generally poor. 
Consistently, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Othman (1999) have argued that the 
choice made by most Malaysian domestic investors to play a passive role in 
demanding improved governance practices constrained the development of good 
governance practices among publicly-listed companies.  
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 This is based on the utilitarian agency perspective that it is not economically viable for 
individual shareholders to engage in governance monitoring. 
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Furthermore, Low (2004) has speculated that there is no shortage of apathetic 
Malaysian individual investors. Once again, this prompts the questions of (i) what 
is the proportion of governance active investors amongst the wider individual 
shareholder class and (ii) whether and how else corporate governance might 
feature or be factored into individual investors‘ share investments. Taking into 
account these contentions, when investigating AGM attendance levels (as outlined 
in the Regulator Perspective section), the proportion of non-attendees is expected 
to be much higher than those investors who do attend.  
 
Another related issue is individual investors‘ awareness of their basic ownership 
rights as shareholders. It has been the dominant presumption that a significant 
proportion of retail investors in emerging markets are ignorant or poorly informed 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) of the fundamental rights accorded to them as 
shareholders of publicly-listed firms. In fact, the The Securities Commission 
Development Centre Quarterly Bulletin [Malaysia] (2002) contended that a 
significant proportion of investors do not know their basic rights as shareowners. 
Such rights are inclusive of (see, for example, Low, 2004; The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance, 2000):  
 
 The right to receive timely and material information from the company 
whose shares they own. 
 The right to attend and vote at AGMs. 
 The right to share in the proceeds of the corporation. 
 The right to seek redress when they are being unfairly treated/exploited. 
 The right to take part in deciding upon fundamental changes to the firm (in 
the event of mergers, takeovers and the winding up of business). 
 
The study investigates the indicative proportions of individual investors who are 
uninformed of their basic share ownership rights as opposed to those who are 
informed (regardless of whether they actually exercise such rights or otherwise).  
 
Next, the study evaluates selected anecdotal evidence which uncovers the general 
nature of individual investors‘ practical understanding of the governance 
phenomenon. Consider the example provided in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 Individual Investors‟ Practical Understanding of Governance 
 
Example 
 
On 16 December 2006, Encik Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek, the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of MSWG and minority shareholders of Malton Berhad dressed down the board for 
the absence of their executive chairman and executive director for two consecutive annual 
general meetings (AGMs) as well as their excessive remuneration when shareholders 
received no dividends. At several points during the three-hour shareholders‘ meeting, the 
aggrieved shareholders put pressure on the board, demanding the whereabouts of the 
Executive Chairman and the executive director. In the annual report, they are both 
substantial shareholders via a private limited company, Malton Corporation Sdn Bhd which 
has a 37.91 per cent stake.  
 
Encik Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek pointed out that their absence did not reflect well on their 
attitude and their responsibility for not taking minority shareholders seriously at once a 
year‘s shareholders‘ meeting. He and minority shareholders present at the AGM found that 
the Deputy Chairman, chairing the AGM (also an independent director)‘s explanation is 
totally unacceptable by saying that they were overseas and that he would convey 
shareholders‘ sentiments to them. As he tried, chairing the AGM not even passing the first 
resolution in tabling the company‘s financial statements, the CEO of MSWG and 
shareholders viewed their absence with skepticism and the chairman‘s explanation 
unconvincing. Also noted in the directors‘ profile in the annual report, the Executive 
Chairman has been described as the executive director‘s spouse.  
 
MSWG then brought up several critical issues to the board‘s attention and shareholders 
followed up vociferously, demanding for answers. The most critical ones, among others, 
are as follows:- 
 The Group‘s five-year summary showed that year-on-year comparison, the group‘s 
profit before taxation shrank by 88.7 per cent although turnover was rising by 36.2 
per cent. The Group‘s profit margins declined to as low as 2.6 per cent from 4.1 per 
cent on the back of rising operating expenses, that eroded earnings of the Group 
while executive directors‘ remuneration kept rising; 
 
 Two related party transactions comprised the insurance premium of RM800,000 
paid to a company controlled by one Lim Bin Hooi, a sister of the Executive 
Chairman and the purchase of corporate gifts (or hampers) of RM400,000 from a 
company controlled by the Executive Director (i.e. the Executive Chairman‘s 
spouse), both were absent from the AGM. The directors tried to clarify that even if 
such transactions were given to outside parties, the same amount of expenses 
would still be incurred and it made no difference whether related or not. However, 
the shareholders doubted, especially the purchase of corporate gifts (or hampers) 
whether it was necessary to be so much. 
 
Much argument, persuasions and exchange of words between shareholders and the 
Chairman of the AGM prevailed, culminating with directors requesting to meet among 
themselves for ten minutes. Only then, they reluctantly decided to adjourn the AGM to 
another date. MSWG is of the view that the affairs at Malton Bhd‘s AGM have, if nothing 
else, shown that minority shareholders have ‗teeth‘ and will bite whenever their patience is 
over-tried or over-tested. In this case it is the unsatisfactory absence of both Executive 
Chairman and Executive Director (his spouse) for two consecutive AGMs and their high 
remuneration besides other critical issues as mentioned above.  
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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The example in Table 2.5 demonstrates the aptness of the study‘s earlier 
prediction, that individual investors‘ concern regarding aspects of a firm‘s 
governance is at a more rudimentary level than the detailed definitions and 
considerations contained within governance codes, guidelines as well as typical 
academic conceptions. For instance, investors are seen to question why overall 
executive remuneration is increasing while the business suffers rather than 
scrutinising the specific aspects of such pay packages like the proportion of 
compensation linked to performance.  
 
Put simply, their understanding of governance is based more on common sense 
rather than on specific processes, rules, regulations or provisions. It is then 
appropriate to explore firm governance from the viewpoint of individual investors 
rather than concentrating on soliciting their opinions regarding fine nuances of 
each aspect as many of them are unlikely to possess such detailed knowledge/ 
expertise.  
 
An indication that lends credibility to the contention above is the rather consistent 
finding reported by a number of past researchers such as Bartlett and Chandler 
(1997) and Lee and Tweedie (1977) that most individual shareholders/investors do 
not understand much of the information contained in many parts of annual reports 
well. As these studies are conducted in Western countries where both capital 
markets and shareholding culture are more established, this study expects 
individual investors in Malaysia to be similarly (if not more) unsophisticated. 
 
Reflecting further on the example given in Table 2.5, another key consideration is 
the argument raised by some quarters that governance is akin to a police force 
(Keasey et al., 2005). When there is no pressing or specific need for it, it does not 
matter much but when it matters, it is of critical importance. High impact, 
controversial examples of this phenomenon are numerous – the fall of Enron in the 
U.S. and the strings of corporate scandals and abuses of executive power reported 
across the globe. Malaysia too has had its fair share of corporate scandals. As 
detailed in Chapter 1, recent episodes include Megan Media and Transmile83 that 
have led to serious questioning of the actual substance of governance reforms 
                                                 
83
 For the specific details pertaining to the two cases mentioned as well as other relevant 
examples please refer to Appendix 1. 
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undertaken and also the very efficacy of the country‘s system of corporate 
governance.  
 
Undoubtedly, the incidences above have given rise to scores of very angry and 
disgruntled shareholders (investors who directly suffered massive investment 
losses, as highlighted by Leong, 2009). These incidents also negatively impact the 
wider investor population‘s trust and confidence in the market (Bushon, 2009; 
Jaafar Sidek, 2007c). The salient point is that only when things go wrong do 
investors start questioning, where is the governance?  
 
In the ways described above, investors are myopic in their investment behaviour 
(Keasey et al., 2005). When the company is performing well (company‘s operating 
performance is solid or its share price is steadily rising), they apparently can 
tolerate, exhibit disinterest and/or not question the way such entities are run or 
even managerial abuses (Philippon, 2006). On the contrary, when things start to 
unravel (when performance declines or when corporate fraud is detected), the 
situation that was acceptable to them suddenly becomes unpalatable. The 
arguments above provide the basis for scrutinising investors‘ propensities for 
governance under differing circumstances. Specifically, when does governance 
start to matter or, if it already matters, become more important to individual 
investors? 
  
Each governance-related investor tendency identified throughout this section (and, 
as summarised in Table 2.6), similar to those offered in the academic and regulator 
perspectives, are investigated by this study as not much is known in reality.  
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Table 2.6 Possible Governance-related Actions/Tendencies (III) 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 1: Pre-Purchase 
 
 Avoid badly governed firms/Only invest in well-governed firms. 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 2: Post-Purchase 
 
 Exercise their ownership rights as shareholders (e.g. vote during AGMs). 
 Monitor management and be involved in ―relationship‖ investing (activism) to 
improve a firm‘s governance when corporate performance and/or certain aspects 
of the firm‘s governance are deemed unsatisfactory. 
 Complain, seek redress and accountability by having their voice/plight heard after 
being mistreated/exploited. 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 3: Exit/Sell Off 
 
 Simply exit (sell the shares) when governance problems arise or when corporate 
performance declines. 
 
 
Lastly, the underlying actual motivations/justifications for the observed individual 
investor behaviours/motivations are as yet unknown and will be empirically 
explored by the current study.  
 
 
2.9  Integration of Key Research Elements (I) 
 
This section draws together and integrates the various governance attributes/ 
issues explored thus far. Emphasis is on how each element features and also links/ 
relates to others. One of the main intentions of this section is to explicate the 
underlying logic for the subsequent lists and also groupings of questions posed to 
respondents in the interviews conducted and also questionnaires distributed84. 
Elements are broadly aligned by the study‘s research questions and the stages of 
the investment cycle. All actions/tendencies are segregated into the stages of the 
cycle where they are most likely to feature. 
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 For detailed explication of the design and also content of both research methods, please 
refer to Chapter 5: Research Methodology.  
89 
 
All three primary research questions are tackled concurrently as each identified 
governance-related tendency/treatment/issue is followed by an exploration of (i) 
the underlying justifications for such an inclination and (ii) the various influences 
that compel individual investors to think and also act in the observed manner. 
 
 
2.9.1  Does Firm-level Corporate Governance Matter to Individual 
Investors? 
 
Authors such as Nofsinger (2008) have argued that investment decisions made by 
individual investors are mostly firm-specific. Hence, the study first considers 
firm-level governance attributes. Investigating only governance attributes provides 
necessary focus as general individual investor studies such as that by Nagy and 
Obenberger (1994) showed that investors consider a wide range of financial and 
also non-financial firm variables (they reported as many as 34 distinct variables).  
 
In exploring whether firm-level governance matters to individual investors, the 
study must take into account its multi-faceted nature. Since (i) there is a range of 
firm-level governance attributes and (ii) an investor may not regard all such 
attributes as relevant/important; the question above then becomes what aspects of 
a firm‘s governance actually matter?  
 
Considering the key assumption of conventional governance mindset that good 
governance results in good, consistent corporate performance, certain 
fundamental factors such as company growth prospects, projected future 
performance and industry outlook85 are not directly considered as they are seen as 
outgrowths/ consequences of good governance86.The various interlinks and also 
integration of research elements are presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. 
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 Most studies have listed similar company prospects/performance-related factors. 
86
 As good governance implies the right decisions are being made to ensure that the 
companies are in the right industries, have good overall performance and effectively 
capitalise on growth opportunities. 
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Table 2.7 Integration of Key Research Elements (I) 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 1: Pre Purchase  
Corporate Governance as Firm-Specific Evaluation Criteria 
 
Individual investors may firstly evaluate certain firm-specific aspects of governance. 
Essentially, the study explores the relative importance of each of the firm-level governance 
variables listed towards the end of Page 71 in Section 2.7.2: Shareholder Activism to 
individual investors in Malaysia. In addition, the study also gauges the importance of how 
transparent and accountable company managers are in their actions in general to 
individual investors.  
 
For those investors who actually do such evaluations (consider any of the said variables), 
subsequent  actions may include: 
(i) avoid investing in badly governed firms (as determined by their evaluations) 
(ii) only invest in well-governed firms (as determined by their evaluations) and/or 
(iii) discount the amount that they are willing to pay for firms exhibiting any governance 
weaknesses.  
 
The possible treatments above are similar in that certain aspects of firm governance are 
typically considered in the form of investment evaluation criteria.  
 
In addition, the study considers a specific non-governance tendency that is argued to be (i) 
a fair indicator of investors‘ propensities to act contrary to governance ideals and (ii) a 
―distraction‖ to governance ―interested‖ investors. This is when investors purchase shares 
solely on the basis of unconfirmed tips/insider info/speculation predicting an imminent rise 
in share prices.  
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 2: Post Purchase  
Governance as Concerns requiring Monitoring/Active Participation 
 
After buying specific shares, an investor enters the post-purchase stage of the investment 
cycle. Here, the relevance of governance in the form of ongoing concerns requiring 
monitoring/active participation is explored (using AGM attendance as proxy). Possible 
reasons for attending identified thus far include  
(i) to vote/have a say in how the firm is run and  
(ii) to protest after being exploited
87
. 
 
 
For investors who are knowledgeable, non-attendance may be a rational response as  
(i) attendance may be too costly and  
(ii) perceptions that their vote/presence won‘t materially influence management 
decisions.  
 
Conversely, non-attendance may stem from lack of awareness, disinterest and/or 
indifference. Possibilities include: 
(i) ignorance (not aware that they are entitled to attend) or  
(ii) unsure of what to say/do or  
(iii) simply not interested.  
 
Investors‘ propensities for other forms of activist-related behaviour such as communicating 
with firm management; submitting shareholder resolutions; and publicly criticising firm 
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 Further elaboration is given under the ―When does governance start to matter/matter 
more‖ subsection. 
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managers/directors through the media, are also investigated. Issues deemed to be of 
possible interest to proactive individual investors are listed under Section 2.7.2 (pg. 48)
88
. 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 3: Exit/Sell Out 
 
At this stage, a possible treatment identified earlier is where investors exit/sell out 
whenever governance weaknesses/concerns are detected
89
. This includes  
(i) exit rather than pressuring management to improve performance and  
(ii) sell out when firms‘ recent operating performances or fundamentals are 
deteriorating.  
 
Next, the study gauges investors‘ awareness from another dimension – their basic share 
ownership rights, regardless of whether they exercise them or not. Proxies to investigate 
their general awareness include  
(i) the right of investors to receive annual reports from the company that they partly 
own every year,  
(ii) the rights of shareholders to vote through the post, and  
(iii) the rights of shareholders to access/tour the company‘s head office at any time that 
they see fit.  
 
 
Table 2.8 Integration of Key Research Elements (Ia) 
 
When does governance matter/matter more to individual investors? 
 
The study found that governance may become more relevant when  
(i) investors are being mistreated/exploited and  
(ii) corporate fraud/scandals happen often. 
 
Other differing general situations are identified in the review on the Malaysian institutional 
environment in Chapter 3.  
 
 
 
2.10  Chapter Summary 
 
The study first defined corporate governance and explained its relevance as 
stemming from the separation between ownership and control inherent within all 
publicly-listed firms. From the agency perspective, shareholders are shown to be a 
core concern and firms‘ ultimate aim is to maximise their wealth. Governance is 
then portrayed as an integrated set of external and internal mechanisms that serve 
to mitigate agency conflicts. The various aspects of governance can be divided into 
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 As argued earlier, since individual shareholders in general are not expected to be very 
sophisticated and also considering the intuitive governance argument, issues/attributes 
that are more nuanced or multifaceted are combined. 
89
 as encouraged by certain market regulators. 
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firm level and country-level attributes. The study then identified all major 
governance attributes that may be important to individual investors.  
  
The study then explained its adoption of agency theory in making sense of the 
Malaysian corporate governance environment and the behavioural tendencies of 
investors operating within such a context. Specifically, agency theory forms the 
underlying foundation for (i) the various governance mechanisms established, (ii) 
the design of the Malaysian capital market, (iii) conceptualising and also guiding 
extensive governance reforms, and (iv) investor primacy in capital markets. The 
aim was to show that the various governance measures discussed are in existence 
and form the current status quo. Hence, this choice of governance lens is 
pragmatic. Alternative perspectives such as stakeholder and transaction cost 
theories were also evaluated.  
 
Next, justifications are given for the sole focus on the individual investor group in 
Malaysia by arguing that they are prone to exploitation, are numerous thus 
economically significant and are largely ignored in the literature. The reasons why 
individual investors may find governance to be important are then outlined. 
 
Subsequently, the study explored the governance roles and tendencies of 
individual investors, as seen from three distinctive viewpoints. The academic 
perspective views investor behaviour on an economic utility basis, predicting that 
individual investors have no proactive role to play in governance. Even so, 
investors may consider governance in their investment evaluations such as 
adopting certain governance-related criteria. 
 
From the regulator perspective, at least some individual investors are encouraged 
and/or expected to play active governance roles. In fact, much resource has been 
expended to compel investors to become more proactive and new governance 
mechanisms have also been introduced to facilitate shareholder activism. The 
study then questioned how reasonable such expectations are considering the 
persuasive academic arguments suggesting otherwise. 
 
In the last major section of the chapter, the study presented the practitioner 
perspective by the use of anecdotal evidence in the popular press and actual 
observations by interested/informed parties that at least some individual investors 
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are seemingly proactive and apparently do play a role in governance. Such 
observations even resulted in reports that individual investors dominate 
attendance numbers at AGMs.  
 
The study compiled a list of (i) all possible governance-related actions and 
tendencies from all reviewed predictions, observations, findings and also 
expectations and, (ii) the various reasons and also influences for both 
undertaking/not undertaking observed/reported range of behaviours.  
 
Lastly, the study provided an integrated outline of all the governance elements and 
issues considered throughout the chapter. This is to show how all attributes 
inter-relate, influence one another and are also categorised into different stages of 
the investment cycle. The main aim is to demonstrate how and why all such 
attributes feature the way they do in the interviews conducted and questionnaire 
distributed. Operational aspects are explained further in the Research 
Methodology chapter.  
 
In the next chapter, the various governance-related environmental and institutional 
attributes distinct to Malaysia are explored, especially in terms of how they (i) 
shape investors‘ opinions with regards to various governance attributes/issues 
/market participants and (ii) impact individual investors‘ propensities to consider 
governance and/or undertake governance-related actions.  
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Chapter 3  Review 2: Environmental and 
Contextual Influences on Investors’ 
Governance-related Behaviour  
3.1  Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter explores Malaysia‘s unique cultural, political, institutional and 
governance environment. An appreciation of these attributes is vital to make sense 
of the propensities of individual investors to consider governance-related factors 
and/or undertake governance-related activist behaviour within such a context.  
 
Specifically, investors‘ governance-related behaviours/tendencies are seen to be 
adaptations and/or responses to the environmental and institutional influences that 
they are subjected to rather than being generic practices that are largely 
unaffected by such country-specific peculiarities. Political involvement in business, 
concentrated corporate ownership structures and relationship-based business 
culture and ethnic-based cultural norms are given particular emphasis.  
 
Next, the notion that individual investors‘ awareness, perceptions, opinions and 
experiences of corporate governance are reflected through their views regarding 
the motivations and actions of various capital market participants are proposed 
and explored. These are formed from their exposure to and also experiences of the 
Malaysian institutional, political, corporate and cultural environment. Individual 
investors are expected to exhibit a range of behaviours/actions/tendencies that 
fairly reflect the kinds of perceptions/opinions reported. 
 
In terms of the conceptual framework established, the relevant aspects being dealt 
with are highlighted (shaded) in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Figure 3.1 Focus of Chapter within the Conceptual Framework of Study (II) 
 
The Malaysian Governance Institutional, Cultural and Political Environment 
 
. 
                                                 The Share          Investment Cycle 
 
Stage 1: 
Pre-Purchase 
 
Stage 2: 
Post-Purchase 
 
Stage 3: 
Exit/Sell Off 
 
Stage 4: 
Post-Investment 
 
Individual Investors’ Propensities to Consider Governance and/or Undertake 
Governance-related Actions/Initiatives 
 
 
 
Investors’ Personal Attributes 
Motivations/Objectives/Preferences/Stylistics 
. 
 
 
3.2  Investor Behaviour and the Governance Institutional 
Environment 
 
While certain countries may be grouped along a few common major governance 
attributes such as those exhibiting concentrated corporate ownership and 
relationship-based business culture, the specific causes, developments, forms, 
functional mechanisms and other nuances of such characteristics are unique to 
each country. Indeed, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) and La Porta et al. 
(1998) have posited that legal, regulatory and institutional environments of 
different countries do fundamentally affect the very process, working mechanisms 
and implications of governance.  
 
The contention above is also supported by Cornelius and Kogut (2003) and Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) who viewed each national corporate governance system as 
distinctive since each country differs in its cultural and historical background and 
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political conditions. For example, Cornelius (2004) contended that corporate 
ownership structures in a particular country are partly determined by the interaction 
between legal, historical and cultural factors. 
 
Consistently, Kuada and Gullestrup (1998) contended that the process of cultural 
development in every society creates a unique governance configuration, that is, 
governance culture and institutional mix in every country is path-dependant (Licht, 
2001; Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Some researchers have even argued that the 
diversity of governance practices around the world nearly defies a common 
definition (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
 
In terms of interactions between capital market participants, Gabrielsson and Huse 
(2004: 24) contend that ―systems of corporate governance and cultural, legal, and 
institutional contingencies are inextricably linked, and different sets of institutions 
support different sets of interactions among actors.”  
 
Hence, in order to make sense of the governance-related behavioural tendencies 
of individual investors in Malaysia, the nature of interactions between the different 
market participants must be understood. Aguilera and Jackson (2003) described 
this focus on interactions between major capital market constituents/groups as 
actor-centred governance, with emphasis on the context within which such 
relationships take place (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Bruce et al., 2005).   
 
The study concurs with Thompson and Davis (1997) who argued that investors‘ 
governance-related behavioural tendencies are not determined solely by capital 
market pressures but also by political and social structures that determine the 
balance of rights and power between them and other market participants. In fact, 
the legal and regulatory rules of the game are posited to be neither neutral nor 
outside the control of market participants (as assumed by academics in the agency 
tradition). Further elaboration is provided in the later sections of the chapter. 
 
Lending credibility to the arguments above, Huse (2005), Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2005) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003) have all acknowledged that governance 
should be viewed as embedded in the social context that exists. Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (1998) also concluded in their study that institutional context matters and 
more importantly, much more research directed at identifying the micro processes 
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of the relevant institutional influences is warranted and needed. Hence, Malaysia‘s 
national and cultural nuances; corporate and political environment; and corporate 
ownership structures (Huse, 2005) are given due attention by the current study.  
 
It must be emphasised that it is not the intention of this study to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the design or state of the current corporate governance regime in 
Malaysia. Instead, the behavioural tendencies of individual investors are seen to 
be logical/reasonable responses to the prevailing governance regime. This is 
consistent with the pragmatic stance adopted where understanding and lessons 
are drawn within the status quo. 
 
In essence, the study aims to develop a principle-agent based view of corporate 
governance that acknowledges contextual influences in its attempt to 
operationalise key constructs from an agency theory perspective in the Malaysian 
capital market setting. This includes variants of aspects described by Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2005) such as who the actual principals are (rather than who the legitimate 
ones should be, as proposed by Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005), the nature of 
―self-interest‖ and the forms/degree of oversight available to principals.  
 
 
3.3  The Malaysian Governance Environment, Culture and 
Institutions 
 
The study begins its explication of the Malaysian governance environment by 
briefly outlining a few important findings of the law and finance governance 
literature (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1998 and La Porta et al., 2000) that 
concentrated on identifying broad-based commonality in certain country-level 
corporate governance attributes across countries around the globe. For example, 
the kinds of general shareholder rights accorded and the types of legal 
systems/traditions and also their consequent influences on corporate ownership 
structures and capital market development.  
 
A summary of a few of its primary findings (focusing specifically on those that 
generally describe corporate East Asia) serves to provide an initial overview of 
some of Malaysia‘s major governance characteristics. This is because, by itself, 
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this literature stream is too descriptive and does not go far enough in terms of 
increasing our understanding of the specific governance processes, nuances and 
implications pertaining to Malaysia. Even so, certain commonalities exist 
(Claessens and Fan, 2002). 
 
One of the main findings is that most countries around the world have highly 
concentrated corporate ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1999) and this 
includes corporate Malaysia (Du and Dai, 2005; Thillainathan, 1999; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002). According to the 
World Bank - ROSC (2001), approximately 85% of Malaysian publicly-listed firms 
had owner/managers and 37.4% had only one dominant/majority shareholder. 
Since corporate ownership structures in most countries are found to be largely 
stable over time (Claessens et al., 2002), such concentrated ownership is unlikely 
to have altered much today. 
 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Claessens et al. (2000) contend that the 
domination in most companies by large shareholders who exercise significant 
control rights put minority shareholders at high risk. This is because when 
corporate managers are also owners of large blocks of shares, the scope for 
pursuing private benefits at the expense of outside investors is inherently wide 
(Doidge et al., 2001; Claessens et al., 2002).  
 
In the Malaysian capital market, such a tendency is exacerbated by the significant 
divergence between cash flow rights and control rights (Du and Dai, 2005; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006). This is where the largest shareholders have controlling rights90 
that are disproportionately more than their direct ownership share91, typically 
through the use of pyramid structures and cross holdings (Khatri et al., 2002; 
Claessens et al., 2000; Thillainathan, 1999).  
 
Oman et al. (2003: front page) highlighted that “pyramidal corporate-ownership 
structures, cross shareholdings and multiple share classes are widely used by 
corporate insiders in the developing world to extract corporate-control rents, exploit 
other investors and resist pressures to improve corporate governance”. In this 
regard, the law and finance literature did find that the protection of minority 
                                                 
90
 Percentage of voting rights. 
91
 Percentage of actual direct shareholdings. 
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shareholders is generally the weakest for countries exhibiting combinations of 
such attributes. Hence, the primary governance concern in Malaysia is the 
potential conflict between majority and minority shareholders. 
 
The concerns above are further compounded by the single most prevalent 
governance attribute exhibited by East Asian capital markets, that is, a business 
culture based on relationships (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) argued that this relationship-based nature of corporate systems served as 
the nexus of the institutional structure of most country-specific studies of 
governance and economic histories. Similarly, Searle (1999) and Gomez and 
Jomo (1999) concentrated on the nexus of business, politics and the state in their 
analysis of the Malaysian political economy. Links between politics and corporate 
governance, albeit of a slightly different nature, have also been made by past 
authors such as Roe (1994). The current study thus places great emphasis on the 
aforementioned cultural and institutional dimensions for the purposes of its review. 
 
Besides referring to the extensive works of Gomez and Jomo (1999) and Searle 
(1999), in terms of the specific institutional and cultural influences being examined, 
the study also draws considerably on the works of Pye (1985) and Crouch (1996). 
This is to obtain a richer and more in-depth insight as they have provided detailed 
accounts of the Malaysian cultural scenario from the dimensions of authority, 
power and politics rather than from a strictly political economy dimension (as per 
Gomez and Jomo, 1999).  
 
 
3.3.1  Relationship-based Corporate Culture and Political 
Involvement in Business 
 
The governance-related behavioural tendencies of individual investors in the 
Malaysian capital market can be better understood with an appreciation of the 
distinct character of Malaysian capitalism. This is because the Malaysian political 
and corporate environment has undergone fundamental changes since 1970 
which resulted in the forging of distinct political-economic linkages at the national 
level (see, for example, Searle, 1999; Gomez, 1999). Throughout the past few 
decades, Malaysia‘s corporate governance practices and norms have also 
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undergone significant evolution, in tandem with changes on the political and 
economic fronts.  
 
Here, the study attempts to make the case that the developments above 
profoundly influenced and shaped (i) the perceptions, expectations and also 
behavioural tendencies of individual investors who partly own Malaysian 
publicly-listed firms and, (ii) the underlying corporate environment itself that 
propagates such behavioural responses.  
 
Scrutiny of the largest publicly-listed corporations and also the major capital 
market participant groups in Malaysia are supported by McVey (1992) and Searle 
(1999) who opined that, in understanding the Malaysian capitalist system, it is in 
big public-listed businesses that the nexus between business, politics and the state 
is most clearly displayed.  
 
As the issues of politics and race/ethnicity are inextricably intertwined in multiracial, 
plural societies like Malaysia with subsequent impact on publicly-listed firm 
governance (see, for example, Gomez, 1999), the study first provides a brief 
historical context. Firstly, the Malaysian population is made up of three major 
ethnic groups. The Malays form the majority comprising more than 50% of the total 
population, the Chinese constitute approximately a quarter, Indians around 8% 
and the rest is made up of various other ethnic groups (Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia, 2008). 
 
Originally being immigrants, the Chinese and Indians have been an integral part of 
Malaysian society for over a century. Typical of former British colonies, the local 
population were subjected to a ―divide and rule‖ regime (Verma, 2004). 
Consequently, Malays are mostly confined to the villages being farmers, civil 
servants and fishermen; the Chinese are more entrepreneurial and dominate 
business/trading in urban areas; and the Indians mostly work in plantation estates 
(Crouch, 1996; Verma, 2004). As their ethnic group comprise the majority, 
ethnic-Malay elites have traditionally been the ruling class and they dominate both 
politics and the bureaucracy even today (Heng, 1997). 
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The Chinese, being the more business oriented and entrepreneurial ethnic group, 
controlled most of the Malaysian economy (Gomez, 1999). More importantly, their 
share of the economy greatly outweighed that of the Malays. To provide a better 
historical context, Snodgrass (1980) demonstrated this disparity by using 
household income as an indicator of income inequality showing that in 1957/58 the 
Malays had the lowest mean monthly income ($139) compared to Chinese ($300) 
and Indians ($237). As a consequence, the Malays (while constituting a majority of 
the population) are mindful and insecure about the significant economic power 
possessed by the Chinese.  
 
Hence, when negotiating the terms for Malaysia‘s independence in the 1950s, an 
arrangement was made where in return for a tacit acceptance that Chinese 
economic interests would not be hindered/disadvantaged, the non-Malays agreed 
to Malay political paramountcy (Crouch, 1996). Malay anxieties regarding their 
economic backwardness were reflected in the Malaysian Constitution, which 
contained provisions for the ―special position‖ of Malays in terms of receiving 
preferential treatment in the fields of education, bureaucracy and business (Crouch, 
1996; Verma, 2004). Horii (1991) described this situation as the fundamental 
contradiction of Malaysian society where economic wealth is largely in Chinese 
hands while the Malay ruling groups monopolises political power.   
 
At this juncture of the review of Malaysia‘s history (i.e the pre-independence period 
in the mid 1950s) from the economic, political and social angles, the researcher will 
divert briefly from the exposition to address another pertinent issue (i.e. the role of 
Syariah law within the context of this study).This is owing to the fact that the role of 
Syariah law within the secular, common law-based Malaysian society was also 
established during this time period. Here, the roles of both Islam and Syariah law 
are set within the general context of inter-communal bargaining with regards to the 
terms of independence and provisions within the Federal Consitution. Lastly, the 
resultant impact of Syariah law on the Malaysian capital market is highlighted. 
 
Subsequent historical developments from the amalgamation of political, economic 
and social forces post-1950s on (i) the distinctiveness of the Malaysian capital 
market and (ii) the subsequent development of a relationship-based corporate 
culture and extensive political involvement in business will be continued thereafter. 
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3.3.1.1 The Influence of Syariah Law on the Malaysian Capital Market 
 
Since the Federal Constitution of Malaysia provides for a dual system of civil 
(based on British common law) and religious or Syariah courts (based on Islamic 
law) (Neo, 2006), the researcher needs clarify the role of Syariah law within the 
context of this study. Specifically, the relevance of Syariah law for the Malaysian 
capital market and corporate sector is examined. To do so, a brief historical context 
of Islam (which forms the very foundation of Syariah law) within Malaysian society 
is essential. This is because only by understanding the position of Islam, as 
enshrined in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, can one begin to comprehend 
the status and reach of Syariah law in the country.  
 
Neo (2006: 101) highlighted that “at the time of independence, Malaya was largely 
secular and its legal systems were based on common law. Islam governed only 
personal and customary matters, i.e. in marital, family and inheritance laws, and 
applied only to the Malay community” (i.e. Syariah law does not apply to 
non-Muslims). The British were anxious to preserve the status quo. Consequently, 
when drafting the Malayan Constitution, the British initially rejected the 
controversial recommendation to entrench Islam as the country‘s official religion 
(Neo, 2006).  
 
What became Article 3 of the Federal Constitution 92  (specifically, Article 3(1) 
provides that ―Islam is the religion of the Federation, but other religions may be 
practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.‖) was accepted only 
after political leaders at the time gave assurances that “they had no intention of 
creating a Muslim theocracy and that Malaya would be a secular state” (Neo, 2006: 
102). Neo (2006) further explained that Article 3 was accepted by all parties on the 
basis that Islam would be limited to the sphere of Muslim personal and customary 
law. The designation of Islam as the Federation‘s religion was widely understood to 
be strictly symbolic and the nation‘s character would remain multi-ethnic and 
secular (Neo, 2006). 
 
                                                 
92
 According to Smith (2004), Malaysia‘s Constitution itself dates from 1957 (Constitution of 
the Federation of Malaya (1957)), which later became the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 
(1963). 
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Therefore, although Article 3(1) provides that Islam is the official religion, it is 
acknowledged that Islam is established as such only for the purpose of conducting 
state ceremony (i.e. Islam plays only a formal role in the Constitution) (Smith, 
2004). In fact, according to Smith (2004: 362), the “Constitution of Malaysia does 
not establish Syariah as the primary or principal source of legislation, or indeed a 
source of legislation at all at the federal level.” In Che Omar bin Che Soh v. Public 
Prosecutor, the Supreme Court of Malaysia focused their interpretation of the 
meaning of ―Islam‖ or ―Islamic Religion‖ within the meaning of Article 3(1). Based 
on Malaysian history, the court concluded that ―Islam‖, as used in Article 3(1) 
affected only a personal law applicable to Muslims (Smith, 2004)93. In Malaysia, 
therefore, Syariah does not constrain legislative power (Smith, 2004). Practically:  
 
Civil courts exercise general jurisdiction over all civil and criminal 
matters as well as non-Islamic customary laws where applicable. 
Syariah courts are state courts created by statute and apply 
Syariah laws to Muslims only, with respect to a limited range of 
matters relating to marriage, inheritance and other personal laws 
(Neo, 2006: 100).  
 
The most obvious demonstration of this fact is in a recent legal battle where the 
High Court [Malaysia] has ruled that the Syariah Court has no jurisdiction over a 
company as it is a corporate entity (Hamdan, 2010). Based on the arguments put 
forth, therefore, this study disregards Syariah law.  
 
 
 
                                                 
93
 The Supreme Court judges provided the following written grounds for their judgement: 
―The concept of sovereignty ascribed to humans is alien to Islamic religion because in 
Islam, sovereignty belongs to God alone. By ascribing sovereignty to the ruler, i.e. to a 
human, the divine source of legal validity is severed and thus the British turned the system 
into a secular institution. Thus all laws including the administration of Islamic laws had to 
receive this validity through a secular fiat... Thus, it can be seen that during the British 
colonial period, through their system of indirect rule and establishment of secular 
institutions, Islamic law was rendered isolated in a narrow confinement of the law of 
marriage, divorce and inheritance only... In our view, it is in this sense of dichotomy that the 
framers of the Constitution understood the meaning of the word “Islam” in the context of 
Article 3. If it had been otherwise, there would have been another provision in the 
Constitution which would have the effect that any law contrary to the injunction of Islam will 
be void. Far from making such provision, Article 162, on the other hand, purposely 
preserves the continuity of secular law prior to the Constitution, unless such law is contrary 
to the latter” (Smith, 2004: 362). 
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3.3.1 (II) Relationship-based Corporate Culture and Political 
Involvement in Business 
 
Here, the review of Malaysia‘s political, economic and social history and their 
impact on the Malaysian capitalist system resumes from the time period right after 
the country gained its independence (post 1957).  
 
Since any radical actions to expand greatly the Malay share of the economy would 
upset the status quo thus undermining the very basis of the ruling coalition‘s 
cooperation and rule, the state initially did not aggressively promote Malay 
advances into the capitalist sector (Searle, 1999). By 1970, Malay households still 
had the lowest mean income ($177), while Chinese mean income ($399) was 
approximately twice that of the Malays (Snodgrass, 1980, Crouch, 1996). At that 
time, per capita Malay income was $34 compared to $68 for the Chinese (Heng, 
1997). A clear illustration of this persistent economic disparity is provided in Table 
3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1 Mean Income per Household by Ethnic Group, 1957/58 - 1970 (Malays, 
Chinese and Indians only) 
 
Ethnic Group 
 
Mean Income per Household ($/month) 
 
1957/58 
 
1970 
 
Malays 
 
Chinese 
 
Indian 
 
139 
 
300 
 
237 
 
177 
 
399 
 
310 
Source: Adapted from Snodgrass (1980) and Crouch (1996) 
 
Also, Malay ownership in the corporate sector remains ―negligible‖ (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999) at a mere 2.4% in 1970, compared to the Chinese share of 34.4% 
(Heng, 1997). 
 
Fundamental changes to the Malaysian political, economic and corporate 
landscape were triggered by the race riots of 1969 (see, for example, Horii, 1991; 
Searle, 1999). The then Malaysian government concluded that it was mainly 
caused by the economic deprivation of the Malays (Crouch, 1996). A system with 
105 
 
an explicit policy of favouring Malays/Bumiputeras94 in seeking greater economic 
equality was needed. This ultimately resulted in the adoption of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) that seeks to ―restructure the Malaysian society to reduce and 
eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function…‖ (Crouch, 
1996: 25) 
 
Second, it is aimed at correcting the inter-ethnic imbalance in the ownership/         
control of wealth in the country (Searle, 1999; Pye, 1985) through affirmative action. 
Various policies/measures explicitly benefiting the Malays/Bumiputeras 95  were 
implemented such as quotas in corporate ownership as well as a variety of 
subsidies, licenses, and credit schemes. Some aspects of the NEP were 
exceedingly ambitious, aiming, for example, for Malays to acquire 30% of 
corporate share ownership and management by 1990, even though they had only 
1.5% then (Pye,1985).  
 
The active distribution of wealth in the country was initially channelled through 
state development agencies and government-linked funds (Gomez and Jomo, 
1999). Attention, however, must be directed at the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO), the dominant party within Malaysia‘s ruling96 National Front 
coalition government. As described by Gomez and Jomo (1999: 103)  
 
The growth of UMNO‟s corporate investments in the 1980s 
meant that the party itself played an increasingly important role in 
the restructuring of ownership in the economy and in contributing 
to the creation of a Malay business and commercial 
class97...from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, UMNO changed 
from a passive to an active corporate investor whose interests 
spanned the entire economy.  
 
                                                 
94
 The term Bumiputera translates into ―sons of the soil‖ (see, for example, Gomez, 1999 
and Verma, 2004) or indigenous peoples of Malaysia, a vast majority of whom are Malays. 
In fact, the term Bumiputera is often used to mean ―Malay‖.  
95
 It must be noted that the NEP, even though touted as a policy that would explicitly benefit 
the Bumiputeras through affirmative action, was designed very much with the particular 
interests of Malays in mind rather than those of other indigenous minority peoples who are 
also classified as Bumiputeras. In fact, Horii (1991) explained that the NEP is also known 
as the Malay first policy as it puts Chinese and Indians in a weaker position than the Malays 
who are the main policy target group. 
96
 Since independence to the present day (1957 – present). 
97
 Roles that in the 1970s had been largely played by the government and the state sector. 
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In fact, few political parties in Asia have become so closely involved in business as 
UMNO (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).  
 
Gomez and Jomo (1999) have further described UMNO, with its extensive powers 
and privileges of long-term incumbency, as seeming like a one-party state. Jomo 
(1986: 52) also noted a change in UMNO itself as “the position of those who stood 
for a more active promotion of Malay capitalism was strengthened‖. Essentially, 
concentration of power gradually shifted within the Malay elite circles from 
politicians as well as administocrats to a combination of politicians and 
businessmen, ancillary to which were the bureaucrats and regulators (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999).  
 
The power shift was clearly reflected in the increasingly dominant view within 
UMNO (and therefore, the government/state) in the 1980s that the spheres of 
government, party or private interests are no longer regarded as distinct entities. 
National, political, and private interests may be pursued simultaneously or in 
tandem, an arrangement described as ―commonness‖ rather than ―conflict of 
interest‖ (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Practically, means of implementation included 
the use of common directorships between companies controlled by the party and 
publicly-listed companies controlled by the government as a mechanism used to 
affect a shift of assets from the government sector to the party or UMNO-related 
business groups in the private sector.  
 
Clearly, in administering the policies of the NEP to create Malay capitalists, an 
intimate relationship was forged between the state, the dominant political party 
(UMNO) and business (Searle, 1999). Searle (1999) argued that this growing 
intimacy has resulted in the enmeshing and blurring of the boundaries between 
business, politics and the state with profound implications for the character and 
development of Malaysian capitalism and also corporate governance (for 
extensive and detailed documentation/evidence, please refer to Gomez, 1994; 
Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Searle, 1999; amongst others).  
 
Extensive evidence shows, therefore, that the state no longer merely played a 
supportive role for private capital; it assumed centre stage by becoming a medium 
for capital accumulation and also serving the particular interests of the governing 
class (Jomo, 1986; Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Groups that consist of Malay 
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politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen emerged which control capital 
accumulation by virtue of their access to state power/apparatus.  
 
According to Gomez and Jomo (1999), increased government intervention in the 
economy has promoted rent-seeking activities leading to increased incidences of 
corruption and economic waste. Crouch (1996) argued that, while the NEP 
succeeded in bringing Malays into business, it failed to stimulate development of 
an independent Malay entrepreneurial class. Malay businessmen were essentially 
individual clients preoccupied with maintaining individual links with political patrons.  
In fact, Jomo and Gomez (1999: 128) argued that ―the creation and disbursement 
or allocation of resources and their protection have been crucial for continued 
political hegemony‖.  
 
Consequently, a cartel-like domination of the NEP by interlocking networks of 
elites has had a marginal net impact on poverty eradication (i.e. state funds have 
not reached the Malay grassroots) while concentrating income and wealth 
amongst this select group of ruling elites and their associates (Gomez and Jomo, 
1999; Mehmet, 1988; Verma, 2004). In short, the system is subject to manipulation 
by the rich and powerful seeking quasi-rents and other forms of unearned rewards.  
 
Similarly, Gomez (1999) found that political involvement in business (especially 
UMNO‘s investments in business) has entrenched cronyism, patronage and 
money politics. These also contributed to other undesirable consequences such as 
corruption and this has the effect of sapping the confidence of ―genuine‖ investors 
(see also Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
 
There is no denying that corruption and cronyism in East Asian countries such as 
Malaysia are deep rooted (Nikomborirak, 1999). Indeed, according to Crouch 
(1996), by 1994 money politics had become so rife that UMNO amended its 
constitution to empower its Supreme Council to draw up a code of ethics that 
prohibits the abuse of power and money with the intention of securing votes or 
support. In fact, the money politics problem has persisted or may even have 
worsened despite its eradication being one of the primary agendas of the current 
Malaysian government (The Star, 2008b).  
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These developments are relevant to corporate governance because they 
culminated in a culture where the ruling elite and their corporate patrons/ 
clients/proxies (most being major shareholders/owners of public-listed firms) as 
well as captive market regulators are involved in numerous blatant scandalous, 
manipulative and even fraudulent activities in the capital markets, often to the 
detriment of minority shareholders. For example, Low (2004) highlighted various 
instances of corporate abuse through related-party transactions, incidence of 
capricious decision making, shifting of assets within the corporate group, 
undertaking transactions without proper disclosure and poor financial 
management by directors.  
 
In fact, the workings of capital market-related manipulations are well documented 
in the political economy literature on Malaysia, a clear illustration of which is 
provided below (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 Diagram of Political Patronage in Malaysia (patterns and channels of 
corruption, money politics and stock market manipulation) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Gomez and Jomo (1999: 190) 
 
In addition to the channels and means above, various specific examples have 
been described in vivid detail by authors such as Searle (1999), Gomez and Jomo 
(1999), Gomez (1999). The selected extracts below illustrate the persuasiveness 
of the arguments presented thus far: 
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Table 3.2 Examples of Political Involvement in Malaysian Publicly-listed Firms 
 
Example 1: 
 
A more important aspect of the government-party relationship that has facilitated UMNO‘s 
business activities was the influence wielded by the party leadership over appointments to 
key institutions and agencies charged with the implementation of the restructuring goals of 
the NEP in the corporate sector. Confidence that such departments and agencies as the 
MTI, Bank Negara, the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) and the Foreign Investment 
Committee (FIC) would facilitate UMNO‘s corporate ambitions gave the party a decided 
advantage against other competitors, particularly in the stock market. So, whenever 
UMNO-linked public companies such as NSTP, UEM or Aokam sought to acquire assets 
through share swaps, the high premiums generally attached to the shares of those 
companies were in large part predicated on market confidence that such deals would be 
supported by the various regulatory agencies concerned. This factor, together with the 
blurring of government and party interests, also seems to have enabled UMNO to ignore 
the spirit, if not the letter, of government procedures and regulations when they posed 
obstacles to the promotion or protection of its corporate interests. 
  
 
Example 2: 
 
Political criteria were also apparent in the appointment of Tan Sri Basir Ismail to a number 
of powerful corporate and regulatory bodies. Political criteria and the changing role of the 
―regulators‖ were most apparent, however, in the appointment of Basir in August 1990 as 
chairman of the powerful CIC. Basir, who had extensive interests in the corporate sector 
and was at the same time the chairman of the Capital Issues Committee, epitomised the 
blurring between the regulators and the market. 
 
 
Example 3: 
 
As a member of the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF) Committee of Inquiry observed, 
‗the right connections‘ can facilitate the relisting of a suspended company and minimise the 
time taken to obtain the necessary approvals from the regulatory authorities concerned. 
 
In a number of other important respects, apparently little regard was paid to required 
procedures and regulations, indicating again the extent to which the party was able to use 
the levers of government to promote and protect its corporate interests. 
 
 
Example 4: 
 
In a failed attempt to corner the tin market which cost the Malaysian government $600 in 
1982, the government attempted to cover up the losses by secretly forming a company, 
Makuwasa Securities Sdn Bhd, in mid 1984. Makuwasa, a $2 company, was given some of 
the privileges of Bumiputra trust agencies, most importantly allotment of public share 
issues at preferential prices. In order to maintain the cover-up, allotment of such shares 
that should have gone to the government-managed Employees Provident Fund (EPF) was 
instead channelled to Makuwasa. Apparently, the idea was that Makuwasa could then sell 
the shares at the market rate on the KLSE and make windfall profits to cover the tin losses. 
Eventually the government admitted that Makuwasa had been formed in an attempt to 
recover the losses from the tin scheme. 
 
Source: Adapted from Gomez and Jomo (1999) 
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In relation to the examples above, particularly to instances where regulators are 
captive and lack independence, Othman (1999) posited that such mechanisms for 
ensuring compliance and enforcement have been generally deficient and 
associated penalties for breaches are insufficient to be deterrents.  
 
Of greater concern is that there seems to be utter disregard and indifference by the 
political and business elites to the outcries, plights and complaints of individual 
investors and the investing public in general. A few notable examples are provided 
below (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Examples of Mistreatment of Individual Minority Investors 
 
Example 1: 
 
In June 1986 MMC, together with its subsidiary Tronoh Mines, sold its entire 42.9 per cent 
interest in Aokam Tin Bhd to a then unknown company called Halimtan Sdn. Bhd. The sale 
went through despite vociferous objections from minority shareholders that Aokam Tin was 
being sold for half its market value. 
 
 
Example 2: 
 
It is hard to see how public interest alone could justify the UEM takeover. Nor is this 
takeover part of his [Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, The Prime Minister of Malaysia] government‘s 
attempt to create a more transparent and accountable corporate environment, as 
practically every analyst quoted in Malaysia‘s docile domestic media has argued… The 
domestic press has also argued that a restructuring of Renong/UEM will help alleviate 
corporate governance concerns that have affected investor confidence in the Kuala 
Lumpur stock market. In response to the financial crisis, new institutions and regulations 
were put in place to help promote greater transparency and accountability in the corporate 
sector. The Renong Group and its controlling shareholder Halim Saad were seldom subject 
to these regulations, however.  
 
 
Example 3: 
 
The scandals were frequent. In March 2001, when the initial public offering of a Renong 
subsidiary, TimedotCom, was poorly received, much of the company‘s leftover equity was 
taken up by a few public institutions. On another occasion in 1997, UEM was used to buy 
up a massive 32.6% stake in Renong for 2.34 billion ringgit. This acquisition, implemented 
partly through a 800 million ringgit loan provided by government-owned and politically 
well-connected banks, upset UEM minority shareholders. The bailout looked like continued 
abuse of the domestic financial sector for vested interests. 
 
 
Example 4: 
 
Tan Sri Tajudin Ramli‘s claim in his court document that he was directed by the two Tuns 
(former premier Mahathir and his then economics tsar, Daim Zainudin) to buy shares in 
Malaysia Airlines (MAS) as a form of ‗national service‘ is nothing less than a bombshell. 
According to Tajudin, the transaction was to help Bank Negara recover from foreign 
exchange losses in 1994. It was however disguised as a commercial deal because the 
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government did not want to undermine investor confidence or create undue public anxiety, 
he said, adding that he was only a nominee/agent of the government in MAS.  
 
Tajudin alleged that the two Tuns had repeatedly assured him that he would not suffer any 
losses or be held liable for anything arising from his purchase of MAS shares. This special 
arrangement was to be a ‗secret‘, he claimed, although the Official Secrets Act was 
apparently not invoked. But he was spilling the beans now because the government had 
not honoured the agreement, he said.  
 
 
If his claim is true, it explains why he bought, through his firm Naluri, a 32 per cent stake in 
MAS at RM8 per share in 1994, well above the then market price of RM3.50. It was hailed 
as the biggest ever privatisation exercise at that time.  
 
After the 1998 financial crisis, the government bought back the MAS stake from Naluri at 
RM8 per share, when the market price was about RM3.  
 
Source: Adapted from Gomez (2001) and Searle (1999) 
 
The trends in the capital market described above are also closely related to the 
general national Malaysian political scenario. In this regard, Jomo (1993) has 
pointed to the heightening concentration of power and discretion in the hands of 
the political executive mostly at the expense of the bureaucracy, the legislature 
and the judiciary (resulting in weak and compromised institutions, as argued by 
Verma, 2004). This resulted in greatly enhanced state autonomy in operational 
terms, enabling the executive to make bold initiatives without seeking prior 
endorsement or support even within the state, let alone society at large (Gomez 
and Jomo, 1999).  
 
In fact, various authors have described Malaysia as having a ―semi-democratic‖ 
(Case, 1993) or ―quasi-democratic‖ or ―semi-authoritarian‖ political system (even 
though the system itself is stable). General political accountability is therefore 
lacking. Verma (2004: 159) aptly described the overall political situation:  
 
In the call to national unity, all ethnic communities are expected 
to subordinate their interests to the cause of political stability... in 
giving primacy to the reconciliation of ethnic interests the leaders 
of ethnic communities have subordinated individual rights and 
civil liberties in favour of religious-community rights. 
 
This led Crouch (1996) to describe the Malaysian political system as an 
amalgamation of both democratic and authoritarian characteristics. Another clear 
indication of this tendency is also seen in the Malaysian electoral process. Gomez 
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and Jomo (1999: 3) have summed up the opinions of authors such as Crouch et al. 
(1980), Gomez (1996) and Kassim (1979) that: 
 
Gerrymandering and other „unfair‟ electoral practices are 
considered almost routine facts of life by an increasingly cynical 
populace unaccustomed to expect otherwise. Such limitations on 
political participation have fostered a political culture with rather 
modest expectations of democracy, civic rights and public 
accountability  
 
Moreover, Gomez and Jomo (1999), Verma (2004) and Crouch (1996) have 
argued that strict control and also ownership of the docile press by both 
politically-linked businessmen and the politicians/political parties themselves, 
alongside restrictive government regulations resulted in limited public 
accountability. They further described the general intolerant official attitude 
towards criticism by ignoring and even discrediting political opposition, NGOs, 
public interest groups and trade unions through various means that include 
repression and manipulation (see Verma, 2004).  
 
Consequently, Crouch (1992), as cited in Gomez and Jomo (1999: 2), contends 
that there is  
 
Minimal protection for the individual from arbitrary state power... 
even the minimal civil liberties and democratic procedures that 
exist are only allowed as long as the position of the ruling elite is 
not seriously threatened, let alone undermined... such rights 
have been quickly modified or abolished when elite interests 
were threatened...Much of this has been legitimized by reference 
to the threat of ethnic conflict and the necessity of making such 
political sacrifices in the interests of political stability, ethnic 
harmony, economic redistribution, economic growth and 
accelerated modernisation...  
 
Translating such experiences to the corporate sector and also capital market, 
individual shareholders in Malaysia who are used to such repression probably do 
not expect corporate managers98 to behave in an accountable manner. Due to the 
very close and mutually-beneficial relationship between politicians and their 
client/patron majority shareholder/managers, effective actions are rarely (if ever) 
taken even after the reporting of corporate abuses. Indeed, it was found that most 
existing arrangements benefit powerful parties such as politicians and certain 
                                                 
98
 Most of whom are politically well-connected if not a proxy or client of politicians. 
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entrenched economic interests, to the detriment of the minority shareholders (La 
Porta et al., 2000). Also, integrity levels amongst certain Malaysian businessmen 
are observed to remain at 'developmental' levels (Jaafar Sidek, 2007c). 
 
In terms of practical consequences, it is conjectured that the propensity of 
individual shareholders in Malaysia to undertake governance-related initiatives is 
significantly reduced by (i) a lack of effective avenues to voice their grievances and 
(ii) the perception that, even if they did campaign for better governance practices 
and/or complain of mistreatment, company management, the government and 
market regulators would be mostly unresponsive (due to the fact that 
politically-linked major shareholder/managers are likely to be able to influence 
enforcement of sanctions).  
 
Therefore, it is predicted that individual shareholders (being powerless) will not 
complain or voice their grievances, even after being blatantly mistreated. 
Reporting of corporate abuses to the press and/or authorities is regarded as either 
defeatist or futile as no concrete actions would ensue. More generally, the lack of 
accountability also means that investors‘ efforts in championing for better general 
corporate governance standards within firms would probably be ignored or simply 
paid lip service to. 
 
The study also considers investors‘ perceptions regarding the likely actions/ 
motivations of other informed market participants such as brokers and auditors. 
Firstly, regulations require all share transactions to be carried out by authorised 
brokerages. Within each brokerage, each individual investor is assigned to a 
particular broker to carry out their buy/sell instructions.  
 
Many brokers/brokerages in Malaysia does (i) offer investment advice and (ii) send 
newsletters and analyst reports, to their clients. Even if a broker does not offer 
such advice formally, the relationship established between the broker and his 
individual investor clients over time is likely to be significant (in terms of influencing 
clients‘ share buy/sell decisions). As brokers profit through commissions that are 
calculated as a fixed percentage of the value of buy/sell transactions, there is an 
incentive for them to frequently promote a range of stocks to their clients solely to 
earn more profits.  
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Odean (1999) has highlighted the fact that excessive trading recorded for the 
brokerage accounts of retail individual investors probably resulted from brokers‘ 
efforts to promote churning of shares to generate more commissions. The study 
investigates investors‘ opinions regarding such an inclination that may be carried 
out at their expense. 
 
As for external auditors, Goodwin and Seow (2002) and Wallace (1980) have 
explained that they have traditionally played a key role in maintaining and 
improving the credibility of firms‘ financial disclosures. Their main function is to 
verify whether firms‘ financial statements reflect the actual states of the businesses 
in a fair manner. In fact, Fan and Wong (2005) have found that they do perform a 
corporate governance role in emerging markets such as Malaysia. 
 
Even so, external auditors have lately been implicated in a number of cases (such 
as the Transmile scandal in Malaysia) that damaged their reputations and also the 
trust that investors place in them to carry out their responsibilities with integrity and 
without conflict of interest. Basically, the study gauges individual investors‘ 
perception regarding the proper conduct of external auditors.  
 
 
3.3.2  Race- and Ethnic-based Influences 
 
Racial and ethnic considerations are particularly relevant as Malaysia is a 
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society, with Muslim Malays in the majority and 
Confucian Chinese in the minority (Pye, 1985). Even though the Malays, Chinese 
and Indians have been living together in Malaysia for more than a century, each 
race has largely preserved its own identity, traditions and cultural distinctiveness 
(Verma, 2004). Indeed, differences in inter-ethnic culture have been posited to be 
more pronounced in Malaysia compared to many other countries (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999). In fact, when comparing the Malays to the Chinese in Malaysia, Pye 
(1985: 248) has described the situation as a “confrontation of two incompatible 
cultures”.   
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More specifically, Pye (1985: 249) further explained that: 
 
The Confucian spirit demands that leaders stand up for their 
rights and proclaim their grievances…The Chinese value 
harmony and correct etiquette, but they find it exceedingly difficult 
to suffer perceived injustice without voicing anguish to somebody. 
Ideally they would like to shame the one who hurt them, but if that 
is impossible any bystander will do. It is not just that one can gain 
face by being an innocent victim, but a public scolding can also 
cause the misbehaving party to lose face. By contrast, the 
Southeast Asian (Malay, in this instance) style in dealing with 
unpleasant and even dangerous situations is one of avoidance 
and silence, of repressing emotions in the hope that the problem 
will go away if matters are smoothed over. The Malays resemble 
the Indonesians and Thais in eschewing harshness and seeking 
gentleness and refinement in human relations.  
 
In this regard, Pye (1985) provided a number of illustrations where these cultural 
differences constantly surface in the Malaysian political scene. For example, the 
factional politics of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) routinely become 
public feuds that are frequently reported in the press as every actor/group tries to 
garner sympathy for, and draw attention to, their mistreatment, claiming that they 
are completely correct in their conduct and thus innocent of all wrongdoing (Pye, 
1985: 249).  
 
On the contrary, relations among Malay leaders remain mostly unreported. This 
conveys the impression that all is harmonious, which certainly is not the case (Pye, 
1985). The Malay defence mechanism is also reflected in the tendency to make 
troublesome and/or delicate issues taboo as subjects for public debate. For them, 
talking about trouble only serves to make matters worse. It is the norm not to 
provoke authority and to attempt to stay out of its way as much as possible. In 
reality, whenever trouble arises: 
 
The Malays respond only with silence which, of course, egged on 
the Chinese to become more vocal in articulating their fears and 
their sense of injustice – a reaction which made the Malays even 
more withdrawn in their need to practice denial… At a deep 
psychological level the extreme contrasts between the ways in 
which both cultures handle anxiety are not only different but 
profoundly antagonistic. And even on the surface these cultures 
present numerous points of conflict that make Chinese and 
Malays scornful of each other. The Chinese are urban people, 
interested in money and market activities… the Malays are rural 
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and are contemptuous of merchants, prefer service careers in the 
army and police… (Pye, 1985: 250). 
 
From the viewpoint of governance, such marked differences in ethnically-based 
responses challenge the very expectations regarding the governance-related 
behavioural tendencies of individual investors. 
  
As a brief reminder, in the preceding chapter, the exercising of a shareholder‘s 
fundamental ownership rights has been shown to be an important notion in 
corporate governance (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Romano, 2000). Shareholders are 
encouraged to voice out any concerns and to communicate with management to 
improve aspects of it. This standing up for one‘s ownership rights is closely linked 
to the Western concepts of political democracy, human rights and equality (such as 
the one share, one vote concept) (Monks and Minow, 2004).  
 
From the description of ethnic-based differences in behavioural tendencies above, 
to expect or insist that investors outside of the US/UK act in a similar manner, 
however, may not be realistic. The earlier argument suggests that individual 
investors who are ethnic Chinese have a much higher likelihood of having their 
voices heard as compared to ethnic Malay ones. In fact, Malay investors are likely 
to be reserved and suffer in silence, even after being exploited or mistreated. This 
is due to their highly tolerant nature, tendency to avoid voicing of trouble and 
general reluctance to provoke authority. The study therefore predicts a much more 
active governance role being assumed by ethnic-Chinese investors as compared 
to ethnic-Malay ones, especially if they become victims of mistreatment.  
 
Considering the overall governance environment that these individual investors 
are exposed to, however, ethnic/racial influences are likely to provide only a partial 
picture of how cultural nuances could impact on individual shareholders‘ 
propensities to exhibit governance-related tendencies. This is because such 
presumptive behaviours are also moulded by the conditioning of these investors‘ 
experiences from sustained exposure to the Malaysian political, business and 
economic environment (as detailed in the preceding sections of the chapter). The 
portrayed scenario, the study contends; significantly distorts the impact of 
ethnic-based influences on individual investors‘ propensities to undertake 
governance-related investment behaviour.  
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3.3.3  Asian Financial Crisis and Unfolding Corporate Scandals 
 
The overall Malaysian corporate governance scenario described above, however, 
may have shifted in the past decade as a significant number of individual investors 
suffered massive share investment-related losses during the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis. Incidences of corporate frauds/scandals such as the aforementioned Enron 
and Transmile have also shown that rapid destruction of shareholder value can 
happen within a very short span of time whenever corporate abuses are 
discovered.  
 
Logically, for those disgruntled investors who are directly affected, they are more 
likely to undertake proactive governance-related behaviours to seek redress, 
justice and/or accountability. It is intuitively appealing to consider the possibility 
that, if governance didn‘t matter before, it would matter more than ever now. 
 
More generally, it is presumed that most individual investors have witnessed or are 
aware of the many waves of accounting scandals and corporate fraud incidences 
around the world since the turn of the 21st century (of which, Malaysia has got a 
number of its own major corporate scandals) and their devastating impacts. This 
implies that minority shareholders‘ awareness of governance concerns in East 
Asian markets should have risen. When corporate failures and abuses happen 
often, they would presumably start paying attention to or take governance-related 
factors into account. This prediction is made by also considering Malaysian 
investors‘ exposure to a decade of sustained governance reforms since the 1997 
Crisis. 
 
Such a trend can clearly be detected from the practitioner literature: 
 
Companies in emerging markets often claim that Western 
corporate governance standards don‟t apply to them. Our 
results, however, show that investors the world over are looking 
for high standards of corporate governance and will pay a 
premium for shares in companies that meet them... high 
standards of corporate governance are crucial to the value of 
companies, especially in emerging markets. (Newell and Wilson, 
McKinsey Quarterly, 2002: 23) 
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Furthermore, Malaysia has a common law legal tradition, an important element 
that should be considered as the basic governance rules/regulations (such as 
basic shareholder rights) are relatively well-established as opposed to them being 
new imports (see, for example, Allen, 2000; La Porta et al., 2000). In addition, Low 
(2004) has highlighted the fact that the Malaysian capital market is relatively 
mature within the East Asian region. Individual investors in Malaysia should 
therefore be relatively well exposed to certain aspects of governance (such as the 
right to attend AGMs and being sent proxy voting forms yearly by the various firms 
that they invest in). Put simply, awareness should be there in some shape or form. 
 
In a separate development, it is often mentioned in the financial media (Bloomberg, 
CNBC, etc) that when the economic outlook for a country worsens or the stock 
market is in a bearish phase, investors flock to companies that have strong 
fundamentals and are well-governed. Hence, governance may become more 
important in times of general economic uncertainty and/or in a bearish/declining 
stock market. 
 
Lastly, increasing investor sophistication worldwide and the decreasing cost of 
collating relevant share investment-related information (through the use of the 
internet, for example) has resulted in easier monitoring of publicly-listed 
corporations. For example, even a quick and casual search on the internet by the 
researcher has revealed that the numbers of share investment-dedicated public 
websites, blogs and investor chat forums is considerable and has been growing 
rapidly. There is also provision of governance-based updates/information by 
informed or interested parties such as the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group 
(MSWG).  
 
The increasingly prominent trends detailed above may be fundamentally changing 
investor behaviour from the governance perspective.  
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3.3 (II)  The Malaysian Governance Environment, Culture 
and Institutions (II) 
 
Returning to the main institutional environment, it must be stressed that not all 
publicly-listed corporations in the Malaysian capital market are badly governed by 
default. In fact, the literature on Malaysia‘s economic history did highlight the 
existence of such firms which do not rely on political patronage or have broken 
away from it. Gomez and Jomo (1999: 26) explained that “even though Malay 
capitalism is a complex amalgam of state, party and private capital, a core of 
productive investment and entrepreneurial activity is emerging from within the 
cocoon of state/UMNO-supported patronage networks and rent-seeking activity”. 
  
A new breed of publicly-listed firms that are both competitive and more resilient is 
also in existence. These are companies that seemingly demonstrate a genuine 
interest in improving themselves. 
 
Nevertheless, considering governance at the country-level, the importance of 
policymakers giving adequate attention to regulatory reform and the establishment 
of competent regulatory bodies cannot be overstated (Oman, 2001). This 
importance is amplified by the regulatory ―capture‖ phenomenon (occurs when 
those with responsibility to regulate a given market are corrupt or otherwise unduly 
influenced by one or a number of participants in that market). As shown by this 
study, regulatory capture is a significant and ongoing concern in Malaysia.  
 
Also, the relevance of considering the political structure and norms in Malaysia and 
their impact on publicly-listed firm governance is further justified by the following 
arguments. First, the very strength of resistance to many of the changes needed 
significantly to enhance the protection of minority shareholders‘ rights and to 
improve corporate governance often exerts itself most strongly through clientelistic 
relationship–based systems of political governance 99 . Corporate governance 
reforms (as detailed in Chapter 2)   that are seemingly impressive in the letter but 
not the spirit is a major concern (termed as ―window dressing‖ measures).  
 
                                                 
99
 Even where corporate insiders may give lip service to the need for better corporate 
governance. 
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Gomez (2001) argued that while the selective imposition of regulations on some 
enterprises has helped create the impression of a well-governed corporate sector, 
a number of oddities continue to occur. Oman (2001: 11) explained that: 
 
The close interaction between the institutions of political 
governance and those of corporate governance is clearly 
reflected in at least three ways: in the central roles of the 
legislative, regulatory and judicial bodies listed among the 
institutions of corporate governance; in the extent to which 
distributional cartels exert their power in both the economic and 
political spheres of activity in a country; and in the importance of 
the enforcement issue.  
 
As mentioned earlier, all three are characteristic of Malaysia. For example, the 
issue of captive regulators has been confirmed by the World Bank – ROSC (2001: 
6) report on the Malaysian capital market which reported that “there has been 
criticism about lack of autonomy and transparency of the regulatory authorities in 
Malaysia”.  
 
Oman (2001) contended that it is virtually impossible to move to an essentially 
rules–based system of governance in one of those sets of institutions without doing 
likewise in the other. Ultimately, they are inseparable. This situation is similar to 
that of Indonesia where Rosser (2003) found that the state apparatus and the 
owners of the major domestic conglomerates sought to block or subvert reform 
making substantive changes not possible. Political preconditions must therefore be 
suitable in order for effective reforms to take root.   
 
Consistent with the viewpoint above, Monks and Minow (2004) opined that, to the 
extent that corporate governance standards are established by public law, one 
could argue that these provisions‘ greatest value is in providing the illusion of 
accountability. Professor Park Kyung Suh (Park, 2005) also revealed at the Asian 
Roundtable on Corporate Governance the fact that there is no significant 
difference in the rules and regulations among these countries, but there is 
significant difference in terms of market perception of their governance practices.  
 
Notwithstanding such contentions, the study acknowledges the fact that there 
seems to be an increase in, or improvements to, enforcement actions by the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia (for relevant examples, please refer to 
Appendix 4). Indeed, according to CG Watch: Corporate Governance in Asia (2005) 
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(by The Asian Corporate Governance Association in collaboration with CLSA 
Asia-Pacific Markets), there seems to be much stronger political resolve in 
Malaysia to improve corporate governance standards in the country of late.  
 
From the arguments presented in Chapter 3 thus far, the study has clearly 
attempted to present a more socialised variant of agency theory. Thoughout the 
entire study, principals (i.e. investors) and also the principal-agent relationship 
remained the core concerns even though a number of contextual/institutional 
influences are introduced. Once again, this is in keeping with the viewpoint of 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2005: 1512) that “there must be a balance between 
recognising unique contextual factors and the theory of principal-agent relations”.  
 
In terms of operationalising the various issues/arguments identified thus far for an 
empirical study that explores governance from the viewpoint of individual investors, 
these are seen to lead ultimately to the issues of investors‘ trust and confidence in 
the workings of the Malaysian capital market (specifically, its various participants).  
The trust and confidence in various market participants, in turn, are argued to exert 
a profound influence on investors‘ governance-related tendencies. Elaboration is 
provided in the following section of the study. 
 
 
3.4  Trust and Confidence in the Malaysian Corporate 
System 
 
As investors‘ general experiences/expectations of governance have been shaped 
by the conditioning of the governance institutional environment over many years, 
the likely cynicism and negative perceptions regarding the likely behaviours/ 
actions of the various market participants are immensely difficult to change. 
Furthermore, reforms that may only serve as a window dressing initiative further 
cast doubt on their effectiveness in enhancing investors‘ trust and confidence in 
the market. Hence, the predicted behavioural tendencies outlined earlier are 
regarded as the entrenched, dominant norm.   
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The study adopts the viewpoint of Ryan and Buchholtz (2001) that the concept of 
trust is inextricably featured in individual investors‘ decision-making. They contend 
that an investor‘s willingness to invest is dependent upon generalised trust and 
also trust in the investment specific situation. The generalised trust of the overall 
governance environment for this group of investors is seen to be above a minimum 
required threshold. This is because, obviously, the individual investors being 
studied are not deterred enough to stay away from the capital markets altogether. 
Giannetti and Simonov (2006: 1509) have argued that “when fear of expropriation 
is not so extreme as to hinder stock market participation, an analysis could be 
carried out to evaluate whether investors take governance characteristics into 
account when they select stocks.”  
 
From the governance environment painted earlier, the underlying governance 
characteristics, constraints and/or weaknesses are seen to be reflected in the 
actions/motivations of the various capital market participants. For example, 
pervasive political involvement in business has resulted in shareholder/managers 
who are political proxies/clients being likely to undertake a range of actions that are 
detrimental to the welfare of individual investors (such as covertly siphoning assets 
and resources out of the firm) with minimal subsequent sanctions.  
 
On the other hand, individual investors are also contended to focus on certain 
market participants in directing their trust/mistrust. From the example given in the 
previous paragraph, some individual investors may be concerned with the 
governance of firms with such manager/shareholders possibly to the extent of 
avoiding such firms. 
 
Hence, investors‘ awareness, perceptions and/or opinions of the various likely 
actions/motivations of market participants must be explored as these profoundly 
influence their subsequent governance-related behavioural propensities. For 
example, the lack of trust in the actions/motivations of majority shareholder/ 
managers may be concentrated on those managers seen as political 
clients/proxies of UMNO, resulting in the adoption of the criterion of not investing in 
politically- or government-linked companies.  
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The contentions above are supported by Giannetti and Simonov (2006) who 
demonstrated that investors enjoying only security benefits (and not private 
benefits) are reluctant to hold stocks of companies where the potential for 
expropriation is expected to be large. Consequently, for companies where outside 
investors feel less protected, they tend to have narrower shareholder bases.  
 
Conversely, some investors may only invest in politically-connected firms. As is 
implicit throughout the arguments presented in the earlier sections of the chapter, 
politically-connected firms are favoured in terms of getting state/government funds 
and projects as well as have considerably higher chances of being bailed out in the 
event of corporate failure. In their empirical study on the value of political 
connections in Malaysia, Johnson and Mitton (2003) have shown that such 
connections accounted for approximately 9% of the estimated $60 billion loss in 
politically-linked Malaysian firms‘ market value during the height of the Asian 
Financial Crisis (1997/1998). This was mainly due to the reduction in expected 
value of government subsidies. 
 
Johnson and Mitton (2003) explained that as the subsequent imposition of capital 
controls in September 1998 coincided with a major political realignment, with 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad winning and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim losing (sacked and thus, lost political power and ability to provide further 
patronage), any ‗‗excess‘‘ gain for firms connected to the winner should provide a 
good measure of cronyism when capital controls measures are adopted. 
Specifically, even though firms with stronger political connections suffer more 
when a macroeconomic shock reduces the government‘s ability to provide 
privileges and subsidies, they also benefit more when capital controls are imposed 
as these allow a higher level of subsidies. 
 
In fact, Johnson and Mitton (2003) showed that when capital controls came into 
effect, approximately 32% of the estimated $5 billion gain in market value for firms 
connected to Prime Minister Mahathir can be attributed to the increase in the value 
of their connections (the value of such connections was approximately 17% of their 
total market value at the time). In terms of individual investors‘ general investment 
criteria, they may adopt the strategy of only investing in politically-connected firms. 
This arguably hampers improvements in governance as they ―reward‖ such firms 
with capital.  
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Overall, the study will initially gauge individual investors‘ awareness and 
subsequently, opinions on various capital market participant motivations/actions. If 
they are found to exhibit such awareness and/or have formed particular opinions 
regarding such motivations/actions, the study then determines whether these are 
taken into account in the form of the specific investment criteria discussed above. 
Daniel et al. (2002) contended that (perhaps due to investor credulity) investors 
typically do not discount the political motivations of more informed market 
participants. Even if they do, they tend not to discount sufficiently. 
 
Please note that the purpose of this study is not to evaluate how accurate and/or 
rational the opinions of individual shareholders of the other market participants are. 
Each opinion is seen to be equally valid as it is assumed to result in a subsequent 
concrete behaviour/decision/tendency that reflects those opinions. For example, 
an individual investor who trusts majority shareholder/managers not to exploit 
them in general would not avoid investing in companies with such dominant 
managers.  
 
From a review of relevant literature, some of the likely motivations/actions of the 
various market participants are listed in Table 3.4. Investors‘ perceptions and 
opinions regarding their likelihood of undertaking each of the listed 
motivations/actions are sought. 
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Table 3.4 The Possible Motivations/Actions of Market Participants 
 
Corporate Managers 
 
 Run the company poorly resulting in disappointing overall performance. 
 Make decisions that are against shareholders‘ interest (e.g., taking on unprofitable 
pet projects). 
 Exploit small shareholders (secretly transfer assets out of the company). 
 Involved in illegal acts (self dealing and share manipulation). 
 Providing insufficient important company information. 
 
Political Parties/Leaders/the State 
 
 Using certain companies to raise political funds through share price manipulation 
and other corrupt practices. 
 
Capital Market Regulators 
 
 Are independent (free from political influence) in carrying out their duties. 
 Carry out effective enforcement all the time. 
 
Brokers 
 
 Can be trusted not to give biased/self-interested advice to clients (honest and 
proper conduct). 
 
Auditors 
 
 Can be trusted not to approve fraudulent/misleading financial statements (honest 
and proper conduct). 
Source: Adapted and integrated from various sources including Low (2004), Oman et al. (2003), 
Searle (1999), Gomez and Jomo (1999) and Gillan and Starks (1998). 
 
Alternatively, similar to aspects of firm-level governance outlined in Chapter 2, 
some individual investors are expected to be indifferent or ignorant of the 
governance problems within the particular investment environment. This is 
expected to be rather prevalent as many authors have argued that developing 
capital markets are driven by the focus of making quick profits by trading/making 
investments based on rumours, tips and speculation. 
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3.5  Integration of Key Research Elements (II) 
 
Unlike in Chapter 2, most governance attributes considered here are country-level 
variables rather than firm-specific ones and emphasis is on how these impact 
investors‘ governance inclinations. Since the review in this chapter introduced 
various new elements to the study, integration with intentions similar to those 
provided towards the end of the previous chapter is necessary. As only notable 
additions are outlined, elements already mentioned in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are not 
repeated. 
 
In Tables 3.5 and 3.6, some of the categories have no new added elements. This is 
mainly due to the fact that a lot of the influences discussed throughout this chapter 
are meant to explain, and make sense of, (i) observed investor behaviours and (ii) 
reported underlying reasons for such behaviours. For example, no new major 
motivations for attending/not attending AGMs were identified. In Chapter 2, a 
possible reason for non-attendance (behaviour) is due to the perception that their 
presence won‘t change management behaviour (reason). In Chapter 3, one of the 
factors influencing the said reason for non-attendance is the presence of 
politically-connected shareholder/managers who are likely to be able to prevent 
any sanctions/enforcement actions if even outside investors lodge complaints with 
market regulators. 
 
Table 3.5 Integration of Key Research Elements (II) 
 
Does country-level corporate governance matter to individual investors? 
Awareness/Perception of Market Participants’ Motivations/Actions 
 
Investors‘ awareness of market participants‘ probable motivational/actions listed in Table 
3.3 are explored. For those who are aware/opinionated, the nature of their perceptions/ 
opinions regarding each considered motivations/actions is then investigated (i.e. positive or 
negative). These are evaluated in terms of the typical pubicly-listed firms and/or market 
participants that investors encounter. The aptness of opinions is not the primary concern. 
Instead, they are assumed to result in behaviours/tendencies that fairly reflect such 
perceptions.  
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 1: Pre Purchase  
Corporate Governance as General Investment Criteria  
 
Investors‘ perceptions may result in certain investment screening criteria being applied 
when making evaluations, likely to be as minimal acceptable risk thresholds in determining 
the subset of investable stocks/firms. The possible criteria are detailed below.  
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 Only invest in well-run/governed companies – Regarded as the ideal general 
governance-related criteria as the crux of governance is being concerned with the 
proper running of public-listed firms. The proportion of individual investors adopting 
this criterion will likely provide a good preliminary indication of the general 
relevance of corporate governance amongst this group. 
 Only invest in companies run by professional managers rather than big 
shareholder/managers – This is because majority shareholder/owners, by virtue of 
their majority shareholding stakes, possess much power and discretion in 
mistreating/exploiting individual investors.  
 Only invest in government/politically-linked companies – This is because such 
firms are given preferential treatment, especially in terms of securing lucrative 
government contracts. Also, there is a relatively higher possibility that the 
government/ruling coalition would not allow such entities (owned and run by their 
associates/cronies/ clients/proxies) to fail (implying bailouts when necessary). 
Hence, investing in such entities, while it exposes investors to higher likelihoods of 
abuses/mistreatment/ exploitation, may be deemed safer and/or more lucrative. 
 Only invest in non-government/non-politically linked companies – Most of these 
majority shareholder/owners are either politically well-connected or proxies/clients 
of UMNO/the government and thus, are in a position to exploit outside investors 
with minimal consequent sanctions. 
 Adopt No/No fixed investment criteria – This may be due to a lack of awareness, 
disinterest, indifference and/or lack of investor sophistication. 
 
These country-level governance criteria can be seen somewhat as a precursor to 
considering firm-specific governance factors. For example, investors who adopt the criteria 
of not investing in politically-connected firms would subsequently (i) select 
non-politically-linked firms and (ii) perhaps apply a few of the firm-specific governance 
criteria detailed in Chapter 2. 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 2: Post Purchase  
Governance as Concerns requiring Monitoring/Active Participation 
 
No new key elements identified. 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 3: Exit/Sell Out 
 
No new key elements identified. 
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Table 3.6 Integration of Key Research Elements (IIa) 
 
When does governance matter/matter more to individual investors? 
Governance as Investment Criteria under Differing Circumstances 
 
On whether governance may become more relevant under differing general 
circumstances, more scenarios have been identified. First, publicised incidents of 
corporate fraud reinforce the perception amongst investors that corporate managers are 
prone to manipulative, self-interested, fraudulent behaviour. Hence, they may pay more 
attention to governance when public company fraud happens often, especially when their 
general trust/confidence in the market is shaken. 
 
Second, the study also identified the possibility of individual investors attaching greater 
importance to firm governance in times of economic uncertainty and/or declining stock 
markets. 
 
Governance under Extreme Scenario 
The study contends that many investors do not have first-hand experiences of, or are not 
aware of, being outright victims of massive, outright expropriation. This is because of the 
covert/secretive nature of various forms of exploitations of investors. 
 
Therefore, to gauge the likelihood of individual investors undertaking governance-related 
behaviours after having suffered massive investment losses due to blatant exploitation, an 
extreme case scenario is developed. The scenario‘s design is deliberately generic so that it 
resonates with investors exhibiting varying levels of expertise and experiences.  
 
The study explores (i) investors‘ tendency to either keep or dispose of affected shares and 
(ii) their latent propensity to complain. Ethnic-Malay investors are expected to keep quiet 
and suffer in silence while Chinese ones are likely to complain to family and friends. 
Responses are also contingent upon investors‘ perceptions regarding the likely 
actions/motivations of other market participants. 
 
In terms of more formal responses, the shareholder activism literature has indicated a few 
possibilities. One is simply to do nothing (take no formal/official/legal action). Probable 
reasons include investors being unsure of how to seek redress; expectations that corporate 
managers will not respond anyhow; perceptions that authorities will not take any actions 
(failing/unwilling to carry out their enforcement duties); or it is simply not in one‘s culture to 
complain.  
 
The alternatives to doing nothing include (i) attend the company‘s AGM or demand an EGM 
(to voice dissatisfaction and demand accountability), (ii) send a formal complaint letters to 
firm management, (iii) file a formal complaint with market regulators (e.g., Securities 
Commission) and/or (iv) use the media (e.g., newspapers) to protest or highlight one‘s 
plight. 
 
 
 
3.6  Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter began with an exploration of Malaysia‘s unique cultural, political, 
institutional and governance environment. The attributes of environmental factors 
are argued to be unique for each country (path dependent and embedded within 
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the social contexts). Actor-centred governance, which emphasises  the nature of 
interactions between the different market participants, was then introduced. 
Understanding of these factors is essential in order to make sense of investors‘ 
governance propensities in the Malaysian capital market.  
 
In the following section, an outline is given of the major characteristics of 
Malaysia‘s capital market, that is, (i) primary governance concern is the potential 
conflict between majority and minority shareholders, (ii) a business culture based 
on relationships and (iii) substantial political involvement in business. The study 
then showed that the Malaysian political and corporate environment had 
undergone fundamental changes in the past few decades which profoundly 
shaped and/or altered investors‘ perceptions, expectations and also behaviours.  
 
The study subsequently examined some of the most important environmental 
factors beginning with political involvement in business. Due to wide disparities 
between the majority Malays who are economically backward and the 
economically-dominant minority Chinese, the NEP was adopted. Various policies 
explicitly benefiting the Malays were implemented to correct the imbalance. In 
administering NEP policies, an intimate relationship was forged between the state, 
the dominant political party (UMNO) and business resulting in the blurring of 
boundaries between business, politics and the state. 
 
With UMNO being the main medium for both capital accumulation and distribution, 
instead of producing a Malay middle-class, created a select (elite) group of Malay 
businessmen being clients/proxies of powerful political patrons seeking 
quasi-rents and other forms of unearned rewards. Political involvement in business 
has entrenched systems of patronage and money politics. This contributed to 
widespread corruption that sapped the confidence of ―genuine‖ investors.  
 
Indeed, the ruling political elite, their corporate clients/proxies (most being major 
shareholder/managers) and market regulators were involved in numerous blatant 
scandalous, manipulative and even fraudulent activities in the capital markets. 
There seems to be utter disregard and indifference to the outcries, plights and 
complaints of individual investors. Various examples and also the channels/means 
by which these are carried out were then provided. 
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More generally, strict control, discrimination and also intimidation of stakeholder 
groups in society coupled with the limited imperative to demonstrate public 
accountability have produced individual shareholders who are used to such 
repression. These investors are likely not to protest or even expect market 
participants (especially politically-linked majority shareholder/owners) to behave in 
an accountable manner. Clearly, country-level governance attributes/concerns 
/issues do impact investors‘ governance propensities.  
 
The second concern is race- and ethnic-based influences. The study attempted to 
make the case that investors belonging to a particular ethnic group have 
inclinations that are very different to those of other groups; this includes the 
likelihood of complaining and demanding accountability after being exploited. Even 
so, these inclinations are also moulded by the conditioning from sustained 
exposure to the Malaysian institutional environment.  
 
The study also suggested that individual investors‘ perceptions may have shifted 
post 1997 Asian Crisis. When corporate failures and abuses happen often, 
investors would presumably start taking governance into account. Increasing 
investor sophistication and the lowering cost of collating investment-related 
information may also be fundamentally changing investors‘ governance 
tendencies. As basic governance rules and mechanisms have been established 
for some time, investors are likely to possess some degree of awareness of them.  
 
Next, the researcher elaborated on the notion that individual investors‘ awareness, 
perceptions, opinions and experiences of corporate governance (from their 
exposure to the Malaysian governance environment) are reflected through their 
views regarding the motivations and actions of various market participants. 
Individual investors are expected to exhibit a range of behaviours/actions/ 
tendencies that fairly reflect the kinds of perceptions/opinions reported. 
 
In the next chapter, the study explores investors‘ personal attributes and 
tendencies instead. Specifically, scrutiny is on their demographic attributes, 
psychological tendencies and other investment-related preferences and stylistics. 
Similar to the aims of the current chapter, individual attributes are utilised to make 
better sense of investors‘ propensities to consider governance and/or undertake 
governance-related actions.  
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Chapter 4 Review 3: Personal Attributes and 
Preferences Influencing Investors’ 
Governance-related Behaviour 
 4.1  Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter explores various aspects of investors‘ personal investment-related 
attributes and tendencies. These include demographic attributes, psychological 
tendencies, investment motivations/objectives and investment preferences/ 
stylistics (for example, preferred investment strategies). In terms of the conceptual 
framework established, the relevant aspects being dealt with are highlighted 
(shaded) in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1 Focus of Chapter within the Conceptual Framework of Study (III) 
 
The Malaysian Governance Institutional, Cultural and Political Environment 
 
. 
                                                 The Share          Investment Cycle 
 
Stage 1: 
Pre-Purchase 
 
Stage 2: 
Post-Purchase 
 
Stage 3: 
Exit/Sell Off 
 
Stage 4: 
Post-Investment 
 
Individual Investors’ Propensities to Consider Governance and/or Undertake 
Governance-related Actions/Initiatives 
 
 
 
Investors’ Personal Attributes 
Motivations/Objectives/Preferences/Stylistics 
. 
 
The exploration of individual investor attributes is geared toward (i) determining 
their respective influences on investors‘ propensities in considering governance or 
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undertaking governance-related actions and (ii) utilising them as test variables to 
uncover potential biases within the study‘s sample of respondents.  
 
Subsequently, in order to make better sense of and integrate the various personal 
attributes considered, the study examines whether investors who adopt a 
particular investment strategy also exhibit distinctive (i) governance inclinations 
and (ii) combination of personal investment preferences/inclinations/stylistics, as 
compared to those adopting other strategies. Distinctiveness stems from the 
intrinsic nature of each investment strategy which is seen to be the embodiment 
and/or outgrowth of particular sets of behavioural tendencies/preferences. Put 
simply, the researcher investigates the indicative qualities of the main investment 
strategies to determine whether they can be used as grouping/anchor variables. 
 
Since very little is known about this investor group and access to them is difficult to 
establish, the study takes advantage of this opportunity to explore (i.e. to collect 
data on) other aspects of their investment-related attributes/practices for future 
studies. These are summarised towards the end of the chapter. 
 
Finally, similar to the integrative treatments accorded to the various attributes/ 
inclinations/issues in Chapters 2 and 3, an attempt is made systematically to link 
the many personal investment-related inclinations, preferences and stylistics 
detailed throughout the chapter. Again, this serves to provide an explication of how 
they are featured in the interviews and questionnaire.  
 
 
4.2  Investors’ Personal Attributes and Corporate 
Governance 
 
Apart from the argument that individual investors‘ governance-related behavioural 
inclinations are rational responses to external influences such as (i) the general 
governance institutional environment and/or (ii) the particular firm-specific 
governance concerns faced/perceived, identified inclinations may also be 
consequences of distinctive individual investment-related practices. Specifically, 
personal attributes such as an investor‘s share investment objectives, preferences, 
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stylistics and/or psychological tendencies may explain the relative probabilities of 
them undertaking governance-related behaviour.  
 
The contention that individual investors‘ personal biases/preferences/stylistics 
influence their decision-making processes throughout the typical investment cycle 
clearly departs from the classic assumption of perfect investor rationality in both 
modern economics and standard finance (Hong and Stein, 1999; Shapira and 
Venezia, 2001; Nicolosi et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2006). Nofsinger (2008: 1) 
explained that “traditional finance theory assumes that people make rational 
decisions to maximise their wealth in the face of risk and uncertainty. Because 
money is involved, reason and logic will overcome emotion and psychological 
biases”.  
 
This study does not subscribe to the rationality assumption as it endeavours to 
capture real-life behavioural tendencies of actual investors who likely do not 
conform to such ideal theoretical standards (see, for example, Quill, 2001). Fisher 
and Statman (1997: 45) argued that “it is no more reasonable to expect investors to 
be concerned only about risk and return when constructing a portfolio than it is to 
expect them to be concerned only about cost and nutrition when deciding what to 
eat.”  
 
Indeed, Brennan (1995) stressed the need to distinguish between the conceptual 
rational-representative investor who is perfectly knowledgeable with real-life 
investors who frequently do not possess such expertise. Moreover, investors are 
faced with limitations in terms of attention, time, resources and information 
processing capacity (Brennan, 1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) suggesting 
that they do not consider (or, more practically, could not possibly consider) all 
publicly available information (Barber and Odean, 2006). In economics, such 
limitations in human capacity are typically described by the term ―bounded 
rationality‖ (Letza and Sun, 2002; Williamson, 1985b). 
 
Investors‘ irrationality is well-reflected in the growing prominence of behavioural 
finance, the literature stream that documents various psychological biases 
exhibited by investors. Various studies in this tradition have supported the many 
arguments and predictions made in Chapter 3 of the study where investors (i) who 
operate within a particular context and (ii) with different personal attributes (such 
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as ethnicity) have differing investment-related behavioural tendencies and biases. 
For example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) have shown that individual investors 
in Finland are more likely to invest in the stocks of Finnish firms that (i) 
communicate in the investors‘ native tongue and (ii) have CEOs of the same 
background. 
 
Overall, there is a strong body of evidence showing that investors are irrational in 
the aggregate rather than being just random/chance events (Subrahmanyam, 
2007; Hirshleifer, 2001; Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Daniel et al., 2002; Statman, 
1999; Jackson, 2003; Shleifer, 2000). In fact, Jackson (2003) has clearly 
demonstrated that the peculiar actions of millions of individual investors in 
Australia are highly correlated across 56 unrelated brokerage firms. Highly 
correlated investment behaviour of retail investors has also been documented 
across a number of distinct studies (see, for example, Feng and Seasholes, 2004 – 
investors within a certain geographic region within China; Barber et al., 2003 – 
sample of individual investors based in the US; Kumar and Lee, 2006 – retail 
investors at a major US discount brokerage house). For an extensive review of the 
behavioural finance literature stream, please refer to Daniel et al. (2002).  
 
Even so, barring select studies such as those by Lease et al. (1974), Lewellen et al. 
(1977), and Schlarbaum et al. (1978), previous individual investor studies have 
mostly disregarded investors‘ initial investment motivations, objectives and how 
they actually go about evaluating their share investments.  
 
Mayall (2006: 126) explained that: 
 
...in the field of behavioural finance, research tends to have 
focused not on share traders‟ initial motivations, influences or 
overall stylistic practices, but rather upon their decision 
frameworks once they embark upon specific buying and selling 
strategies (and particularly decisions which appear “irrational”, 
such as overtrading or not maximizing profit opportunities, for 
example Shefrin and Statman (1993), Odean (1998), Barber and 
Odean (1999; 2000)).  
 
Hence, exploration of personal attributes such as investment goals, mindset and 
other preferred investment practices on a firsthand basis is also partly spurred by 
the fact that little is actually known about individual investors (Vieru et al., 2006; 
Clark-Murphy and Soutar, 2004; Warneryd, 2001) along the aforementioned 
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dimensions. The classic description by Lewellen et al. (1977: 288) given below 
remains valid to this day: 
 
...virtually all we believe we know about the individual investor‟s 
circumstances and decision processes has been inferred from 
either broad trading statistics, general security price movements, 
or portfolio simulations. With few exceptions, very little in the way 
of explicit observation has been attempted – due undoubtedly to 
the fact that the necessary data are exceedingly difficult to 
acquire.  
 
 
Further substantiating the claims above, Wood and Zaichkowsky (2004) 
highlighted that only a handful of studies have attempted directly to approach 
individual investors thus far (e.g. Dorn and Huberman, 2002; Dorn and Huberman, 
2005; Clark-Murphy and Soutar, 2004; Nagy and Obenberger, 1994). Indeed, how 
individual investors in reality form their mental models of the operations of capital 
markets remains a mystery (Brennan, 1995). 
 
In fact, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) showed that some individual investors do 
consider other company characteristics besides risk and returns and that 
governance may matter in such a context (i.e. investors‘ equity selection process).  
 
This study is also the first attempt to explore a range of individual investor 
behaviours and interpret as well as integrate them from a distinct, unifying 
perspective, that of corporate governance. Moreover, Kim and Nofsinger (2003) 
highlighted the need to explore further individual investor behaviour in cultures that 
are entirely distinct from Western culture. Notable exceptions include the study of 
individual investors‘ investing behaviour in China by Chen et al. (2005) and in 
Taiwan by Lin (2005).  
 
The current study addresses all the gaps identified above. Besides viewing them 
as potential influences on investors‘ general propensities to consider governance 
or undertake governance-related actions, the various individual investor attributes 
also serve a few specific purposes. First, they are utilised to act as test variables 
for potential significant biases within the study‘s individual investor sample. This 
treatment is necessary largely due to the way the study‘s investor sample is drawn, 
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especially considering the study‘s claim of partial representativenes100. Specifically, 
investor respondents are drawn from a number of participating brokerages, each 
being geographically distinct and have clients (i.e. investors) who may be distinct 
from those of other brokerages in certain respects101. 
 
Second, the study examines the suitability of investors‘ primary investment 
strategies being indicative variables that fairly predict investors‘ relative 
propensities to consider governance and/or undertake governance-related 
behaviours. If such strategies are indeed shown to exhibit indicative qualities, the 
study will be able to gauge the prevalence of governance amongst the wider 
individual investor population in Malaysia. In addition, governance researchers in 
the future could easily obtain preliminary indications of the overall relevance/ 
importance of governance amongst any population, groups or subgroups of 
individual investors operating within different environments by the use of such 
anchor variables. 
 
 
4.3  Investors’ Demographic Attributes 
 
This study has highlighted the fact that little is actually known about individual 
investor characteristics in developing capital markets such as Malaysia. Notable 
exceptions are the recent work by Feng and Seasholes (2005) who presented 
certain demographic attributes of individual investors in China and Lin (2005) who 
investigated investor overconfidence in Taiwan.  
 
Through a review of literature on individual investors, personal attributes that are 
typically of interest are – age; gender; race; income; wealth (net worth); level of 
education; years of share investment experience; state/region of residence; and 
amount of financial knowledge (see, for example, Dorn and Huberman, 2005). 
Clark-Murphy and Soutar (2004) have referred to these as the background 
characteristics of investors.  
 
                                                 
100
 For more details regarding the claim of partial representativeness, please refer to 
Chapter 5. 
101
 For detailed explication, please refer to Chapter 5. 
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The collection of individual investors‘ demographics aids in achieving the study‘s 
primary aims. For example, the contention that ethnic-Chinese investors exhibit a 
higher propensity for governance in terms of seeking redress post exploitation102 
can only be explored if respondents can be divided along the ethnic dimension.  
 
Secondly, as mentioned in Section 4.2, these demographic attributes are also 
utilised to test for significant differences and/or potential biases between individual 
investor respondents that are attached to the different participating brokerages. 
 
 
4.4  Investors’ Psychological Attributes 
 
The consideration of some of the major psychological attributes typically exhibited 
by individual investors (as theorised, described and empirically explored by the 
behavioural finance literature stream) is aimed at satisfying objectives that are 
similar to those for demographic attributes.  
 
 
4.4.1  Risk-taking Propensity 
 
The field of finance subscribes to the notion that “risk is at the centre of all 
investment decisions” (Bernstein, 2007: ix). Another fundamental idea in traditional 
finance is the trade-off preference between risk and return (Baker et al., 1977). 
Hence, the greater the amount of risk that an investor is willing to take on, the 
greater the potential return. Investors view this as compensation for taking 
on additional risk. 
 
Notwithstanding the very detailed and specific examination of investors‘ risk-taking 
propensities (ex post risk-return relationships) in past empirical studies, the current 
study only explores the risk-averse/seeking tendencies of individual investors in 
Malaysia in a generalised manner. As emphasis is on investment behaviours 
arising out of individual preferences, the variable of interest is investors‘ 
pre-investment (ex ante) risk preferences through their self-reported general 
                                                 
102
 Please refer to Chapter 3. 
139 
 
investment risk attitude (broadly along the lines of Baker et al., 1977 and Cohn et 
al., 1975).  
 
In terms of the interplay between governance and risk, the study subscribes to the 
view of Monks and Minow (2004) that corporate governance should be properly 
understood as an element of risk. An implication is that for those investors who 
take certain aspects of governance into account, regardless of whether they are 
risk-seeking or risk-averse (i.e. irrespective of their individual risk preference 
levels), such considerations are meant to lessen the relative amounts of risk that 
they would otherwise have taken.  
 
Alternatively, some risk-seeking investors may be more inclined to purchase 
speculative shares and/or are solely concerned with fluctuations in share prices, 
regardless of what goes on in the companies that shares are supposed to reflect. It 
is also possible that some investors who do consider certain attributes of the 
underlying firms may not consider governance-related aspects. 
  
Investors‘ relative risk-propensities will be examined within the context of their 
primary investment strategies later in the chapter. 
 
 
4.4.2  Mental Accounting 
 
Individual investors‘ actual share portfolios are likely to be made up of distinct 
subdivisions (Nofsinger, 2008; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). It is intuitively 
appealing to expect that certain tranches of shares are bought with different 
intentions in mind. For example, some may be aimed at generating stable dividend 
streams to build up savings for retirement while some are for gambling/speculative 
purposes.  
 
Undoubtedly, investors would likely treat certain tranches of shares within their 
portfolio intended for short-term speculation in a markedly different manner than 
those that he/she intends to keep for the long-term. This practice is termed by 
proponents of behavioural finance as ―Mental Accounting‖. This concept is 
explained by Nofsinger (2008: 50) in that “…mental accounting leads to building of 
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portfolios layer by layer. Each layer represents the investment choices that satisfy 
various mental accounts. This process allows investors to meet the goals of each 
mental account separately...”  
 
According to Shefrin and Statman (1985), mental accounting is where decision 
makers tend to segregate and apply decision rules to each investment that they 
make separately. Each investment decision is largely independent of the natures, 
goals and also performances of other shares in his/her overall portfolio. Similarly, 
Kumar and Lim (2007: 1) mentioned that  
 
The extant evidence from psychological research suggests that 
people tend to consider each decision as unique, often isolating 
the current choice from their other choices. In other words, 
people often engage in narrow framing (e.g., Kahneman and 
Lovallo (1993), Kahneman (2003)), where the interactions 
among multiple decisions are often ignored.  
 
The above arguments justify the study‘s focus on firm-specific governance in 
Chapter 2.  
 
Practically, the study explores the prevalence of such ―divisions‖ within investors‘ 
portfolios by scrutinising the general proportions of investors‘ share portfolios that 
are devoted to speculative/gambling purposes. This is because it is argued that 
developing capital markets such as Malaysia are normally rife with rumour/ 
speculation driven trading (Low, 2004). Implicit is the suggestion that the gambling 
mindset is likely to be prevalent amongst Malaysian investors. This, in turn, would 
mean that segregation along the gambling vs. investment dimension is likely to be 
applicable to most sampled investors‘ portfolios. 
 
From a governance perspective, investors are encouraged to make investment 
decisions based on company fundamentals and not listen to unsubstantiated, 
short-term and attention-grabbing rumours and speculation. Hence, it is predicted 
that the higher the proportion of an investors‘ portfolio being devoted to 
gambling/speculation, the more compelled he/she generally is in disregarding 
corporate governance. 
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4.4.3  Overconfidence 
 
One of the most well-established phenomena in investor psychology is 
overconfidence. It points to the tendency of an investor overestimating his/her 
ability in performing specific actions/tasks. According to Odean (1999), share 
selection can be a difficult task, and is it mainly in such difficult activities that people 
tend to show the greatest overconfidence. Overconfidence usually occurs when 
investors have experienced a degree of success in their investments (Nofsinger, 
2008). It is also found that culture can breed overconfidence as reflected by 
evidence that people raised in Asian cultures exhibit more overconfidence than 
people from the US (Yates et al., 1997).  It would be interesting to explore such a 
tendency amongst Malaysian investors. 
 
As overconfidence can be the result of a number of psychological biases, the study 
will try to capture this phenomenon by jointly investigating three of the main 
sources of overconfidence attributable to investors who actively make their own 
share investment decisions. According to Nofsinger (2008), these include:  
 
 Self-Attribution – describes the situation where investors believe that 
investment successes are attributed to their own skill while any failure is 
caused by bad luck. 
 Illusion of Control – People often believe they have influence over the 
outcome of uncontrollable events. Key factors that foster the illusion of 
control are choice, outcome sequence, task familiarity, information and 
active involvement.  
 Illusion of Knowledge – This refers to the tendency for people to believe 
that the accuracy of their forecasts increases with more information; that is, 
more information increases one‘s knowledge about something and 
improves one‘s decisions. However, this is not always the case. Relative 
financial knowledge is also treated as representation of individual investors‘ 
general levels of investment sophistication (Dorn and Huberman, 2002; 
Daniel et al., 2002). 
 
From the perspective of corporate governance, the variable of particular interest is 
the degree of perceived knowledge (proxied by the Illusion of Knowledge bias 
outlined above). This is because, due to the fundamentals-based evaluation 
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required for taking certain aspects of governance into account, investors who are 
more knowledgeable are predicted to be more likely to be able to take governance 
into account (implying higher probabilities of possessing the necessary knowledge 
and expertise to evaluate aspects of a firm‘s governance).  The study explores 
indications of such a relationship indirectly, through the use of primary investment 
strategies.  
 
Moreover, the degree of perceived knowledge will be compared to another related 
variable that is Degree of Actual Knowledge (by testing investors‘ actual ability to 
explain certain market-related financial concepts). This is to explore whether 
investors who perceive themselves as more knowledgeable than the average 
investor do indeed possess more financial knowledge rather than just being a 
consequence of overconfidence. In addition, the study also investigates whether 
investors who possess higher amounts of actual knowledge/financial expertise are 
more likely to consider governance.  
 
 
4.5  Individual Investor Preferences and Stylistics 
4.5.1  Investment Motivations and Objectives  
 
From previous studies on individual investors, economic considerations such as 
increases in share prices and also stable income streams from dividend payouts 
form the dominant motivations and/or objectives of investors investing in shares. 
This makes perfect sense as the very act of investing is mainly to generate 
acceptable returns. The major investment objectives considered by this study, as 
proposed by Lease et al. (1974) include (i) short-term share price increase, (ii) 
long-term share price increase and (iii) dividend income. 
 
From the perspective of corporate governance, it is predicted that investors who 
are more concerned with long-term increase in share prices and dividend income 
are more likely to consider governance-related factors and/or undertake 
governance-related behaviours. This is because governance is concerned with 
corporate managers/directors displaying accountability and putting in place the 
right systems and processes to ensure that the right decisions are made at the 
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right time; and the focus is on improving the company‘s operations with the 
ultimate aims of generating superior returns for shareholders in a sustainable 
manner over the long-term. Indeed, Bushee et al. (2004) explained that the 
benefits of good governance usually manifest/materialise over the longer term. 
 
On the contrary, investors with relatively short investment horizons are predicted to 
play no role in proactive governance. This is because such investors would have 
sold out long before any discernable benefits/impact of better governance 
practices and/or corporate performance (as a result of proactive investor efforts) 
could materialise.  
 
An alternative to either being indifferent towards governance or being proactive in 
considering and/or furthering it; individual investors with both short- and long-term 
investment motivations/objectives may simply take aspects of governance into 
account in the form of general investment criteria.  
 
In their respective samples of individual investors, Lease et al. (1974) and Jackson 
(2003) found that respondents were primarily concerned about long-term gains in 
share prices and had little interest in short-term increases. The two studies are 
based in the US and Australia respectively. The current study expects to find 
relative importance attached to each of the major investment objectives to be 
different in the case of Malaysian investors considering the prevailing viewpoint 
that such developing capital markets are driven more by speculative and rumour- 
based trading (Low, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, some of these individual investors are portrayed as being solely 
transfixed by fluctuations in share price over the short term while paying scant 
attention to the underlying companies whose values these shares supposedly 
reflect (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This suggests that investor indifference 
towards governance is likely to be a significant tendency. 
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4.5.2  Attention-based Trading and the Exit Decision 
 
In this section, the study considers a range of market signals and also 
psychological tendencies that specifically influence investors‘ decision on whether 
or not to sell the shares that they already own. In particular, the impact of 
attention-grabbing information circulating in the market on at least some of the 
sell-out decisions is explored. This phenomenon of attention-induced share trading 
(i.e. buying and selling) is well documented by many behavioural finance 
researchers (see, for example, Barber and Odean, 2006). The main idea is that at 
least some of investors‘ sell-out decisions are influenced by the receipt of certain 
attention-grabbing information circulating in the market.  
 
Consistent with the earlier prediction that certain non-governance influences may 
affect investors‘ share purchasing decisions (i.e. rumours predicting an imminent 
rise in share prices) and also how such influences impact investors‘ 
governance-related tendencies, the study scrutinises the influences of 
unconfirmed tips/insider information/rumours predicting (i) an imminent fall in the 
share price or (ii) that the company‘s business operations are declining on 
investors‘ propensities to sell out/exit. These often sensational but unsubstantiated 
pieces of information undoubtedly grab investors‘ attention.  
 
The current study views these as ―distractions‖ (to proactive governance in 
particular) as they trigger a heightened tendency to sell as the perceived risk of an 
imminent fall in share price increases even at the expense of good potential 
long-term value appreciation (as well-governed firms presumably exhibit superior 
long-term firm performance). It is intuitively appealing to assume that, from the 
standpoint of investors, regardless of whether such rumours/speculations are 
well-founded or otherwise, negative news/speculation are equated to higher 
chances of share price declines. Within the described context, it is deemed more 
preferable to lock-in gains or incur less losses (by selling out) rather than adopting 
a seemingly more risky, wait-and-see attitude to confirm the validity of such 
information. 
 
Investors who value governance would ideally only rely on actual company 
announcements and other substantiated/official sources of information rather than 
basing their investment decisions on unsubstantiated/speculative information. 
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Similar to the influence of rumours/speculation on the share purchasing decision, 
attention-based psychological biases are regarded as distractions to more stable, 
long-term ownership of shares and points towards short-termism. As investors in 
emerging markets are seen to be more speculative and prone to rumour-driven 
trades (Low, 2004), the tendencies above are expected to be rather pronounced 
amongst individual investors in Malaysia. 
 
Next, the study considers the decision to exit when a company‘s recent operating 
performance or other fundamentals have in fact taken a turn for the worse. It is 
presumed that for investors who are solely concerned with share price fluctuations 
rather than the companies that the shares supposedly represent, worsening 
fundamentals or operating performance would not have a significant impact on 
their selling decisions. They are simply not interested in these developments.  
 
As for individual investors who do report a heightened tendency to sell out due to 
worsening fundamentals, this is an indication that they do take firm governance- 
and/or performance-related factors into account (this tendency is also considered 
in Chapter 2). Higher probabilities to sell out also point to two further possibilities.  
 
One possibility is that aspects of governance, as argued earlier, are mostly used as 
investment criteria where investors choose firms that are well-governed103  or 
well-performing. When these aspects deteriorate, decline and/or are found to be 
ineffective, they would simply sell out (the famed ―Wall Street Walk‖, as explained 
by Kim and Nofsinger, 2004) rather than engaging in governance-related activist 
behaviours to campaign/lobby for the necessary improvement to be made. In 
addition, this particular tendency acts as a complement to investor‘s self-reported 
propensities to sell their shares rather than pressuring management to improve 
performance. 
 
Lastly, as individual investors are often seen as being unsophisticated and 
possibly irrational, there is a possibility that the decision to sell out is due to other 
motivations/reasons not consistent with rational analysis, reasoning or significant 
company-related developments (the notion of noise trading, as explained by 
Shleifer and Summers, 1990). This is where investors exit without any 
attention-grabbing information (substantiated or otherwise). In behavioural finance, 
                                                 
103
 Along the specific dimensions that they do consider 
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the phenomenon where an investor makes financial decisions depending on 
background feelings or mood that are unrelated to the investment itself is termed 
as misattribution bias (Nofsinger, 2008).  
 
 
4.5.3  Average Shareholding Period 
 
Average Shareholding Period provides an indication of the likely timeframe a 
typical tranche of shares is owned. It is duly acknowledged that this is a rather 
crude measure as ownership length for each tranche of shares is dependent upon 
what and when various changes take place (for example, changes in price trends 
and announcements of new and significant company developments). Even so, the 
average shareholding period could serve as a useful indication of the underlying 
preference/mindset that an investor adopts in terms of share ownership. For 
example, an investor with an average shareholding period of two years would 
clearly have a very different investment approach to one who own shares for a 
typical timeframe of days.  
 
It is also acknowledged that authors such as Hull (1997) have argued that these 
differing timeframes attributed to the trader/investor versus owner/shareholder 
mindset is overlapping and misleading. Nevertheless, such typical shareholding 
periods can be compared to these individual investors‘ initial investment objectives 
and mindset to gauge their perceptions of what the term ―long-term‖ and 
―short-term‖ really entails. Hence, the average shareholding period is only 
evaluated in terms of the exhortation of governance in adopting long-term, stable 
shareholdings where shareholders see themselves more as long-term owners.  
 
This measure is also related to the concept of portfolio churning or turnover 
(Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Dorn and Huberman, 2005) which calculates the 
percentage of shares held a year before that are still being held at the present day. 
For example, an average shareholding period of six months would imply that the 
share portfolio is turned over approximately twice per year.  
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4.5.4  Primary Investment Strategies 
 
One of only a select few empirical studies that directly investigated the issue of 
individual investors‘ investment strategies is Lease et al. (1974) which investigated 
often-pursued investment strategies of US household investors. These 
approaches are found to be highly similar to those often mentioned in, and are the 
subjects of choice for, many publications in the popular business and investment 
press (see, for example, Elder, 1993; Tier, 2006; Lynch and Rothchild, 2001; 
Graham and Dodd, 2009; Graham, 2006). Such strategies include the fundamental 
approach; technical approach; a combination of fundamental and technical 
approaches; and reliance on outside parties such as stock brokers and investment 
newsletters.  
 
Another indication of their widespread popularity is the frequent use of such terms 
and also discussions of such strategies in (i) the financial and business media 
(including CNN, CNBC and Bloomberg) and (ii) share investment-related blogs, 
chat forums and user communities on the internet (including Malaysian-based 
investment sites). 
 
Each of these investment strategies can be seen as an expression of an investor‘s 
fundamental beliefs of how capital markets work and subsequently, the means to 
exploit such workings to generate above average returns (to ―beat the market‖, as 
explained by Statman, 1999 and Bernstein, 2007). A good description of the critical 
impact of individual investors‘ investment philosophy, and consequently strategy, 
is given by Tier (2006: 14): 
 
Think about what you believe moves markets. Do prices reflect 
fundamentals? If so, in the short-term or the long-term? Or both? …Or 
maybe you believe that prices have little or nothing to do with 
fundamentals at all; that what moves prices is investor psychology. Or 
the balance between the number of shares of a particular stock being 
offered for sale and how many buyers are interested in it at any 
particular moment. If you‟re a technical analyst you might believe that 
all of this is irrelevant and everything is “in the chart”. 
 
Hence, whether investors actually consider governance-related factors and their 
relative propensities for undertaking governance-related behaviours partly 
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depends on their personal investment philosophy/understanding regarding the 
workings of the market, expressed through their choices of investment strategies.  
 
This study contends that the primary investment strategies pursued by investors 
offer fairly good indications of the relevance/importance of governance to them. In 
addition, each primary investment strategy is presumed to be utilised by investors 
who share certain distinctive characteristics.  
 
The first two major strategies considered by Lease et al. (1974) are the 
fundamental and technical approaches which require individual investors to 
conduct their own analysis on certain information available that is relevant to the 
stock being evaluated. Some investors are also found to adopt strategies that 
involve elements of both fundamental and technical approaches.  
 
As an alternative to the three strategies which require some degree of effort 
(carrying out analysis, however simple or complicated it may be), an individual 
investor might take ―short cuts‖ and adopt easily implementable strategies when 
choosing which shares to purchase (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The 
behavioural finance literature has coined the term Heuristic Simplification to 
describe such a phenomenon (Nofsinger, 2008; Kumar and Lim, 2007).  
 
The assumption for these strategies is that no significant amounts of 
research/analysis are involved. Indeed, Kumar and Lim (2007) and Kahneman 
(2003) have explained that when people use simple heuristics and make decisions 
in an intuitive manner, they adopt the most readily available decision frame. For the 
purposes of this study, such simplified approaches are divided into 
attention-based, reputation-based and reliance-based strategies.  
 
The validity/rationality of investors‘ respective views of how markets work is of 
lesser importance, rather emphasis is on the fact that such views are expressed in 
their investment behaviours through use of particular strategies.  
 
Each of the aforementioned investment strategies is discussed below.  
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4.5.4.1 Fundamental Analysis 
 
Fundamental analysis of a public-listed firm involves analysing its financial 
statements and health, its management and competitive advantages as well as the 
firm‘s competitors and markets. According to Penman (2004: 3), for investors who 
purchase shares in such firms, their primary concern is “the amount to pay – the 
value of the shares... the analysis of information that focuses on valuation is called 
valuation analysis, fundamental analysis”.  
 
As described by Lease et al. (1974) in their study of individual investors in the US, 
aspects of a firm that are normally scrutinised by those investors adopting this 
strategy include company prospects and outlook, earnings, dividends, quality of 
management, amongst others. Obviously, the strategy is primarily based on the 
notion of generating good investment returns by selecting publicly-listed 
companies that are stable, well-run, have solid performance and also bright future 
prospects. 
 
Alternatively, fundamentals-based investors look for companies whose shares are 
seen to be mispriced by the market (specifically, undervalued) in the sense that its 
price level does not fully account for the perceived underlying strength of its 
fundamentals and/or its future prospects/performance.  Profits can be made by 
investing in the mispriced shares and then waiting for the market to recognise its 
"mistake" and re-price the security (see, for example, Penman, 2004). The 
contention is that, at some point in the not-too-distant future, share prices will shift 
to a level that broadly reflects what the investor perceives as the firms‘ respective 
fundamental values.  
 
Due to its very nature (i.e. being concerned with quality of management, for 
example), investors who make use of fundamental analysis for investment 
decision-making are naturally inclined to place great importance on aspects of 
publicly-listed firm governance. This is because governance provides the 
underlying facilitative structures and processes. For example, being concerned 
with the quality and capability of firm managers can be supported by considering 
the appropriate incentive/compensation structures to actually motivate these 
managers to exert enough effort to achieve the appropriate targets and objectives. 
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Some academics and practitioners, however, see fundamentals-based investing 
as being largely confined to analysing publicly-listed firms‘ financial statements. 
The study posits that even for those who take this view, corporate governance is of 
relevance to them. At the very least, good governance improves the timeliness of 
corporate disclosures and dissemination of material information (i.e., 
fundamentals-based information) in order for them to make effective evaluations 
and hence, informed investment decisions. In addition, good governance also aids 
in enhancing the reliability of the figures reported within the financial statements 
that these investors are dependent upon. Again, the study contends that corporate 
governance may matter within such a context as well.  
 
Also relevant to fundamentals-based investors, however, is the contention of 
proponents of corporate governance that better governed firms are more valuable 
and generate superior investment returns (there is a considerable volume of 
empirical research regarding the relationships between corporate governance or 
particular aspects of it with corporate performance, some of which is mentioned in 
Chapter 2). Second, share prices will fairly reflect a firm‘s underlying 
characteristics over the long-term. Most importantly, corporate governance 
ultimately provides investors with better assurances that they will ultimately receive 
the anticipated returns on their investments (as per Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
 
In a related development, individual investors who opt for fundamental analysis are 
also argued to be influenced by tips/speculations/rumours to a lesser degree as 
compared to other more speculative strategies as they presumably make 
investment decisions that are largely based on official/substantiated information. 
 
In their sample of US investors, Lease et al. (1974) found that 42% of their study‘s 
respondents adopt this approach to investing. This is by far the most popular 
investment strategy reported by their respondents. Hence, the study expects 
fundamental analysis to be one of the more popular strategies adopted by 
individual investors in Malaysia as well. Even so, considering the likely possibility 
that investors in developing markets are generally less sophisticated than those 
based in developed capital markets, the proportion of fundamental analysts is 
expected to be lower compared to that reported by Lease et al. (1974). 
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Generally, there are numerous publications in the practitioner/popular business 
and investment press (especially ―how to‖ investment books) offering different 
variations of this particular investment strategy (see, for example, Tier, 2006; 
Graham, 2006; Graham and Dodd, 2009) that are readily available to individual 
investors. 
 
The study predicts that a majority of fundamentals-based investors take at least 
some aspects of corporate governance into account. On whether or not they do 
and, if they do, the particular means to account for governance is subject to 
empirical scrutiny.  
 
 
4.5.4.2  Technical Analysis 
 
The philosophical thinking behind technical analysis (also known as charting or 
Chartism due to its focus on detecting trends and recurring patterns in share prices 
using stock charts; see, for example, Mayall, 2006) is very different from that of 
fundamental analysis. This is aptly described by Shleifer and Summers (1990: 23):  
 
Technical analysis typically calls for buying more stocks when 
stocks have risen (broke through a price barrier), and selling stocks 
when they fall through a floor. “Adam Smith” (1968) refers to the 
informal theorem of Chartism that classifies phases of price 
movements in terms of categories – accumulation, distribution and 
liquidation. The suggested trading strategies then respond to the 
phase of the cycle the security is supposed to be in. These trading 
strategies are based on noise or “popular model” and not on 
information. 
 
Shares are thus evaluated purely from data generated by market activity. This is 
because the patterns in share price, volume and other trends represent the 
aggregate sentiment/thinking of other investors in the market. More importantly, 
such patterns/trends can suggest future movements of the corresponding shares 
(Steen and Kendall, 2005). In other words, individual investors making use of 
technical analysis aim to predict the behaviour of other active investors/traders in 
the market. Thus, price predictions are essentially extrapolations from historical 
price patterns.  
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As the famous adage ―it is all in the charts‖ implies, individual investors making use 
of such a strategy obviously make no attempt to consider the underlying 
fundamentals of the companies that the shares are supposed to reflect. Similarly, 
Mayall (2006: 124) explained that “this orientation assumes that any information 
necessary can be gleamed from the market itself – rather than looking, for 
example, at company fundamentals”. In fact, Shleifer and Summers (1990) 
highlighted that so-called technical analysis is an example of demand shifting 
without a fundamental rationalisation. This means that individual investors ―create‖ 
noise or information and trade even without any news/changes to the underlying 
fundamentals of the stock.  
 
The main implication of this is that governance-related factors probably matter very 
much less/do not matter at all to this investor group. 
 
Lease et al. (1974) found that only 4% of their sampled population portray 
themselves as technical traders. This study would expect a similarly low 
percentage of respondents to be purely technical traders as the degrees of 
expertise required are relatively high (Mayall, 2006). This is because it involves 
technical concepts which require understanding of the working mechanisms/logics 
underlying such techniques. Popular amongst these include use of support and 
resistance levels; moving averages; Moving Average Convergence and 
Divergence (MACD); Relative Strength Indexes (RSI); and Bollinger Bands. 
 
 
4.5.4.3  Combination of Technical and Fundamental Analyses 
 
Even though the two strategies outlined above seem to adhere to opposing views 
of how markets work or might be exploited, some investors can and do (please 
refer to Lease et al., 1974) combine these strategies in a complementary manner 
for stock picking. Elements of both fundamental and technical analyses serve as 
mutually moderating influences since both occupy extreme and opposite ends of 
the ―relative importance of governance (fundamentals)‖ spectrum.  
 
On the one hand, fundamentals-based investors may use technical analysis for 
deciding entry and exit points (invest in well run/performing companies when the 
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price is right). On the other hand, some investors relying on technical analysis use 
fundamental analysis to limit their universe of possible purchasable stocks to 
'good' companies (those perceived to have lower risk). Lease et al. (1974) found 
this to be the second most popular investment strategy in their sample of individual 
investors.  
 
Expanding further on such an investment strategy, the key to investment success 
is not just predicting future fundamentals, but also predicting the movement of 
other active investors. Resources spent tracking price trends, volume and 
numerous other gauges of demand for equities makes no sense if prices are 
believed to respond only to fundamental news and not investor demand. This 
practice makes perfect sense, in contrast, in a world where investor sentiment 
moves prices – it pays to track (Shleifer and Summers, 1990). 
 
The study expects individual investors who make use of a combination of 
fundamental and technical analyses to take governance-related factors into 
account, albeit with varying degrees of importance. Even so, as fundamentals such 
as firm governance are only used as maximum acceptable risk thresholds, the 
relative degrees of importance of governance should be lower than for pure 
fundamentals-based investors.  
 
 
4.5.4.4  Attention-based Strategy 
 
Many studies in both standard and behavioural finance literature have focused on 
how investors react to attention-grabbing news, company announcements (e.g. 
quarterly financial results or announcement of the securing of major contracts/ 
projects) and other company-related information. Kumar and Lee (2006) contend 
that individual investors engage more in attention-based trading compared to 
investment professionals. Hirshleifer et al. (2002) and Lee (1992) have reported 
that individual investors exhibit the tendency to buy shares following earnings 
surprises, both positive and negative. Odean (1999) contended that investors may 
consider purchasing shares that they come across in the newspapers or hear 
about in the news. 
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Also, investors‘ attentions are probably drawn towards the most actively traded 
shares, those with large price movements or those that are reported in the financial 
media (Odean, 1999). Such stocks tend to generate a lot of excitement and 
interest. Busse and Green (2002) have demonstrated that stocks mentioned on a 
specific investment-focused programme on CNBC around midday are subject to in 
a fivefold increase in trading volume on average within minutes after the mention. 
Seasholes and Wu (2004) reported that individual investors in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange are net buyers of particular stocks the day after such stocks hit an upper 
price limit. Similarly, Jackson (2003) reported that individual investors in the 
Australian Stock Exchange are also net buyers after high individual stock volatility.  
 
Consistently, Barber and Odean‘s (2006) study has shown that investors are net 
purchasers of attention-grabbing stocks (inclusive of stocks in the news; stocks 
experiencing high abnormal trading volume; and stocks with extreme one day 
returns). They contended that attention-based buying tendencies arise from the 
formidable difficulty that investors face in searching the thousands of stocks they 
can potentially purchase.  
 
Barber and Odean (2006:1) explained that: 
 
Human beings have bounded rationality. There are cognitive – and 
temporal – limits to how much information we can process. We are 
generally not able to rank hundreds, much less thousands, of 
alternatives. Doing so is even more difficult when the alternatives 
differ on multiple dimensions. One way to make the search for 
stocks to purchase more manageable is to limit the choice set. It is 
far easier, for example, to choose among 10 alternatives than 100… 
Odean (1999) proposes that investors manage the problem of 
choosing among thousands of possible stock purchases by limiting 
their search to stocks that have recently caught their attention...  
 
Hence, due to resource constraints (time, expertise, memory, information 
processing capacities etc), it is almost certainly not possible for individual investors 
to consider all potential stocks that are available to them. Again, heuristic 
simplification makes such decisions manageable. This study would argue that 
attention-induced trading, being well documented by various studies, merits its 
inclusion as an investment strategy/style by itself. 
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Whether they consider governance obviously depends on the kinds of 
attention-grabbing information that investors are drawn toward (as some are 
indiscriminate – focusing more on the attention generated per se and not on the 
factors that form the basis of that attention). Investors pursuing an attention-based 
strategy are assumed not to do any significant amounts of analysis to learn more 
about the stocks/companies that they invest in. They are also assumed to pay 
cursory attention to the news/information that has grabbed their attention in the first 
instance. 
 
 
4.5.4.5  Reputation-based Strategy 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997:749) have highlighted that reputation is certainly an 
important reason why publicly-listed firms are able to raise money. They argued 
that “managers repay investors because they want to come to the capital market 
and raise funds in the future, and hence need to establish a reputation as good 
risks in order to convince future investors to give them money.” This seems to 
imply that being reputable creates the perception that such companies are less 
risky or are relatively safe to invest in. It is intuitively appealing to argue that a 
long-established corporate reputation is even more important in developing capital 
markets where legal institutions are weaker, contracts are much harder to enforce 
and the scope for exploiting small shareholders is wide. In such an environment, 
reputation building could be vital in gaining the trust and confidence of investors to 
invest. 
 
The notion that, for individual shareholders/investors who may (i) be relatively 
uninformed, (ii) not possess much financial knowledge or (iii) simply be looking for 
a convenient stock selection method (heuristic simplification), the strategy of 
investing in firms that are household names in terms of long-established 
reputations seems reasonable. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2003) suggested that 
either investors prefer to hold stocks in which the precision of their information 
about cash flows is high (implying lower information asymmetries) or they use 
simple rules of thumb when making decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982)  
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Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2003) further argued that investors may naively 
associate product quality with superior stock price performance (therefore, use the 
heuristic of investing in stocks with strong brands). Put simply, investors‘ 
propensity to invest increases in relation to stocks/companies with perceived high 
brand recognition. Indeed, they found that individual investors prefer to invest in 
stocks with easily-recognised products and also a strong brand name. 
 
In essence, such a strategy relies on familiarity and convenience. Indeed, Daniel et 
al. (2002) described this familiarity or ―mere exposure‖ effect where investors 
perceive what is more familiar to be more attractive and less risky. Another 
indication of this is the finding by Huberman (2001) that employees of 
publicly-listed firms tend to invest in their own company‘s stock (with evidence 
suggesting that it is not based on advantages of superior insider knowledge) as 
they are likely to be more familiar with it and thus, perceive the stock as low in risk. 
This may be similar to huge Western publicly-listed companies in the past such as 
AT&T or General Electric which are household names possessing solid and lasting 
reputations for being good businesses.  
 
Also, reputation building is a long-term and complicated process, thus once a 
firm/manager attains a certain level of reputation, it could be treated as a valuable 
commodity that warrants protection (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1984). As it is far 
harder consistently to build upon a solid reputation over time as it could be easily 
destroyed with a few detrimental actions, investors would be fairly certain that firms 
with such track records take considerable effort to safeguard their economic 
interests. Kreps (1990), as quoted by Davis (2002), has argued that managers‘ 
desire to maintain reputation in the market will help to protect shareholders.  
 
Becht et al. (2003:16) noted that “interestingly, although reputation building is an 
obvious way to establish investor protection, this type of strategy has been 
somewhat under-emphasized in the corporate governance literature.” In this 
regard, the current study argues that investments based on reputation have an 
indirect impact on governance.  
 
Generally, the biggest and most well-established publicly-listed firms have higher 
visibility and are relatively more transparent. This is partly due to the fact that they 
must adhere to the most stringent governance guidelines and regulations besides 
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being under the scrutiny of many investors. Moreover, these firms are often 
regarded as better governed (popularly known as ―blue chip‖ stocks) compared to 
emerging small firms that are usually seen as more speculative. Thus, insofar as 
these big firms have both, better reputation and governance, then investors basing 
their investment decisions on the good reputations of publicly-listed firms would 
serve to advance corporate governance. Again, this is based on the assumption 
that at least some of the reputation gained is based upon the good governing of 
such entities.  
 
Another related consideration is the governance attribute of capable management. 
This is because, in many countries and firms around the world, the major 
shareholder/managers who are also firm founders represent the public face of 
these entities. Investors may invest based on these prominent business leaders‘ 
reputations, especially considering their track record of success.  
 
 
4.5.4.6  Reliance-based Strategy 
 
All of the investment strategies outlined above require the individual investor to 
adopt certain actions to reach an investment decision. The study now considers 
the situation where shares are purchased due to recommendations made by other 
parties. As we are dealing with active investors, this simply means that the 
purchasing decision itself is still made by the individual but the choice of purchases 
is based on the advice of third parties (as opposed to surrendering capital to 
institutional investors for administration on his/her behalf). 
 
Lease et al. (1974) broke down this approach into two distinct categories, that is, 
either relying on brokerage firms/brokers or the advice of investment 
newsletters/investment counsellors. As investment reliance can potentially 
develop with multiple sources (from professionals to family and friends), this study 
would make a different distinctive tendency. In essence, rather than breaking down 
the various sources of reliance, this study would only differentiate between 
individual investors who make their own investment decisions and those who 
depend on other parties to do so.  
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As individual investors are usually perceived to be relatively unsophisticated, the 
tendency to depend on third parties is expected to be fairly significant. With 
respects to this investor group, how governance features in their investments is 
indirect. This is because, unlike other investment strategies that by nature compel 
investors toward or away from governance, relying on others for investment 
advice/decision making is suitable for investors exhibiting a wide range of 
tendencies and/or attributes. In essence, it is dependent upon the importance of 
governance to those who offer them advice rather than these investors being 
particularly interested in governance per se. Another implication is that, if they 
depend on multiple sources of external advice, governance may feature in a 
haphazard and inconsistent manner.  
 
 
4.5.4.7  Primary Investment Strategies as Indicative/Anchor 
Variables  
 
The study has thus far considered various behaviours, tendencies, environmental 
factors and also personal attributes. Undoubtedly, the subsequent analyses of 
findings relating to those behaviours/tendencies and their underlying influences/ 
motivations will be fruitful in helping us to better understand the relevance and 
prevalence of each amongst respondent investors. They also provide certain 
indications regarding the likely behavioural tendencies of the wider individual 
investor population in Malaysia. For example, findings pertaining to the proportion 
of individual investors actually attending AGMs and the proportion of attendee 
investors actually concerned with corporate governance. 
 
Even so, analysis on a variable-by-variable basis (i.e. along the lines of each 
behaviour/tendency) is not the ideal configuration when it comes to illustrating 
investors‘ many attributes in an integrated, person-centred manner. This was 
evident when the study attempted to reconcile and make sense of all the 
tendencies, actions and motivations reported by any one individual investor. How 
can the study best build, segment and illustrate some of the most typical/dominant 
behavioural profiles based on exhibited inclinations, as reported by individual 
investors? 
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The study contends that the complication above can be solved by the utilisation of 
certain broad indicative/anchor variables. Such variables will act as overarching, 
unifying components and also the reference by which other variables are viewed 
and evaluated in both the person-centric and also collective manners. In the 
course of identifying potential indicative/anchor variables, however, the study 
faced two further problems.  
 
First, most variables are found to influence a host of other variables while 
concurrently, are also influenced by a number of other variables. This makes the 
choice of suitable anchor variables difficult. Second, chosen anchor variables must 
persuasively be portrayed to represent/reflect/embody a range of behavioural 
inclinations and implications while at the same time not require strict conformance 
to a set of fixed and prescribed actions/tendencies. This is because the study is 
concerned with uncovering certain dominant/typical/prevalent general behavioural 
regularities and not how each investor specifically deviates from, or conforms to, 
pre-defined fixed behavioural patterns104.  
 
The only variables found adequately to address the complications above are 
investors‘ primary investment strategies. This is because, as argued earlier in the 
chapter, investment strategies are not mere tendencies/preferences per se but 
they also possess certain distinctive, intrinsic natures that compel investors 
towards certain behaviours and away from others. At the same time, they are also 
not so rigid and prescriptive to require that investors must exhibit all aspects of a 
certain set of specific actions/tendencies in order to merit classification.  
 
As is obvious from the arguments put forth for the phenomenon of mental 
accounting earlier in the chapter, the study acknowledges that investors do exhibit 
some other tendencies some of the time. Even so, the study contends that each 
individual investor possesses a predominant, primary set of investment practices, 
preferences and behavioural tendencies (that are collectively and broadly 
consistent as to be fairly reflected by a particular primary investment strategy) that 
are adopted most of the time. This conception of how investment practice actually 
takes place in reality is contended to be pragmatic. Consistently, the choice of 
                                                 
104
 For a detailed explication regarding the justifications for such arguments and also the 
statistical analytical aspects of it, please refer to Chapter 5. 
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statistical procedure for analysing the study‘s empirical data was also made with 
this need for flexibility in mind (detailed justifications are provided in Chapter 5).  
 
Essentially, the study evaluates the indicative qualities of primary investment 
strategies to determine whether or not they make good indicative variables. The 
main idea is that each investor inclination/action is interpreted by considering the 
intrinsic nature of the investment strategy and as a component of a particular set of 
distinctive behaviours (as complements to the lens of corporate governance).  
 
In applying the above procedure, a necessary requirement is to disregard whether 
investment strategies are the factors being influenced (i.e. chosen partly as a 
consequence of particular combinations of preferences/tendencies/stylistics) or 
the influencing factors (i.e. compelling investors towards certain behaviours/ 
tendencies/preferences). As mentioned, the unique intrinsic qualities possessed 
by primary investment strategies make this non-distinction reasonable.  
 
 
4.6  Governance or Performance? 
 
Partly for ease of analysis, the study has thus far worked along the assumption that 
well-governed publicly-listed companies would have superior performance (in 
terms of generating shareholder value). This is the primary assumption that 
academic proponents and also practitioners are working on. Even so, Gillan and 
Starks (1998) have raised the issue that many investors are actually interested 
strictly in corporate performance rather than how such entities are governed.  
 
As argued in earlier review chapters, individual investors are likely to be myopic. 
Hence, when the company is registering strong performance and/or generating 
good profits/returns, investors may be more inclined to tolerate, overlook or 
disregard indications that managers are abusing their power even to the point of 
stealing company assets. When corporate performance declines, however, the 
prevailing governance attributes become unacceptable. It is at this point that the 
study makes a distinction in order to explore the tendency of investors being 
concerned only with corporate performance. Specifically, the study solicits 
investors‘ opinions regarding (i) how much they are actually concerned about 
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company governance and (ii) managerial abuse of power; when their investment in 
a particular firm is profitable. 
 
Another dimension to this issue relies more on the beliefs of an individual investor 
of how the market works and consequently, what share prices actually reflect. If 
they perceive that share prices are mainly driven by investor sentiment rather than 
the underlying fundamentals of the firms that the shares supposedly 
represent/reflect; then whether or not good governance results in superior 
company performance doesn‘t matter since it is not reflected in corresponding 
share prices. Put simply, there is then less incentive to consider 
governance-related factors. The study therefore explores investors‘ perception of 
whether company operations/ fundamentals are less important in a speculative 
market. 
 
4.7  Integration of Key Research Elements (III) 
 
In this section, the study integrates key research elements discussed throughout 
the chapter. Elements already covered in Chapters 2 and 3 are not repeated. 
 
Since most personal attributes and preferences of individual investors are argued 
to affect their respective governance-related tendencies over the entire share 
investment cycle, selected general predicted influences are outlined below: 
 The higher the proportion of an investor‘s share portfolio devoted to 
speculative/gambling purposes, the less important is the overall 
importance of governance to that investor. 
 Investors who do consider governance are generally more likely to be 
relatively knowledgeable compared to their average peers.  
 Investors with shorter-term investment horizons are less likely to undertake 
pro-active governance-related initiatives. 
 
The various predictions above are investigated within the confines of primary 
investment strategies (acting as anchor/grouping variables). The influences and 
also impact of other attributes are not entirely clear as yet and will be explored by 
closely examining the relevant data obtained.  
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In terms of identification of new governance-related behaviours/treatments and 
possible underlying motivations, please refer to Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below.  
 
Table 4.1 Integration of Key Research Elements (III) 
 
Does country-level corporate governance matter to individual investors? 
Investment Cycle Stage 1: Pre Purchase  
Corporate Governance as General Investment Criterion  
 
In this chapter, another distinct general governance investment criterion has been 
identified, that is: 
 
To only invest in penny/speculative stocks – This is expected to be the preferred criteria for 
investors who trade mainly on speculation/rumours/perceived insider information. 
Specifically, Daniel et al. (2002) explained that for those investors who are only transfixed 
by share prices and trade mainly on speculation and rumours, the probability is higher that 
they would speculate on low-priced, riskier penny stocks. Justification is that these 
investors are able to purchase bigger tranches of shares (as they are cheaper) in the hopes 
that positive price fluctuations would result in more profits. 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 2: Post Purchase  
Governance as Concerns requiring Monitoring/Active Participation 
 
Another possibly important motivation for non-attendance of AGMs is that such an action is 
not relevant to the investment style adopted (for example, those investors opting for 
technical analysis). 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 3: Exit/Sell Out 
 
Possible triggers of selling: 
 Irrational emotions – whenever an investor feels like selling.  
 Unsubstantiated rumours predicting an imminent fall in share prices. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Integration of Key Research Elements (IIIa) 
 
When does governance matter/matter more to individual investors? 
Governance as Investment Criterion under Differing Circumstances 
 
Governance may not matter/matter more under any differing circumstances because it is (i) 
irrelevant to investment style or (ii) not considered (ignorance, indifference or lack of 
investment expertise). 
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4.8  Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter aimed to explore various aspects of investors‘ personal 
investment-related attributes such as (i) demographic attributes, (ii) psychological 
tendencies, (iii) investment motivations/objectives and, (iv) investment 
preferences/stylistics. Secondly, to utilise these attributes as (i) influences that 
helps explain individual investors‘ governance propensities and (ii) as test 
variables to uncover potential biases within the study‘s sample of respondents.  
 
Individual investor biases, tendencies and preferences are embraced even though 
it is a departure from the rationality assumption of traditional finance. The main 
justification for such a choice is that the study is interested in capturing real-life 
behavioural tendencies of actual investors who clearly do not conform to such ideal 
theoretical standards. Furthermore, instead of just being chance/random biases, 
the field of behavioural finance has offered a body of evidence that investors are 
irrational in the aggregate and in systematic ways as well. The final supporting 
point is that not much is known about investors‘ behavioural tendencies.  
 
Subsequently, the study introduced and also described the characteristics of 
various personal attributes. They include:  
(i) various demographic variables such as age, race, years of share 
investment experience, 
(ii) psychological biases such as risk-taking propensity, mental accounting and 
overconfidence,  
(iii) investment preferences such as investment motivations/objectives, primary 
investment strategies and average shareholding periods.  
 
Each variable is also evaluated in terms of its respective potential influences on 
investors‘ governance propensities. 
 
In order better to appreciate the bigger picture and to make sense of the interplay 
between the various personal attributes considered, the study examines the 
potential of investors‘ primary investment strategies being indicative or anchor 
variables. Specifically, investors who adopt a distinct investment strategy are 
predicted to exhibit (i) a unique combination of governance-related tendencies and 
(ii) a peculiar set of general underlying behavioural tendencies, when compared to 
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those pursuing other strategies. The study then contended that this is due to the 
intrinsic nature of each strategy. Indicative/grouping variables provide a simple 
means by which to segment investors along the dimension of dominant 
tendencies. 
 
The study subsequently provided (i) an outline of other relevant individual investor 
attributes where primary data has been collected for future, post-doctoral research. 
Included are (i) investors‘ investment mindset, (ii) sources of information used, (iii) 
share portfolio performance benchmarks, (iv) share portfolio returns and (v) 
degree of diversification. Lastly, an integration of the many elements introduced 
throughout the chapter is presented.  
  
In the next chapter, the study will elaborate on the philosophical stance of the 
researcher, the research design as well as the many steps taken both to collect 
and analyse primary data.  
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Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
5.1  Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter begins with an elaboration of the epistemological and methodological 
positioning of the study. The primary focus is on explaining the researcher‘s 
pragmatic stance. A detailed description of the study‘s overall research design is 
then provided, especially in justifying the use of an exploratory, sequential mixed 
research methods procedure. This is followed by a brief outline of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study within the context of a pragmatic piece of research. 
 
Next, the actual steps taken in carrying out the research are laid out. This is 
inclusive of the way the study‘s individual investor sample is drawn and how 
various bias-related concerns are dealt with. The study then moves on to consider 
the various design-related issues that are specific to (i) the semi-structured 
interviews developed and subsequently, (ii) the main questionnaire constructed. In 
addition, important considerations pertaining to issues of reliability, validity and 
generalisability are also dealt with. The data analysis procedure utilised is then 
explained. Lastly, limitations of the study are discussed.  
 
 
5.2  Pragmatist Research Philosophy 
 
The philosophical underpinning that expresses a researcher‘s worldview or 
paradigm is an essential starting point for any piece of research undertaken 
(Creswell, 1994). This is because a researcher‘s paradigmatic stance largely 
determines how he/she designs and conducts an inquiry (Creswell and Clark, 
2007). 
 
First, with regards to the nature of reality (ontology), researchers traditionally 
subscribe to either one of two major ontological positions105 (Reichardt and Rallis, 
1994; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). On the one hand, the positivist/objectivist camp 
                                                 
105
 Even though there are a number of distinctive positions somewhere in between the two major 
camps, these are usually seen as being aligned, are more inclined towards and/or nestled within the 
sphere of one camp or the other.  
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posits that a single, objective and detached reality exists while on the other, the 
constructivist/subjectivist researchers argue that there are only multiple, subjective 
and individually constructed realities (Cherryholmes, 1992; Goles and Hirschheim, 
2000). The current study, however, subscribes to an alternative perspective of 
reality – that of a pragmatist (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
 
The pragmatist position begins with the acceptance of the existence of an external 
reality independent of the human mind (Cherryholmes, 1992), a physical world 
without meaning106 (James, 1907). Pragmatists contend that it is not possible to 
research this physical reality in a completely objective manner as researchers are 
grounded and confined by their individual experiences and values (Cherryholmes, 
1992). As there is no way to determine what reality is (which renders all efforts to 
mirror/represent it futile), the practical usefulness of specific representations of it is 
desired rather than the accuracy of representation (Gibson, 1979).  
 
A more extreme position was advocated by Rorty (1982) who suggested 
discarding the very notion of representativeness altogether and instead, 
researchers should simply ―cope‖ with the world around them. This study, however, 
adopts a less extreme stance, by emphasising the practical usefulness of the 
particular representation that is produced through the current empirical research. 
Even with such a stance, being a pragmatist, the resultant representation should 
be subjected to future re-tests of how practically useful or applicable it still is at 
those particular points in time.  
 
In terms of epistemology which deals with the nature of knowledge, pragmatic 
researchers shun the traditional divide that forces them to choose between the 
objectivity107 and subjectivity108 of knowledge. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) have 
referred to this entrenched divide as the grand ―Either-Or‖ mindset. Instead, 
pragmatists readily embrace both points of view. Objectivism and subjectivism are 
simply opposite ends of a spectrum rather than two opposing, mutually exclusive 
positions. It is perfectly acceptable to switch back and forth along this continuum 
(Goles and Hirschheim, 2000) as relative amounts of objectivity and subjectivity 
exist at any one time during an inquiry (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
                                                 
106
 Referring to the absence of intellectual intelligence. 
107
 The stance of the positivist camp. 
108
 Philosophical position of subjectivist researchers. 
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Instead of outright rejection of all philosophical considerations, however, 
pragmatists simply do not see much point in extensively debating and searching 
for metaphysical concepts such as ―truth‖ and ―reality‖ (Creswell and Clark, 2007). 
Since these concepts are highly abstracted from the concrete world, the outcome 
of such debates is regarded to be largely inconsequential to the actual research 
undertaken (Howe, 1988; Rorty, 1982). Epistemological arguments should 
therefore be absolved 109  rather than resolved. Indeed, for pragmatists, the 
meaning of any concept “is determined by its practical implications; and that the 
truth of any judgment is determined in and through practical activity” [Emphasis 
added] (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004:847). 
 
Clearly, pragmatism emphasises the practical over the epistemological and the 
empirical over the conceptual. Knowledge derives its meaningfulness and 
relevance from its capacity to initiate positive change/action (Wicks and Freeman, 
1998 and Goldkuhl, 2004). Legitimacy is derived by being a servant to practice and 
pragmatic changes are progressive as they seek to induce gradual improvements 
of the status quo (Goldkuhl, 2004).  
 
Pragmatist philosophy‘s emphasis on ―practicality‖ and ―usefulness‖ complements 
the contention of authors such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Khan (2003) that 
the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical importance. In fact, 
governance researchers are presented with unique opportunities to influence 
corporate practices directly through the careful integration of theory and empirical 
study (Daily et al., 2003). The study‘s focus on (i) the real-life behavioural 
tendencies of investors and (ii) understanding the phenomenon of governance as it 
is being practised, is consistent with conventional pragmatist thought.  
 
Pragmatic research is value-laden. A researcher‘s personal values and also 
experiences are acknowledged to inevitably influence and impact on every study 
that he/she undertakes. These are, however, not necessarily seen as drawbacks 
or impediments. In fact, relevant personal experiences could aid in understanding 
the practicalities of the situation at hand. Therefore, the researcher‘s years of 
experience of investing in Malaysian publicly-listed firms as an individual investor 
and also the fact that he is Malaysian (implying deep appreciation of the race- and 
ethnic-based values and norms outlined in Chapter 3, for example) are positive 
                                                 
109
 Or abandoned. 
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attributes. These values and experiences are invaluable in interpreting and also 
understanding observed individual investor behaviours/tendencies. 
 
In terms of research methods, the use of quantitative methods largely defines 
positivist research while qualitative methods dominate within the subjectivist camp. 
Similar to the earlier rejection of rigid epistemological and ontological stances, 
pragmatic researchers shun the notion that there is a guaranteed methodological 
path to the ―Promised Land‖ (as described by House, 1994). Instead, pragmatists 
favour and adopt certain methods because they have specific conceptions as to 
what they are trying to achieve in their research (Morgan, 1998).   
 
Basically, the research questions should dictate the choice of methods utilised. 
The main criterion is that the methods used should be the most appropriate ones in 
giving a reliable answer to the specific inquiry being undertaken (Wicks and 
Freeman, 1998; Creswell and Clark, 2007) rather than emphasising the methods 
themselves or the worldviews underlying such methods (Goles and Hirschheim, 
2000; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
 
The breaking of the entrenched epistemology-method link (Howe, 1988) typically 
results in the use of different combinations of quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies and methods within a single study. This flexibility in mixing methods 
is a hallmark of pragmatic research in generating knowledge (Creswell, 2003). In 
fact, Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) have formally linked pragmatism with mixed 
methods research (Rocco et al., 2003). The current study makes use of a mixed 
methods approach as well.  
 
By mixing and matching, however, pragmatic researchers have often been 
accused of lacking consistency by researchers from the other philosophical 
traditions. This is because pragmatists, by embracing and changing their 
worldviews and methodologies as and when they see fit, seem frequently to shift 
their basic assumptions from one piece of research to another. Consequently, it is 
hard to evaluate their findings within a rigorous philosophical and methodological 
context with any significant degree of consistency. 
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Pragmatists respond to the above criticism by ensuring that each stage of their 
research is carried out with scientific rigour. For example, each research method 
employed would adhere to its corresponding accepted protocols of research 
quality such as those pertaining to validity, reliability, credibility and/or 
trustworthiness. Transparency of the research process is also another key 
measure. In this regard, Crotty (2003: 40/41) opined that: “in the end, it is our 
account of the research process that establishes the credentials of our 
research…The process itself is our only justification”.  
 
Towards such an end, Crotty (2003) suggested that the research process must be 
explicated in a faithful and comprehensive manner. These practical steps are 
demonstrated in the following sections. 
 
 
5.3  Mixed Methods Design  
 
The study adopts a two-stage, sequential mixed methods procedure that combines 
the use of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires. In this section, 
justifications for the need to adopt both research methods to tackle the research 
questions posed by this particular study are provided. It also outlines the reasons 
for conducting interviews before distributing questionnaires. Certain philosophical 
arguments are used to highlight the logic behind such choices. Arguments are 
presented on a conceptual level as the specific attributes of adopted methods are 
explicated later in the chapter.  
 
Firstly, pragmatists contend that “the analysis of meanings (of signs, i.e., ideas, 
concepts, statements) is an analysis of certain kinds of actions in certain 
contexts… For the pragmatist, therefore, meaning has reference… to the 
ordinary situations and conditions in which actions occur” [emphasis added] 
(Thayer (1968), as cited in Crotty, 2003: 73).  
 
This justifies the study‘s focus on exploring the governance-related behavioural 
tendencies of individual investors (certain kinds of actions) within the Malaysian 
capital market (certain context). As the meanings behind observed investor actions 
must be appreciated within their overall social context, such an exploration is 
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carried out by taking into account the various cultural, institutional and political 
influences distinct to the Malaysian investment environment (the ordinary 
situations and conditions in which actions occur). 
 
Attempting to understand governance as it is being practised is important as 
previous shareholder-centred studies relied largely on statistical inferences drawn 
from aggregate market data or individual trading records (Kumar and Lee, 2006 
and Daniel et al., 2002). These studies are plagued with the statistical problems of 
potential omitted variables and undetermined causality (Daily et al., 2003) leading 
to inconclusive findings. Downes et al. (1999) argued that these design drawbacks 
show the need for qualitative exploration of investor attitudes/perceptions toward 
governance, especially investment-related practical and philosophical issues and 
their impact on corporate governance to a degree unattainable through research 
confined to traditional statistical analysis and extant literature surveys. 
 
Moreover, inconsistencies found with regards to investors‘ governance-related 
behavioural tendencies between predictions in the literature, the expectations of 
regulators and anecdotal real-life observations suggest that (i) the actual 
prevalence of each considered behaviour/tendency is unknown and (ii) there are 
other important, yet unidentified motivations/justifications behind observed 
behaviours/tendencies. Indeed, Creswell and Clark (2007:30) contended that “the 
literature may be used to identify… the specific questions that remain unanswered 
in the literature and that must be asked of the participants” [emphasis added]. 
 
 Miles and Huberman (1994: 17) also suggested that “the researcher has an idea 
of the parts of the phenomenon that are not well understood and knows where to 
look for these things – in which settings, among which actors” [Emphasis 
added].  
 
For the current study, the elements that are not well understood are the actual 
governance-related behavioural tendencies of individual investors and the 
underlying justifications/motivations for identified tendencies, inconsistencies that 
can only be adequately addressed by approaching first-hand individual investors 
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(among which actors; must be asked of the participants) in the Malaysian capital 
market (in which setting)110.  
 
Building on the above themes, pragmatists have stressed the need “for always 
considering situations from the viewpoint of the actor… when sociologists refer 
to meaning, it is to the subjective meaning actors impute to their actions” 
[emphasis added] (Coser, 1971 as cited by Crotty, 2003: 75). 
 
Hence, the study considers governance (i) from the standpoint of individual 
investors (viewpoint of the actor) and (ii) accepts the meanings offered by 
respondents at face value (the subjective meaning actors impute to their actions) 
and base systematic interpretations on such foundations (Mitchell, 1977 as 
summarised by Crotty, 2003). Each opinion is seen to be equally valid in the sense 
that they are assumed to result in subsequent, concrete behaviour. 
 
The arguments above justify the choice of conducting interviews with selected 
market participants, especially individual shareholders. In particular, semi- 
structured interviews are regarded as the most suitable as questions posed to 
respondents are open-ended which enables the identification of yet unknown key 
motivations/reasons underlying observed governance-related tendencies. At the 
same time, each question is guided by specific themes, contexts, issues and 
actions to inject an accepted degree of focus111.  
 
The study‘s overall governance focus is both preserved and refined by (i) only 
considering the range of potentially important governance-related behaviours/ 
tendencies compiled earlier, (ii) considering each issue/factor/attribute/tendency 
within the particular stage of the investment cycle where they most likely feature 
and (iii) framing the issues/responses/motivations as likely/typical responses to 
generic, probable yet specific scenarios/situations. These procedural guidelines 
naturally induce a logical and progressive structure. 
                                                 
110
 Taking into account the shortcomings and also inconclusiveness of past empirical 
studies in this area. 
111
 On the contrary, structured interviews where respondents select their responses from a 
fixed list of rigid, close-ended answers isn‘t suitable for identifying yet undiscovered key 
variables. As for unstructured interviews where investors are free to describe their 
investment experiences with few boundaries/constraints, they are considered too broad 
and unsystematic. In fact, responses obtained will almost certainly transcend the general 
governance context of the study. 
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Justification for a more structured approach is that most relevant constructs (i.e. 
the various governance-related (i) firm- and country-level characteristics/issues 
and, (ii) investor actions/tendencies considered) are well documented in the 
literature. Miles and Huberman (1994: 17) offer a good summary of this strategy: 
 
Tighter designs are a wise course, we think, for researchers working 
with well-delineated constructs. In fact, we should remember that 
qualitative research can be outright “confirmatory” – that is, can 
seek to test or further explicate a conceptualization. Tighter designs 
also provide clarity and focus for beginning researchers worried 
about diffuseness and overload… So a case can be made for tight, 
prestructured qualitative designs… 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) have termed the design considerations outlined above 
as “a sort of anticipatory data reduction” as they are intended to focus subsequent 
analysis on pertinent issues only. This is consistent with the study‘s intention to 
focus on dominant trends112 where only major issues/tendencies uncovered during 
the interviews are included for subsequent consideration113. 
 
The study predicts that only a few dominant motivations/justifications (inclusive of 
yet unidentified ones) will emerge from investors‘ responses in explaining their 
actual behaviours/tendencies. This is because when considering ―rational 
goal-oriented products‖ (Weber, 1949 as cited in Crotty, 2003), people are 
presumed to act under certain common motivations and in turn, select suitable 
means to the ends they envisage114.  
 
Essentially, the study contends that certain goal-oriented activities such as share 
investing are driven by certain dominant imperatives (for example, the economic 
motive to make profits) resulting in certain behavioural regularities/patterns. Such 
regularities/patterns are also seen to be logical outgrowths/responses/adaptations 
to distinct environmental influences. This contention is supported by past studies 
showing that individual investors typically display a few distinct underlying 
behavioural patterns (see, for example, Lease et al., 1974; Schlarbaum et al., 1978; 
Wood and Zaichkowsky, 2004).  
 
                                                 
112
 Or the most prevalent behaviours and motivations. 
113
 For further details, please refer to the Semi-Structured Interviews section in this chapter. 
114
 Unlike hedonic/entertainment-based social activities where the possible motivations/ 
justifications can be very diverse/virtually unlimited. 
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In terms of research methodology, Greene et al. (1989) suggested that mixed 
methods studies can help sequentially where results arising from the first method 
are used to inform the development of instruments for the second method.  
 
On the one hand, quantitative studies “persuade” the reader 
through de-emphasizing individual judgment and stressing the 
use of established procedures, leading to more precise and 
generalizable results. On the other hand, qualitative research 
persuades through rich depiction and strategic comparison 
across cases, thereby overcoming the “abstraction inherent in 
quantitative studies (Firestone, 1987, as quoted in Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 41). 
 
Similarly, the study‘s mixed methods procedures take advantage of the 
complementary strengths of both methods used. Interview findings inform the 
development of the questionnaire‘s instruments. The results of the questionnaire, 
in turn, enable the study to explore the actual prevalence/relevance of each 
identified action, tendency and/or justification/motivation. 
 
Within the range of possible mixed methods study types, the current study would fit 
under what is known as an Exploratory Design (Creswell and Clark, 2007)  where 
results of the first method (qualitative) helps develop/inform the second method 
(quantitative). 
 
 
5.4  Pragmatism and Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
As the Malaysian capital market is structured along Anglo-Saxon principles of 
governance which place emphasis on (i) shareholder value maximisation and (ii) 
mechanisms aimed at minimising agency concerns, the study complements the 
status quo by making sense of investor behaviour through an agency perspective 
albeit a more-socialised, all-encompassing yet contextualised version of it.  
 
Moreover, pragmatists believe in the under-determination of theory by facts 
(Reichardt and Rallis, 1994) where the same set of data can potentially be 
explained by many different theories. Hence, the choice of theory is actually not a 
major concern since pragmatic researchers are typically driven by their own 
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anticipated consequences and the choosing of the best explanations to reach their 
own intended outcomes (Cherryholmes, 1992; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
 
It is hoped that this research will shed some light on the highlighted gaps in current 
established knowledge, especially in increasing our understanding of (i) whether 
and how governance actually features in individual investors‘ share investment 
decision-making, (ii) the underlying reasons/justifications why these investors 
consider/do not consider governance and undertake/do not undertake 
governance-related initiatives.  
 
In turn, such an understanding serves to inform governments, regulatory agencies/ 
authorities and also academics in introducing policies and/or proposing ways to 
improve (i) the investment practices of individual investors, (ii) the content and also 
focus of investor education programmes and, (iii) the design of governance 
mechanisms to make them more practically useful/relevant to these investors. 
 
 
5.5  General Sampling Strategy: Overall Sampling Frame 
and Procedures 
 
The first primary design-related decision faced was to identify and segregate 
between individual investors who make their own investment decisions and those 
who delegate this responsibility to various investment funds115. Investors116 in the 
latter group (i) are mostly unaware of which publicly-listed firms such funds invest 
in but rather, are only interested in the annual overall performance of the said funds 
and (ii) own shares indirectly through the funds only in the sense that they are the 
funds‘ ultimate beneficiaries. In turn, these funds invest in a wide variety of 
investments/assets that is not confined to just equity. Therefore, only those 
individual investors who have personal share dealing accounts and actively 
manage their own share portfolios (Lease et al. (1974) described these investors 
as having money under conscious, active management) are sought.   
                                                 
115
 Including mutual/pension/insurance funds that pool investors‘ money and invest on their 
behalf under the names of the funds rather than the individuals who contributed capital. 
116
 Perhaps the term ―contributors‖ would be more appropriate to describe this investor 
group in terms of their investment behaviour. 
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It was found that any individual investor117 wanting to purchase shares of firms 
listed in Bursa Malaysia118 is required to open a share-dealing CDS account119 with 
any one of the 35 120  authorised stock broking houses in the country. The 
researcher decided, therefore, to gain access to investors through these stock 
brokerages. Indeed, most previous studies on individual investors made use of 
such a strategy as well (see, for example, Kumar and Lee, 2006; Badrinath and 
Lewellen, 1991; Barber and Odean, 2006; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Jackson, 
2003; Feng and Seasholes, 2004). For most of these previous studies, the actual 
samples of investors are typically drawn from a single local brokerage up to 
multiple branches of many brokerages. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the sample of individual investors are drawn (with 
due consideration given to the various constraints, as detailed below) to provide, 
as much as possible, partially indicative tendencies that fairly reflect the typical 
behaviours/tendencies of individual investors as a collective group within the 
Malaysian capital market. In order to (i) try to obtain the best possible geographical 
coverage and dispersion, and (ii) circumvent the possible distinctiveness and/or 
biases that individual investors connected to only one particular brokerage may 
exhibit; the researcher opted for a multi-brokerage design.  
 
Next, the following limitations and/or constraints are taken into careful 
consideration: 
(i) resource constraints, especially in terms of time and the costs of carrying 
out empirical research, and 
(ii) the manageability of data in terms of both volume and complexity 
(considering that all stages of the empirical work such as collecting, 
compiling, coding, testing and processing of data will be carried out by the 
researcher himself. Also, due to the design of the study which looks at 
many different variables over the entire share investment cycle, the 
resultant size of the dataset is likely to be substantial). 
                                                 
117
 The term ―retail investors‖ refers to those individual investors who have got their own 
share dealing accounts. This implies that they are ―active‖ investors in that they assume 
personal responsibility in making their own share investment decisions.  
118
 The Malaysian stock exchange. 
119
 Bursa Malaysia‘s Central Depository System for shares. 
120
 Source: The Bursa Malaysia (the Malaysian stock exchange) website– 
www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/brokers/equities/list_of_brokers_alpha.html [Last 
accessed: 14
th
 July 2008] 
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Taking into account all of the above, the study decided to negotiate access to 
select branches121, each attached to a different local brokerage and located in a 
different region around the country (mainly in order to mitigate the potential biases 
outlined earlier while attempting as wide a coverage as possible). As is the case 
with most previous empirical studies of a similar nature, the final number of 
participating branches/retail brokers is very much dependent upon their willingness 
to participate (specifically in terms of granting access to their retail clients).  
 
In this regard, the researcher was able to secure the participation of a number of 
them (each from a different local brokerage and in a different geographical region). 
Specifically, each of the 13 states in Malaysia is considered to be a different region. 
In terms of the practical procedure, the researcher obtained a complete list of all 
brokerage branches in the country and targeted one particular branch per state.  
 
Due to the above stated constraints, the researcher conducted the study with any 
and all retail brokers that were willing to participate. Put simply, the researcher 
would only attempt to solicit the participation of other suitable branches if (i) the 
number of different regions covered by participating retail brokers are deemed to 
be inadequate, and/or (ii) the total number of responses to the primary survey 
phase are insufficient, to satisfy the purposes of the study. 
 
In terms of actually carrying out the research, the researcher decided not to 
request that the lists of clients of the participating retail brokers be made available. 
This is because such requests would invariably fail as brokerages are not allowed 
by law to reveal the personal details of their clients. Instead, participating brokers 
were requested to forward the study‘s questionnaires to their individual clients via 
email and/or the post122 on the researcher‘s behalf. Access to individual investors 
is thus indirect. This approach was deemed to be the best available option taking 
into account the constraints faced.  
 
Notwithstanding the impediments faced, this approach serves the purposes of the 
study on two counts. On the one hand, the researcher can be certain that the 
                                                 
121
 More specifically, the retail brokers who are attached to those select branches. 
122
 i.e. to forward it to clients in their mailing/e-mailing lists. 
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study‘s recipients are individual investors while on the other, respondent 
anonymity is guaranteed123.  
 
The questionnaire was sent out to all participating retail brokers‘ clients rather than 
employing any random and/or systematic sampling techniques for their respective 
clients‘ lists. There are a few justifications for such a procedure. First, it is deemed 
unreasonable to request random/systematic sampling as this would involve 
unacceptably high costs incurred on the part of the participating brokers/ 
brokerages124. More importantly, such a requirement would materially affect their 
willingness to participate in the survey. Even if systematic/random sampling were 
carried out, the researcher could not be certain that the brokers tasked to 
undertake such a procedure would be able to carry it out properly. Second, given 
limited time and resources, it is not also possible for the researcher to train retail 
brokers on the proper sampling procedures to follow.  
 
Third, the researcher has got no information on what criteria are applied to 
determine the positions of each client within each list125. As such, the distinct 
possibility that the overall sample (due to the possible inherent biases within the 
sub-samples obtained from certain brokerages) would be biased in certain 
respects even if appropriate random sampling procedure were applied cannot be 
ruled out. In addition, as this piece of research is interested in the general 
behavioural tendencies of individual investors126, choosing to sample as many 
respondents as possible seems pragmatic. Lastly, aiming at capturing the largest 
possible number of respondents reduces the possibility of obtaining an insufficient 
number of overall responses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123
 This is due to the fact that the researcher is not able to scrutinise investors‘ personal 
details. In addition, the questions asked within the questionnaire do not request any 
specific pieces of information that enable such identification to be made. 
124
 In terms of the need to devote resources such as time, use of computers and other data 
processing/storage facilities, etc. 
125
For example, segregated according to age, ethnic background, region or total amount 
invested. 
126
 With the underlying assumption that all investors operating under the same investment 
environment would exhibit one of a few similar major behavioural tendencies. 
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One of the main concerns with this sampling procedure is the possibility of certain 
biases/peculiarities of clients of certain participating branches/retail brokers driving 
the overall results of the study127. Possible biases include the geographic locations 
of the retail brokers/branches themselves. Such locations may cause certain 
obvious biases if, for example, most participants are located in major cities or 
certain regions/states. In such a case, the sample will be biased towards urban 
investors or investors residing within certain regions/areas.  
 
Even so, explicit and systematic evaluation of the geographical coverage and 
locations of each of the participants cannot be carried out so as to preserve/ 
guarantee their anonymity. It would be rather straightforward to identify a specific 
brokerage/group of retail brokers if a geographical coverage analysis is presented 
by illustrating the numbers and locations of all affected branches across the nation.  
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned design constraints, the biases above are 
partially mitigated by the fact that all local stock brokerages (and also all of their 
branches) are (i) open to Malaysians from all walks of life128 regardless of where 
their clients are based and (ii) the procedures of opening an account are simple 
and straightforward 129 . Second, the researcher also managed to solicit the 
participation of retail brokers located in a few different regions around the country. 
Thus, in aggregate, any differences (if found to exist) should not be too 
pronounced.  
 
Most importantly, the assumption above is also based on the findings of various 
studies that concentrated on individual investor samples based in different 
countries and regions around the world – all consistently demonstrating that 
individual investor behaviour is highly correlated (see, for example, Jackson, 2003; 
Feng and Seasholes, 2004; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Barber et al., 2003, amongst 
others). More relevant to the current study‘s sampling design where sampled 
investors are drawn from a small number of branches of a few local brokerages, 
however, is Jackson (2003) who found strong evidence that individual investors in 
Australia exhibit strong systematic patterns. The actions of individual investors 
                                                 
127
 Since the study aims to provide a fair reflection of the general governance-related 
behavioural tendencies of individual investors as a distinct class of investors. 
128
 The only requirement is that the client must be a Malaysian citizen over the age of 18.  
129
 To open a share dealing account, the client is required to go through a simple 
registration procedure involving form filling and depositing a small amount of money as a 
minimum. 
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across a large number of unrelated retail brokerages are therefore highly 
correlated130.  
 
Although being rather dated, Lease et al. (1974) also found that their sample of 
respondents, being the clientele of a single US brokerage, is not unlike that of the 
typical US brokerage. The study contends that this may extend to particular 
branches of each brokerage as well. 
 
The study posits that by collecting data from respondents across a number of 
brokerage branches131, even if claims of generalisability/representativeness (even 
though is not a primary aim of the study per se) cannot be made due to its 
non-probability sampling design, partially-representative ―indicative tendencies‖ 
could be obtained132. In this regard, Bryman and Bell (2003) have contended that in 
the field of business and management, non-probability samples are actually very 
common and are in fact, more prominent than samples based on probability 
sampling.  
 
The study may also have results that are potentially skewed towards 
English-speaking respondents. Even so, this is not a major concern as Malaysia 
was under British occupation for more than a hundred years before gaining 
independence in 1957 so English is a well-established language in Malaysia. 
Considering the fact that education is free and compulsory for all Malaysians 
above the age of 7; and that English is one of the mediums of delivery in public 
schools; most Malaysians can speak and understand English.  
 
More important, however, is the fact that most of the news and materials published 
by publicly-listed companies133, securities analysts134 and brokerages135 are in 
English136 . Great care was also taken to ensure that the simplest and most 
straightforward English words/phrases were used to construct the questions posed 
in the interviews and also questionnaires. Related feedback was also obtained 
                                                 
130
 More specifically, 56 brokerage firms with millions of retail clients. 
131
 Implying wide coverage of the general individual investor population. 
132
 Please refer to the section on Status of Research Findings: Generalisability and 
Representativeness. 
133
 Such as annual reports, proxy voting forms and material announcements. 
134
 Reports analysing the financial figures and also prospects of publicly-listed companies. 
135
 Market news and updates. 
136
 With other languages often supplementary/optional, if provided at all. 
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from a number of individual retail investors through extensive pre-testing (further 
elaboration is provided later in the chapter). 
 
The general planning, procedures and decisions described above constituted the 
first stages of carrying out the research. The outline above ideally sets the scene 
for specific discussions on subsequent decisions made and also steps taken in 
relation to each of the two research methods employed.  
 
 
5.5.1  Ethics and Ethical Consent 
 
Ethical consent has been obtained from all participating organisations and 
individuals. The researcher has offered all parties assurances of anonymity and all 
ethical consent forms are kept in a safe and secure location.  
 
It must be reiterated that all information and/or references that could potentially 
lead to the positive identification of any participants of the study are altered to 
standardised, generic forms. For example, the study refers to individual investor 
participants using generic identifiers such as Investor 01, Investor 02 and so on. 
Similar treatment is accorded to all other parties/participants of the study. 
 
 
5.6  Semi-Structured Interviews 
5.6.1  Sampling-related Issues 
5.6.1.1  Initial Recruitment of Interview Respondents 
 
After initial access was established, a sampling procedure had to be developed for 
identifying and selecting a suitable sample of individual investors for the study‘s 
semi-structured interview phase. Ultimately, the researcher opted to solicit the 
voluntary participation of individual investors by generating interest in the research 
through distribution of a pilot questionnaire137.  
                                                 
137
 More details will be provided under the Questionnaire subsection within this chapter. 
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The exercise was undertaken in only one particular brokerage so as to minimise 
the possibility that (i) participating retail brokers may not agree to participate in 
more than one round of primary data collection138 and/or (ii) the individual investors 
who respond to the pilot study would not respond again to a subsequent 
questionnaire of a similar nature. Choosing one brokerage was seen as a good 
measure to mitigate such risks139 and, at the same time, to obtain some indication 
of the likely response to such questionnaires.  
 
 
5.6.1.2  Unit of Analysis 
 
For this qualitative phase, the study had to determine its unit of analysis. Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 90) were helpful in this regard with their explanation that: 
 
...quantitative researchers usually think of cases as individual 
persons, draw a “sample” of persons, and then collect 
comparable “data points” from each… By looking at a range of 
similar and contrasting cases, we can understand a single-case 
finding, grounding it by specifying how and where and, if possible, 
why it carries on as it does.  
 
As the qualitative phase is primarily meant to inform the subsequent quantitative 
phase, the study would follow the described quantitative conception of the unit of 
analysis. Every individual investor is treated as a ―case‖ (unit of analysis) with 
unique behavioural configurations (Miles and Huberman, 1994) but holistically, 
each case is predicted to be likely to exhibit one of a few typical broad patterns of 
investment behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138
 Or that they may withdraw their participation after the first round. The possible reasons 
for this are many ranging from the study requiring too much company resource to carry out 
to the worry that their customers would be unhappy or unnecessarily burdened. 
139
 Even if the respondents from a single brokerage where the pilot study was carried out 
are unwilling to participate again in the main data collection round, the study can still collect 
data from the retail clients of the other participating brokerages. 
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5.6.1.3  Number of Interviews Required 
 
This section outlines the procedures used to determine the number of interviews 
required to satisfy the aims of the study. This issue was found to be a common 
concern frequently raised by qualitative researchers. In this regard, Guest et al. 
(2006) attempted to provide a general guideline by empirically demonstrating that 
major themes could be detected as early as six interviews and saturation occurred 
after about 12 interviews. They further quoted various studies such as those by 
Morse (1995), Bryne (2001) and Fossey et al. (2002) that aimed for the ―gold 
standard‖ by which purposive sample sizes are determined, that is, the idea of 
reaching theoretical saturation. Such a stage is reached when no new major 
themes emerge as additional interviews are conducted. The researcher used this 
crude yardstick of twelve interviews as a minimum target while, at the same time, 
aimed for data saturation.  
 
Out of a total of 57 individual investors who responded to the pilot questionnaire, 
10 expressed their interest in taking part in the interviews. As more respondents 
were required, a pragmatic combination/mixed sampling strategy140 had to be 
employed. Ultimately, a further nine were identified with the assistance of a few 
stock brokers with whom the researcher had established working relationships.  
 
The selection of respondents wasn‘t based on random sampling because, due to 
the relatively small number of cases being scrutinised, it can deal the researcher 
with a decidedly biased hand anyhow (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In addition, 
Kuzel (1992) has argued that qualitative samples tend to be purposive not random. 
The details of the combination sampling carried out are as follows:  
 
 The initial 10 respondents were recruited using a Convenience sampling 
strategy as it depended on the willingness of some of the pilot 
questionnaire respondents to participate. The sole criterion was voluntary 
participation.  
 The remaining nine respondents were selected based on a reputational 
case selection strategy (Miles and Huberman, 1994) as they are chosen 
and recommended by stock brokers (regarded as ―key informants‖, as 
                                                 
140
 Involving a number of distinct sampling strategies. 
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these respondents are clients serviced by them) who saw these selected 
respondents as typical cases141. This procedure can also be classified as 
purposive sampling as the selection of participants was in accordance with 
predetermined criteria relevant to a particular research objective (Patton, 
2002, as quoted in Guest et al., 2006). 
 
The study stopped at 19 individual investors as the researcher is reasonably 
convinced that theoretical saturation had been reached at this point142. The steps 
undertaken meant that the study was undertaking a non-probabilistic sampling 
procedure. It is non-probabilistic because the number of respondents is not 
predetermined using random sampling techniques but instead, is dependent upon 
the notion of saturation. 
 
 
5.6.2  Methodological and Data Triangulation 
 
By using both qualitative and quantitative methods to study the phenomenon of 
interest (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Jick, 1979), the study adopted a procedure 
known as methodological triangulation143. This combination of inductive (from 
grounded results to general inferences) and deductive approaches (from general 
inferences to predictions) through mixed methods triangulation enables stronger 
inferences (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) to be made in explaining and 
understanding the governance-related behaviours and motivations scrutinised.  
 
In addition to using mixed methods, a multiplicity of perspectives (Greene et al., 
1989) is also sought for a more balanced view of reality. This is because 
pragmatists believe that adopting a single perspective on a phenomenon under 
scrutiny would distort and limit a researcher‘s view (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000). 
Such an attempt was made through data triangulation where semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with a number of stock brokers, a market insider who 
possesses very intimate knowledge of the workings of the Malaysian capital 
                                                 
141
 Individual investors with ―typical‖ behavioural tendencies were sought so as to facilitate 
and also to increase the chances of identifying the relevant tendencies at a later stage of 
the research (also to minimise the distorting effects of irrelevant, extreme or deviant 
tendencies). 
142
 In terms of identifying major trends. 
143
 Involving the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
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market and also a registered secretary of a publicly-listed Malaysian corporation144. 
The views of these informed market participants regarding the behavioural 
tendencies of individual investors are corroborated and compared with the findings 
of the earlier investor interviews. Such an endeavour is beneficial because: 
 
 Most stock brokers offer investment advice to their clients. As each broker 
services many clients, they could provide a valuable overview and insights 
into the general behavioural tendencies of individual investors. As for 
brokers who do not offer investment advice, at the very least, they do 
execute each and every buy/sell order for their clients (implying that they 
still possess intimate knowledge of general investor strategies/tendencies).  
 The public-company secretary is able to provide a unique perspective on 
investors‘ proactive governance-related behaviour as this respondent is 
involved in all shareholder-related concerns involving the firm where this 
respondent works, including the preparation of proxy materials, 
involvement in the running of AGMs and handling of communications with 
outside shareholders/investors. 
 The market insider can provide fascinating and relevant insight as this 
respondent has experience in a variety of different roles that are connected 
to the Malaysian capital market at different periods over the past few 
decades. This includes being part of the top management team of a 
Malaysian publicly-listed firm, a stock broker and also a retail investor. 
More importantly, this key informant is also politically well-connected and 
had taken part in certain controversial activities in the market itself, details 
of which are presented in the study‘s findings.  
 
The objective of the data triangulation procedure above was to inject a degree of 
complementarity (Greene et al., 1989) into the study where distinct yet overlapping 
aspects of the phenomenon being researched are exploited to increase the validity 
and reliability of findings145.  
 
The various design issues relevant to the study‘s semi-structured interview 
questions are explicated below.  
                                                 
144
 Whose co-operation is the result of the ―opportunistic sampling strategy‖ (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) of taking advantage of unexpected leads. 
145
 Both validity and reliability of data obtained from semi-structured interviews will be 
considered in a later section. 
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5.6.3  Interview Questions-related Design Issues 
 
It is important to first reiterate the intention of conducting semi-structured 
interviews. As the many possible ways by which individual investors can consider 
governance have been identified and compiled earlier146, interview responses 
provide preliminary indications as to which of these treatments or means of 
consideration are actually important/prevalent amongst this investor group in 
reality.  
 
Subsequently, as there are also certain shortcomings to current explanations, 
justifications and also understanding with regards to why investors undertake or do 
not undertake governance-related behaviours, the interviews are utilised to 
uncover important reasons/motivations (i.e. to (i) determine which of the known 
explanations/predictions are actually relevant and (ii) to uncover yet to be identified 
pertinent justifications/reasons/motivations). 
 
In order to explain the general construction, ordering and design of the questions 
posed within the semi-structured interviews, an ideal starting point is to refer to the 
general ordering of the different elements of the study, as presented in the 
Integration of Research Elements sections toward the end of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
Again, it is clear that the various constructs (governance-related behaviours and 
motivations) are well described/documented147. Where concepts are pre-defined, 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that a high degree of structure is justified.  
 
Practically, significant findings from the interviews are largely meant to affect the 
inclusion or exclusion of particular items in the study‘s questionnaire. In this sense, 
the semi-structured interviews could be seen as an intermediate step between the 
information compiled in the Integration of Research Elements sections towards the 
end of Chapters 2, 3 & 4 and the study‘s main questionnaire. This is aptly reflected 
in the example given below.  
 
 
 
                                                 
146
 Referring to both decision-making treatments and proactive governance actions. 
147
 As mentioned earlier – compiled through a thorough review of extant literature, the 
expectations of government regulators and also some real-life anecdotal evidence. 
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Table 5.1 Example of how Interview Findings Inform Content of Questionnaire 
 
One of the interview questions posed is: 
 
For those companies where you do own shares, do you attend any of their Annual 
General Meetings (AGMs)? 
 
STEP 1: 
 
If they do attend, from a governance viewpoint, the following possible responses have been 
generated from the literature review: 
 To ask questions, vote or have a say in how the company is run. 
 Only to protest after being mistreated/cheated/exploited. 
 
 
STEP 2: 
 
From the semi-structured interviews, it was found that there were other potentially 
important actual motivations for attending AGMs. These include: 
 For the free food/free gifts that the company hands out. 
 For the experience of attending (to see what actually goes on). 
 Employer‘s (managers of the publicly-listed company itself) request.  
 
 
STEP 3: 
 
Potentially important motivations identified in STEP 1 and STEP 2 are incorporated into the 
final version of the questionnaire:  
 To ask questions, vote or have a say in how the company is run. 
 Only to protest after being mistreated/cheated/exploited. 
 For the free food/free gifts that the company hands out. 
 For the experience of attending (to see what actually goes on). 
 Employer‘s (managers of the publicly-listed company itself) request.  
 
 
While the interview questions are partially structured in the sense that each one is 
contextualised (to a particular stage within the investment cycle) and deals with a 
specific action/factor/issue, investors‘ underlying motivations/justifications for each 
reported action/tendency are explored through the ―open-ended‖ response feature 
(where respondents are given the flexibility to provide all answers deemed relevant 
within the context of the questions asked). In addition, the interview questions 
posed are generic enough to be applicable to all investors. The example given 
above on AGM attendance clearly illustrates these design features.  
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The full Interview Schedules for all interviewee categories (i.e. brokers, individual 
investors, company secretay and market insider) is provided in Appendix 5. 
 
A majority of semi-structured interviews conducted were tape recorded and 
transcribed. It is interesting to note that a total of six respondents expressed 
reluctance for their interview sessions to be tape recorded. 
 
 
5.6.4  Coding of Themes 
 
Codes are tags/labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or 
inferential information compiled during a study. Codes are usually attached to 
―chunks‖ of varying size – words, phrases, sentences, or whole paragraphs, 
connected or unconnected to a specific setting. They can take the form of a 
straightforward category label or a more complex one (e.g., a metaphor). Bliss et al. 
(1983: 41) argued that a word or phrase: 
 
does not “contain” its meaning as a bucket “contains” water, but 
has the meaning it does by being a choice made about its 
significance in a given context. That choice excludes other 
choices that could have been made to “stand for” that word or 
phrase, and that choice is embedded in a particular logic or 
conceptual lens, whether the researcher is aware of it or not.  
 
Since pragmatists believe in the under-determination of theory by facts and also 
place emphasis on practical consequences that are useful from the researcher‘s 
viewpoint, ―meanings‖ are generated and made sense of from (i) the conceptual 
lens of corporate governance and (ii) the standpoint of individual investors. This 
distinct approach to meaning-making is applied to the subsequent coding/labelling 
of all governance-related attributes/trends/issues/considerations identified in the 
interview responses collated/transcribed. 
 
Practically, the study applied a flexible and pragmatic procedure where the unit of 
analysis could be in the form of any blocks of data (a clause, sentence or 
paragraph) deemed ―meaningful‖ (i.e. deals which a particular motivation, action, 
tendency, consideration, context and/or situation). Also, some researchers have 
highlighted the potential of overlaps where a chunk of data is usually a candidate 
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for more than one category/code. Even so, overlaps and multiple levels of coding 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) is not a major concern for this study considering the 
overall design, structure and purpose of the semi-structured interviews.  
 
Respondents are first asked whether or not they take into consideration a 
particular issue/factor/attribute and/or undertake a particular action. Subsequently, 
the researcher enquires on the underlying reasons/justifications for that particular 
tendency. All semi-structured interview questions are designed with a similar 
structure. Framed in such a manner, most responses are specific, distinct and 
non-overlapping thus making the coding process both relatively transparent and 
unambiguous. Again, this is best illustrated by an example. 
 
Table 5.2 Example of How Meaningful Blocks of Data are Derived and Isolated 
 
Interview 
Participants 
 
Responses 
 
Coding 
 
Researcher: 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ok. So what kinds of shareholders or proxies of 
shareholders typically attend AGMs then? 
 
The shareholders are basically all those aunty, uncles... 
Proxies are also those that shareholders who are in KL 
who can't attend the meeting. They will just ask their 
relatives in Penang to be the proxy for the shareholders 
to just enjoy  the  food... (laughs) 
 
So, they're just there to enjoy the food? 
 
 
Yeah, that's right and the free gifts if any. They always 
ask for free gifts. 
 
So, the primary motive there is actually to collect freebies. 
 
 
Yup, and also the food... free lunch or free tea break. 
 
Do these people form the majority of the numbers or are 
there some other proxies of shareholders that are supposed 
to be there for different reasons? 
 
Mainly, they... most of them are actually this type of 
shareholders and proxies but then, apart from this, 
they also requested to be... they are also requested by 
the boss to be the proxy of the shareholders in order to 
propose and second the resolutions of the AGM... to 
pass. 
 
Even for other listed companies that I know of, most of 
the time they will have their AGMs in their premises 
itself... in the office building itself… Then they just get 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOOD 
(motivation) 
 
 
 
 
GIFTS 
(motivation) 
 
 
 
FOOD 
(motivation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMPLOYER 
(motivation) 
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one or two shareholders and then most, majority of 
them will be their staff. 
EMPLOYER 
(motivation) 
 
The inclusion and exclusion of all relevant themes are discussed and illustrated in 
some degree of detail throughout Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
The procedures established in carrying out of the semi-structured interviews 
alongside the various findings derived are undoubtedly accompanied by a number 
of validity and reliability issues. These are dealt with in the following section. 
 
 
5.6.5  Validity and Reliability of the Interview Process and Findings 
 
According to Kvale (2007), the concept of validity generally pertains to the degree 
to which a method investigates what it is intended to investigate. For the purposes 
of this study, the Respondent/Member Validation technique is employed (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). This is where the researcher provides interviewees with an 
account of his findings, especially the interpretation of their responses to the many 
interview questions posed. As explained by Bryman and Bell (2003: 290), the aim 
is to:  
 
seek corroboration or otherwise of the account that the 
researcher has arrived at…to ensure that there is good 
correspondence between their findings and the perspectives and 
experiences of their research participants… respondent 
validation can provide a means of confirming the validity of 
individual accounts.  
 
Hence, the researcher obtains feedback from respondents interviewed to validate 
the meanings of their accounts and to address any inconsistencies in interpretation. 
This, alongside triangulation of multiple viewpoints, increases the credibility of the 
findings. 
 
The next issue is that of reliability. Kvale (2007) explained that reliability pertains to 
the consistency and trustworthiness of research findings. Trustworthiness is 
derived from the transparency of the procedures undertaken in both collecting and 
analyzing interview data. This is demonstrated by the details provided in this 
chapter regarding various aspects of the semi-structured interview design. 
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Ultimately, a piece of research is only deemed trustworthy if the reader judges the 
study to be so (Rolfe, 2006).  
 
Next, the issue of reliability is also linked to the consistency in transcription, coding 
and also analysis of interviews. As the researcher has transcribed and coded all 
the data himself rather than utilising the aid of external coders, a certain degree of 
consistency is claimed.  
 
 
5.6.6  Other General Design-related Issues 
 
The most common problem with interviewers is asking leading questions. Other 
problems include failure to listen closely; repeating questions that have already 
been asked; failure to probe when necessary; failure to judge the answers; and 
asking vague or insensitive questions. These are careful considerations arising 
from the advice of Fowler (1993) that particular care needs to be taken about the 
way questions are posed. 
 
Taking into account the possibility that investors are unlikely to be able to recall 
specific instances of behaviour, the study generally requires them to report 
behavioural tendencies that they deem to be ―typical‖ over the years of their share 
investment related activities.  
 
 
5.7  Questionnaires 
5.7.1  Sampling-related Issues 
 
Unlike the semi-structured interviews where the idea of theoretical saturation 
determines the sample size, the quantitative method of using questionnaires 
requires a certain pre-determined minimum sample size. Fowler (1993) contended 
that, in order to determine sample size required, separate estimates of the various 
subgroups of interest within the sample are required. Emphasis is on the minimum 
sample sizes that can be tolerated for the smallest subgroups of interest.  
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This procedure is adopted rather than aiming for responses from a certain 
percentage of the sampling population which Fowler (1993) contended to be the 
wrong approach. Also, it partially mitigates the concern that the sample population 
size for this study is unknown148. The subsample of individual investors that is of 
particular importance is that comprising those who are involved in proactive 
governance149. Both extant literature and also anecdotal evidence suggest that 
they form a small minority of the overall individual investor population hence, is 
taken to be the smallest subgroup of interest.  
 
Based on the pilot study conducted, governance-active investors are estimated to 
make up about 4% of respondents. With the target of obtaining responses from at 
least 30 respondents who are involved in proactive governance, a minimum of 
about 800 questionnaire responses is required.  
 
The proportion of 4% derived from the pilot questionnaire suggests a certain 
degree of bias towards over-estimating the typical proportion of governance-active 
investors. This is because attendances at AGMs (used as a proxy for active 
shareholding in this instance) typically number in the hundreds or perhaps up to a 
few thousands while there are many millions of shareholders (approx 6.6 million in 
July 2007). In addition, shareholders who are concerned with governance are 
more likely to take an interest/participate in a governance-based study. Heberlein 
and Baumgartner (1978) highlighted this tendency by demonstrating that people 
who are particularly interested in the research problem tend to be the most likely to 
return questionnaires.  
 
Secondly, it is highly unlikely that investors are involved in proactive governance 
for all the companies that they have/have had a shareholding stake in. For 
example, some investors only attend AGMs to complain after being exploited. 
Consequently, this study adopts the criteria that as long as a shareholder has 
attended any AGMs since he/she started investing, he/she is considered as 
governance active. This is unlikely to inject an unacceptably high degree of bias 
into the results of the sample since proactive governance actions are 
uncommon/rare. Furthermore, the motivations/reasons underlying identified 
tendencies are more important than the frequency of taking initiatives.  
                                                 
148
 Brokerages have contended that such information is commercially sensitive. 
149
Shareholder activism-related initiatives. 
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The study‘s main questionnaire (a copy of the full version of the survey is given in 
Appendix 6) was distributed on 9th May 2008 with two further follow-ups on 23rd 
May 2008 and also on 6th June 2008. Distribution was made via hardcopies and 
also online versions of the questionnaire. The number of hardcopy questionnaires 
distributed was approximately 5,000 copies and the online questionnaire was 
forwarded to email accounts of individual investors who were listed on participating 
brokers‘ client lists. A total of 1,133 responses to the questionnaires were received. 
Out of this, 27 were discarded as they were incomplete, yielding a final sample of 
1,106 responses. This magnitude of responses is comparable to that of Dorn and 
Huberman (2002) who elicited 995 valid responses. 
 
One of the main challenges faced by the researcher was the inability to determine 
the response and non-response rates for the sampled population. This is due to 
the fact that the researcher cannot be certain how many potential respondents 
actually received a copy of the questionnaire. Furthermore, participating 
brokerages were unwilling to divulge the total numbers of clients/share dealing 
accounts that they possess as such information is deemed to be commercially 
sensitive. Hence, even if the researcher assumes that the questionnaire 150 
reached all clients of the participating brokerages, the response rate will still be 
unknown.  
 
Next, findings may be biased if investors who did not respond differ in some 
systematic way from those who did. The only indication that the researcher 
managed to obtain is informal feedback from the participating brokers. Specifically, 
brokers were asked to enquire of some of their clients on whether or not they 
responded and, if not, why not. Major reasons for non-response include (i) general 
disinterest in the study, (ii) dislike of filling in questionnaires in general and (iii) lack 
of incentives to do so (monetary, in particular). Even though the benefits of 
providing monetary incentives to respondents in improving response rates have 
been reported, this option is unavailable as it is against the University‘s ethical 
research policy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150
 either the hardcopy, the softcopy (online) or both 
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5.7.2  Questionnaire Design Issues 
5.7.2.1  Validity of Survey Instruments 
 
The extent to which the answer given is a true measure and means of what the 
researcher wants or expects it to mean is called validity (Peterson, 2000). As this is 
an exploratory study, particular focus will be given to construct validity. Basically, 
construct validity addresses the question of how the researcher can be certain that 
the investor attributes that he intends to measure are indeed what was measured 
(Creswell and Clark, 2007). For example, when the researcher claims that investor 
risk-propensity is being measured, how certain is he that risk-propensity is really 
the attribute measured? Within the context of this study, Dorn and Huberman 
(2005: 18) aptly summed up the situation by explaining that: 
 
Unobservable psychological attributes, such as risk-aversion and 
overconfidence, are central to the traditional theory of investor 
behaviour as well as to the behavioural approach. Variation in the 
behaviour of investors is often associated with variations in the levels 
of the attributes across investors, and therefore an empirical 
examination… calls for the elicitation and estimation of these 
attributes… done with questionnaires in which individuals are asked 
to answer a series of questions… The presumption is that an 
individual‟s responses proxy the individual‟s level of the attribute. 
 
The current study used an approach similar to the one described above where a 
number of statements/questions form the separate items for scales measuring 
particular investor attributes. It was decided that validity of the various subjective 
attribute measurement scales used would be enhanced by using corresponding 
instruments that had been designed by past studies. The reasons for this are that:  
 
(i) the instruments in past studies have been subjected to much validity and 
reliability pre-testing,  
(ii) being an exploratory study, a number of different attributes are being 
investigated concurrently which mean that it would be too time consuming 
to develop new measurement scales for each attribute (a pragmatic 
assumption), and 
(iii) even with a number of known drawbacks (discussed below), similar 
versions of these measurement scales have been employed across 
different studies and contexts.  
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Another valid argument is that, notwithstanding differing contexts, these measures 
were created for broadly similar aims and purposes across the different studies – 
to explore the general investment-related psychological tendencies of investors. 
For example, Kapteyn and Teppa (2002) have observed that measures of risk 
aversion constructed from responses to such statements (as measurement items) 
can indeed explain considerable variation of such psychological constructs151. 
 
In terms of the drawbacks of such an approach (i.e. using questionnaire-based 
proxies), Dorn and Huberman (2005) have listed the following issues: 
 
 The presence of multiple proposed proxies for the same attribute and the 
fact that investors‘ responses are likely to be domain-specific and 
correlation across proxies may be poor.  
 Such proxies are difficult to apply to other populations because one would 
have to estimate those proxies in a new study. Moreover, the proxy may 
lose its validity for another population. 
 
Dorn and Huberman (2005) highlighted that the alternative is to use observables 
such as gender and age as they are easily measured and also extended to those 
outside of the studied population. Even though this alternative has its own validity 
issues, Dorn and Huberman (2005) attempted to mitigate these drawbacks by 
considering both information types (questionnaire-based proxies and 
observables).  
 
Consequently, the current study collected both types of information described so 
that a broadly similar mitigation approach can be taken. As for the 
domain-specificity issue, it is not seen as a major problem as the study is 
interested in behavioural tendencies in a particular institutional context anyhow. In 
addition, rather than specific incidences, the study is more concerned with general 
tendencies of individual investors over the years that they have been investing.  
 
A summary of the measurement scales utilised to explore individual investors‘ 
psychological attributes is given below. 
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 As mentioned in Dorn and Huberman (2005). 
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Table 5.3 Measurement Parameters for Psychological Tendencies 
 
Subjective 
Investor 
Psychological 
Attribute 
 
Number of Items* 
in Measurement 
Scale** 
 
Previous Studies with 
Similar/Comparable 
Instruments 
 
Measurement 
Type 
 
Risk-Taking 
Propensity 
 
2 
 
Dorn and Huberman 
(2005) 
 
Baker et al. (1977) 
 
 Wood and 
Zaichkowsky (2004) 
 
5-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
 
 
7-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
Self-Attribution 
 
2 
 
Dorn and Huberman 
(2005) 
 
5-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
Degree of Control 
 
2 
 
Dorn and Huberman 
(2005) 
 
Wood and Zaichkowsky 
(2004) 
 
5-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
7-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
Relative Investment 
Knowledge 
 
1 
 
Dorn and Huberman 
(2002) 
 
5-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
Self-Reported 
Perceived 
Investment 
Knowledge 
 
2 
 
Dorn and Huberman 
(2002) 
 
5-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale with 
additional ―Don‘t 
Know‖ option 
*in the form of statements (please refer to the relevant sections of the distributed Questionnaire) 
**for justifications on the number of items included to form each scale, please refer to the Test 
Respondent Feedback section. 
 
Apart from scales/instruments measuring psychological attributes, various types of 
question were posed in the questionnaire. They explored a range of behaviours, 
perceptions/opinions, preferences and other relevant investor attributes. A majority 
of questions and their accompanying response options included were based on 
any one or combinations of the following: 
 
 Important variables/attributes/issues identified by past empirical studies on 
investor behaviour. 
 Relevant theoretical attributes/issues/constructs identified through review 
of past literature (most of which is related to corporate governance). 
 The findings of the study‘s semi-structured interviews. 
 
196 
 
A good example is the question on the relative importance of certain primary 
investment objectives (compiled based on past empirical studies and findings of 
semi-structured interviews).  
 
Table 5.4 Measurement Parameters for Share Investment Motivations/Objectives 
 
Share Investment 
Motivations/Objectives 
 
Primary Source 
 
Measurement Type 
 
Short-term share price increase 
 
Lease et al. (1974), 
Schlarbaum et al. (1978) 
 
4-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
Long-term share price increase 
 
Lease et al. (1974) 
 
4-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
Dividend Income 
 
Lease et al. (1974), 
Schlarbaum et al. (1978) 
 
4-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
Fun/Excitement (like casino 
gambling) 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
Subrahmanyam (2007) 
 
 
4-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale 
 
Pride/Ego (to show people that 
you own shares) 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
4-point Likert-type 
Ordinal Scale  
 
Next, a significant number of questions concerning governance-related behaviour 
are framed in a manner that applies to very specific aspects/scenarios/issues but 
yet, are generic and applicable to all individual investors. These perceptions/ 
tendencies/actions are derived through investors‘ responses to various statements, 
typically in selecting certain options within ordinal scales.  
 
As for specific/alternative actions taken by investors, they are required to select 
one or more nominal options that are not ordered in any particular manner and/or 
are mutually exclusive of one another. 
 
A clear example was given in the Semi-Structured Interview section. Such 
questions are argued to be both relevant and valid, at least in a common sense/ 
practical way. This has been termed as face validity.  
 
 
 
197 
 
5.7.2.2  Reliability of Survey Instruments 
 
According to Fowler (1993) when two respondents are in the same situation, they 
should answer the question in the same way. To the extent that there is 
inconsistency across respondents, random error is introduced, and the 
measurement is less precise. A test is reliable to the extent that whatever it 
measures, it measures it consistently. Generally, there are a few methods to test 
the reliability of measurement instruments used. These include the Test-Retest, 
the Equivalent/Parallel Form and the Internal Consistency methods. 
 
Firstly, the Test-Retest method basically entails asking the same group of 
respondents to attempt an instrument twice (at two different points in time). 
Reliability is gauged from the degree of correlation between the separate attempts 
at the same instrument. The study ruled out the use of this method as it is not 
possible to (i) identify the same set of respondents and (ii) carry out the survey 
more than once.  
 
One alternative is to do an Equivalent Form test. This basically involves the 
creation of two different versions of a particular measurement instrument. Both are 
assumed to be measures of the same attribute of interest. Respondents are 
required to complete both instruments and the corresponding scores for both 
instruments are correlated (Fowler, 1993). Put simply, the consistency between 
the two instruments is determined. This method was also ruled out after 
considering two major concerns.  
 
A persistent issue raised in the feedback from test respondents 152  was the 
lengthiness of the questionnaire. Also, quite a number of investor attributes are of 
interest which means many parallel instruments would have to be introduced in 
order to test the reliability of each original instrument. Hence, it is reasonable to 
assume that introducing additional parallel instruments would materially affect 
potential respondents‘ willingness to participate.  
 
                                                 
152
 Please refer to the section below. 
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Since the researcher has opted to make use of measurement scales/ instruments 
utilised by past studies that have been extensively tested, designing untested 
parallel instruments is unnecessary.  
 
The Internal Consistency method, by contrast, is the easiest test of reliability. 
Respondents are required to complete only the original measurement instruments 
once (Fowler, 1993). There are a few different ways of testing the internal reliability 
of instruments. The Split Half and Kuder-Richardson techniques were ruled out as 
they mainly deal with instruments with right vs. wrong choices (i.e., typically ―1‖ for 
―Correct‖ and ―0‖ for ―Incorrect‖) while the study mainly employs attitude-related 
instruments where scores are distributed along a continuum represented by 
Likert-type scales.  
 
The internal reliability of attitudinal measurement instruments is usually assessed 
by the use of Cronbach Alpha. As such, the study made use of Cronbach Alpha to 
test the internal reliabilities of the various instruments used. The normal convention 
is that an alpha score of 0.7 or above indicates acceptable instrument reliability 
(the scales measure what they claim to measure). Wood and Zaichkowsky (2004) 
made use of Cronbach Alpha as well in their study. The relevant Cronbach Alpha 
scores are presented in the next chapter.  
 
More generally, the reliabilities of the many questions posed are dependent on a 
number of other practical design issues. These are explored in the following 
section.  
 
 
5.7.2.3  Other General Design-related Issues 
 
In constructing the questionnaire, the study is mindful of the following general 
principles of good questionnaire design (Bryman and Bell, 2003): 
 
 Asking questions in the most direct and in as brief a manner as possible.  
 Choosing the simplest words to phrase the questions (especially 
minimising the use of technical words or jargon). 
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 Ensuring that there are no repeating/overlapping questions (barring the 
notable exceptions of ―test‖ questions). 
 Checking for leading questions153. 
 Ensuring that the overall layout/structure and style (for example, font sizes 
and margins) are appealing to respondents. 
 Ensuring that the questions are coherently ordered, in a way that makes 
sense to respondents.  
 
These guidelines above apply to both the questions themselves and the many 
possible responses provided. Taken together, they are strategies that aim to 
mitigate one of the most basic reasons why respondents report events with less 
than perfect accuracy, that is, the possibility respondents not understanding or are 
confused by the actual requirements of the questions.  
 
Another issue that is of particular interest is the argument that respondents may 
not know the answers to certain questions posed. As one of the study‘s primary 
aims is to gauge investor awareness of certain governance issues/variables, some 
investors who ―don‘t know‖ are not only expected but such a response is 
incorporated into the instruments (as a distinct response option) themselves154. In 
addition, for those questions pertaining to taking/not taking particular actions, the 
―don‘t know‖ option is featured as one of the list of possible responses155.  
 
Besides the mere inclusion of the ―don‘t know‖ option in some questions, Lam et al. 
(2002) have argued that the positioning of this particular option in relation to other 
possible responses has to be carefully considered. This is because researchers 
such as  Presser and Schuman (1989) and Gilljam and Granberg (1993) found that 
providing a ―don‘t know‖ option increases the proportion of responses in that 
category compared to another version of the same question that does not offer 
such an option. The researcher must also take this into account as the ―don‘t know‖ 
option must be included due to the study‘s aforementioned aim. Ultimately, the 
                                                 
153
 Questions that are designed in such a way that respondents are inclined to select 
certain responses in a biased manner. 
154
 For an appropriate example, please refer to items featured in Question F1 within the 
questionnaire. 
155
 Referring to, and discerning between, either (i) not knowing how to go about taking such 
actions or (ii) not knowing about such actions at all (no prior knowledge). 
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researcher opted to place the ―don‘t know‖ option as the last option in a Likert-type 
instrument. The reasons are (as outlined by Lam et al., 2002): 
 
 This arrangement presumably forces respondents to first consider their 
best response to the item before being given the opportunity to omit 
supplying solicited information by selecting the ―don‘t know‖ option. 
 Placing the ―don‘t know‖ option before the Likert scale might likely tempt the 
respondents to abandon the extra effort needed to search for a possibly 
more considered response.  
 
Related to the issues raised above is the fact that some investors may not be able 
to recall their specific actions due to poor or limited memory. This is not seen to be 
a major concern as the study typically requires investors to report their general 
behavioural actions and corresponding reasoning ―on average‖. Essentially, they 
are required to report tendencies that are normally exhibited over the many years 
of their respective share investment activities rather than specific incidences. A 
potential drawback, however, is that the study would struggle to fairly document 
those investors with highly erratic investment behaviour.  
 
Questions with an open-ended response option are kept to a minimum.  This was 
to ensure that analysis of data gathered is more straightforward and has higher 
degrees of comparability across the sample. Furthermore, some of the important 
responses that could not be anticipated initially were uncovered with the earlier use 
of semi-structured interviews.  
 
 
5.7.2.4  Test Respondent Feedback 
 
One important concern with the general use of questionnaires stems from the fact 
that respondents do not have the opportunity to seek clarification from the 
researcher whenever ambiguity or uncertainty arises. This is because each 
respondent may have different interpretations of the questions posed and 
subsequently provide answers based on such interpretations. Any degree of 
subjectivity would affect the reliability of the responses (please refer to the previous 
section) provided. Therefore, the study endeavoured to achieve more consistency 
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where the meanings contained within the questionnaire156 should mean the same 
to all respondents. 
 
The first strategy was to ensure that the questions were posed in the simplest and 
most straightforward manner possible (as explained in the previous section). 
Second, the various questions, the many close-ended answers provided and/or 
measurement instruments were subjected to extensive pre-testing. The individual 
investors and brokers who participated in the earlier semi-structured interviews 
played an instrumental role in this regard. The researcher managed to solicit their 
further co-operation in scrutinising all aspects of the questionnaire‘s design and 
also contents and to provide constructive feedback for refinement. A total of six 
versions/iterations/drafts of the questionnaire were commented upon before both 
the researcher and the volunteer testers were reasonably satisfied.  
 
Given below (Table 5.5) is a summary of the most pertinent issues raised by the 
volunteer testers/test respondents and also the subsequent modifications made by 
the researcher.  
 
Table 5.5 Summary of Issues and Modifications 
 
Summary of Pertinent Issues Raised 
 
Modifications Made 
 
The overall length of the questionnaire is 
simply too long. Many remarks were 
made, especially in the verbal feedback for 
the first two drafts, along the lines of the 
questionnaire ―looking like an exam 
paper‖. 
 
The following steps were taken to address 
this issue:  
 Reducing the number of items 
forming the overall scales to measure 
the various behavioural tendencies of 
investors (such as risk-taking 
propensity). 
 To include only the most pertinent 
questions. 
 To be more concise by posing 
questions using similar measurement 
scales together in the form of tables 
(especially when the requirement is 
to tick a number of separate items), 
where possible. 
 
The use of certain technical terms/jargon. 
 
 
The study attempted to minimise the use of 
technical terms/jargon where possible. For 
example,  
 ―executive compensation‖ was 
replaced by ―how managers are paid‖  
 ―well-governed‖ was replaced by 
                                                 
156
 As perceived and intended by the researcher. 
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―well-run‖  
 ―timely material disclosures by the 
firm‖ was replaced by ―speed by 
which the company publishes 
latest/important information‖ 
 
Certain combinations of words/whole 
questions may be understood /interpreted 
in a few different ways. 
 
Re-phrase or re-frame all such identified 
problematic combinations of words/ whole 
questions so as to minimise subjectivity and 
also the possibility of alternative 
interpretations. 
 
The style of the language used was 
deemed to be ―too formal‖. 
Overall, test respondents found the style 
to be ―impersonal‖, ―not very 
approachable‖ and intuitively unappealing. 
 
 
The questions and list of potential answers 
were re-framed to inject an acceptable 
degree of informality (especially use of the 
first-person term ―I‖). For example,  
 ―Not familiar with complaint 
procedures‖ was changed to ―I am 
not sure what to do/how to complain‖ 
―Individual returns target‖ was changed to 
―My personal target of returns‖ 
 
The overall ordering of questions. 
 
Some of the questions within the 
questionnaire were re-ordered in a manner 
that made more sense for the respondents. 
 
General presentation and formatting. 
Specifically: 
 Overload - the questions are 
cramped very closely together. 
 The questionnaire was ―thick‖ 
(four sheets of A4-sized paper). 
Taken together, these create the initial 
presumption that there would be 
numerous questions asked and hence, 
require much time and effort to complete. 
This would discourage some potential 
respondents from attempting the 
questionnaire. 
 
Ample spacing in between questions and 
questions were printed on both sides of the 
paper (two A4-sized sheets in total). 
 
All necessary changes were subsequently made. Again, the final version of the 
study‘s main questionnaire is given in Appendix 6. 
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5.8  Status of Research Findings: Generalisability and 
Representativeness  
 
Being an exploratory study, the emphasis is to shed more light on the phenomenon 
of governance in actual practice from the viewpoint of individual shareholders. It 
looks at increasing our understanding of whether and how governance actually 
works within particular environmental contexts. Seen from such a perspective, the 
main intention is not to produce findings that are highly generalisable to, or 
representative of, individual investors in general. This is also partially a 
consequence of the way that the actual sample of investors was drawn.  
 
Even so, based on the study‘s key assumption that investors generally exhibit a 
limited number of general behavioural patterns/tendencies157, it could be claimed 
that the overall status of the study‘s findings is one of partially-representative 
―Indicative Tendencies‖. This term ―Indicative Tendency‖ was coined to describe 
the situation where the findings show the existence and also natures of certain 
regularities but could not go as far as to claim generalisability/representativeness 
even within the population of individual investors in Malaysia158. In addition, the 
prevalence of each behaviour/tendency is ―indicative‖ in the sense that they are 
broadly reflective of actual representative prevalence. Such an argument explains 
the repeated use of the terms ―tendency‖ and ―prevalence‖ throughout this study. 
Strictly speaking, they actually imply ―indicative tendency‖ or ―indicative 
prevalence‖.  
 
As for the investor self-reported underlying motivations/reasons for exhibiting/not 
exhibiting certain behaviours, the study views these as ―indicative associations‖. 
These indicative inferences may apply to Malaysian individual investors in both 
past and future situations (since the study concentrated on the typical and general 
behavioural tendencies of sampled investors over the years that they have been 
investing). The study‘s use of mixed research methods and also triangulation of 
viewpoints add to the overall credibility of the arguments above.  
 
 
                                                 
157
 Again, within a certain institutional environment. 
158
 The environmental context within which the study was conducted. 
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5.9  Data Analysis Procedure  
 
The logic and justifications underlying the choice of data analysis procedures and 
techniques adopted by this study are broadly consistent to those detailed by 
Lewellen et al. (1977). Therefore, for the purposes of the current section, the study 
draws heavily upon the arguments presented in their paper. Specifically, they have 
called for, and indeed utilised, statistical techniques that are “more relaxed in their 
statistical power but, on the other hand, are more suitable to the inspection of 
group behaviour, segmentation phenomena, and non-linearities; accordingly, they 
are more robust and more revealing for the objectives at hand” (Lewellen et al., 
1977: 6). 
 
More specifically, in achieving the many objectives set by studies that are similar in 
nature to the current one, they recommended “reliance on a set of analytical 
techniques other than the popular tools of correlation and regression typically 
employed in financial research” (Lewellen et al., 1977: 6). 
 
This is consistent with the study‘s idea of moving away from traditional statistical 
models-based studies where findings have been (i) inconsistent, (ii) unsuccessful 
in identifying other potentially important behaviours/motivations outside of 
theorised models, (iii) inconclusive and, (iv) bear little resemblance to reality. Also 
relevant is the fact that the study is exploratory by nature. In explaining the 
specifics behind their recommendation above, Lewellen et al. (1977) offered the 
following salient considerations: 
 
 A number of relevant variables considered (particularly those within the 
questionnaire) are categorical rather than continuous. Also, most exhibit no 
inherent ordinal properties.  Even though dummy variables could be used 
to represent such attributes in regression models, the derived error terms 
tend to violate the normal distribution assumption and this compromises 
subsequent interpretation. Furthermore, the available degrees of freedom 
are rapidly depleted by the volumes required for such variables.  
 Even if considered attributes are more standard in form, the essential 
―linearity of relationships‖ assumption for the application of the regression 
method is often violated. Such problems are compounded by significant 
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and also difficult-to-circumvent multicollinearity among the likely 
independent variables. 
 The probable existence of certain segmentation/trends within particular 
underlying behaviour patterns which the imposition of regression 
techniques treating the sample as homogeneous is apt to conceal.  
 
Apart from the many concerns raised above, what Lewellen et al. (1977: 7) 
contends to be the most important issue is directly quoted below as their 
explanation is both illuminating and concise: 
 
...the thrust of regression and other conventional econometric 
techniques is to attempt to identify the presence of systematic 
relationships by criteria involving the degree of adherence of 
every observation in the data set to the pattern in question… For 
the phenomena at issue here, however, such an approach 
seems inappropriate. Because we are dealing heavily with 
elements of internal attitude development and decision 
formulation, we should anticipate a very substantial level of 
single-observation “noise” due to those peculiarities and 
aberrations of personal makeup which originate inevitably in 
circumstance dimensions unreachable by variables we can 
construct as measurement inputs. Hence, we should properly be 
sceptical of the possibilities for explaining well the fit of each 
individual investor in the sample into a neat behaviour pattern. 
Instead, we should aim at detecting significant differences 
among broader group investment styles and be content with any 
reasonable successes we can achieve in that regard. 
 
The study adopts a few distinct design features and treatments in attempting to 
mitigate some of the key concerns above. The distortions or ―noise‖ in the data are 
reduced by:  
 
(i) framing the various issues/attributes/tendencies within generic scenarios/ 
situations typically faced by all individual investors for each tranche of 
shares and/or the underlying firm evaluated, purchased and disposed,  
(ii) requiring investors to provide responses that describe their typical 
actions/reaction over the years of investing in shares (rather than to recall 
specific incidences/decisions at a particular point in time), and  
(iii) emphasising dominant trends and/or likely actions while acknowledging the 
possibility of other behaviours/tendencies exhibited by the same individual 
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investor at other times159. These treatments are well reflected in the study‘s 
notion of ―indicative tendencies‖. 
 
In terms of classifying investors into broad behavioural pattern sets, Wood and 
Zaichkowsky (2004) used a segmentation approach to profile and segregate their 
sample of individual investors. For the purposes of the current study, the primary 
investment strategies adopted by individual investors are used as the basis of 
segmentation for ease of comparison. This is because, as argued in Chapter 4, an 
investor‘s main investment strategy is a good indicator/embodiment of his/her 
propensity to consider corporate governance and/or undertaking governance- 
related behaviour. Such an approach is also consistent with the suggestion of 
Lewellen et al. (1977) to explore significant differences among broader investment 
styles. 
 
The specific statistical techniques employed to investigate the various 
governance-related individual investor actions/tendencies is elaborated in the 
following section.  
 
 
5.9.1  Chi-Square, Contingency Tables and Cross-Tabulations 
 
Raw data for each considered variable, obtained from responses to the study‘s 
main questionnaire, is first coded into SPSS. In determining the types of analysis to 
carry out, the researcher took into account the (i) stated aims of the study, (ii) 
complications faced by previous statistics-based governance studies and (iii) 
salient points raised by Lewellen et al. (1977) in the previous section.  
 
As the researcher is investigating general trends and behavioural regularities while 
bearing in mind the fact that investors do behave differently from how they normally 
do some of the time; simple contingency tables and cross-tabulations are used.  
Field (2009: 783) described a contingency table as “a table representing the 
cross-classification of two or more categorical variables. The levels of each 
variable are arranged in a grid, and the number of observations falling into each 
                                                 
159
 Even so, overall, a dominant set/pattern of behaviours/tendencies will be clearly 
reflected in his/her responses. 
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category is noted in the cells of the table.” This procedure is also found to be 
suitable as most of the study‘s variables are categorical, either Nominal or Ordinal.  
 
In SPSS, “summarizing data that fall into categories is done using crosstabs 
command (which also produces the chi-square test)” (Field, 2009: 694). Therefore, 
cross-tabulation and chi-square are generated concurrently. Next, the researcher 
closely scrutinized, uncovered and then described the distinctive relationships (i.e. 
trends or patterns in the data) arising out of various combinations of the many 
different variables considered. Put simply, the researcher scrutinises and 
interprets both the Expected and Observed frequencies shown within each cell.  
 
Subsequently, the significance of all apparent relationships between variables 
displayed in a contingency table is determined by the use of Pearson‘s chi-square 
test of independence procedure (Aron et al., 2008; Field, 2009). The exact 
procedure and also interpretation of results generated by SPSS is described by 
Field (2009: 697). 
 
The Pearson chi-square statistic tests whether two variables are 
independent. If the significance value is small enough 
(conventionally Sig. must be less than .05) then we reject the 
hypothesis that the variables are independent and gain 
confidence in the hypothesis that they are now in some way 
related.  
 
An illustration is provided below using actual data collected by the current study 
(Tables 5.6 and 5.7).  
 
Table 5.6 Chi-Square Test Results for General Investment Strategy/Average 
                 Shareholding Period 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.035E2 35 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 111.118 35 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.235 1 .007 
N of Valid Cases 1105   
a. 10 cells (20.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .47. 
 
As the Chi-Square test for statistical independence in Table 5.6 shows a sig-value 
(Asymp. Sig, 2-sided) of less than 0.01, the study can conclude that an association 
exists between investors‘ general investment strategy and average shareholding 
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period with 99% confidence. Significantly different average shareholding periods 
are indeed linked to differing investment-related practices/preferences.  
 
Table 5.7 Cross-tabulation Results for General Investment Strategy/Average  
                 Shareholding Period 
   AvgHold 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
General 
Investment 
Strategy/ 
Approach 
Based on 
Company 
Reputation 
Count 0 1 5 13 40 62 45 39 205 
Expected Count 1.5 4.6 16.0 19.5 49.5 58.1 31.7 24.1 205.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
.0% .5% 2.4% 6.3% 
19.5
% 
30.2
% 
22.0
% 
19.0
% 
100.0
% 
Catch 
Attention 
Count 5 12 31 36 74 93 42 31 324 
Expected Count 2.3 7.3 25.2 30.8 78.3 91.8 50.1 38.1 324.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
1.5
% 
3.7
% 
9.6% 
11.1
% 
22.8
% 
28.7
% 
13.0
% 
9.6% 
100.0
% 
Rely on Others Count 2 9 22 25 64 69 35 15 241 
Expected Count 1.7 5.5 18.8 22.9 58.2 68.3 37.3 28.4 241.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
.8% 
3.7
% 
9.1% 
10.4
% 
26.6
% 
28.6
% 
14.5
% 
6.2% 
100.0
% 
Fundamental 
Analysis 
Count 0 0 6 14 43 53 32 33 181 
Expected Count 1.3 4.1 14.1 17.2 43.7 51.3 28.0 21.3 181.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
.0% .0% 3.3% 7.7% 
23.8
% 
29.3
% 
17.7
% 
18.2
% 
100.0
% 
Technical 
Analysis 
Count 1 2 14 10 21 11 4 2 65 
Expected Count .5 1.5 5.1 6.2 15.7 18.4 10.1 7.6 65.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
1.5
% 
3.1
% 
21.5
% 
15.4
% 
32.3
% 
16.9
% 
6.2% 3.1% 
100.0
% 
Combination of 
Fundamental 
and Technical 
Analysis 
Count 0 1 8 7 25 25 13 10 89 
Expected Count .6 2.0 6.9 8.5 21.5 25.2 13.8 10.5 89.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
.0% 
1.1
% 
9.0% 7.9% 
28.1
% 
28.1
% 
14.6
% 
11.2
% 
100.0
% 
Total Count 8 25 86 105 267 313 171 130 1105 
Expected Count 8.0 25.0 86.0 105.0 267.0 313.0 171.0 130.0 1105.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
.7% 
2.3
% 
7.8% 9.5% 
24.2
% 
28.3
% 
15.5
% 
11.8
% 
100.0
% 
1 = Less than 1 day; 2 = Less than 1 week; 3 = 1 to 4 weeks; 4 = 1 to 2 months; 5 = 2 to 6 months; 6 = 6 months 
to 1 year; 7 = 1 to 2 years; 8 = More than 2 years.  
 
For illustration purposes (Table 5.7), only the relationship between reputation- 
based strategy and average shareholding period is described.  
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The above findings are found to be broadly consistent with the researcher‘s earlier 
contention that investors utilising certain strategies consider attributes that take 
longer to manifest and are thus more likely to hold on to their shares for longer. 
This, in turn, results in more stable shareholdings over time160. This includes 
investors with reputation-based strategies. The fact that observed investor 
numbers are actually more than expected for the three longest average 
shareholding period categories (i.e. average of six months or more) clearly reflects 
the persuasiveness of this argument.  
 
All significant relationships are interpreted in a similar manner.  
 
 
5.10  Limitations of Study Design 
 
The study‘s design comes with a number of limitations.  
 
First, the study is not able to gain access to individual investors‘ actual trading 
records as such information is considered commercially-sensitive. In addition, local 
brokerages are not allowed by regulation/convention to divulge these records. As a 
consequence, the study was not able to reaffirm the accuracy of information 
provided by respondents regarding their share investment tendencies and 
preferences by scrutinising their actual share trading decisions.  
 
Second, as detailed earlier, this study‘s overall sample size is constrained by 
limited resources in terms of time and associated costs of carrying out empirical 
research. The various findings of the study will be more credible and better reflect 
the individual investor population in Malaysia if only the researcher is able to obtain 
access and subsequently, to draw the main investor sample from entire networks 
of branches of the various local brokerages. 
 
Third, while the study is meant to be holistic and concentrate on the bigger picture, 
this also means that a large number of variables are considered. In effect, each 
variable in itself is not considered in a detailed and comprehensive manner. Even 
                                                 
160
 For detailed explanations, please refer to the justifications given under the general 
investment strategy/average risk propensity subsection. 
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though this concern is not likely to have a significant impact on the overall results of 
the study, the implication is that some degree of accuracy may have decreased.  
 
 
5.11  Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter began with an explication of the researcher‘s pragmatic worldview. 
Pragmatists (i) emphasise the practical usefulness of specific representations of 
reality or alternatively, simply ―cope‖ with the world around them, (ii) accept that 
relative amounts of objectivity and subjectivity exists throughout the research 
process, (iii) derive knowledge through practical implications/activity, (iv) aim to 
initiate positive actions/change, (v) recognise the value-laden nature of research, 
(vi) typically make use of mixed methods methodologies, with the main criteria 
being use of methods that best answer the research questions posed and (vii) 
ensure that each stage of their research is carried out transparently and with 
scientific rigour (by adhering to accepted protocols of research quality. 
 
The study then justified its choice of adopting a two-stage, sequential mixed 
methods procedure that combines the use of interviews and questionnaires. Since 
pragmatic inquiry is argued to be research on certain kinds of actions in a certain 
context (i.e. the ordinary situations and conditions in which actions occur),  the 
study explores the governance-related behavioural tendencies of individual 
investors within the Malaysian capital market while taking into account major 
attributes of the Malaysian institutional and investment environment. 
 
As pragmatists emphasise practicality of research, understanding of the 
phenomenon of governance as it is being practised is achieved by considering it 
from the standpoint of the practitioners themselves (i.e. individual investors). In 
addition, the researcher accepts the perceptions and meanings offered by 
respondents at face value (the subjective meaning actors impute to their actions). 
These perceptions/understanding (i.e. of meanings) are argued to result in a set of 
governance-related behavioural tendencies that fairly reflect such views/ 
understanding. 
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The researcher then described past studies that have yielded inconclusive results, 
likely to have omitted potentially important actions/motivations and are also argued 
to bear little resemblance to reality (as many explanations and variables are 
theorized). Consistent with this, there seems to be disconnect with regards to 
investors‘ governance-related behavioural tendencies between predictions in the 
literature, the expectations of regulators and anecdotal real-life observations. This 
implies that (i) the actual prevalence of each considered behaviour/tendency is 
unknown and (ii) there are other important, yet unidentified motivations/ 
justifications behind observed behaviours/tendencies.  
 
The study next argues that a good solution is to approach the individual investors 
themselves. In short, interviews are utilised to identify all potentially important 
actions/tendencies/issues while questionnaires are used to uncover the indicative 
prevalence of each attribute in reality. Due to the peculiar nature of investments, 
the study expects to uncover a few behavioural regularities/patterns amongst the 
individual investor group. 
 
In the ensuing section, the study detailed pragmatists‘ belief in the 
under-determination of theory. This is where any set of data can potentially be 
explained by a number of theories and the choice of theory itself is not of 
paramount importance in the sense that such a theory is deemed suitable as long 
as it could help satisfy the researcher‘s intentions and objectives.  
 
Next, the actual procedures and steps taken in carrying out the research are 
outlined. These include the way the study‘s individual investor sample is drawn and 
how various bias-related concerns are addressed. Access to investors is 
established through local stock brokerages. Due to certain constraints, a 
non-random or non-systematic sampling procedure was adopted. A few of the 
more relevant aspects include (i) every individual investor is treated as a unit of 
analysis, (ii) the number of interviewees is determined by the concept of theoretical 
saturation (sampling is through convenience and reputational case selection 
strategies) and (iii) use of both methodological and data triangulation to enable 
stronger inferences to be made. 
 
The study then details the various design-related issues that are specific to (i) the 
semi-structured interviews developed and subsequently, (ii) the main 
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questionnaire constructed. Important considerations pertaining to issues of 
reliability, validity and generalisability are also dealt with. Specifically, the study 
focused on construct validity and internal consistency. Other good research design 
practices adopted are then briefly discussed along with test respondent feedback.  
 
Being an exploratory study, the emphasis is to shed more light on the phenomenon 
of governance in actual practice from the viewpoint of individual shareholders. 
Hence, the main intention is not to produce findings that are highly generalisable 
per se. Even so, a key assumption is that investors generally exhibit a limited 
number of general behavioural patterns/tendencies, the overall status of the 
study‘s findings is argued to be one of partially-representative indicative 
tendencies. Findings show the existence and nature of certain regularities but 
could not go as far as to claim generalisability/representativeness. 
 
Finally, a few of the study‘s limitations are outlined. The primary findings of the 
research are presented in the next two chapters.  
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Chapter 6 Research Findings 1: Individual 
Investor Attributes 
6.1  Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 6 reports the various findings pertaining to the basic demographic 
attributes and also psychological tendencies of individual investors that make up 
the final sample of the study. The detailing of various individual investor attributes 
is aimed at satisfying two objectives.  
 
First, the relevance of the study‘s many findings hinges on the claim that 
behaviours/tendencies identified are at least partially or broadly representative of 
the wider individual investor population in Malaysia. Due to the way sampled 
respondents are drawn, how well the various findings obtained reflect the actual 
behavioural tendencies of individual investors is a major concern. The study must 
therefore place adequate emphasis on demonstrating the credibility of this claim 
before proceeding to examine investors‘ investment and governance-related 
tendencies161 within the typical investment cycle. 
 
Second, the exposition of respondents‘ investment-related demographic and 
psychological attributes is meant to provide some insights into the profiles and 
inclinations (i.e. major investment-related demographic attributes, psychological 
tendencies, preferences and stylistics) of this largely unknown, under-researched 
investor group.  
 
Next, individual investors‘ main investment objectives/motivations and primary 
investment strategies are explored. This is followed by an evaluation of whether an 
individual investor‘s primary share investment strategy provides a good indication 
of the likely combination of investment-related attributes that he/she possesses.  
 
Taken together, Chapter 6 presents the various attributes, tendencies, 
assumptions and preferences that individual investors bring into the typical share 
investment cycle. Each individual feature or combinations of features is argued to 
                                                 
161
 In fact, this applies to all of the study‘s findings but since this chapter is governance 
focused, the argument is built around governance-related findings. 
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influence investors‘ subsequent actions/behaviours/tendencies within all stages of 
the cycle. Findings that are contextualised to within the investment cycle itself such 
as investors‘ governance- and other investment-related behaviours/tendencies are 
presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Please note that the various findings reported in Chapter 6 are not intended to 
address or to provide direct responses to this study‘s primary research questions. 
Instead, all personal attributes/preferences/stylistics reported are meant to be 
subsequently utilised to help explain the different governance-related behaviours 
exhibited by Malaysian individual investors (discussed in Chapter 7).  
 
 
6.2  Demographic Attributes of Individual Investors 
6.2.1  Interview Respondents 
 
Respondent investors‘ demographic attributes are not regarded as key variables of 
interest for the interview stage of the study162. Even so, attributes that are deemed 
to be more distinct are outlined to better appreciate the peculiarities and nuances 
of the responses obtained.  
 
One of the major demographic distinctions inherent within the sample of interview 
respondents is the fact that 23 out of the 25 interviewees are ethnic-Chinese. The 
two remaining ones are ethnic-Indian. As the study did not manage to elicit the 
voluntary participation of any ethnic-Malay investors, caution must therefore be 
applied in interpreting the results. Even so, this is not viewed as a major concern as 
the range of possible behaviours is fairly confined163 and also generic in nature164.  
                                                 
162
 This is because semi-structured interviews are intended to focus on the identification of 
potentially important governance tendencies/actions exhibited by investors as well as yet 
unknown key motivations/reasons underlying each reported tendency (i.e. compiling 
relevant variables rather than looking for potential significant relationships). The actual 
prevalence or importance of each reported indicative tendency/action amongst the wider 
population of Malaysian investors as well as their relationships with demographic variables 
are then explored at the questionnaire stage. Hence, demographics of a small number of 
individual investor interviewees are relatively unimportant as compared to the demographic 
properties of the much bigger sample of individual investor respondents of the study‘s 
questionnaire. 
163
 This is mainly because, as explained in Chapter 5, certain rational, goal-oriented 
activities such as share investing are driven by certain dominant imperatives resulting in a 
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Differences, if any exist, should manifest themselves mainly in the form of the 
relative likelihoods of undertaking the various identified behaviours rather than 
producing a different set of actions. Findings from interviews are thus deemed 
adequate in terms of identifying potentially important investment-related 
behaviours/considerations while the questionnaire focuses on trends arising from, 
and the indicative prevalence of, each of the identified factors.  
 
Second, with a fair balance of 11 female and 15 male respondents, the interview 
findings should well reflect the opinions of investors along the gender dimension.  
 
Next, certain demographic attributes are briefly discussed to highlight the 
justifications for their subsequent inclusion into, or exclusion from, the study‘s 
questionnaire. From preliminary discussions about issues that are of particular 
concern to interviewees165 and also extensive feedback from questionnaire test 
respondents, the researcher found that investors were particularly concerned with 
disclosing details regarding their personal income and also net wealth. Although 
assurances were given that their identities would remain anonymous, much 
reluctance remained.  
 
A number of interviewees were generally reluctant and/or unwilling to divulge such 
information even if only to the researcher alone. Interestingly, they specifically 
raised the concern that their financial positions would be compared to others which 
may cause them to lose face if theirs are inferior. Consequently, the Income and 
Net Wealth variables are omitted from the questionnaire. Such a treatment 
mitigates any reluctance to participate and also circumvents the possibility of 
investors not responding truthfully to the questions thus producing results that are 
biased or not reflective of this investor group.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
few distinct behavioural regularities/patterns. Refer to Section 5.3 Mixed Methods Design 
in Chapter 5 for detailed justifications. 
164
 i.e. normally practiced/experienced by most investors. 
165
 Before the start of each interview session. 
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6.2.2  Questionnaire Respondents 
6.2.2.1  Age 
 
Table 6.1 presents the various findings relating to the age profile of respondent 
investors. 
 
Table 6.1 Age Profile of Questionnaire Respondents 
Age Range (years) No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Sample 
18 – 25 122 11.03 
26 – 35 253 22.88 
36 – 45 273 24.68 
46 – 55 276 24.96 
56 – 65 126 11.39 
Above 65 56 5.06 
Total 1106 100 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, investors from different age groups are generally 
well-represented within the sample. More specifically, three age groups (26 – 35, 
36 – 45 and 46 – 55) are represented by more than 20% of respondents each and 
approximately 11% for each of the 18 - 25 and 56 - 65 age groups. Investors above 
the age of 65 form the smallest category, comprising about 5% of the total number 
of respondents. 
 
The overall age distribution is typically expected as the 18 – 25 age group tends to 
comprise of those who are still pursuing their higher education or have just entered 
the country‘s workforce. It is likely that not as many people in this age group could 
afford to invest in equities. On the other hand, the working age population166 are 
ideally placed to invest as most presumably have been working for a number of 
years and have thus amassed a certain amount of wealth/capital for investment 
purposes. After the age of 56, a considerable percentage of the population is 
eligible for retirement. As pensioners have lesser income, they may be less willing 
and/or able to invest in equities. This reasoning seems to explain the trends within 
Table 6.1 quite well. 
 
                                                 
166
 The 26 – 35, 36 – 45 and 46 – 55 age categories. 
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Overall, with five out of the six categories being represented by at least 10%167 of 
respondents, findings should provide a fair indication of the actual behavioural 
tendencies of this investor class along this particular dimension. 
 
 
6.2.2.2  Gender 
 
Next, the profile of investor respondents is examined from the gender dimension.  
 
Table 6.2 Gender Profile of Questionnaire Respondents 
Gender No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Sample 
Male 708 64.01 
Female 398 35.99 
Total 1106 100 
 
Referring to Table 6.2, approximately 64% of sampled investors are male. This is 
consistent with all previous individual investor studies where males and/or male 
household heads form the majority of respondents. Even so, the current study has 
a comparatively higher proportion of female respondents. For example, Dorn and 
Huberman (2005) reported that almost 90% of respondents in their German-based 
study were male.  
 
The finding above is surprising as patriarchal, male-dominated societies typical of 
Asian cultures (Crouch, 1996) are expected to result in even higher proportions of 
male respondents compared to Western-based samples. Perhaps this merely 
reflects the fact that more females are willing to participate in the study rather than 
it being an indication of the actual proportions of the Malaysian individual investor 
population.  
 
Notwithstanding the contention above, with female respondents comprising a 
significant minority, potential behavioural distinctiveness along the gender 
dimension are easily detectable. As male respondents still significantly outnumber 
                                                 
167
 Or, in terms of actual numbers, more than 100 respondents each. 
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their female counterparts, the findings should be sufficiently indicative to satisfy the 
purposes of the study. 
 
 
6.2.2.3  Race/Ethnicity 
 
The third demographic attribute that is of particular interest is the racial make-up of 
the sample of individual investors.  
 
Table 6.3 Race Profile of Questionnaire Respondents 
Race No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Sample 
Malay 243 21.97 
Chinese 781 70.62 
Indian 80 7.23 
Other (Malaysian) 0 0.00 
Other (Foreign) 2 0.18 
Total 1106 100 
 
Comparing the racial makeup of the general Malaysian population with the investor 
sample given in Table 6.3, individual investors who are of ethnic-Chinese origin are 
over-represented within the sample while ethnic-Malay investors are 
under-represented168. Specifically, 71% of respondents are ethnic-Chinese even 
though they comprise only a quarter of Malaysia‘s total population. Even so, the 
derived figures are expected as the Chinese in Malaysia are much more inclined 
towards entrepreneurial, investment and other market-based activities as 
compared to the Malays who traditionally tend not to prefer, are sceptical of, or are 
relatively more likely not to actively participate in such activities. The literature on 
Malaysia‘s economic history and political economy has clearly documented these 
trends (see, for example, Crouch, 1996 and Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
 
In fact, the Chinese do control major portions of the country‘s economy (and also 
have comparatively high corporate share ownership collectively) which led to the 
adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the past decades (Searle, 1999). 
                                                 
168
 As ethnic-Malays comprise more than half of the total Malaysian population while the 
Chinese make up about a quarter. Indians, on the other hand, form approximately 8% of 
the population. 
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One of the goals of the NEP was to increase the very low corporate ownership 
proportions attributable to the Malays (Gomez, 1999). As increasing the Malay 
share of corporate ownership is done through a number of means (for example, 
through various share trustee schemes for Malays, state-controlled Malay-based 
investment vehicles/arms, Malay-centric political party corporate ownership such 
as assets under UMNO, etc), the Malays could opt for many schemes and funds 
that own shares on their behalf or act as the custodians or intermediary owners169.  
 
Consequently, the number of ethnic-Malay individuals with direct share ownership 
is again expected to be lower than their proportion of the country‘s total population 
even though it has increased significantly over the years. This 22% figure is 
perhaps crudely reflective of the proportion of Malay investors within the wider 
population of individual investors.  
 
Lastly, as the Indians form roughly 8% of the total population of Malaysia, the 7% of 
individual investors in the sample being of ethnic-Indian origin fairly reflects the 
makeup of the general population, if not the proportion of ethnic-Indian individual 
investors within this class of investors. Asian News International (2009) reported 
that one of the targets of the main ethnic-Indian party within the ruling coalition is to 
increase the share of Indian corporate share ownership to 1.5% indicating that 
Indian investors‘ share ownership proportions in terms of value is significantly less 
than their proportion in terms of numbers.   
 
Overall, the three major ethnic groups are fairly well-represented within the sample. 
Hence, any race-based distinctiveness in terms of investors‘ behavioural 
tendencies should be detectable. Even so, it does not reflect the actual breakdown 
proportions of the country‘s total population in terms of ethnicity. An important 
consideration, however, is the fact that the make-up of the sample is very broadly 
reflective of the proportions of economic wealth attributed to the different major 
races in Malaysia. 
 
 
                                                 
169
 Often at favorable terms not available to members of the public who are not 
ethnic-Malay. 
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6.2.2.4  Years of Share Investment Experience 
 
Table 6.4 details findings related to respondents‘ years of share investment 
experience.  
 
Table 6.4 Questionnaire Respondents‟ Years of Share Investment Experience 
Share Investment Experience (years) No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Sample 
0 – 2  294 26.58 
3 – 5  246 22.24 
6 – 8  163 14.74 
9 – 11  165 14.92 
12 – 15  117 10.58 
More than 15 121 10.94 
Total 1106 100 
 
With each category being represented by at least 11% of investors (approximately), 
there is a wide range of investment experience within the sample of questionnaire 
respondents. This ensures adequate representation of investors along this 
dimension, from novices/beginners to very experienced ones.  
 
6.2.2.5  Main Share Dealing Brokerage 
 
The following set of findings is related to the share brokerages that respondent 
investors are primarily attached to.   
 
Table 6.5 Questionnaire Respondents‟ Primary Share Dealing Brokerages 
Main Brokerage* Number of Respondents % of Overall Sample 
A 49 4.43 
B 195 17.63 
C 174 15.73 
D 242 21.88 
E 211 19.08 
F 102 9.22 
G 25 2.26 
H 0 0.00 
I 0 0.00 
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J 19 1.72 
K 3 0.27 
L 6 0.54 
M 10 0.90 
N 11 1.00 
O 2 0.18 
P 1 0.09 
Q 1 0.09 
R 4 0.36 
S 29 2.62 
T 2 0.18 
U 1 0.09 
V 1 0.09 
W 2 0.18 
X 1 0.09 
Y 1 0.09 
Z 10 0.90 
None 4 0.36 
Total 1106 100** 
*anonymised **rounded up 
 
Table 6.5 details the various stock brokerages where respondents opened their 
primary share dealing accounts. As agreed with participating brokerages, their 
identities have been concealed by the use of proxy letters to both guarantee and 
preserve their anonymity170.  
 
It is observed that most respondents‘ primary share accounts are under any one of 
five often-cited brokerages (i.e. Brokerages B – F, comprising 83.54% of the total 
sample). The rest are more sporadic and most probably reflect the fact that even 
though some investors may have received the questionnaire through a particular 
participating brokerage, their primary share-dealing accounts are with other 
brokerages. This multi-account, multi-brokerage finding supports the contention 
that potential biases in investor attributes/tendencies across brokerages are 
moderated by the ease with which individuals from all walks of life can join any 
local brokerage house.  
 
 
                                                 
170
 For more details, please refer to Chapter 5. 
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More importantly, previous studies such as those by Jackson (2003), Feng and 
Seasholes (2004), Barber et al. (2003), Kumar and Lee (2006) have also 
consistently shown that the behaviours of individual investors are highly correlated 
both within and between unrelated brokerages. Therefore, by also taking into 
account the relatively well-spread out demographic characteristics of the sample 
(as presented earlier), the contention is that clients from these brokerages are 
likely to be sufficient in terms of forming a partially indicative sample of the larger 
individual investor population in Malaysia. 
 
As the justifications given above in relation to potential biases within the sample 
are largely based on intuitive logic, the study endeavours to address these 
bias-related concerns in a more comprehensive and credible manner. In order to 
achieve this, a series of Chi-Square tests is undertaken to both detect and 
compare potential significant differences between individual investors attached to 
each of the six brokerages with the highest proportions of respondents, as reported 
in the study (i.e. Brokerages A – F). These brokerages are chosen as they 
collectively represent approximately 88% of investors sampled. No significant 
differences between the investor groups, segregated by their respective reported 
primary brokerages, will be detected if major biases are absent.   
 
The actual tests for potential biases are carried out along the dimensions of age, 
gender, race and years of investment experience.  The results are presented in 
Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 below.  
 
Table 6.6 Chi-Square Test Results for Main Brokerages/Age 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.379
a
 25 .983 
Likelihood Ratio 12.316 25 .984 
Linear-by-Linear Association .094 1 .760 
N of Valid Cases 973   
a. 2 cells (5.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.22. 
 
Table 6.7 Chi-Square Test Results for Main Brokerages/Gender 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.861
a
 5 .164 
Likelihood Ratio 7.865 5 .164 
Linear-by-Linear Association .083 1 .773 
N of Valid Cases 973   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.37. 
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Table 6.8 Chi-Square Test Results for Main Brokerages/Race 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.415
a
 10 .405 
Likelihood Ratio 10.511 10 .397 
Linear-by-Linear Association .413 1 .521 
N of Valid Cases 973   
a. 1 cells (5.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.68. 
 
Table 6.9 Chi-Square Test Results for Main Brokerages/Years of Investment  
                Experience 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.783
a
 25 .979 
Likelihood Ratio 14.303 25 .956 
Linear-by-Linear Association .125 1 .724 
N of Valid Cases 973   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.09. 
 
From the Tables above (i.e. Tables 6.6 to 6.9), the study found insufficient 
evidence of significant differences between the profiles of investors from the 
various brokerages along all evaluated dimensions. Therefore, indicative 
tendencies derived from the subsequent sets of findings presented in this chapter 
are once again argued to be likely to provide, at the very least, a reasonable 
degree of insight into general individual investor behaviours/tendencies in 
Malaysia. 
 
 
6.2.2.6  State of Residence 
 
The set of findings below deals with the geographic spread of sampled investors 
around the country. In the Research Methodology chapter, this dispersion pattern 
has been highlighted as one of the more relevant concerns in terms of inducing 
potential bias into the sample.  
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Table 6.10 Questionnaire Respondents‟ States of Residence 
State of Residence No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Sample 
Kuala Lumpur 425 38.43 
Selangor 221 19.98 
Perak 132 11.93 
Pahang 85 7.69 
Pulau Pinang 166 15.01 
Johor Bharu 69 6.24 
Melaka 3 0.27 
Terengganu 1 0.09 
Negeri Sembilan 2 0.18 
Kedah 2 0.18 
Total 1106 100 
 
In terms of investors‘ states of residence, Table 6.10 shows that respondents 
based in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur and its surrounding areas form a 
significant proportion of the overall sample171. Specifically, approximately 38% of 
respondents are based in and around the capital city.  
 
More generally, most survey respondents are reportedly based within six regions/ 
states. Besides Kuala Lumpur, these areas include Selangor (approx. 20%), Perak 
(approx. 12%), Pahang (approx. 8%), Pulau Pinang (approx. 15%) and Johor 
Bharu (approx. 6%). Considering the overall pattern of the findings, the study 
investigates the general nature of association between the various different 
brokerages and investors‘ reported state of residence. 
 
The preliminary Chi-Square test for statistical independence yields a sig-value of 
less than 0.01 leading the study to conclude that a significant association exists 
between investors‘ main brokerages and their state of residence with 99% 
confidence. Observed value trends confirm that individual investor clients of 
particular brokerages make up significant proportions of the samples for certain 
states. For example, 79 out of 85 individual investors based in Pahang are clients 
of Brokerage D. These findings are indeed consistent with the sampling design of 
the study where only select branches of the different brokerage that are located in 
different geographical regions took part in the survey.  
                                                 
171
 When compared to the proportion of the total Malaysian population living in this 
geographical area.  
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As overall investor demographic distinctiveness is found to be insignificant when 
comparing between the client sets of local brokerages (as represented by their 
corresponding branches in different states), respondents are only distinct in the 
geographical sense. As the study managed to solicit the participation of investors 
exhibiting a wide range of demographic attributes and also based in a number of 
geographically dispersed states, the partially representative indicative tendencies 
argument still holds.  
 
The study has now reported the various findings related to the demographic 
attributes of individual investors such as age and gender. In the next section, focus 
is on reporting respondent investors‘ investment-related psychological tendencies 
and motivations. 
 
 
6.3  Psychological Attributes of Individual Investors 
6.3.1  Interview Respondents 
 
Similar to the study‘s treatment of demographics-related issues, respondents‘ 
psychological attributes are given lesser priority and thus, lesser emphasis during 
the semi-structured interview phase. In addition, unlike governance-related 
issues/factors that may/may not be considered during various stages of the 
investment cycle, psychological tendencies are ever present in every investor and 
differ only in terms of direction172 and/or degree173.  
 
Furthermore, an exploration of potential psychological attributes is also 
unnecessary as the study has already chosen the specific attributes to be 
investigated beforehand. Again, the underlying tendencies/distributions of such 
attributes for investors as a collective group are of particular interest rather than as 
individuals. Hence, soliciting responses regarding such attributes from a few 
interview respondents is of little value.  
 
                                                 
172
 Positive or negative tendency. 
173
 High or low propensity. 
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The specific sets of findings related to the psychological tendencies of 
questionnaire respondents are given below.  
 
 
6.3.2  Questionnaire Respondents 
6.3.2.1  Risk Propensity 
 
To investigate the risk propensities of individual investors, respondents were 
asked to rate their degree of agreement/disagreement with the following 
statements:  
(i) I am willing to take high risk in exchange for high expected share returns, 
and  
(ii) I feel comfortable investing in shares that are considered risky.  
 
Since both statements together make up the measurement scale for risk 
propensity, the study first needs to determine whether both actually measure the 
same attribute. In this regard, the Cronbach‘s Alpha reliability test shows a score of 
0.836. This is higher than the required threshold of 0.7, suggesting that both 
statements are reliably measuring the same attribute.  
 
Next, detailed findings regarding the risk propensities of sampled investors are 
presented.  
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Table 6.11 Average Risk Propensity Profile of Questionnaire Respondents 
Average Risk Propensity* 
(5 = Highest; 4 = High; 3 = Neutral; 2 = Low; 1 = 
Lowest) 
No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Sample 
1.0 21 1.90 
1.5 40 3.62 
2.0 161 14.56 
2.5 155 14.01 
3.0 289 26.13 
3.5 195 17.63 
4.0 144 13.02 
4.5 65 5.88 
5.0 36 3.25 
Total 1106 100 
*average score for the two statements 
 
As shown in Table 6.11, approximately 34% of respondents are relatively low risk 
takers (average scores of 1.0 to 2.5); 26% are risk neutral (average score of 3.0); 
and the remaining 40% are relatively high risk takers (average score of 3.5 to 5.0). 
In aggregate, therefore, the general indication is that Malaysian individual 
investors tend to slightly favour taking on above average amounts of risk.  
 
More importantly, a majority of respondent investors are neither extremely risk 
averse nor extremely risk seeking. This is based on the finding where 85% of 
individual investor respondents opt to take moderate amounts of investment risk 
(average score of between 2.0 to 4.0).  
 
Overall, the results show that individual investors in Malaysia tend to be rather 
moderate in terms of risk taking propensity. Such a tendency is more conservative 
than the study‘s presumption that investors in developing capital markets are 
highly risk tolerant/seeking as a sizeable proportion of them are assumed to 
engage frequently in rumour-driven, speculative share trading (see, for example, 
Low, 2004).  
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6.3.2.2  Mental Accounts 
 
If the mental accounting phenomenon is found to exist, it would lend support to the 
study‘s contention that investing in shares is a highly complex activity in real life. In 
turn, this will lend credibility to the claim that both the analysis and statistical 
methods used by this study must be inherently flexible to fairly reflect, capture and 
account for this complexity of reality.  
 
The pervasiveness of mental accounting can be detected in the interview extracts 
(i.e. Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3) below. 
 
Figure 6.1 Interview Extract Regarding Mental Accounts (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 14: 
 
 
How would you describe the proportions of shares in your portfolio? What 
percentage is long-term and what percentage of it is short-term, generally? 
 
Because my capital is small... so normally 20% of my capital will be in 
for long term and about 60% will be in trading. The last 20% is when 
there is an opportunity, I will go for... I mean... punting. 
 
Figure 6.2 Interview Extract Regarding Mental Accounts (2) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Broker 04: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 04: 
 
Is it fair to suggest that most of the trades being made in Malaysian stock 
market are based on all these rumours and speculations? 
 
I mean yes. I can say that 80%. 
 
Ok... 
 
Our country... all the retailers in our stock market are still very much... 
I mean speculative or gambling … very high gambling mindset. 
 
Figure 6.3 Interview Extract Regarding Mental Accounts (3) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Investor 05: 
 
 
What would you say is your typical investment horizon for equity 
investments? Do you normally invest in term of days, weeks, months or 
years? 
 
I really... I would love to hold in months and also years, but that 
depends on what sort of companies I invest in... Because I would 
allocate certain fraction of my portfolio towards long term investment 
and some of it will go to medium term trading which is months. 
 
Next, the study investigates the general proportions of investors‘ share portfolios 
that are devoted to speculative/gambling purposes. This is because, from the 
viewpoint of corporate governance, investors should make investment decisions 
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based on company fundamentals and not listen to unsubstantiated rumours and 
speculation.  
 
As the interview extracts above suggest that the gambling and/or speculative 
mindset is prevalent amongst Malaysian investors, the study expects most 
respondents to be familiar with the concept of mental accounts along the 
investment vs. gambling/speculative dimension. Results below show the 
proportions of respondent investors demonstrating this trait. 
 
Table 6.12 Mental Accounts (Proportion of Share Portfolio devoted to Speculation/ 
     Gambling) 
Proportion of Share Portfolio intended for 
speculation/gambling (average %) 
No. of 
Respondents 
% of Overall 
Sample 
0% 303 27.40 
20% 427 38.61 
40% 200 18.08 
60% 108 9.77 
80% 46 4.16 
100% 22 1.99 
Total 1106 100* 
 
From Table 6.12, the study found that 27% of respondents have share portfolios 
that are solely intended for stable share investments. Conversely, a mere 2% of 
sampled investors devote their entire share portfolio towards speculative/gambling 
purposes. Taken together, only a minority of individual investors have share 
accounts that are intended for a single purpose. 
 
The primary finding of interest is that around 71% of respondents reported forming 
different mental accounts within their respective individual share portfolios (thus 
showing that the psychological phenomenon described by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1981) and Nofsinger (2008) is indeed typical even for investors in emerging 
markets). Put simply, they own different tranches of shares, some of which are 
intended to satisfy long-term objectives while others are for short-term speculation. 
This indicative tendency is posited to be, at the very least, partially reflective of the 
wider individual investor population in Malaysia.  
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In addition, these results support the contention that most investors in emerging 
markets are prone to either rumour-driven speculative share trading or approach 
investments with a gambling mindset (Low, 2004).  
 
The findings also suggest that most investors make share investments for a 
number of reasons/motivations that may or may not be carried out using just one 
specific investment strategy. Even so, the study argued in Chapter 4 that dominant 
tendencies can be teased out of the different practices/strategies adopted for 
different purposes. The underlying assumption is that one particular objective 
(along with an accompanying set of related actions/tendencies) would be more 
dominant relative to others within any one share portfolio. For example, a 
respondent with 20% of his/her portfolio devoted to gambling/speculative purposes 
would have an investment-based strategy as the dominant tendency.  
 
 
6.3.2.4  Overconfidence 
 
The following sets of findings are related to one of the main psychological traits 
documented by behavioural finance, that of overconfidence. The measurement 
scale for overconfidence is made up of three smaller scales or sub-attributes. They 
are self-attribution bias, degree of control and degree of perceived knowledge. 
Consequently, findings for each of the three sub-attributes are presented before 
combining them to derive the results for overconfidence. 
 
 
6.3.2.4.1  Self-Attribution Bias 
 
To investigate the degree of self-attribution exhibited by individual investors in 
Malaysia, respondents were asked to rate their degree of agreement/ 
disagreement with the following statements: 
 
(i) My past profitable investments were mainly due to my specific investment 
skills and  
(ii) My investment losses have often resulted from factors beyond my control. 
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First, the study needs to determine whether the two statements actually measure 
the same trait. The Cronbach‘s Alpha reliability test shows a score of 0.426 which 
is considerably lower than the required threshold of 0.7. Both statements, therefore, 
do not measure the same attribute, at least not up to the study‘s required reliability 
standards. Hence, this scale cannot be used as (i) a measure for self-attribution 
and (ii) part of the overall overconfidence scale.  
 
 
6.3.2.4.2  Degree of Control 
 
To measure investors‘ overall degree of control, respondents were asked to rate 
their degree of agreement/disagreement with the following statements:  
 
(i) I am fully responsible for the results of my investment decisions, and  
(ii) I make all the important share investment decisions myself.  
 
Again, the Cronbach‘s Alpha reliability test is conducted which yielded a score of 
0.693. Adhering strictly to the established minimum threshold of 0.7, the result 
shows that these statements do not measure the same attribute, at least not up to 
the study‘s required reliability standards. As a consequence, this measurement 
scale cannot be used as (i) a proxy for degree of control and (ii) part of the overall 
overconfidence scale.  
 
Judging from the results of the reliability test of both measurements scales 
examined thus far (i.e. for Self-attribution bias and Degree of Control), the 
drawbacks outlined by Dorn and Huberman (2005) regarding the utilisation of 
similar psychological scales across different contexts is confirmed. Specifically, 
they cautioned that (i) investors‘ responses are likely to be domain-specific, (ii) 
correlation across proxies may be poor, and (iii) proxies may lose their validity for 
another population. 
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6.3.2.5  Degree of Perceived Knowledge 
 
The degree of perceived knowledge (as a distinct psychological inclination), by 
itself, is often used as a measure of overconfidence by previous empirical studies 
in the behavioural finance tradition. Its measurement scale is made up of a single 
statement, that is:  
 
(i) I am more knowledgeable in share investments compared to the average 
investor.  
 
Questionnaire respondents‘ responses to the statement on degree of perceived 
knowledge will be used as a proxy measure for overconfidence (implying that the 
degree of perceived knowledge is equated to overconfidence in this subsection). 
This is because: 
 
 Neither of the other two sub-attribute measurement scales passed the 
instrument reliability test (Cronbach‘s Alpha). Furthermore, the study found 
that, even if the Self-Attribution scale‘s reliability is accepted by rounding up 
the actual figure to 0.7, the reliability of the subsequently constructed grand 
overconfidence scale (by combining the self-attribution and degree of 
perceived knowledge scales) is also less than 0.7 (the exact figure being 
0.624).  
 Several past empirical studies have used degree of perceived knowledge 
(using the ―average investor‖ as a benchmark) as an adequate proxy for 
overconfidence. 
 
Individual investors‘ tendencies/inclinations in relation to overconfidence are 
explored below.  
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Table 6.13 Questionnaire Respondents‟ Degree of Perceived Knowledge 
More Knowledgeable than the Average Investor No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Sample 
Strongly Agree 72 6.52 
Agree 269 24.34 
Neutral 492 44.53 
Disagree 185 16.74 
Strongly Disagree 87 7.87 
Total 1105* 100 
*one respondent did not enter a response 
 
From Table 6.13, the study finds that approximately 31% of respondents think that 
they are more knowledgeable than the average investor174. Conversely, only 25% 
of respondents think otherwise175. The remaining 45% of sampled investors are 
neutral on this issue. This set of findings is broadly consistent with those of past 
empirical studies (see, for example, Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; Lee and Tweedie, 
1977), that individual investors are mostly ―unsophisticated‖ (specifically, most 
individual investors do not understand information contained in many parts of 
corporate annual reports) as only less than one third of respondents perceive 
themselves as possessing investment knowledge that is above average. 
 
Ideally, equal numbers of investors would make up each of the five categories 
when comparing their individual investment knowledge in relation to the others. Put 
simply, each of the five categories above should be selected by approximately 
20% of total respondents.  
 
As only 31% of investors reported that they either agree or strongly agree with the 
statement as compared to the ideal of 40% (the total for two categories), the 9% 
difference in investor numbers can be attributed to the larger than expected 
Neutral category. Another implication is that this 9% of investors are ―under 
confident‖ by reporting average expertise when they actually belong to the more 
knowledgeable than average categories.  
 
 
                                                 
174
 By either Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing with the statement. 
175
 By either Disagreeing or Strongly Disagreeing with the statement. 
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Conversely, investors who either disagree or strongly disagree with the above 
statement are also expected to comprise roughly 40% of respondents. Since the 
actual reported figure is just 25%, this implies that there is a 15% shortfall in 
investor numbers. This 15% of investors are ―over confident‖ in the sense that they 
should belong to less than averagely knowledgeable categories but instead, report 
having average amounts of investment knowledge.  
 
Considering the overall distribution of investors along this particular dimension, 
there seems to be a mixture of overly confident and less confident investors within 
the Neutral category. More importantly, the attribute of overconfidence is detected 
in the sample of Malaysian investors. As 15% of respondents are found to be 
overconfident as opposed to just 9% who are ―under‖ confident, the indicative 
tendency uncovered is that individual investors in Malaysia tends to be marginally 
overconfident on balance. This tendency is surprising as the contention by authors 
such as Yates et al. (1997) is that people raised in Asian cultures should exhibit 
high levels of overconfidence. Further research in this area is required. 
 
 
6.3.2.6  Self-Reported Actual Knowledge 
 
The previous sets of findings related to the degree of perceived knowledge are 
based on sampled respondents‘ opinions regarding the amount of financial 
knowledge that they possess relative to their peers. Naturally, a pertinent issue is 
whether the degree of perceived knowledge fairly reflects the degree of actual 
financial knowledge/expertise. To investigate this, sampled investors are 
questioned on their ability to explain selected financial concepts. 
 
The study first considers investors‘ ability to explain the price earnings (PE) ratio. 
As the corresponding Chi-Square test yields a value of less than 0.01, a significant 
association is shown to exist between degree of perceived knowledge and actual 
knowledge with 99% confidence. Indications point toward a strong and also 
positive association between these two variables. Essentially, those investors who 
report being more knowledgeable than the average investor are also more likely to 
be able to explain the PE ratio concept well.  
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A similar test is conducted to enhance the credibility of the PE ratio findings. The 
ability to explain a share bonus issue or stock split is used for such a purpose. As 
expected, a Chi-Square test value of less than 0.01 is obtained. This means that 
statistically significant association does indeed exist with 99% confidence.  
 
The resulting cross-tabulation figures reveal a remarkably similar trend with that 
identified for the PE ratio test. There is an obvious, persistent yet gradual shift in 
terms of investor numbers towards higher explanatory abilities with increasing 
reported degrees of actual knowledge. Once again, indicative tendency is of a 
positive association between degree of perceived knowledge and actual financial 
knowledge.  
 
The results of the study consistently show that, even though some investors are 
prone to be overconfident, investors who claim to be more knowledgeable than the 
average investor are indeed more likely than expected to actually be more 
knowledgeable than average. This lends further credibility to the earlier argument 
that most individual investors are relatively unsophisticated (in terms of 
understanding financial concepts presented in annual reports, as described by 
Bartlett and Chandler, 1997) since only a minority of them are found to have above 
average financial expertise (referring to both perceived and actual financial 
knowledge). 
 
 
6.3.2.7  Additional Test for Potential Sample Bias 
 
The study has thus far conducted a series of tests to address concerns that 
respondents drawn from different stock brokerage branches around the country 
are significantly biased in some respects. Respondents‘ demographic attributes 
were scrutinised for any possible differences. Besides the anticipated geographical 
distinctiveness of investors attached to different brokerages, no significant biases 
are found along a number of demographic attributes.  
 
Another implicit assumption made is that investors exhibiting similar demographic 
attributes also have psychological attributes that do not significantly differ from one 
another. As an added precaution, sampled investors are again divided into their 
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respective primary brokerages and the degree of perceived knowledge is used as 
a proxy for psychological attributes in order to test this assumption (please refer to 
Table 6.14).  
 
Table 6.14 Chi-Square Test Results for Main Brokerage/Degree of Perceived 
                  Knowledge 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.998
a
 20 .397 
Likelihood Ratio 21.116 20 .390 
Linear-by-Linear Association .008 1 .930 
N of Valid Cases 972   
a. 2 cells (6.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.38. 
 
As the resultant Chi-Square sig-value is more than 0.05, there is insufficient 
evidence of significant differences between the different subsamples of investors 
in terms of degree of perceived knowledge. The partially representative 
assumption for the overall sample is again holding up well. Since the sample of 
individual investors from the different brokerages exhibit no significant differences 
in terms of demographic and psychological characteristics, the study assumes that 
other behavioural inclinations/tendencies reported in the remaining sections of 
Chapter 6 and also throughout Chapter 7 provide partially/ broadly representative 
indications of the wider individual investor population in Malaysia as well. 
 
All findings related to respondents‘ investment-related demographic and 
psychological attributes have now been presented. Moving away from 
demographics and psychological tendencies, the study now reports findings 
pertaining to investors‘ investment-related preferences and stylistics. First, 
respondents‘ primary motivations/objectives for investing in Malaysian equities are 
considered.  
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6.4  Investment Motivations and Objectives 
 
Consistent with past empirical studies, all interview participants revealed that 
generating investment returns through share price increases (both in the short- 
and long-term) is their primary objective/motivation. Some did mention dividend 
income but it is of lesser importance compared to share price increase. Findings 
provide good support for the study‘s argument that the specific nature of ―affective 
products‖ (Weber, 1949 as cited in Crotty, 2003) such as shares of publicly-listed 
companies, limits the likely motivations/objectives of investors in purchasing them. 
Essentially, dominant economic imperatives are found to confine potentially 
unlimited motivations/objectives of investing in equities to a few logical ones. 
 
Notwithstanding the observations above, the study also identified a few potentially 
important non-economic reasons/motivations for investing in shares. These can be 
detected from the responses of certain semi-structured interview participants given 
in Figures 6.4 and 6.5:  
 
Figure 6.4 Interview Extract Regarding Investment Motivation and Objectives (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 10: 
 
 
 
Are there other important reasons why you actively invest in shares? 
Besides making profits, what else do you get out of it? 
 
Yes, I get a lot of excitement investing because I can test my 
investment theories and see what works. Other than that, looking at 
my shares go up also excites me. Other than that, whenever I discuss 
with friends who also buy the same shares at the same time, we 
normally call each other up whenever we see a big rise or fall in the 
market price or when got new news about the company... very fun 
actually. 
 
Figure 6.5 Interview Extract Regarding Investment Motivation and Objectives (2) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Broker 05: 
 
Are there other important reasons why your retail investor clients actively 
invest in shares? I mean, besides making profits... 
 
For some clients, pride is a factor. To show people that they own a lot 
of shares and to boast about it... just like owning a very expensive car 
like... 
 
From Figures 6.4 and 6.5, two distinct motivations seem to be rather important 
within the wider individual investor population in terms of compelling them to invest 
in shares. They are Fun/Excitement and Pride/Ego. As such, these are added 
alongside the original three listed (short-term share price increase, long-term share 
price increase and dividend income) in the questionnaire. The following are 
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findings pertaining to the indicative prevalence of each of the listed investment 
motivations/objectives.  
 
Table 6.15 Questionnaire Respondents‟ Primary Investment Objectives/   
                  Motivations 
Investment Motivation/Objective No. of Respondents 
 Very 
Important 
Important Slightly 
Important 
Irrelevant 
Short-term share price increase 411 
(37.16%) 
526 
(47.56%) 
142 
(12.84%) 
27 
(2.44%) 
Long-term share price increase 373 
(33.73%) 
485 
(43.85%) 
179 
(16.18%) 
69 
(6.24%) 
Dividend Income 192 
(17.36%) 
394 
(35.62%) 
309 
(27.94%) 
211 
(19.08%) 
Fun/Excitement 25 
(2.26%) 
38 
(3.44%) 
267 
(24.14%) 
716 
(64.74%) 
Pride/Ego 6 
(0.54%) 
38 
(3.44%) 
172 
(15.55%) 
890 
(80.47%) 
 
Table 6.15 shows that share price increases are typically regarded with 
significantly higher degrees of importance compared to the other objectives/ 
motivations. A total of 84.72% of respondents rated short-term share price 
increase as either Important or Very Important. This is closely followed by 
long-term share price increase with a corresponding percentage of 77.58%. More 
interestingly, just 27 out of 1106 investors rated short-term share price increase as 
Irrelevant making it the most highly rated objective. 
 
Next, roughly 53% of respondents rated dividend income as either Important or 
Very Important even though it is Irrelevant for about 19% of respondents. Evidently, 
generating returns through dividend income is a relevant investment objective for a 
majority of individual investors but it is considerably less important when compared 
to share price increases. 
 
As for fun/excitement and pride/ego, 88.88% and 96.02% of respondents 
respectively rated them as either only slightly important or irrelevant. Conversely, 
not more than 6% of investors have rated each of the two motivations as either 
important or very important. These results show that even though the interview 
extracts portray these as potentially key motivations across this investor class, the 
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actual indicative tendency is to the contrary. More importantly, this finding is an 
indication that individual investors approach their share investments in a non-trivial 
manner. As predicted by Weber (as cited in Crotty, 2003) certain dominant 
imperatives do form the underlying motivations for rational goal-oriented products 
(and, in this case, the imperative to make profits). 
 
The findings also clearly demonstrate the salience of short-term gains in 
developing capital markets such as Malaysia which stands in stark contrast to 
empirical studies conducted in the West (see, for example, Dorn and Huberman, 
2005 and Lease et al., 1974) where individual investors report having mostly 
longer-term objectives and pay scant attention to short-term capital gains. 
 
 
6.5  General Investment Strategies 
 
In terms of the general investment strategies that individual investors adopt and/or 
prefer, interview respondents‘ responses are found to fit well into the six distinct, 
pre-selected strategies identified from the extant literature. In terms of 
inclusion/omission of items for the study‘s questionnaire, therefore, no changes 
were made to the original strategies listed. Table 6.16 outlines findings related to 
the strategies pursued by individual investor respondents. 
 
Table 6.16 Questionnaire Respondents‟ General Investment Strategies 
Investment Strategy No. of 
Respondents 
% of Overall 
Sample 
Reputation-based 205 18.54 
Attention-based 324 29.30 
Rely on Others 242 21.88 
Fundamental Analysis 181 16.37 
Technical Analysis 65 5.88 
Combination of Fundamental and Technical 
Analyses 
89 8.05 
Total 1106 100* 
*rounded up 
 
The study found that approximately 70% of sample respondents use relatively 
simplistic investment strategies. Included are reputation-based, attention-based 
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and reliance-based strategies. Evidently, most individual investors in Malaysia do 
not conduct much systematic analysis when evaluating which shares to purchase. 
The Heuristic Simplification explanation proposed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) and Nofsinger (2008) seems to apply well to these investors. However, it 
remains unclear whether this practice is mainly attributable to a lack of investment 
knowledge/expertise, a lack of time and resources, and/or a lack of motivation to 
conduct more in-depth research. Even so, considering the persuasiveness of past 
empirical findings (reported by researchers such as Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; 
Lee and Tweedie, 1977), individual investors‘ lack of investment knowledge is 
likely to be one of the main underlying reasons. Further research, however, is 
required to enhance our understanding of this particular issue. 
 
About 16% of investors sampled undertake variants of fundamental analysis176. 
Compared to Lease et al. (1974)‘s finding where 42% of investors in their 
US-based sample make use of fundamental analysis, individual investors in 
Malaysia typically have lower levels of sophistication. On the other hand, a mere 
6% of respondents rely primarily on technical analysis. Due to the nature of 
technical analysis, investors opting for this strategy are likely to be sophisticated 
and possess good finance-related knowledge177 . In comparison, self-reported 
technical investors comprised about 4% of Lease et al. (1974)‘s sample.  
 
Lastly, about 8% of respondents make use of a combination of fundamental and 
technical elements in their analysis of potential shares to purchase. The 
corresponding percentage reported in Lease et al. (1974)‘s study stands at 23%. If 
this is used as a benchmark of overall investor sophistication, Malaysian investors 
are again found to be comparatively inferior. 
 
Judging by the proportions of Malaysian investors who make use of 
heuristically-simplified investment strategies, we could detect a general lack of 
individual investor sophistication. As explained by the study in earlier chapters, this 
indicative tendency is expected for investors based in developing capital markets 
(see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Even so, the proportion of better 
                                                 
176
 Concentrating on evaluating various aspects of a company‘s prospects and operations; 
industry-related outlook; a country or region‘s investment climate; and/or other 
fundamental factors. 
177
 Due to the very nature of this particular strategy which involves the interpretation of 
stock charts and, for some, technical indicators as well. 
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informed investors is still significant as fundamental analysis, technical analysis or 
a combination of both are collectively practiced by approximately 30% of 
respondent investors.  
 
 
6.5.1  Investor Profiles by Investment Strategies 
 
In previous chapters of the study, an individual investor‘s primary investment 
strategy is argued to provide fair indications of his/her likely investment-related 
actions, tendencies, preferences and stylistics (similar to the argument made by 
Lewellen et al., 1977)178. 
 
The following section is aimed at evaluating the credibility of the contention made 
above. Such a procedure is again intended to test the credibility of the responses 
given by sampled investors. This is because if (i) investment strategies are indeed 
found to be good indicators of distinct investor inclinations/tendencies and (ii) also, 
the distinctive trends/tendencies uncovered can be well explained/justified 
according to the inherent nature of each investment strategy; the study will be able 
to show that investors have responded in a sufficiently earnest, fair and reasonable 
manner leading to findings that are more credible/valid.  
 
Second, investment strategies that are fairly indicative can serve as reference 
variables to make it easier to make sense of the many findings presented. It is 
easier to integrate the many different investor characteristics and also better 
appreciate the wider qualities of the individual investor population if investors are 
divided and viewed from the lens of these investment strategies. For example, 
instead of scrutinizing the many separate figures and result sets for a number of 
variables that are proxies of investor sophistication, researchers can derive a 
preliminary but meaningful, overall indication of sophistication by simply looking at 
the proportion of investors making use of heuristically simplified strategies.  
 
                                                 
178
 For example, due to the general nature of fundamental analysis, investors opting for this 
strategy are assumed to have relatively longer-term investment horizons; are more likely to 
consider corporate governance-related factors and have relatively longer average 
shareholding periods. 
242 
 
Indeed, if one considers that approximately 70% of individual investors in Malaysia 
make use of heuristically simplified investment strategies, it is clear that this 
investor group is generally not very sophisticated. Hence, even before carrying out 
more in-depth evaluation, the researcher is able to deduce the relative lack of 
investor sophistication compared to the same investor subgroup in the US (Lease 
et al., 1974). 
 
The arguments above hinge on the often-cited contention (which was verified 
earlier by the study) that even though an individual investor may opt for different 
investment strategies or differing sets of investment related actions/behaviors at 
different times, a dominant strategy or set of behaviors is present. Hence, while 
predicted indicative tendencies may not be perfectly shown by cross-tabulated 
figures, the underlying trends uncovered would still fairly reflect the general nature 
of each corresponding investment strategy.  
 
 
6.5.1.1  General Investment Strategy/Average Risk Propensity 
 
The first test of the indicative qualities of investors‘ primary investment strategies is 
conducted by exploring the associations between chosen investment strategies 
and the corresponding risk propensities of respondent investors.  
 
Table 6.17 Chi-Square Test Results for General Investment Strategy/Average 
                  Risk Propensity 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.803E2 40 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 191.568 40 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.437 1 .035 
N of Valid Cases 1106   
a. 10 cells (18.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.23. 
 
As the results in Table 6.17 show a Chi-Square sig-value of less than 0.01, it is 
surmised that there are significant differences between investors‘ chosen primary 
investment strategies and their corresponding risk propensities. The full set of 
cross-tabulation results for investors‘ general investment strategies and their 
corresponding average risk propensities is given in Appendix 7.  
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Cross-tabulated results show that investors pursuing a reputation-based strategy 
exhibit a preference for taking lower risks as higher numbers of them than 
expected make up all lower risk propensity categories. In addition, a significant 
proportion of them also report having average risk propensity. Findings are 
consistent with the nature of this particular strategy as reputable companies are 
presumed to be relatively more stable and well-established, making them 
seemingly safer/lower risk investments. In short, this strategy appeals more to 
investors with lower risk propensities.  
 
On the contrary, investors who pursue an attention-based investment strategy are 
found to be more inclined towards higher risk propensities (i.e. their numbers are 
higher than expected for all higher risk categories). A likely explanation is that 
respondents who base their equity purchasing decisions on attention grabbing 
news/information/rumours are more likely to engage in impulsive or speculative 
trading.  
 
The study found that investors utilising a reliance-based strategy exhibit yet 
another distinct risk propensity pattern, that is, they are more likely than expected 
to adopt non-extreme risk propensities, especially in the risk neutral or slightly risk 
seeking categories. Relatively wide spread of risk propensities is also evident 
amongst this group of investors. Such an observation makes intuitive sense 
because different risk appetites do not directly impact the need to depend on 
others for investment advice (as an investment strategy). Conversely, the two 
strategies examined above are fundamentally different from relying on others 
because they reflect more on the intrinsic characters of those investors179. 
 
Higher numbers of investors undertaking fundamental analysis than initially 
expected display an inclination towards lower risk propensities. Disproportionately 
higher numbers of investors are recorded for all lower risk categories. As 
mentioned, such a tendency is predicted as the logic of fundamental analysis is to 
identify and invest in firms with solid corporate performance and good future 
prospects (which presumably lowers firm-specific investment risk).  
 
                                                 
179
 For example, selecting seemingly safer, reputable companies is more intuitively 
appealing to investors with relatively lower intrinsic risk propensities. 
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Next, investors utilising technical analysis are found to exhibit the tendency of 
having medium-to-high risk propensities. These investors are over-represented in 
all higher risk propensity categories. Such a distinct overall risk propensity pattern 
is broadly consistent with the conjecture made by the study in Chapter 4. Individual 
investors using this strategy are willing to invest in the shares of relatively 
risky/speculative companies as they are looking to profit from significant share 
price fluctuations180. Furthermore, as long as the charts show the right patterns, 
investors will purchase the corresponding shares no matter how risky the shares 
and/or the underlying companies are.  
 
For combination-based investors, they are predicted to have non-extreme, 
mid-range risk propensities due to the mutually moderating influence of the 
distinctive fundamental analysis and technical analysis risk inclinations181. Results 
show higher than expected numbers of investors in this group reporting higher 
average risk propensities. As combination-based investors typically use 
fundamental analysis to form a threshold, mainly to avoid investing in overly risky 
companies, elements of technical analysis may exert a bigger overall influence. 
This may explain why even though these investors exhibit higher risk propensities 
in general, the highest risk propensity category is under-represented182.  
 
The indicative tendencies described above add credibility to the study‘s contention 
that investors grouped according to their primary investment strategies exhibit 
distinct combinations of investment-related attributes/tendencies/preferences. In 
short, primary investment strategies are indeed good predictors of individual 
investor attributes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
180
 Bigger, more stable blue chip firms are generally expected to have more stable share 
prices thus lowering the chances of making higher profits (in percentage terms) from share 
price fluctuations as compared to riskier, small capitalisation firms. 
181
 For a more detailed explanation, please refer to the Investment Strategies section in 
Chapter 4. 
182
 As investors tend not to violate the thresholds of riskiness determined by fundamental 
analysis. 
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6.5.1.2  General Investment Strategy/Degree of Perceived 
Knowledge 
 
As an additional test of the indicative qualities of investment strategies, a 
cross-tabulation is carried out with degree of perceived knowledge (referring to 
Table 6.18, significant associations exist as the relevant Chi-Square test value is 
less than 0.01). 
 
Table 6.18 Chi-Square Test Results for Degree of Perceived Knowledge/General 
                  Investment Strategy 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.320E2 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 145.783 20 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 43.329 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1105   
a. 1 cells (3.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.24. 
 
The full set of cross-tabulation results for investors‘ general investment strategies 
and their corresponding degrees of perceived knowledge is given in Appendix 7. 
 
Cross-tabulated results show that all three Heuristically-simplified strategies are 
more likely to be pursued by investors who perceive themselves as either less 
knowledgeable than, or similar to, the average investor. More of these investors 
make up the ―less than average‖ and also ―average‖ knowledge categories than 
initially expected. Considering the positive association between perceived 
knowledge and actual knowledge, the study can ascertain that one of the main 
reasons for these investors opting for simplified strategies is the lack of financial 
expertise.   
 
On the other hand, the three investment strategies which require some degree of 
analysis being carried out by the investors themselves are found to be made up by 
disproportionately more than expected relatively knowledgeable investors. Overall, 
the study has again demonstrated the indicative qualities of investors‘ primary 
investment strategies. 
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Thus far, the study has convincingly demonstrated the fact that investment 
strategies provide good indications of various individual investor attributes/ 
characteristics/practices. This attribute is therefore a good starting point or 
reference variable for future empirical studies that focus on the behavioural 
tendencies of individual investors.  
 
 
6.6  Chapter Summary 
 
Throughout Chapter 6, the study reported various findings pertaining to individual 
investors‘ investment-related demographic attributes, psychological tendencies, 
preference and stylistics. These characteristics together make up the general 
profiles of respondents and also the assumptions and tendencies that they bring 
into the typical investment cycle.  
 
The study‘s main sample of individual investors is shown to be fairly balanced with 
relatively good representations of investors from different age ranges, genders, 
race/ethnic groups and also with a range of investment experience. These enable 
any distinctiveness in investors‘ actions/tendencies/preferences as results of 
variances in these attributes to be easily detectable.  
 
Subsequently, the study has shown that investors attached to the different 
participating brokerages, while being geographically distinct from one another, are 
not significantly different or biased along a host of other demographic and also 
psychological dimensions. Thus, indicative tendencies uncovered are contended 
to be at least partially representative of the wider individual investor population in 
Malaysia. 
 
As only a minority of individual investors sampled have share accounts that are 
intended for a single purpose, most respondents do purchase different shares for 
different reasons/purposes by using possibly different strategies/preferences as 
well. Nevertheless, the study demonstrated that each investor does have a 
dominant primary investment strategy and adheres to a set of 
tendencies/actions/preferences that are consistent with such a strategy. Again, the 
partially representative indicative tendencies argument is posited to hold. 
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In addition, individual investors in Malaysia are collectively slightly overconfident 
and also exhibit the tendency of assuming slightly higher than average amounts of 
investment risk. A majority of these investors also lack sophistication and are more 
likely to pursue heuristically simplified investment strategies. The relative amounts 
of knowledge that investors perceive having is fairly reflective of the actual amount 
of investment knowledge that they possess. Moving on, short-term share price 
increase is reported to be the most important investment objective for this investor 
group.  
 
Finally, investors‘ primary investment strategies are shown to be fairly good 
indicators of the combinations of investment-related attributes/tendencies/ 
preferences that they exhibit. 
 
In the next chapter, all findings pertaining to individual investors‘ governance- 
related behavioural tendencies and their underlying motivations are presented. 
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Chapter 7 Research Findings 2: Investors’ 
Governance-related Behaviour over 
the Share Investment Cycle  
7.1  Chapter Outline 
 
In the preceding chapter, the study reported the investment-related attributes of 
investors, from basic demographics to psychological tendencies to investment 
objectives, preferences and stylistics. Investors are treated as individuals who 
bring distinct tendencies and assumptions into the share investment process.  
 
In Chapter 7, the study presents the various tendencies/actions/inclinations 
exhibited (i.e. reported) by individual investors within the context of the share 
investment cycle itself, with particular focus on corporate governance-related ones. 
Interpretations of the study‘s findings are made from the standpoint of individual 
investors and also the lens of corporate governance. Reporting of research 
findings from the governance perspective is aimed at providing a comprehensive 
response to the research questions established in Chapter 1, namely: 
 
 Q1: Does corporate governance matter to individual investors? If it does: 
o What aspects of it are taken into account in their share investment 
practices?  
o How are the relevant governance aspects taken into account? 
 Q2: When or under what circumstances does governance start to 
matter/matter more? 
 Q3: What are the reasons/justifications and also influences underlying 
individual investors‘ propensities to consider governance, undertake 
particular governance-related action and/or exhibit governance-related 
tendencies? 
o What country-specific environmental and institutional factors 
influence and also explain observed behavioural tendencies? 
o What personal investment-related attributes, preferences and 
stylistics influence and also explain observed behavioural 
tendencies?  
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In attempting to address the many aspects of the questions above, the responses 
are concurrently structured according to (i) the first two main research questions 
above (Q1 and Q2) and (ii) the major stages of the typical share investment cycle. 
Basically, the study explores whether and how governance is taken into account 
(i.e. in addressing Q1) by considering the governance actions/tendencies reported 
by individual investors in a stage-by-stage manner, moving from Pre-Purchase to 
Post-Investment stages (Stages One to Four). Each of the many relevant issues, 
attributes and/or actions reported are cast into the specific stages of the cycle 
where they would be most likely to take place/to be considered by investors.  
 
As for findings pertaining to Q3, they will be presented concurrently with the 
responses to both Q1 and Q2. This is because each governance-related 
tendency/action reported by respondents is then accompanied by an exploration of 
both the environmental and also personal influences that result in that identified 
tendency/action. 
 
Subsequently, primary investment strategies are evaluated on whether they 
provide fair indications of investors‘ individual propensities to consider corporate 
governance. 
 
 
7.2  Does Governance Matter to Individual Investors? 
 
Straightforward as the question may seem, the appropriate response is dependent 
upon addressing a few closely-related questions beforehand. Firstly, when asking 
if corporate governance matters, the presupposition is that investors are aware of, 
or have formed opinions regarding, certain elements of it. The study must, 
therefore, first investigate the aptness of such a presupposition.  
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7.2.1  Investment Cycle Stage 1: Pre-Investment 
7.2.1.1  Investors’ Awareness of the Motivations/Action of Market 
Participants (Country-level Governance) 
 
In Chapter 2, the study demonstrated that the many aspects of governance that 
investors may be aware of and/or take into account can either be firm-level or 
broader country-level governance attributes (see, for example, Klapper and Love, 
2004). Second, the notion that individual investors are likely to have a common 
sense and intuitive understanding of governance was proposed, explained as well 
as illustrated (through the use of certain examples)183.  
 
The notions above are further developed towards the end of Chapter 3 and 
individual investors‘ awareness of the major Malaysian corporate governance 
institutional/cultural attributes (i.e. country-level governance factors) are posited to 
be ultimately reflected in their awareness/opinions regarding the likely action/ 
motivations of various capital market participants. This argument is derived by 
combining (i) a variation of the concept of actor-centred governance introduced by 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003), (ii) contextual, embedded and complementing 
institutions governance by authors such as Gabrielsson and Huse (2004), 
Cornelius and Kogut (2003), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), amongst 
others, and (iii) the concepts of investor trust and confidence in share investment 
decision-making propounded by Ryan and Buchholtz (2001). 
 
For example, the major institutional corporate governance characteristics in 
Malaysia include (i) pervasive political involvement in business, (ii) the existence of 
many majority shareholder/managers and (iii) a corporate culture that is 
relationship-based (see, for example, Claessens and Fan, 2002 and Searle, 1999). 
As an extension, politically-connected majority shareholder/managers are argued 
to possess significantly more scope to exploit individual minority investors with 
minimal consequent sanctions as compared to corporate managers who are not 
majority shareholders and/or not politically well-connected. In turn, individual 
investors who are aware/opinionated may (i) ultimately direct their scepticism/ 
distrust of such institutional factors at politically-connected majority shareholder/ 
owners and (ii) subsequently adopt broad-based criteria such as not investing in 
                                                 
183
 Please refer to the later parts of Section 2.8 in Chapter 2. 
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politically-linked companies (to first determine the overall subset of firms that are 
acceptable before looking at a specific firm within the investable subgroup). 
 
The study, therefore, begins by exploring whether or not individual investors are 
aware of a range of relevant motivations/action of various market participants. The 
relevant findings are presented in the following section of the chapter. 
 
 
7.2.1.1.1  Corporate Management, Political Parties/Leaders/the 
State and Government Regulators 
 
Due to their highly related nature, the result sets for corporate management, 
political parties/leaders/the state and government regulators are presented 
together to enable subsequent, concurrent analysis. Such a procedure is deemed 
necessary to demonstrate the intricate linkages and mutual dependencies that 
deepen our understanding of the Malaysian corporate governance environment. 
 
First, the study considers investors who are unaware or have no opinions 
regarding market participants‘ likely motivations/behaviours.  
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Table 7.1 Awareness of Capital Market Participant Group-related Motivations/ 
     Action (1) 
Market 
Participant  
Motivations/Action Don’t Know 
(No. of 
Respondents) 
% of Overall 
Sample 
Corporate 
Management 
Run company poorly resulting in 
disappointing overall performance 
Make decisions that are against 
shareholders’ interests 
Exploit small shareholders 
Involvement in Illegal Acts 
Providing insufficient information 
 
94 
 
166 
219 
231 
173 
 
8.50 
 
15.01 
19.80 
20.87 
15.64 
Political 
Parties/ 
Leaders/State 
Making use of companies to raise 
political funds through manipulation 
of equity prices 
 
138 
 
12.48 
Market 
Regulator 
Independent/free from political 
influence 
Carry out effective and consistent 
enforcement 
284 
 
385 
25.68 
 
34.81 
 
Figures in Table 7.1 above clearly show that only a minority of investors are 
unaware/have no opinions regarding the likelihoods of corporate managers 
undertaking each of the listed action. The highest percentage found is 20.8% for 
the possibility of managers being involved in illegal acts. Corresponding figures for 
the other four actions are 8.5%, 15%, 19.8% and 15.6% respectively.  
 
Similarly, only 12.48% of individual investor respondents report being unaware or 
have not formed opinions regarding the likelihoods of political parties/leaders/the 
State making use of companies to raise funds through underhanded moves in the 
stock market.  
 
In the case of market regulators, about a quarter to a third of individual investors 
either do not know/have no opinions on whether or not they are independent 
and/or carry out effective enforcement. This percentage is higher than those 
reported for the other two groups as presumably, fewer investors have direct 
exposure or extensive knowledge on the roles, responsibilities and enforcement 
action of regulators. 
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For all three capital market participant groups above, the sets of results obtained 
are outside of the study‘s prior expectations as significantly more investors than 
expected are aware/have formed opinions regarding the various likely actions/ 
motivations. Predictions of the opposite partially stems from earlier findings 
showing that a majority of individual investors are relatively less knowledgeable184 
and pursue heuristically-simplified investment strategies (i.e. relying on others 
and/or do not do much in-depth investment evaluation). These two variables are 
relevant as one gives an indication of the ability to understand/evaluate while the 
other is a gauge of the likely motivation to find out or form opinions. Specifically, 
from the perspective of governance, the earlier findings provided preliminary 
indications that are broadly complementary to the ―no shortage of apathetic 
investors‖ argument by Low (2004) suggesting limited or lesser awareness of the 
said action/motivations owing to investor apathy, ignorance and/or disinterest. 
 
Having considered further, however, the result sets obtained for investors‘ 
awareness regarding the various actions/motivations of corporate managers are 
unsurprising as they are probably given the most attention by investors amongst 
the various main market participant groups. This is mainly due to their central role 
in the running of all such firms (this particular tendency is further explored later in 
the chapter by discerning between investors who are not transfixed by share price 
fluctuations alone when making investment decisions with those who are).  
 
The results for political parties/leaders/the State suggest that most individual 
investors are aware of the significant political involvement in publicly-listed firms 
which also make intuitive sense. If one considers the pervasive and explicit 
involvement of the Malaysian government and also political parties (especially 
UMNO) in the corporate sector as reflected by (i) many of the largest public-listed 
firms being termed as Government-linked companies (GLCs) due to their clear 
political links and (ii) many others that are widely seen and acknowledged as 
politically- connected (please refer to the works of Gomez and Jomo, 1999 and 
Searle, 1999, amongst others), the very high level of investor awareness is again 
expected.  
 
                                                 
184
 Compared to the perceived ―average‖ investor and also judging from reported amounts 
of actual financial knowledge. 
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Perhaps, the explanation above also applies those investors who report being 
aware and/or opinionated regarding the action/motivations of capital market 
regulators that are largely perceived to be closely-linked to and/or are influenced 
by the government/political parties (clear examples by Gomez and Jomo (1999) 
are given in Table 3.1). More generally, please refer to Figure 3.2 for a concise 
depiction. 
 
Overall, these observations point to the fact that sampled investors either (i) have 
high inclinations to form their own opinions/assumptions (regardless of whether 
they actually possess any relevant information or otherwise), (ii) base such 
opinions on their accumulated experiences and observations through the many 
years of making share investments and/or alternatively, extend their opinions 
regarding the general political scenario to the corporate sector. 
 
Next, in order to gauge the kinds of thoughts that these opinionated investors have 
on the considered motivations/action (i.e. whether they are positive or negative on 
balance), the study draws upon the relevant interview extracts (Figures 7.1, 7.2 
and 7.3 below). These extracts are selected as they are typical of most of the 
responses obtained for the issues being considered. 
 
Figure 7.1 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivations 
                  (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor07: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor07: 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
For a typical Malaysian publicly-listed company, what would you say are the 
chances of it being mismanaged by corporate managers? 
 
...I would think chances are quite high... the public company being 
mismanaged; everyone has kind of accepted the fact that the 
Malaysian corporate governance it is not good. The major 
shareholder involve in purchasing and disposing (of) its (his/her) 
company shares which I don’t think it makes sense you know... for 
the shareholders to reshuffle the shares. You know, buy at a certain 
time and then sell certain time... too much of (such) activities going 
on. Yes, basically that’s how it is, you see. You know that these 
directors are actually, mostly politically connected. 
 
Ok, what about their involvement in illegal acts like fraud? 
 
Fraud. I think we have seen a big one which is Transmile and there 
are actually a few companies that are about to go for listing but 
somehow they got stopped half way but there were no reasonable 
explanation being given by the companies. So I guess it could have 
something happening behind the scene which we do not know of. 
 
So there is evidence that its happening, isn‘t it? 
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Investor07: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor07: 
 
Yes. 
 
Ok. What about the possibility of unfair treatment of small shareholders? 
 
The probability of it? Oh, it can be quite high as well because... it’s 
that sometime the minority do not really understand the companies 
they actually invest in, so they end up, the majority taking advantage 
of them. Majority owners always have this profiting behaviour, you 
know… 
 
From Figure 7.1, it is clear that typically, individual investors have negative 
perceptions on balance (as represented by ―a typical Malaysian publicly-listed 
company‖) regarding the various action/motivations of corporate managers. Next, 
consider the issues raised in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 below.  
 
Figure 7.2 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivations 
                 (2) 
Investor 08: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 08: 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 08: 
One look at it, it looks very plain that... you have regulator, you have 
investor and then you have the management of the companies. It 
seems like these people are not really operating independently. You 
have another part which is the government interfering, I mean the 
roles played by the regulator... though I know... I mean it’s not on 
paper but you know, people been talking about it and I find it’s quite 
true. 
 
So, you mean all these entrenched business interests… 
 
And because you have the system where you allow the politicians to 
get involved in the company, in running the businesses of this 
company… So you cannot prevent this thing from not happening… 
 
I see. Where vested interests and the regulators (are) all colluding, in this 
market, yes? 
 
Yes. 
 
Figure 7.3 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivations 
                  (3) 
Investor 16: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 16: 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 16: 
 
 
Very poor because in terms of talking from the side of regulator… 
 
Please elaborate more. 
 
Ok, maybe like... I give you an example of Iris... happened to Iris when 
the share prices was over 10 cent plus, then it went up to like 1 dollar 
plus. So how much there’s increase, how many times? 
 
It has increased 10 to 13 times, I think. 
 
10 to 13 times. You know what happen during this time? SC... not 
SC… Bursa Malaysia only issue warning to this... to the company of 
Iris... But no action has been taken towards the company. Awhile after 
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Researcher: 
 
Investor 16: 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 16: 
that then the share came down, then it was like no more thing, you 
know, nothing happened. 
 
Yes. It was a blatant case of share price manipulation... 
 
Which the Bursa did issue warning but they… I mean the Bursa does 
not seem to be like really concerned of it at all. I don’t think that would 
be any... 
 
So it‟s just half-hearted action, isn‟t it? 
 
Yes. Yes, they did it half-heartedly. 
 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 both influence and justify the study‘s contention that the three 
market participant groups (comprising corporate management, political parties/ 
leaders/the State and government regulators) should be analyzed concurrently 
due to their intricate interlinks (as recommended by Searle, 1999).  
 
Preliminary indications from the responses of semi-structured interview 
respondents are that individual investors are very likely to have negative 
perceptions with regards to the various actions/motivations of these groups. Put 
simply, these market participants are likely to be perceived to be involved in a 
range of action that is detrimental to the interests of individual investors. 
 
Additionally, the study presents a detailed personal account of a number of the 
aforementioned detrimental actions/motivations by a market insider who had 
directly participated and also witnessed first-hand such acts. This portrayal (please 
refer to Figure 7.4), besides providing supporting evidence to the study‘s 
interpretation of the results above, also provides a fascinating and succinct view 
into the underlying corporate environment in Malaysia and the relationships 
between its major participants. 
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Figure 7.4 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivations 
                  (4) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
 
 
The Malaysian government itself has been aggressively promoting better 
corporate governance standards and awareness since the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis as mentioned by you... is this not having any major impact 
at all? If not, why? 
 
There isn’t much impact because there is too great exposure of the 
political parties with the business structure in Malaysia, especially 
the listed companies… and to be transparent in all the process, there 
is going to be readily a lot of threats... and cheaters which may not be 
clean, efficient, truthful or even... I would rather say... fair to other 
players in the market. So there is a lot of information that actually 
been contained and covered up... 
 
So is it fair to say then that these reforms could be described somewhat as 
window dressing? 
 
It is half-hearted and window dressing... that is very true. 
 
And what is the biggest problem? Is it a lack of enforcement? Because 
obviously we do now have a lot of new laws and reforms coming into force... 
 
The laws are created, the laws are actually been tabled, approved but 
we have yet to actually see a lot of execution or implementation to 
justify and to prove that there are seriousness in implementing what 
is actually been promoted. 
 
I see but could you please give me an example or two, of this perceived 
insincerity or half-heartedness? 
 
In reality when the stocks will move up more than 30 to 40 percent, 
there are supposed to be queries, there are supposed to be 
suspension of counters… and trading… In fact, most of the time the 
stock could have tripled from the base to the peak. And then it will 
crash within a week and there’ll be cries of such a process, there’ll be 
cries for execution… 
 
Yes. 
 
There’ll be cries for investigation. So far, the number of stocks that 
have crashed including BIG, Ngiu Kee, Falcon...  only one director or 
one company which were prosecuted, but it only involved financial 
penalization, nothing sort of... like jail or anything like that, so they 
probably get away with few hundred thousand Ringgit of fine when 
investor have lost millions of dollars. In the case of other stocks so 
far investigation is still carrying on but up to now, nothing has 
happened so it has been more than a year almost two now. 
 
So what you‟re saying indirectly is that the government is passively or 
indirectly allowing market manipulators to operate within the stock system? 
 
Yes, because there are people within the authorities who believe that 
such manipulation will create activity… interest… it’s both perceived 
to be good for the stock market and given that, by controlling such 
activities, you’ll be perceived to be a dead market if they were to 
enforce... checking out what is going on. 
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Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
I see. Do you have any personal experiences with regards to all this 
operators operating manipulating the market? 
 
Yes, I do. In fact, we used to operate such activities during 1996 but 
due to the Financial Crisis, where as a group or as individual, we have 
the opportunity to actually conduct such activities without much 
questioning or prevention from the authorities. 
 
I see... very interesting. Could you briefly describe how these operators 
work? Now, how do they manipulate share prices? An example... perhaps? 
 
 
To create interest, one can be actually churning the volume of the 
stocks. 
 
I see… to create volume… 
 
Yes. 
 
And to generate interest… 
 
To generate interest and that’s by actually churning the volume of the 
stocks, where one can... without any change of beneficiary 
shareholders, one can use two or three or more accounts to do buy 
and sell activities... and this is the normal procedure of doing it, or 
some could be passing rumours of certain things making use of any 
activities that is going to come out. 
 
I see. So it‟s just trading of information that are rumours. Ok, you are just 
spreading it out into the markets or you‟re just using the same amount of 
shares and passing it among different parties which are connected to make 
as though there are lots of demand and interest in the stocks? 
 
Yes, that’s true. 
 
Ok. Now, does the Securities Commission know or suspect that such 
activities are going on in the background? 
 
Yes, the authorities, the Securities Commission or stock exchange 
has real time information... each and every transaction, every names 
that appear, in fact, I do understand that there is a system in place 
that if the price rose by X percentage intraday, then there is a trigger 
which they do actually monitor. There is a department in stock 
exchange operation... it’s the surveillance unit that they actually 
monitors... how should I say, under unusual activities. We call it 
unusual activities. 
 
I see. By unusual activities, you mean unusual fluctuations in the share 
price? 
 
Yes, that’s right. 
 
Now, after undertaking some of these alleged activities back in the 1990s, 
what was the Securities Commission‟s response? 
 
Oh, the Commission has got... do not respond much to this because... 
we have seen shares which are trading for a dollar, a Ringgit which 
will be pushed all the way up to about a hundred and fifty and then 
will tumble to zero or from a dollar to fifty-five dollars and tumble to 
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Researcher: 
 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
zero, and we have yet to see anybody who are responsible for such 
activities been actually brought to court or been charged in court for 
such things. 
 
I see. So, which scenario is this? Are the regulatory agencies just simply 
turning a blind eye or do they simply allow all these activities or are they 
colluding and are involved themselves? 
 
I believe all the three points that has been discussed are actually 
acting in concert. 
 
All the three points? 
 
Yes. 
 
I see. So which one is it more to, in your opinion? 
 
They are…I would put that turning a blind eye probably the first… and 
I wouldn’t say they are actually colluding with the parties but turning 
a blind eye and allowing things to happen is probably what is actually 
happening. 
 
After further clarification post-interview, the market insider interviewee in Figure 
7.4 revealed that often, the majority shareholder/managers of companies whose 
shares are the targets of (or the means for) such underhand/manipulative activities 
are themselves involved. This includes covertly funding such moves, involvement 
in the actual churning of the shares and/or spreading unfounded rumours and 
consequently, obtaining a share of the profits incurred. Such action is partly carried 
out to fund the personal and/or political initiatives of their political patrons.  
 
Based on the revealing explanation above, collusion and complex interlinks are 
shown to exist between the Malaysian political establishment, capital market 
regulators, corporate managers/directors185  and other market participants such as 
brokers. Specifically, at least some of the majority shareholder/owners Malaysian 
publicly-listed companies and also Malaysia-based stock brokers are involved in 
underhanded and manipulative activities in the local stock market. 
 
Besides lending added credibility to the study‘s other findings reported thus far and 
their corresponding analyses, such a portrayal of the overall corporate 
environment is also consistent and strongly supported by the extensive empirical 
works of Gomez (1999), Gomez and Jomo (1999), Searle (1999), amongst others.  
These findings are also of utmost importance because they demonstrate that, as 
                                                 
185
 A significant proportion of whom are proxies/clients of political parties/leaders or are 
themselves politicians. 
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posited by Oman (2001) and Allen (2000), good corporate governance is not 
possible without good political governance.  
 
Weighing the available evidence, therefore, the suspicions/reservations expressed 
by individual investor interviewees regarding the motivations/actions of other 
market participants seem, at the very least, reasonable (regardless of whether 
such opinions are based on sound reasoning and understanding or simply 
reflections/extentions of their perceptions, biases and/or cynicism regarding the 
general Malaysian political environment without actually examining the facts).   
 
Next, the study investigates the prevalence of these seemingly dominant views 
amongst the wider population of individual investors in Malaysia. Specifically, the 
study investigates the nature of investors‘ opinions (positive or negative on 
balance) regarding the various actions/motivations of other market participants. 
The focus is on the majority of questionnaire respondents who are 
aware/opinionated. The relevant figures are given in Table 7.2 below. 
 
 
Table 7.2 The Likelihood of Capital Market Participant Group-related Motivations/ 
     Actions (1) 
External Factors Number of Respondents 
 
 Highly 
Likely 
Likely Unlikely Highly 
Unlikely 
Total* 
Run company poorly resulting in 
disappointing overall performance 
154 
(15.2%) 
517 
(51.1%) 
293 
(29.0%) 
48 
(4.8%) 
1012 
(100%) 
Make decisions that are against 
shareholders’ interests 
159 
(16.9%) 
494 
(52.6%) 
254 
(27.0%) 
33 
(3.5%) 
940 
(100%) 
Exploit small shareholders 
 
147 
(16.6%) 
417 
(47.0%) 
258 
(29.1%) 
65 
(7.3%) 
887 
(100%) 
Involvement in Illegal Acts 
 
151 
(17.3%) 
381 
(43.5%) 
264 
(30.2%) 
79 
(9.0%) 
875 
(100%) 
Providing insufficient information 
 
89 
(9.5%) 
544 
(58.3%) 
281 
(30.1%) 
19 
(2.0%) 
933 
(100%) 
Political Parties/Leaders making 
use of companies to raise political 
funds through manipulation of 
equity prices 
 
232 
(24.0%) 
 
609 
(62.9%) 
 
117 
(12.1%) 
 
10 
(1.0%) 
 
968 
 (100%) 
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Market regulators are 
independent/free from political 
influence 
23 
(2.8%) 
256 
(31.1%) 
442 
(53.8%) 
101 
(12.3%) 
822 
(100%) 
Market regulators carry out effective 
and consistent enforcement 
34 
(4.7%) 
257 
(35.6%) 
346 
 (48.0%) 
84 
(11.7%) 
721 
(100%) 
 
Examining the figures in Table 7.2, the study found that the percentages of 
respondents who rate the probability of occurrence for each of the detrimental 
managerial actions above as either Likely or Highly Likely are 66.3%, 69.5%, 
63.6%, 60.8% and 67.8% respectively. As predicted earlier, a majority of 
opinionated investors are clearly sceptical of the proper motivations/actions of 
typical Malaysian corporate managers.  
 
Again, the indicative tendencies above fit in well with (i) the Malaysian corporate 
environment portrayed by the study‘s literature review (Chapter 3) and (ii) the 
general opinions of interview respondents. The existence of politically 
well-connected, powerful majority shareholder/managers (many of whom are also 
proxies, clients or cronies of political parties/leaders) in most publicly-listed firms 
who possess the means to exploit investors with minimal sanctions is likely to 
explain such perceptions.  
 
Furthermore, as is implicit within the arguments of authors such as Verma (2004) 
and Crouch (1996), the investing public are also used to being exploited and have 
been conditioned to still look for but not expecting demonstration of corporate 
accountability, especially after taking into account the more general Malaysian 
political landscape. Ultimately, these trends and experiences have resulted in their 
negative perceptions of powerful market participants, regardless of whether these 
sentiments are justified or otherwise. 
 
As for the considered motivations/actions of political parties/leaders and/or the 
State, a strong tendency is found where 87% of opinionated respondents think the 
likelihood of occurrence either Likely or Highly Likely. A mere 13% thinks that the 
balance is towards non-manipulation. This set of results is credible as it is 
consistent with the many reported cases and also popular accounts of pervasive 
political interference in Malaysian publicly-listed firms (as detailed in Chapter 3 as 
well as the study‘s interview extracts presented earlier). Such unfavourable 
opinions seem to be well entrenched.  
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The study then found that a majority of investors are sceptical and have 
reservations with regards to market regulators‘ likely motivations/actions. Findings 
complement the ―politically captive‖ regulator explanation (see, for example, World 
Bank - ROSC, 2001; Becht et al., 2003). From corporate figures being officially 
involved in the running of the regulators to the utilisation/manipulation/bypassing of 
capital market mechanisms to unfairly benefit politically-linked companies or 
disadvantage less politically connected ones (please refer to Table 3.1), market 
regulators would struggle to pass even basic tests of independence and 
effectiveness.  
 
In the next section, a similar procedure is applied to presenting the various findings 
related to two other important capital market participant groups, that is, brokers 
and external auditors. 
 
 
7.2.1.1.2  Brokers and Auditors 
 
In this section, the study considers the perceptions/opinions of individual investors 
regarding the likely motivations/actions of their personal brokers and also external 
auditors of publicly-listed firms.  
 
Table 7.3 Awareness of Capital Market Participant Group-related Motivations/ 
    Actions (2) 
External Factors No. of 
Respondents 
% of Overall 
Sample 
 (Don’t Know)  
Brokers can be trusted not to give 
biased/self-interested advice to clients 
 
89 
 
8.05 
Auditors can be trusted not to approve 
fraudulent/misleading financial statements 
 
226 
 
20.43 
 
Figures in Table 7.3 show that most respondents (approximately 92%) have 
formed opinions regarding the likely motivations behind the action/advice of their 
personal brokers. Such a finding is expected as individual investors have intimate 
relationships with their brokers since most do offer share investment advice 
besides carrying out their clients‘ instructions.  
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Around 20% of investors reported being unaware/have no opinions when it comes 
to the motivations/actions of external auditors. This proportion is higher than the 
one for brokers as most investors have minimal exposure to the activities of 
company auditors due to the nature of their work. In fact, they only have access to 
the mandatory declarations made by these auditors in company annual reports. 
The detailed breakdown of opinions is given in Table 7.8 below. 
 
Table 7.4 The Likelihood of Capital Market Participant Group-related Motivations/  
     Actions (2) 
External Factors No. of Respondents 
 
 Highly 
Likely 
Likely Unlikely Highly 
Unlikely 
Total* 
Brokers can be trusted not to give 
biased/self-interested advice to 
clients 
51 
(5.0%) 
452 
(44.4%) 
451 
(44.4%) 
63 
(6.2%) 
1017 
(100%) 
Auditors can be trusted not to 
approve fraudulent/misleading 
financial statements 
86 
(9.8%) 
475 
(54.0%) 
284 
 (32.3%) 
35 
(4.0%) 
880 
(100%) 
 
As brokers mainly profit through commissions from share transactions, the view 
that they offer investment advice just to encourage their clients to trade frequently 
seems logical (for explanations regarding the concept of churning, see Barber and 
Odean, 2006). Even so, judging from the evenly divided figures reported, investors 
are not of one mind when it comes to opinions regarding their brokers‘ likely 
motivations. Consider Figures 7.5 and 7.6 below.  
 
Figure 7.5 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivations 
                 (5) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 02: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 02: 
Do you think that your brokers give fair and unbiased investment advice to 
you? 
 
I don’t think it is 100%. 
 
Well, do you think the tendency is more towards biased or unbiased? 
 
80% not biased. 
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Figure 7.6 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivations 
                  (6) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 09: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 09: 
 
Do you think that your personal broker gives fair and unbiased investment 
advice to you? 
 
No, no. So called follow the wind. 
 
Please explain. 
 
Brokers will always follow the market wind. If the market right now is 
hot for plantation, then they will sell plantation stocks. Whatever the 
market condition, good or bad, no matter what... will also say that it is 
time to invest.  
 
Next, approximately 63.8% of opinionated respondents have favourable views of 
external auditors while 36.3% have negative perceptions. A likely explanation is 
that most Malaysian publicly-listed companies employ the Big Four accounting 
firms as their auditors (Fan and Wong, 2005). With their world-class reputations, 
many investors may be swayed towards trusting these auditors‘ integrity in terms 
of not approving fraudulent or misleading financial statements (Goodwin and Seow, 
2002; Wallace, 1980).  
 
To summarise briefly the various findings reported thus far, in terms of individual 
investors‘ awareness and also opinions of the many likely actions/motivations of 
capital market participants (as representing country-level governance attributes), 
similar indicative tendencies can be detected throughout. Basically, individual 
investors perceive/assume that market participants are more likely to have 
questionable motives and behavioural tendencies than not. The sole exception is 
the external auditors who are viewed favourably on balance. The suppressive 
Malaysian political environment, pervasive political involvement in publicly-listed 
firms and also relationship-based business culture are posited to be the major 
perception-influencing factors.  
 
Even so, as reasoned by Giannetti and Simonov (2006), these governance 
concerns are not severe enough to deter these individual investors from investing 
in the Malaysian capital market altogether. Hence, it is logical to presume that, due 
to the degrees of seriousness and depth of individual investors‘ perceptions 
pertaining to the governance concerns identified, at least some of them do tailor 
their investment practices to mitigate any adverse effects. The different ways and 
means to do so are examined next. 
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7.2.1.2  Governance as General Investment Criteria 
 
In the preceding section of the chapter, the study has determined that a majority of 
investors are aware and/or opinionated with regards to the likely action/motivations 
of key market participants. This naturally leads to the question of whether such 
opinions materially affect the behavioural tendencies of investors. Therefore, the 
study will now consider whether and, if so, how the various governance concerns 
identified earlier are considered in their share investment decision-making.  
 
First, the possibility of governance featuring as a general investment criterion is 
explored. It is based on the premise that, for the many investors who are aware 
and/or opinionated regarding the likely actions/motivations of various market 
participants, they may adopt certain criteria that aim to take advantage of or, to 
mitigate the impact of, these likely acts/intentions.  
 
Referring back to the possible treatments compiled in Chapter 2, these investment 
criteria (if utilised) are presumed to form the main mechanisms and also thresholds 
for investors to potentially (i) avoid investing in what they perceive and/or evaluate 
as badly governed firms or (ii) only invest in well-governed firms. Each criterion, of 
course, reflects a particular aspect of governance being considered. 
 
Accordingly, the governance-related criteria listed in Table 7.5 are some of the 
most relevant ones that are uncovered, derived and compiled from the reviews in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Table 7.5 General Governance-related Investment Criteria 
Investment Criteria No. of 
Respondents 
% of Overall 
Sample 
Only Invest in well-run companies 545 49.28 
Only Invest in Govt/Politically linked companies 99 8.95 
Only Invest in Companies run by professional 
managers rather than big shareholder/managers 
 
95 
 
8.59 
Only Invest in Non-Govt/Non-Politically linked 
companies 
109 9.86 
Only Invest in Speculative/Penny Stocks 99 8.95 
No/No Fixed Criteria 427 38.61 
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Table 7.5 shows that roughly four out of every ten investors have no/no fixed 
investment criteria, governance-related or otherwise. Even so, more significant is 
the fact that 61%186 of sampled investors do adopt one or more governance-related 
investment criteria.  
 
The general rule of only investing in well-run companies is found to be the most 
widely adopted with approximately 49% of sampled investors reporting doing so. 
Put simply, around half of individual investors only invest in well governed firms. 
This finding is positive as the study did not expect to find such a high proportion in 
a developing market that has been portrayed as mostly speculation and 
rumour-driven (see, for example, Low, 2004 and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
However, the said contention by authors such as Low (2004) is still very relevant 
as the result also implicitly suggests that a significant 51% of respondents are 
willing to invest in companies even if they are poorly run (implying that governance 
is only of slight or no importance to this group of investors).  
 
The other four general investment criteria are not particularly important as each is 
adopted by only about 8% to 10% of investors. Considering the earlier finding that 
a majority of investors are aware or have formed opinions on pervasive political 
involvement in publicly-listed firms, the relatively low percentages of investors who 
either only invest in government/politically linked companies or avoid them 
completely suggests investor indifference or credulity (Daniel et al., 2002). This is 
because they do not take into account the impacts of such attributes sufficiently 
even when they should (as the likelihood of being abused or disadvantaged are 
either considerably higher or lower).  
 
The investor credulity/indifference argument is further supported by the earlier 
finding that a majority of their perceptions/opinions are negative on balance 
(suggesting that there is a real need to consider such factors). For example, only a 
handful of investors actually avoid companies with majority shareholder/managers 
even though the scope for managerial abuse is greater.  
 
                                                 
186
 This is derived from the assumption that the ―No/No Fixed Criteria‖ subgroup does not 
adopt any governance-related criteria (along the governance dimensions considered in 
Table 7.5). 
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As a mere 9% of investors invest only in speculative/penny stocks, only a small 
minority of individual investors in Malaysia are consistently speculative in their 
share investments. These investors are not expected to attach much importance to 
governance as smaller firms (i.e. penny stock firms) are usually less transparent 
and have lower governance standards. Specifically, their size usually implies less 
resource can be devoted to proper governance and they may also be less able to 
gain higher standards such as the inability to attract highly qualified independent 
directors. In addition, these firms are also typically young and hence, may not have 
tried and tested governance structures and processes in place as yet. 
 
As a brief summary for the section, the only general governance-related 
investment criterion that is adopted by a sizeable proportion of individual investors 
in Malaysia in their share investment evaluations is the rule of only investing in 
well-run companies. Other major governance concerns arising from country-level 
environmental/institutional characteristics are only taken into account by a small 
minority of individual investors. 
 
At this stage, the study does not make the distinction between governance and 
performance187  and thus, the term ―well-run‖ is taken to mean well-governed 
(ex-ante, as it is applied before actually investing). Such a distinction is explored 
and its elements deconstructed and evaluated at a later section in the chapter. This 
is because further interpretation of this finding and its implications is only possible 
after the reporting of other essential elements required for undertaking such an 
evaluation. 
 
 
7.2.1.2  Governance as Firm-specific Evaluation Criteria 
 
As an extension of the general investment criteria in the previous section, the study 
shifts its attention to governance criteria that are more firm-specific. This is 
because a large part of investors‘ share evaluation and other investment-related 
practices/action are argued to be firm specific (see, for example, Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985; Kumar and Lim, 2007).  
                                                 
187
 Instead, this possibility is examined under the Governance or Performance section in 
Chapter 8. 
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Essentially, the evaluation of each and every tranche of shares/publicly-listed 
company is carried out quite separately from others for most individual investors. 
Focus is therefore on the degree of importance that investors attach to various 
governance-related attributes when evaluating whether or not to purchase shares 
of a particular company.  
 
Since there are various firm-specific governance variables/attributes, in terms of 
exploring whether governance matters to investors at the firm-level, it is perhaps 
more appropriate to ask – what specific aspects of governance matter?  
 
The study contends that at the pre-purchase evaluation stage of the investment 
cycle, only those firm-level factors that an individual investor considers to be 
important are consistently taken into account. This assumption is key if one 
considers that the combinations of factors considered for each tranche of 
shares/public listed company being evaluated may be different.  
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the study acknowledges that investment is often a 
complicated process and as such, the researcher should focus on dominant/ 
favoured variables as these have the highest probability of featuring as essential 
variables meriting consideration regardless of other ad hoc, attention-grabbing 
factors 188. Of course, those aspects of governance that are considered important 
form the basis of investors‘ governance-related treatments such as (i) avoid 
investing in badly governed firms or (ii) only invest in well-governed ones.  
 
In order to identify which factors are likely to be important, a host of governance 
attributes are presented to interview respondents. Interviewees are then asked 
whether they consider each of the listed factors or otherwise (please refer to the 
Individual Investor Interview Schedule in Appendix 5). The study found that a 
majority of interviewees does not consider most of the firm-level governance 
attributes posed in their share evaluations, barring three factors (that are reported 
as being relevant/important by many interviewees). They are:  
 
                                                 
188
 For example, stock selection may initially depend on the kinds of attention-grabbing, 
firm-specific news/developments/variables that catches the attention of an investor before 
he/she subsequently evaluates the stock‘s/firm‘s other characteristics that are normally 
deemed to be important decision-making considerations. This argument implicitly 
acknowledges that some other tendencies/actions may be adopted at some other times. 
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(i) The abilities and qualifications of company managers/directors;  
(ii) Quality and speed of information disclosure; and  
(iii) The degree of transparency and accountability shown by managers to 
investors.  
 
Subsequently, in order to explore the indicative prevalence of considering 
firm-level governance amongst the wider Malaysian individual investor population, 
these three governance-related factors are utilised as proxies. Justifications are 
that judging from the responses of interviewees, these factors are (i) seemingly the 
most important firm-level governance aspects from investors‘ viewpoint and (ii) the 
most likely be considered by individual investors who are governance-interested in 
their investment evaluations (which make them good proxies).  
 
In addition, the study also investigates the prevalence of the tendency for investors 
to consider unconfirmed tips/insider info/speculation predicting a rise in a firm‘s 
share price. Justification is that this tendency provides vital clues to individual 
investors‘ inclination away from governance (for detailed explanations and 
justifications, please refer to Section 2.6.1. of the study). Table 7.6 illustrates the 
corresponding responses of questionnaire respondents. 
 
Table 7.6 Company-specific Governance-related Attributes  
Company-related Factors No. of Respondents 
 
 Very 
Important 
Important Slightly 
Important 
Irrelevant 
Unconfirmed tips/insider info/speculation 
predicting a rise in share price. 
88  
(7.96%) 
338 
(30.56%) 
473 
(42.77%) 
207 
(18.72%) 
Qualifications, abilities and experience of 
company directors/managers. 
214 
(19.35%) 
335 
(30.29%) 
275 
(24.86%) 
282 
(25.50%) 
Quality and speed of company information 
disclosures. 
116 
(10.49%) 
285 
(25.77%) 
334 
(30.20%) 
371 
(33.54%) 
How transparent and accountable 
company managers are for their actions. 
178 
(16.09%) 
255 
(23.06%) 
314 
(28.39%) 
359 
(32.46%) 
 
Table 7.6 shows that at least a quarter to about a third of investor respondents do 
not at all consider any one or a combination of the three governance-related 
factors. Specifically, 25.5% disregard the qualifications, abilities and experience of 
directors/managers; 33.5% are uninterested in the quality and speed of company 
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disclosures; and 32.5% do not consider how transparent and accountable 
company managers are for their actions189.  
 
For the majority of investors who do consider these aspects of firm governance, 
the abilities and experience of directors/managers is the most popular with 74.5% 
of respondents regarding this attribute with varying degrees of importance. The 
corresponding percentages are lower for quality/speed of disclosures (considered 
by 66.5% of investors) and managerial transparency/accountability (67.5% of 
respondents). It is interesting to note that if those investors who selected ―Slightly 
Important‖ are excluded, the percentages for the three factors drops to 49.6%, 
36.3% and 39.2% respectively. Put simply, only a minority of investors (albeit a 
sizeable one) consider these factors being more than just of secondary/passing 
importance. 
 
Next, more than 81%190 of investors sampled attach various degrees of importance 
to unconfirmed tips when making share investment decisions. Breaking down the 
figures further, approximately 39% of respondents regard such tips as either 
Important or Very Important. As argued in Section 2.6.1. of the study, paying heed 
to such unconfirmed information provides clear indications of the (i) inclination 
towards short-termism and (ii) focus on share prices rather than the underlying 
companies. More importantly, these typical aspects of speculative/impulsive 
                                                 
189
 These findings are not surprising considering that even the biggest institutional 
investors in Malaysia plays a passive role in corporate governance (Thillainathan, 1999). 
This is despite them being presumably more sophisticated and are more likely to be 
governance interested due to the sizes of their shareholdings. Specifically, Thillainathan 
(1999: 19) reported that “the local institutional investors including the EPF [The Employees 
Provident Fund – the country‟s compulsory employees pension savings scheme - whose 
total shareholdings accounts for 9% of Malaysia‟s capital market capitalization] play only a 
passive role in corporate governance and rely on third party research, primarily that by 
brokerage houses”.  
 
Most institutional investors in Malaysia are similar to the EPF in that they are governance 
passive and rely on third party research. Similarly, “foreign fund managers like certain 
domestic institutional investors have opted to play a passive role in corporate governance” 
(Thillainathan, 1999: 21). Even in the more developed Western capital markets, “there was 
much anecdotal evidence to suggest that institutional shareholders do not adopt a 
monitoring role, preferring to sell their holdings in problem companies…” (Keasey et al., 
2005). It seems that institutional investors in general do not focus on firms‘ governance 
attributes and simply remain slient or sell out whenever governance concerns arise.  
 
Therefore, the finding that a sizeable proportion of individual investors in Malaysia 
disregarding the three governance attributes considered seem reasonable.  
 
190
 100% less 18.72% for the Irrelevant subgroup 
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trading run counter to the general tenets of governance- or fundamentals-based 
investing. 
 
This indicative tendency verifies the contention of some authors that most 
investors in developing capital markets are prone to be influenced by speculation 
and hence make impulsive, irrational share purchases (see, for example, the 
conjectures made by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and Monks and Minow, 2004).  
 
Combined with the earlier finding that about 70% of investors pursue heuristically 
simplified strategies, the psychological/emotional influences detailed by 
behavioural finance seem to better describe investors‘ behaviours compared to 
rational models propounded by traditional, standard finance (see, for example, 
Subrahmanyam, 2007).  
 
Please note that as only three attributes are considered when evaluating the 
overall importance of firm-level corporate governance, the derived conclusion is, 
then, a qualified response that merits reframing. Corporate governance, when 
proxied by the three firm-related attributes above, is typically of secondary 
importance to individual investors collectively (on average). Nevertheless, the 
study contends that the most important discovery is that corporate governance is 
actually taken into account by a majority of investors in the form of firm-specific 
evaluation criteria.  
 
The study further contends that such governance-related criteria are used as the 
mechanisms for investors to (i) discern between well-governed and poorly- 
governed firms, and thus (ii) form the basis for either avoiding poorly-governed 
firms or investing only in well-governed ones (listed as two of the most probable 
investor treatments of governance within each of the three major perspectives 
discussed in Chapter 2).  
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7.2.2  Investment Cycle Stage 2: Post Purchase 
7.2.2.1  Governance as Concerns requiring Monitoring and/or 
Active Participation 
 
The study now considers if and how governance is taken into account by individual 
investors post-purchase. At this stage of the investment cycle, most empirical 
research has been carried out on a range of governance-related behaviours that 
are commonly classified under shareholder activism (see, for example, Gillan and 
Starks, 1998; Karpoff, 1998; Romano, 2000).  
 
Instead of being a one-off evaluation criterions, governance is portrayed as an 
ongoing concern where the running of the firm is monitored and active participation 
is expected, both to improve corporate governance practices/standards and to 
exercise basic ownership rights (see, for example, The Securities Commission 
Development Centre Quarterly Bulletin [Malaysia], 2002). Governance, if indeed 
taken into account by individual investors, is argued to feature in the described 
manner at this particular stage.  
 
The wider question of ―does governance matter‖ is being addressed as only 
investors who value governance or think that it is important would expend 
significant amounts of time, effort and other resources to frequently monitor 
aspects of it or engage in shareholder activism. The study places particular 
emphasis on attendance at AGMs. This is because attending AGMs apparently 
provides the most visible indication of an individual investor being ―active‖ or 
interested in governance.  
 
Specifically, individual investors who attend are assumed to exercise their 
ownership rights and are concerned with the ways by which these entities are run. 
The study investigates the aptness of such assumptions. In addition, yet 
undiscovered motivations for both attending and not attending AGMs are also 
given due attention.  
 
First, the tendency for individual investors to attend AGMs is scrutinised.  
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Table 7.7 Attendance at AGMs 
Attendance at AGMs No. of Respondents % of Overall Sample 
Have Attended 62 5.61 
Have Never Attended 1044 94.39 
Total 1106 100 
 
The figures in Table 7.7 show that only a small minority of individual investors have 
attended any AGMs throughout the time that they have been investing in shares. 
Specifically, less than 6% of investors sampled have reportedly done so. The 
Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group‘s (2006) contention that shareholder 
activism in Malaysia, even though on a rising trend, is actually developing from a 
low base seems credible (when AGM attendance is used as proxy for activism). 
 
Attendance is indeed poor particularly if the study‘s earlier prediction of possible 
bias of the results (in registering relatively higher attendance numbers) is factored 
in. Basically, respondents who are more governance-inclined may be more likely to 
respond to the survey.  
 
Next, as the study argued in earlier chapters that attendance at AGMs alone 
cannot simply be equated with activism, the motivations behind attendance/ 
non-attendance must be examined.  
 
 
7.2.2.1.1.  Investors’ Motivations for Attending AGMs 
 
From a review of established literature, the likely reasons for individual investors 
attending AGMs are to ask questions, vote or have a say in how the company is 
run and to protest after being mistreated/cheated/exploited. However, if one 
considers the issues raised in Figure 7.7, a more compelling picture emerges.  
 
Figure 7.7 Interview Extract Regarding Attendance at AGMs (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
Taking your specific role as secretary into account, you are charged with 
the collection and presenting of all shareholder and management proxy 
resolutions annually. You are also given AGM attendance records and 
handling all other manners of correspondence such as emails and letters 
with outside shareholders, yes? 
 
Yes, actually, as the role of the secretary, I did help to create all the 
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Secretary: 
 
 
Researcher: 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
information for the shareholders, the proxy for the... the number of 
the proxy who attended the meetings and also the number of shares 
and also the keeping of AGM attendance records. 
 
Very interesting. Thank you very much. Now, since you are charged with 
the safekeeping of all such information over the years, what is your 
observation with regards to the general levels of minority shareholder 
involvement or participation in the affairs of the company? Now, before we 
get on further, let‟s break this down further. We‟ll start by exploring 
shareholder attendance numbers and voting at AGMs. Is there a noticeable 
rise in the numbers of minority retail shareholders attending AGMs in recent 
years? 
 
Actually the shareholder attendance numbers have never been 
changing. It is more or less very minimal only... and minority retail 
and institutional shareholders, I don't see them much… attending the 
AGMs. 
 
Ok. So what kinds of shareholders or proxies of shareholders typically 
attend AGMs then? 
 
The shareholders are basically all those aunty, uncles... Proxies are 
also those that shareholders who are in KL who can't attend the 
meeting. They will just ask their relatives in Penang to be the proxy 
for the shareholders to just enjoy the food... (laughs) 
 
So, they're just there to enjoy the food? 
 
Yes, that's right and the free gifts if any. They always ask for free 
gifts. 
 
So, the primary motive there is actually to collect freebies. 
 
Yes, and also the food... free lunch or free tea break. 
 
Do these people form the majority of the numbers or are there some other 
proxies of shareholders that are supposed to be there for different reasons? 
 
Most of them are actually this type of shareholders and proxies but 
then, apart from this, they also requested to be... they are also 
requested by the boss to be the proxy of the shareholders in order to 
propose and second the resolutions of the AGM... to pass. 
 
By this you mean that the boss encourages employees themselves to 
attend as proxies? 
 
It is not that the boss wanted to encourage the employees to do that... 
because sometimes the proxies of the shareholders or the minority 
shareholders when they attend the meeting, they don't bother to raise 
up their hands to propose or second the resolutions to be passed. 
They just want things to be over very soon, I mean, for the resolution 
to be done as fast as possible within 5 to 10 minutes for all the 10 
resolutions to be passed within this period of time so that they can go 
off. 
 
So, is there a significant number then of proxies that represent the majority 
shareholder in such a case? 
 
Yes, most of the resolutions they propose, the proposer and the 
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Researcher: 
 
 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
seconder of the resolution... most of them are proxies. 
 
I see. What about for those shareholders in attendance who are 
independent of top management or the majority shareholder? Do they 
normally ask questions and raise issues of concern or do they largely 
remain silent? 
 
They actually largely remain silent. Even our majority also... 
shareholders also the same. They will just keep quiet and they will 
just propose and second the resolutions. 
 
I see. Thank you very much for all these.  
 
Even for other listed companies that I know of, most of the time they 
will have their AGMs in their premises itself... in the office building 
itself… Then they just get one or two shareholders and then most, 
majority of them will be their staff. 
 
The interview extract above clearly documents the fact that many investors or their 
nominated proxies (for example, close family members) attend AGMs simply for 
the free food and door gifts being offered. Furthermore, most attendee investors do 
not propose or even second AGM resolutions, much less being actively interested 
in governance issues. Still others are compelled to go at the request of their 
employers (the managers of the companies conducting these AGMs). In fact, other 
interviewees have described a similar situation as well. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 are 
further examples: 
 
Figure 7.8 Interview Extract Regarding Attendance at AGMs (2) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Mkt Insider:  
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Mkt Insider:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider:  
Regarding your previous role as one of the top management of a certain 
listed company... what is your observation in regards to minority 
shareholders involvement or participation into the affairs of the company? 
Attendance at AGMs, for example. 
 
In AGMs, there won’t be many people which come to attend... it was 
representative for the shareholders. In the normal circumstances, if 
there are issues to be brought up which would be considered 
serious… 
 
Yes. 
 
Then it is planned that there would be many people either from 
nominees of the majority shareholder… maybe shareholder and the 
management, they will appear and there will be a small minority of 
independents in the council and any attempt by the independent 
minority to table or to question will actually be silenced by the 
majority when... show of hands is actually taken into account. 
 
So most of them are the nominees of top management or the majority 
shareholders, yes? 
 
Yes. 
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Figure 7.9 Interview Extract Regarding Attendance at AGMs (3) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Broker 03:  
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 03:  
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 03:  
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 03:  
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 03:  
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 03:  
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Broker 03:  
 
Now, what else can you tell me about your customers or these share 
investors who go through you with regards to shareholder activism. For 
example, do they attend any AGMs? 
 
Very few do. Those who attended AGMs normally what they look for 
is not information. 
 
Then? What do they look for? 
 
Goodies. 
 
Goodies? 
 
Yes, whatever the company can give to them as a door gift. 
 
As a door gift… 
 
Yes, that's right. That's right. If that particular company don't give 
door gifts normally the investor don't go.  
 
Ok, can you give me an example? 
 
For example, company... Carlsberg. 
 
Carlsberg... 
 
Carlsberg. Sometimes they give a half dozen of... this Carlsberg cans, 
you know... to the customer as a door gift...so my customer, this 
particular customer, like to attend this type of AGMs. 
 
So, they go there is to... just to get all these goodies. Will they go to great 
lengths to go to these places? 
 
Yes, why not? Even far off places from Bentong to KL... they took a 
bus to KL just to attend and get the goodies and then come back to 
tell us about it (laughs) 
 
From the various findings/evidence presented above, it is obvious that many 
individual investors attend AGMs for reasons/motivations that are not directly 
related or even relevant to the running of the publicly-listed firms that they partly 
own. Most importantly, these extracts strongly suggest that AGM-attending 
individual investors cannot be presumed to be active/interested in corporate 
governance without actual confirmation.  
 
The study‘s contentions that (i) certain actions that are perceived to be 
governance-related can be undertaken for non-governance reasons/motivations 
and (ii) our understanding of certain issues within the area of corporate 
governance can only be furthered by approaching practitioners (in this case, 
individual investors) on a firsthand basis, are thus vindicated. 
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To investigate the indicative prevalence of each of the motivations uncovered 
within the wider individual investor population, the results below are presented with 
a detailed breakdown of the self-reported reasons/motivations for the 62 
respondents within the sample who have actually attended. 
 
Table 7.8 Investors‟ Motivations for Attending AGMs 
Reasons for Attending AGMs No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Attendees 
Ask Questions, Vote, Making Voice/Opinion 
Heard 
28 45.16 
For Free Food/Door Gifts 18 29.03 
Just for the Experience 14 22.58 
To Protest Post-Exploitation/Mistreatment 1 1.61 
At Employer’s Request 1 1.61 
Total 62 100* 
*rounded up 
 
From Table 7.8, the study found that almost half of attending investors do so to 
exercise their ownership rights. This shows that at least some individual investors 
can and do play an active role in corporate governance. Strickland et al.‘s (1996) 
findings as well as anecdotal evidence presented on individual shareholder 
activism in Malaysia suggest that their participation can indeed be encouraged. 
Therefore, capital market regulators‘ expectations may not be wholly unreasonable 
afterall. Even though these ―governance interested‖ respondents do represent a 
significant proportion of attending investors, the figure only equates to a mere 3% 
of the main investor sample size total (i.e. out of 1,106 respondents).  
 
This set of empirical results also provides preliminary validation of (i) the study‘s 
prediction and (ii) indications derived from interviewees; that AGM attendance may 
be for reasons unrelated to governance. Perhaps more intriguing and also yet to be 
captured by other studies on investor behaviour and governance is the relevance 
of the second and third motivations. Approximately 29% of attendee investors did 
so because of the free food and/or door gifts that organising firms offer to their 
shareholders. In addition, those who attend just to experience what actually goes 
on during these AGMs comprise 22.58% of such purportedly ―active‖ investors. 
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Again, these motivations cannot be linked to the exercising of ownership rights191 
or improving governance192.  
 
Next, 1.61% of investors attend solely at the request of their employers (the 
companies organising the AGMs). Rather surprisingly, even with a subsample size 
of just 62 respondents, there is such a response obtained193. This finding is 
intriguing because it provides an indication that such a practice does indeed exist. 
By reasonably assuming that only certain publicly-listed companies request their 
employees to attend, further research on the nature of employee shareholder/ 
proxy involvement in governance may yield important insights.  
 
Moving on, only one respondent reported having attended AGMs to protest after 
being exploited and/or mistreated. Even so, this finding is not surprising. As 
suggested earlier by authors such as Keasey et al. (2005), most investors only 
question the absence or ineffectiveness of governance when things go wrong 
(myopic investors). Furthermore, mistreatment/exploitation are done covertly by 
nature and  outright frauds/scandals are relatively uncommon occurrences that do 
not directly impact most investors considering the size of the overall individual 
investor population (approximately 5,062,049 in December 2007 according to 
Bursa Malaysia, 2007) and the comparatively small size of the study‘s sample. 
Hence, few respondents are expected to select this option. In this instance, only 
one investor having experienced such a scenario has responded.  
 
Taken together, the finding that more than 50% of individual investor attendees of 
AGMs do so not because of any governance-linked motivations194 is key. This is 
because it reaffirms the earlier contention that one must exercise caution in 
interpreting certain governance-related investor behaviour that may seem obvious 
in terms of intent. Secondly, empirical research in governance should be more 
focused on being representative of the actual situation on the ground rather than 
just being theoretically persuasive.  
 
                                                 
191
 Specifically, the right to vote and have their voices heard. 
192
 To advance/improve the running of such publicly-listed entities. 
193
 Albeit there being only one individual investor in the sample to report so. 
194
 Or, put simply, not for the good of the company in terms of concern for its general 
running, its prospects, its performance, etc. 
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In terms of theoretical implication, the study‘s results regarding motivations for 
attending AGMs seems to be broadly supportive of agency theory‘s self-interested, 
utility-maximizing and profit-oriented conceptions of the individual investor (see, for 
example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Becht et al., 2003; Monks and Minow, 2004). 
This is because, judging from the enthusiasm and inclination of some investors to 
attend AGMs for free gifts and free food, it is clear that economic and material 
gains are the prime intention, albeit being rather misguided ones. The findings are 
also consistent with the dominant motivations view for rational goal-oriented 
products (Weber, as cited in Crotty, 2003). 
 
Even though agency theory conceptions of investor motives may indeed describe 
a majority of investors, some do attend even though it may not be economically 
viable to do so (and also not for misguided economic gains such as free gifts). For 
example, the 22% of investors who attend at their own costs just to witness what 
goes on during AGMs. Once again, behavioural finance does seem to be able to 
describe the behaviours of investors better than the ―rational-representative 
investor‖ view (Brennan, 1995) of standard finance. Justification is that this study 
has shown that many investors exhibit a range of behaviours that depart from 
rationality (similar to Daniel et al., 2002).  
 
 
7.2.2.1.2  Investors’ Motivations for Not Attending AGMs 
 
For non-attendance at AGMs, the preliminary list of possible reasons include (i) 
attendance being too costly and time consuming, (ii) investors are unaware that 
they are entitled to attend, (iii) investors are unsure of what to say or do, (iv) 
investors‘ votes and/or presence won‘t change management decisions and, (v) 
such an action is not relevant to their investment styles. Subsequently, interviews 
revealed no other motivations that may be important.  
 
Figure 7.10 provides a typical interviewee response with regards to the issue under 
scrutiny. The extract is meant to demonstrate the relevance of the earlier identified 
potentially important motivations. 
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Figure 7.10 Interview Extract Regarding Non-Attendance at AGMs (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 14: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 14: 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 14: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 14: 
Have you ever attended any AGMs of these corporations and exercised 
your vote? 
 
No. 
 
Why not?  
 
Don’t have the time to go about it but... yeah, major thing is this, I 
don’t have the time and the other thing is... not really anything we can 
do during the AGM because we are just retailers. Normally, we can’t 
vote against management during most of the AGM... everything has 
been pre-planned already, pre-approved. 
 
Pre-planned and pre-approved, and you‟re too small to do anything? 
 
Yes. 
 
So, you‟re not going because you think that it won‟t make a difference 
anyway? 
 
Yes. 
 
More generally, the researcher found that different combinations of the five 
potentially important reasons are typically given by the study‘s interview 
respondents (similar to that in Figure 7.10). Having explored the likely relevance of 
the compiled justifications, the study next examines the indicative prevalence of 
each identified reason amongst the wider individual investor group.  
 
Table 7.9 Investors‟ Motivations for Not Attending AGMs 
Reasons for Not Attending AGMs No. of 
Respondents 
% of Overall 
Non-Attendees 
Didn’t Know/Not Aware of Right to Attend 31 2.97 
Too Costly and Time Consuming 422 40.42 
Unsure of What To Say/Do 165 15.81 
Not Relevant to Investment Style 285 27.30 
Vote/Presence Won’t Change Management 
Decisions 
 
141 
 
13.51 
Total 1044 100* 
*rounded up 
 
Table 7.9 shows that 94% of the study‘s total number of respondents (1,044 out of 
1,106) has not attended any AGMs throughout the period of time that they‘ve been 
investing in equities. Even so, responses collated above show that only a very 
small fraction of non-attending investors (approx. 3%) lack awareness in terms of 
their fundamental right to attend the AGMs of publicly-listed companies that they 
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partly own. A further 16% do not attend because they are unsure what is expected 
of them at AGMs. In combination, investors who are uninformed, ignorant, lack 
knowledge or experience in this respect constitute less than one fifth of the 
non-attending subsample.  
 
The findings above are rather unexpected. This is based on the contentions by 
authors such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who suggested that most shareholders 
do not know the basic ownership rights that they possess much less exercising 
those rights. In this regard, Low (2004) has also pointed to the significant 
proportion of apathetic, indifferent and/or disinterested shareholders in developing 
capital markets such as Malaysia.  
 
Perhaps the situation has improved since the late 1990s and the impact of the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis and subsequent governance reforms, investor 
education programmes (such as those organised by the Securities Commission) 
as well as extensive press coverage of the many incidences of corporate 
frauds/scandals in Malaysia and around the world have improved investors‘ 
knowledge of their basic share ownership rights and major corporate governance 
issues.  
 
Next, the most popular reason given by respondents for not attending/participating 
at AGMs is that such an action is too costly and time consuming. Approximately 
40% of respondents selected this as the main reason for non-attendance. 
Economic considerations, especially cost viability, are the dominant force that 
compels investors towards certain behavioural tendencies (as per Weber, 1949 as 
cited in Crotty, 2003). In this case, yet again the relevance of agency theory‘s cost 
utility focus is clearly demonstrated (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
The study is inclined, therefore, to agree with both academics and practitioners 
that to develop a culture of activism, policymakers must clearly show and/or 
convince investors that being more governance active is both economically viable 
and beneficial (as is the implicit aim of empirical studies aiming to link corporate 
governance with corporate performance such as those by Brown and Caylor, 
2006, and Gompers et al., 2003, amongst others). Besides making available new 
mechanisms for them to exercise their ownership rights and seek redress, they 
should develop innovative means to increase investors‘ interest in the actual 
282 
 
governance of firms. Perhaps offering them free or cost effective access to 
governance-based sources or databases of relevant information on various 
aspects of publicly-listed firm governance could prove effective.  
 
Approximately 27% of respondents do not attend AGMs because they believe that 
such an action is irrelevant to their individual investment styles. Perhaps their 
shareholding periods are simply too short or they utilise investment strategies that 
concentrate only on share price fluctuations. The different justifications are further 
explored in later sections in the chapter, especially when considering the distinct 
natures of often pursued investment strategies and the proportion of investors 
opting for each such strategy (in effect, identifying the likely reasons that render 
AGM attendance irrelevant). 
 
Judging from their responses to this AGM issue, the final 13.5% of non-attending 
respondents are likely to be relatively well informed, knowledgeable investors. 
Essentially, this group comprises of investors who reported that attending AGMs is 
futile as their vote/presence simply won‘t carry sufficient voting weight to materially 
influence management decisions. Such reasoning shows that governance is 
contextualised as both firm-specific issues and institutional/corporate 
environments do shape investors‘ perceptions/opinions leading to corresponding 
behavioural tendencies. The earlier findings that most investors are 
opinionated/aware of other market participants‘ likely motivations/action and that 
subsequently, some investors do adopt certain governance-related criteria, 
enhances the credibility of such a claim. 
 
Another implication of the last finding is that, if these individual investors could find 
a cost-effective avenue/means to unite for collective governance action, at least 
some of these investors can be compelled to become governance active. Notable 
examples include the United Shareholders Association (as detailed by Strickland 
et al., 1996) and the Securities Investors Association (Singapore) (Pulses, 2006). 
This vindicates the establishment of the independent Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group (MSWG) by the Malaysian government. 
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7.2.2.2  Other Forms of Shareholder Activism 
 
Besides AGM attendance, the study also explores the extent of individual 
investors‘ involvement in other forms of shareholder activism-related initiatives. 
Interviewees were asked about their levels of involvement in such activities and 
also the underlying reasons for involvement/non-involvement. The relevant 
Figures (7.11, 7.12 and 7.13) are presented below. 
 
Figure 7.11 Interview Extract Regarding Other forms of Shareholder Activism (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
 
Investor 01: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 01: 
For those companies where you do own shares, have you tried any one of 
the following activities? Communicating with company management via 
emails or letters or shareholder relations department, submitting 
shareholder proposals or using the media to highlight your concerns 
regarding the company? 
 
No, didn’t try. 
 
Why not? 
 
Never considered. 
 
Figure 7.12 Interview Extract Regarding Other forms of Shareholder Activism (2) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
 
Investor 12: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 12: 
For those companies where you own shares, have you attempted any one 
of the following? Communicating with company management through 
emails or letters or maybe through shareholder relations department, 
submitting shareholder proposals or using the media to voice concerns 
regarding the company? 
 
Haven’t. 
 
Why not? 
 
Never thought of it... don’t know how also. 
 
Figure 7.13 Interview Extract Regarding Other forms of Shareholder Activism (3) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
 
 
Moving on to the next issue, are other forms of communication initiated by 
minority shareholders such as writing letters or emails to management or 
attempting to hold informal discussions with the top management, a rare 
occurrence? 
 
Yes, actually this is a very rare occurrence or it did not occur at all. 
The most the minority shareholders or any shareholders... they will 
just write in a request to ask for annual reports that's all... that's the 
most they will do...other than that, there is no communication 
between the minority shareholders and top management.  
 
From the extracts above, the study found clear indications that individual investors 
are ignorant, disinterested or simply never considered undertaking such initiatives. 
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Suggestions in the literature that the culture of shareholder activism is not deeply 
ingrained in developing capital markets seem credible. In addition, the results also 
vindicate the claim by the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) that 
activism in Malaysia currently involves only a select group of individual investors 
(i.e. the claim that activism is starting from a low base of shareholders).  
 
The study now explores indications of the prevalence of the identified trends.  
 
Table 7.10 Other Forms of Shareholder Initiatives 
Other forms of Shareholder Initiatives No. of 
Respondents 
% of Overall 
Sample 
 Communication through emails/letters/investor 
relations dept; Use of the media; Submit 
shareholder proposals 
 
25 
 
2.26 
 
Looking at Table 7.10, the study found that only 25 respondents (comprising only 
2% of the overall sample) have undertaken other forms of activist initiatives. Even if 
such initiatives are viewed collectively, the combined number of investors involved 
is still considerably lower than the proportion of investors who had attended AGMs. 
Nevertheless, the study explores the types of governance-related issues that are 
of concern to investors who undertake such initiatives.  
 
Table 7.11 Governance-related Issues Raised 
Governance-related Issues Raised No. of Respondents 
Long-term underperformance (share price or profits). 16 
Improving amount and speed of company disclosures. 5 
How much/how directors/managers are paid. 6 
Reducing the power of big shareholder/managers. 2 
Unfair/questionable business decisions; mismanagement; fraud; 
negligence; etc. 
10 
Company strategy-related issues and other important corporate 
decisions such as mergers/takeovers 
 
9 
Changing board of directors’ structure and composition 4 
Shareholder voting-related 5 
Appointment of Company Auditors 4 
Other 0 
 
The figures in Table 7.11 show that the issue of long-term underperformance is 
raised most often. A total of 16 out of the 25 respondent investors who report being 
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involved in such activist initiatives have placed emphasis on this issue. This is 
followed by querying seemingly unfair or questionable business decisions and 
thirdly, strategic issues such as mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Other listed factors are rarely the main concerns of such initiatives even though 
none of these received no reported interest. Even though the numbers of investors 
interested in these other aspects of firm-level governance are low, it does however 
show that all such attributes of governance are relevant to at least some individual 
investors. This indication is important as the earlier set of findings which identified 
only three firm-level factors being of particular importance to individual investors 
may have created the perception that these other aspects of governance are totally 
overlooked/ignored.  
 
Overall, activist investors mainly care about performance/investment returns per 
se or other performance- or returns-impacting issues. Again, very few investors are 
found to pay attention to ongoing structural and process-related issues such as 
board composition, executive compensation, voting-related procedures, etc. 
Investors are therefore mainly concerned with the returns that they ultimately make, 
even among the select few who are more proactive.  
 
From a governance perspective, the implication is that a significant majority of 
these investors do not care about how the publicly-listed companies are actually 
run195. Emphasis on performance-related variables is predicted to be even stronger 
amongst the majority of governance-passive investors. Once again, the prevailing 
Agency Theory perspective of general investor disinterest and self-utility 
maximisation seems to be holding up well to scrutiny. Explicit distinction between 
governance and performance will be explored later in the chapter. 
 
The available evidence again suggests that individual investors are myopic 
(Keasey et al., 2005). When the firms that they partly own are profitable or their 
investment in a firm‘s shares is generating good returns, governance is of little 
concern. Conversely, when things go wrong (e.g. underperformance or occurrence 
                                                 
195
 How corporate decisions are made, whether the management is capable or suitably 
qualified, the kinds of checks and balances to ensure there are no abuse of corporate funds 
and assets, corporate disclosures are adequate and timely, etc. 
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of fraud), at least some investors are more likely to begin to take an interest in 
some aspects of governance out of dissatisfaction.  
 
Briefly summarising the findings in this section, in terms of corporate governance 
being a concern/attribute that requires continual monitoring or active participation, 
only a very small percentage of individual investors in Malaysia view it, or take it 
into account, in such a comprehensive manner. The suppressive Malaysian 
governance institutional and corporate environment is undoubtedly a significant 
contributing factor that exacerbates this inclination. Alternatively, most do not think 
that governance is important enough to merit expending significant amounts of 
time, effort and resource to (i) monitor particular aspects of it or (ii) proactively push 
for improvements of it.  
 
 
7.2.3  Investment Cycle Stage 3: Exit/Disposal of Shares  
 
When examining the trends uncovered for this particular stage of the investment 
cycle during preliminary analysis of empirical findings, the researcher found that 
certain factors/issues materially influence the relative importance that individual 
investors attach to governance.  
 
Second, it is found that investors‘ consideration of governance attributes usually 
takes place in the previous two stages of the cycle. Hence, the focus for this 
section is slightly different where, instead of considering how governance is taken 
into account, it explores how other factors influence/change an investor‘s 
inclination towards governance. 
 
For the current section, the study investigates selected factors/scenarios that 
might compel individual investors to exit or dispose of their shareholdings.  
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Table 7.12 Factors Influencing the Exit/Sell Decision  
Factors Influencing the Exit/Sell Decision No. of Respondents 
 
 Always Usually Sometimes Never 
Tips/Insider Information received 
predicting a fall in the share price soon. 
109 
 (9.86%) 
413 
(37.34%) 
458 
(41.41%) 
126 
(11.39%) 
Negative rumours regarding the 
company’s business operations. 
62 
(5.61%) 
349 
(31.56%) 
522 
(47.19%) 
173 
(15.64%) 
Company’s recent operating 
performance/fundamentals are 
worsening. 
123 
(11.12%) 
471 
(42.59%) 
406 
(36.71%) 
106 
(9.58%) 
Whenever one feels like selling. 108 
(9.77%) 
378 
(34.18%) 
412 
(37.25%) 
208 
(18.81%) 
 
The figures in Table 7.12 clearly show that only a small number of investors 
(approx. 11%) are unaffected by tips/insider information predicting an imminent fall 
in share prices. The remaining 89% of investors exhibit various propensities to sell 
out (from always to sometimes) after receiving such information. The study‘s 
prediction that investors are unwilling to bear the ―heightened‖ possibility of 
incurring investment losses (regardless of whether such tips turn out to be true or 
otherwise) thereby increasing the likelihoods of them impulsively selling out seems 
valid. Unconfirmed tips seem to influence both buying and selling decisions 
considering the earlier finding that 81% of respondents base part of their share 
purchasing decisions on such information. In addition, a fairly similar albeit slightly 
weaker indicative tendency can be detected for the influence of negative rumours 
regarding the company‘s operations on selling decisions. 
 
Next, about 90% of respondents reported various propensities for disposing of 
their shares whenever a company‘s operating performance begins to deteriorate. 
With such a high number of investors exhibiting the predisposition to sell out at the 
first instance/indication of trouble, the opposite inclination to keep the shares and 
campaign for governance improvements must surely be very low. In fact, the many 
sets of results for shareholder activism confirm this.  
 
Another implication of the finding above is that it helps to explain the country-level 
governance criteria of only investing in well-run companies. This is because the 
researcher can now begin to detect investors‘ inclination towards corporate 
performance rather than corporate governance. How the firm is actually run seems 
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to be of lesser or scant concern if the firm is performing well (presumably 
generating good returns for these investors). Conversely, they are more inclined to 
sell out when performance worsens, even if a firm is actually well governed. It is 
apparent that a majority of Malaysian individual investors adopt a ―perform or 
explain/abandon‖ mindset. Further exploration into the ―governance or 
performance‖ issue is undertaken in the next subsection.   
 
Finally, for the current set of results, some respondents‘ investment-related 
behaviour is influenced by their emotional states (as argued by proponents of 
behavioural finance such as Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Daniel et al., 2002; 
Statman, 1999; Nofsinger, 2008; Subrahmanyam, 2007). In this regard, 81% of 
investors report various propensities to sell out for this particular reason. 
Consistent with the various causes of investor irrationality described by 
behavioural finance, a majority of individual investors in Malaysia are influenced by 
non-rational emotions. Hence, similar to findings pertaining to motivations for 
attending/not attending AGMs, behavioural finance explanations look increasingly 
superior to those of standard finance. 
 
Taken together, these results show that investors‘ share investment actions are 
influenced by unconfirmed speculation/rumours/tips and also emotional states to 
various degrees. From the perspective of governance, these are, at best, 
undesirable distractions to individual investors. For example, unconfirmed 
negative rumours/speculation regarding a company‘s operations or share prices 
compel investors to sell out impulsively regardless of how well the company is 
governed. Impulsive action overrides/take precedence over governance 
considerations (which once again fit ideally with the short-termist, impatient and 
profit-maximisation portrayal in the academic literature). More importantly, even 
individual investors who consider firm governance are more likely to sell out rather 
than campaign/lobby/demand improvements.  
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7.2.4  Governance or Performance? 
 
The findings reported thus far are based on the premise that good governance 
results in good/superior corporate performance (see, for example, Gompers et al., 
2003, and Bauer and Guenster, 2003). Great care was taken to justify such an 
assumption in previous chapters. Even so, many individual investors may actually 
be mostly concerned with corporate performance (i.e. share price performance 
and/or firm operating/profit performance) and not to the actual ways by which these 
firms are governed.  
 
Good preliminary indications for the claim above is the set of findings presented in 
the preceding section where many respondents are found to be much more 
focused on performance per se and even for those who do take governance into 
account, performance-related aspects exert a strong influence on their investment 
decision-making. This is also evident in their focus on managerial capability and 
speed/quality of disclosures rather than the proper governance structures/ 
processes such as the composition of the board, level of executive compensation, 
internal control systems, etc. Even so, some governance-interested investors do 
attach a certain degree of importance to transparency and accountability on the 
part of corporate managers. 
 
The following sets of findings aim to discern between the two. Figures 7.14 and 
7.15 provide some insights into the thoughts of investors regarding governance or 
performance issues.  
 
Figure 7.14 Interview Extract Regarding Governance or Performance (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Investor 01: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Investor 01: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
In general, if the performance of the company that you've invested in is 
worsening, would you rather sell your shares than pressuring management 
to improve performance? 
 
(I) will sell the shares because (I) am only small shareholder, it's not 
my turn to pressure or persuade management to improve... 
 
As long as the share price or operating profits or dividends go up, how the 
company is actually run doesn't really concern you. Do you agree or 
disagree? 
 
Agree. 
 
Lastly, as long as your investment is profitable, you can tolerate managers 
abusing their power, even stealing company assets. Do you agree or 
disagree? 
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Investor 01: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Investor 01: 
 
Not really, but for short-term investment it is because for long term, 
auditor can check it. 
 
If such a situation was discovered in one of the companies that you 
invested in, would you take any action, assuming that your investment in 
that company is still profitable? 
 
Oh, Still can accept. Before it turn into a loss... my money. I can 
accept the management doing bad things. 
 
Figure 7.15 Interview Extract Regarding Governance or Performance (2) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Investor 06: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Investor 06: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Investor 06: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
Investor 06: 
In general, if the performance of the company that you've invested in is 
declining, would you rather sell your shares than pressuring management 
to improve performance? 
 
I will sell my shares rather than pressuring management to improve 
performance... because I am just a small investor. 
 
As long as the share price or company profits or dividends go up, how the 
company is actually run doesn't really concern you. Do you agree or 
disagree? 
 
I agree. This is because my main objective is to make profit from my 
investment. 
 
As long as your investment is profitable, you can tolerate managers 
abusing their power, even stealing company assets. Do you agree or 
disagree? 
 
I can tolerate but I do not agree with such actions. 
 
If such a situation was discovered in one of the companies that you 
invested in, would you take any action, assuming that your investment in 
that company is still profitable? 
 
No, I will not take any action. 
 
Evidence from Figures 7.14 and 7.15 above suggests that at least some investors 
pay scant attention to the general management of public-listed companies, 
provided that their investments in these companies‘ shares are profitable. 
Furthermore, mismanagement and even blatant abuse of power (proxied by 
managers stealing company assets) are found to be acceptable to some of them 
as long as investment returns are positive.  
 
Subsequently, the study explores the prevalence of these identified governance/ 
performance tendencies below.  
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Table 7.13 Respondents‟ Behavioural Tendencies (Governance or Performance) 
Behavioural Tendencies 
(Governance or Performance) 
No. of Respondents 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
As long as the share 
price/operating profits/dividends 
go up, how the company is run is 
not a big concern. 
139 
(12.57%) 
411 
(37.16%) 
355 
(32.10%) 
188 
(17.00%) 
13 
(1.18%) 
As long as my investment is 
profitable, managerial abuse of 
power (even stealing company 
assets) can be tolerated. 
48 
(4.34%) 
224 
(20.25%) 
322 
(29.11%) 
370 
(33.45%) 
142 
(12.84%) 
I’d rather sell my shares than 
pressuring management to 
improve performance. 
153 
(13.83%) 
530 
(47.92%) 
321 
(29.02%) 
97 
(8.77%) 
5 
(0.45%) 
Company operations/ 
fundamentals are less important 
in a speculative market. 
62 
(5.61%) 
317 
(28.66%) 
503 
(45.48%) 
207 
(18.72%) 
17 
(1.54%) 
 
Table 7.13 shows that approximately 50% of respondents concur that, as long as 
profits are made or when the company is posting strong operating figures, how 
managers actually run the companies is of secondary concern. It is much higher 
than the 18% who think otherwise. Indicative tendency indeed shows that investors 
are mostly concerned with corporate performance per se rather than governance 
proper. The utilitarian agency theory prediction that individual investors are mostly 
disinterested in the governance of publicly-listed firms seems to hold (Thompson 
and Davis, 1997; Becht et al., 2003; Monks and Minow, 2004).  
 
Next, 46% of respondent investors report being intolerant of corporate managers 
abusing their wide discretionary powers to the extent of stealing company assets. 
Nevertheless, it is highly surprising that even when blatant abuses are emphasised, 
25% of investors still do not care/can tolerate such action as long as their 
investments are profitable. A further 29% are undecided as to whether such action 
is tolerable or otherwise. When a combined 54% of investors are tolerant/ 
indifferent to abuse, it is easy to see why corporate managers are able even to 
openly exploit/expropriate outside investors. As most investors do not take any 
redress action (since they do not expect company managers to even respond to 
their complaints – an observation derived from the study‘s earlier findings), 
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corporate managers are able to abuse their positions and power with minimal 
sanctions/apprehension.  
 
From an agency perspective, managers will pursue self-interested utility 
maximising behaviour whenever they are allowed to do so (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Gauging investors‘ behavioural tendencies in this manner seems to be a 
good way to distinguish between concern for governance as opposed to concern 
for performance. All findings thus far are consistent in showing that a majority of 
individual investors in Malaysia are primarily focused on performance as opposed 
to good governance per se (i.e. the proper structures and processes in place in 
running the firms). Referring back to the country-level governance criterion of only 
investing in well-run companies, investors who adopt this criterion are most likely 
to be referring to well-performing companies instead (that is, a well-performing 
company is one that is well-run). 
 
The study found that a sizeable majority of investors would rather sell out than to 
campaign or lobby company managers to improve corporate performance. 
Another 29% are reported to be undecided while only 9% of investors sampled 
report being more inclined to pressure management for better performance.  
 
Results are consistent with academic theoretical predictions that most individual 
investors cannot be relied upon to play a significant role in governance monitoring 
(as explained by Monks and Minow, 2004). Government/regulators should 
therefore reconsider the practice of encouraging individual investors to play a 
bigger governance role; to implement steps to lower the costs of activism; or to 
better demonstrate the benefits of good governance to investors. However, this 
―selling out whenever problems arise‖ action has been encouraged by some 
policymakers in government and also certain regulators (as described in Section 
2.7 (II) Government/Regulator Perspective (II) in Chapter 2). 
 
Perhaps the results reported thus far simply reflect the fact that most individual 
investors in Malaysia haven‘t matured enough in terms of share investment 
sophistication and haven‘t reached the stage where the culture of activism is 
readily embraced. For example, most still pursue heuristically-simplified 
investment strategies, corporate governance is still very much only about good 
corporate performance and a vast majority also opt to sell out rather than press for 
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improvements in governance. At this stage, therefore, the government‘s focus on 
encouraging activism may be misplaced (i.e. premature).  
 
Here, the study is simply arguing that more resources should be placed on investor 
education to increase their investment knowledge and sophistication and for now, 
focus more on encouraging individual investors to account for governance in their 
share investment practices (specifically, more cost-effective means such as 
evaluating aspects of governance before purchasing shares – investment criteria) 
rather than costly shareholder activism. 
 
Returning to the set of results above, the last statement is meant to gauge 
investors‘ beliefs regarding how well share prices actually reflect the underlying 
fundamentals of the firms that they represent. In this regard, around 45% of 
investors are found to be undecided, 34% believe that speculation/sentiments 
affect the prices of shares while 20% believe otherwise. Hence, only one in five 
individual investors do think that fundamentals/governance is no less important in 
speculative markets. Even so, the actual percentage may actually be considerably 
higher given the significant proportion of investors who are undecided.  
 
 
7.2.5  Average Shareholding Period 
 
The study found that important indications regarding the propensities of individual 
investors to consider corporate governance or undertake governance-related 
initiatives can also be obtained from looking at investors‘ typical shareholding 
timeframes. Consider the following interview extracts (Figures 7.16 and 7.17): 
 
Figure 7.16 Interview Extract Regarding Average Shareholding Period (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Mkt Insider: 
What is the typical investment horizon of these investors? Do they talk of 
their investments in terms of days, weeks, months, or years? 
 
If anybody in the market place talks about years and months, they are 
perceived to be the long term investors and most of the participants 
are talking about days and weeks in term of time planning. 
 
Days and weeks... 
 
Yup, the retail investors are looking at a very short term... days and 
weeks. 
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Figure 7.17 Interview Extract Regarding Average Shareholding Period (2) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Broker 03: 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 03: 
What is the typical investment horizon of these investors? Do they talk of 
their investments in terms of days, weeks, months, or years? 
 
It depends on what happens to the counters that they purchase. 
Usually, most retail investors that I deal with invest for the 
shorter-term... weeks and months, some just a few days. If they make 
losses, may hold for longer... maybe many months… up to a few 
years even. 
 
So, they tend to hold on to loss-making investments for longer? 
 
Some. Want to wait till the price go back up to sell out and break 
even... don’t want to sell at a loss. 
 
The extracts above suggest that the wider individual investor population in 
Malaysia is likely to have relatively short shareholding timeframes. The disposition 
effect (Nofsinger, 2008) is also found in developing capital markets such as 
Malaysia as interview respondents have highlighted their aversion to losses by 
tending to hold on to loss-making shares for longer. The pervasiveness of these 
indicative tendencies is investigated below.  
 
Table 7.14 Questionnaire Respondents‟ Average Shareholding Period 
Average Shareholding Period No. of Respondents % of Overall Sample 
Less than 1 day 8 0.72 
Less than 1 week 25 2.26 
1 – 4 weeks 86 7.78 
1 – 2 months  105 9.49 
2 – 6 months  267 24.14 
6 months – 1 year 314 28.39 
1 – 2 years 171 15.46 
More than 2 years 130 11.75 
Total 1106 100 
 
From Table 7.14, most respondent investors are not extremely short-term 
traders/investors as only 11% hold on to their shares for an average period of four 
weeks or less. Therefore, even if a significant proportion of investors do engage in 
short-term speculation196, only a small minority have extremely short-term trading 
horizons on average. 
 
                                                 
196
 As earlier results show that more than 80% of investors take heed of unconfirmed 
tips/insider information/speculation and also, 73% of investors have devoted part of their 
individual share portfolios for speculation/gambling/punting purposes. 
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Most individual investors own their shares for a period of between two months and 
a year. With approximately 53% of sampled investors represented by this period, 
Hull‗s (1997) contention that the perceived difference in shareholding periods 
between ―investors‖ and ―traders‖ (implying long-term vs. short-term perspectives) 
is misleading due to significant overlaps is vindicated. A good illustration is that 
77.6% of investors rated long-term share price increase being either an Important 
or Very Important investment objective even when 78.2% of the same group have 
reported average shareholding periods of one year or less. 
 
With about three out of every four individual investors reporting average 
shareholding periods of one year or less, the contention that most investors in 
developing capital markets adopt relatively short-term investment horizons is 
credible (as argued by Monks and Minow, 2004). Included is the fact that the most 
important investment objective is short-term share price increase and the 
pervasive influence of tips/rumours/speculations in inducing impulsive buy/sell 
decisions.  
 
One can envisage a scenario where a tranche of shares is purchased right after 
the AGM of a public-listed company. As the average holding period is usually less 
than a year, seven out of ten investors would on average have sold out before up to 
around the period of the company‘s next AGM. Even if they were to attend and 
press for better governance, these investors would have sold out long before any 
discernable improvements can be detected or translated into improved corporate 
performance. This explains why so many investors reported that attending AGMs 
is not relevant to their investment style and it applies to most other forms of 
governance initiatives as well. Under normal circumstances197, therefore, investors 
with average share ownership of less than one year are assumed to be 
uninterested in governance monitoring.  
 
The study‘s earlier finding that a majority of investors do take into account some 
aspects of a firm‘s governance however, suggests that governance is not totally 
disregarded by short-term shareholders. Instead, these sets of results provide 
further support to the study‘s contention that governance-related concerns are 
being taken into account in a manner distinct from constant monitoring (specifically, 
as a one-off preliminary investment screening criteria).  
                                                 
197
 Barring perhaps, incidences of corporate fraud and other blatant abuses. 
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Reverting to shareholding timeframe, approximately 27% of total respondents are 
found to adopt longer investment horizons by typically holding on to their shares for 
one year or more. Investors‘ inclination to hold on to loss-making shares for longer 
could result in some investors being classified as longer-term shareholders due to 
such holdings rather than being purely the result of pre-planned strategy or natural 
inclination. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of governance, the two groups of 
investors with typical shareholding periods of more than a year have a higher 
likelihood of considering certain aspects of a company‘s corporate governance due 
to their relatively stable, long-term shareholding style.  
 
When interpreting the indicative tendencies identified above, it must be noted that 
the shareholding periods are only averages and some tranches of shares may be 
owned for a much longer or shorter time period compared to the average. Even so, 
the notion that an investor with a typical investment horizon of a few days has 
markedly different preferences and practices from another with an average 
timeframe of a few years seems intuitively appealing. Averages are useful as they 
provide some indication of investors‘ other share investment related practices. It is 
obvious that the arguments made thus far have been guided by this underlying 
logic. In addition, this tendency-based treatment mirrors the complexities of 
making investments in real life where a myriad of influencing factors would affect 
the holding periods of different tranches of shares.  
 
 
7.2.6  Other Supporting Empirical Evidence and Interim Summary 
(Q1) 
 
In this section, the study presents other important empirical observations and 
evidence that materially affect individual investors‘ propensities for considering 
governance and/or undertaking governance-related initiatives. Then, an interim 
summary will be provided, mainly to offer an integrated interpretation of the various 
findings aimed at addressing Research Question 1 (Q1) that have been reported 
thus far.  
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One of the key factors that has been identified is investors‘ apparent lack of 
confidence and scepticism regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
Malaysia. Also, numerous academics such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Low 
(2004) and Becht et al. (2003) have portrayed individual investors to be ill-informed, 
disinterested, unsophisticated and mostly reliant on tips/rumour fuelled, short-term 
trading. These trends, as valid as they may seem, apparently do not tell the whole 
story. Clear indications of this are detected in Figure 7.18 and 7.19 below.  
 
Figure 7.18 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivations 
                    (7) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Broker 04: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 04: 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Broker 04: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Broker 04: 
 
Are you particularly interested or show any preferences for good 
governance usually when you invest? 
 
Not really. 
 
Now, why not? 
 
Because in our country... I mean… the corporate governance is very 
low to me, so I still prefer to go on technicals rather than on the 
fundamentals. 
 
Do you not trust that corporate governance in Malaysia is effective then? 
 
Yes, I don’t really trust it. 
 
Would governance be more relevant to you then, in times of financial crisis 
or declining corporate performance? 
 
Until our country’s corporate governance... I mean impose… that can 
protect the retailers or the small shareholders… have enough power 
to voice out then I will or else, to me, I still don’t believe it. 
 
Figure 7.19 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivation 
                    (8) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 05: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 05: 
 
Is the transparency and responsibility of corporate management a key 
consideration? 
 
Ideally it should be a key consideration but I don’t think you can apply 
in Malaysia. So, I mean, it does not really matter to me much. 
 
Why does it not apply to Malaysia?  
 
Why is that it does not apply to Malaysia? Partly due to certain 
conflict of interest in the party which are actually involve in it. It have 
political interference, ok, as well as directors having interest in it, and 
you have political people actually under... director of these 
companies. 
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For governance proponents, even though the empirically-derived, indicative trends 
are expected (considering the many concerns within the Malaysian governance 
system, as detailed earlier), these findings are worrying on a few counts. It 
documents a situation where investors who are supposedly concerned with 
governance or have considered taking governance into account do not actually do 
so because of significant constraints faced within the investment environment. 
 
As was described in Chapter 3, it is also likely that by operating within the 
suppressive Malaysian political environment where accountability and 
transparency are not normally expected and the voicing of mistreatment and other 
abuses are ignored, the investing public‘s (in this case, individual investors‘) 
negative perceptions of the various action/motivations of powerful vested interests 
extends into the corporate sector as well. In fact, the study documented many 
incidences of blatant mistreatment of minority investors and that their subsequent 
initiatives to seek redress were largely ignored. Figures 7.20 and 7.21 further 
illustrate the difficulties faced on this front.  
 
Figure 7.20 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivation 
                    (9) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Broker 04: 
Why do you think this is so? What are the main problems that we are 
facing? 
 
They have to tighten up the rules. Just recently, there’s a few… two 
companies that cooked up the accounts and, I mean, our rules didn’t 
change from last time, I don’t think they put these two management… 
these two companies management into jail. They will get a fine but, 
fine to them is nothing. We can fine them how many millions, they are 
willing to pay for it because they are big enough, aren’t they? To me 
fine, the penalty or the punishment of those who have mismanaged or 
misled the public or the retail shareholders should be put into jail, 
not... I mean, just by fine… is hopeless. 
  
 
Figure 7.21 Interview Extract Regarding Market Participants‟ Actions/Motivations 
                    (10) 
Researcher: What are the main problems that we are facing? 
Co. 
Secretary: 
 
 
 
 
Corporate governance, I don't think that it will work very soon or we 
can see any benefits in the short term but in long-term perhaps if 
really, really government enforce it and... there is really enforcement 
there... probably all the boards of directors will really comply... in 
order to make corporate governance work but I foresee that it will 
take a very, very long time. It is not as easy as what you can see 
because there is other influence from external factors such as... the 
political situation and also the government interruption. 
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From Figures 7.20 and 7.21, many capital market paticipants seem to have good 
practical knowledge and awareness of major governance concerns and the overall 
effectiveness of corporate governance rather than being fully uninformed or 
possess no knowledge/awareness whatsoever (contrary to the prediction of 
authors such as Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
Empirical responses also show that individual investors‘ very perception of ―lip 
service‖ corporate governance is sufficient to discourage at least some of them 
from taking on any governance role. These findings increase the credibility of 
earlier results showing that a majority of individual investors have negative 
opinions regarding the actual likely motivations/actions of other key market 
participants.  
 
In addition, it seems that positive market developments since the 1997 Financial 
Crisis are not really successful in changing investors‘ entrenched perceptions of 
the Malaysian corporate environment. Specifically, sustained governance reforms 
and the rise of some well-run corporations that do not depend on political 
patronage are more likely than not seen by investors as window dressing with little 
substance. Ultimately, reform initiatives need to be carried out in a sincere, 
fulsome and consistent manner rather than just creating the appearance of having 
improved as investors seem to be able to see through these superficial moves.  
 
The findings above vindicate Oman‘s (2001) contention that good political 
governance goes hand-in-hand with good corporate governance. More importantly, 
however, is the realisation that individual investors, when seen as a distinct group, 
are actually more sophisticated than envisaged in the academic literature in this 
respect. 
 
Combining and considering further (i) the form over substance reforms issue 
described earlier and (ii) the apparent cynicism, scepticism and/or lack of 
confidence on the part of the individual investors, a major implication of this is that 
any real positive changes in Malaysian corporate governance will take a long time 
to alter long-held negative suspicions, perceptions and beliefs. Such a situation is 
perhaps inevitable under a capital market system that is amalgamated with a 
political system based heavily on patronage (please refer to Figure 3.2 that clearly 
documents the mechanisms of the Malaysian political patronage system) and 
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affirmative redistribution of wealth policies that are dished out by powerful political 
parties/politicians (see, for example Gomez and Jomo, 1999, and Searle, 1999). 
 
The overall lack of confidence in the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
Malaysia creates a self-defeating situation. This is where investors are reluctant to 
consider and demand better governance as such efforts are seen to be futile while, 
on the other hand, no improvements can be achieved without them applying 
sufficient pressure on both regulators and corporate managers. Evidence points 
towards the potential of at least some individual investors being involved in 
governance as they‘re actually more compelled to ignore or remain passive by the 
inability to affect change rather than being disinterested or indifferent in the first 
instance. 
 
The arguments above reinforce the view that the government should play a central 
role in spearheading the relevant governance initiatives, particularly in creating 
suitable legislation and enforcing it (Low, 2004). However, with the enmeshing of 
political and economic interests in the country (Searle, 1999), the forces opposing 
real reforms are very significant indeed (Oman, 2001). It also indirectly suggests 
that encouraging individual investors to play a bigger and more active role in 
governance is also a very difficult task under current circumstances. 
 
As an interim summary, when asking whether and how governance matters to 
individual investors, the appropriate response is as follows. Certain firm-specific 
governance attributes do matter for a majority of individual investors but not very 
much on average. Important governance aspects include the capability of 
corporate management, the transparency and accountability of corporate 
managers and the speed as well as quality of company disclosures. These factors 
support another one of the study‘s important findings, that is, investors are more 
concerned with corporate performance than corporate governance per se. This is 
because the capability of corporate managers is essential in producing good 
performance. 
 
On the other hand, in order for investors to be informed of the latest company 
developments, successes and performance so that timely investment decisions 
can be made, corporate transparency (in the form of fair and accurate material 
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disclosures) is required as well as the speed of such disclosures (so that they will 
be able to take advantage of such developments). 
 
To individual investors in Malaysia then, corporate governance is very much about 
improving corporate performance rather than the structures and processes that are 
right and/or proper for the running of the publicly-listed firms in question. 
 
In terms of actual treatment, governance is taken into account primarily in the form 
of evaluation criteria but not in the form of activism-based initiatives or constant 
monitoring. Lastly, a majority of individual investors in Malaysia are aware/ 
opinionated regarding broad, major governance concerns which suggest that they 
are actually more sophisticated than previously thought in this respect. Even so, 
they are credulous in the sense that they do not tailor their investment practices to 
account for the perceived governance concerns. Furthermore, a majority of 
individual investors in Malaysia are influenced by and also engage in speculative 
and rumour-driven share investments to different extents. They mostly adopt 
short-term investment timeframes on average and are primarily in the market to 
make quick profits (as evidenced by their focus on corporate performance and 
investment returns). 
 
The following sections of the study are focused on the presentation of empirical 
findings pertaining to the second main research question (Q2).  
 
 
7.3  When Does Governance Matter to Individual Investors? 
 
When viewed from another angle, instead of asking whether or not governance 
matters and how it matters, it may perhaps be fruitful to ask when does governance 
start to matter or, if it already matters, become more important to individual 
investors? The possibility that investors may behave differently under differing 
general circumstances is intuitively appealing. Earlier indications that suggest 
individual investors are likely to be myopic (as described by Keasey et al., 2005) 
also add to the relevance of this particular research question.  
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7.3.1  Governance under Differing General Conditions 
 
With regards to the possibility that governance becomes important/more important 
under differing general circumstances198, the extract below (Figure 7.22) offers 
what is perhaps the most intriguing finding pertaining to this issue.  
 
Figure 7.22 Interview Extract Regarding Governance under Differing General  
          Conditions (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Mkt Insider: 
 
Ok. So, fundamentals199, are they important at all? Is it important in the 
valuation of the company itself? 
 
No, it is not. 
 
Ok. Are there any examples that you can give me? 
 
You see... during the financial crisis, stocks like Malayan Banking, the 
biggest bank in Malaysia which was traded at about... close to 20 
Ringgits and during the crisis, it went all the way down between a 
year and a half to about 2 Ringgits and 70 sen which is about 10 to 
15% of its value. Well, ideally, a strong fundamental stock wouldn’t 
even depreciate more than 50% of its value even in any environment 
but that has happened... that has proven that whatever fundamental 
structure they’re talking about, it has gone down the drain.  
 
Contrary to the study‘s prediction that governance may matter more when the 
economy and/or stock market is declining as investors would opt for stocks of 
better governed companies that are perceived to be less adversely affected, the 
interviewee makes the exact opposite argument (Figure 7.22). Specifically, under 
these circumstances, company fundamentals would be totally disregarded/ignored 
(as evidenced by the respondent‘s ―go down the drain‖ comment) as many 
investors impulsively exit/sell their shares regardless of fundamentals or all other 
considerations for that matter.  
 
Whether the tendency above is due to panic selling, selling to cover losses 
incurred elsewhere, sell to buy back later at a much lower price, or any other 
possible reasons for selling, the point is that this response suggests that most 
                                                 
198 Referring to the overall share investment climate. 
199
 As detailed in Chapter 4, fundamentals are factors that could be regarded as important 
in understanding a firm and its business. The term usually refers to important/major 
firm-specific characteristics/factors such as its current and future/prospective earnings, 
revenues and growth; future business prospects, quality and capability of management and 
may be inclusive of corporate governance-related concerns. 
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investors are overwhelmingly concerned with stemming any investment losses200 
even at the expense of potential long-term value. In short, emotions take 
precedence over good governance. 
 
Since governance may become less important or even irrelevant to some investors 
in times of economic uncertainty and/or declining markets, the opposite situation 
may also hold. This is where fundamentals become a key consideration when the 
stock market is rising and investor sentiment is bullish. Such thinking was 
unexpectedly found in yet another key interview extract, as shown in Figure 7.23. 
 
Figure 7.23 Interview Extract Regarding Governance under Differing General  
          Conditions (2) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Broker 04: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Broker 04: 
 
Are company fundamentals important at all and, if so, in what sense is it 
important... perhaps in terms of the valuation of the company itself? 
 
Company fundamentals are important as equity analysts use this 
kind of information to value the companies but valuations depend on 
the projected figures analysts use... to predict the future prospects of 
the company. What we get is usually different valuations by different 
analysts... see whether they think the business will do well or badly. 
When times are good and the share prices hit the target price... there 
are analysts who will revise the company valuations upwards and the 
new target price is also set higher so that investors will keep buying 
and chasing the counter. 
 
So, the valuations change often and fundamentals are priced or valued 
differently even by the same analyst? So, these figures actually do not 
reflect fundamentals per se but more towards taking advantage of positive 
investor sentiment and encourage them to buy more of such shares? 
 
Yes, fundamentals is a kind of way to convince investors of the worth 
of the companies but at the end of the day, it’s just the opinion of the 
analyst more than... actual worth of the company. 
 
The extract above details how equity analysts make use of company fundamentals 
to predict the future prospects/performance of publicly-listed firms. Projected 
figures are used to estimate firms‘ fair values and also target share prices that 
reflect the said valuations. Broker 04‘s contention is that fundamentals may 
sometimes be priced/valued more aggressively and frequently (leading to many 
revisions of both company valuations and target share prices) to take advantage of 
the buying momentum generated by investors‘ bullish sentiments. This is 
consistent with brokers‘ tendency to make frequent buy/sell recommendations to 
stimulate trading and earn more commissions. 
                                                 
200
 Either potential or incurred losses. 
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Regardless of whether the generated figures fairly reflect company fundamentals 
or investor sentiment (as explained by Statman, 1999), the salient point is that 
many investors would pay more attention to company fundamentals in a rising 
stock market. This is because share reports published by equity analysts tend to 
use fundamentals-based arguments and investors in a rising market are more 
inclined to buy/invest in shares rather than sell/exit the market. In addition, 
stockbrokers are also inclined to make use of such analyst reports to compel their 
clients to buy more shares.  
 
For the next relevant general investment situation, consider Figure 7.24 below. 
 
Figure 7.24 Interview Extract Regarding Governance under Differing General  
          Conditions (3) 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 08: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Thank you very much. Now, besides this are you generally concerned 
about the quality and capability of a corporation‟s management? 
 
Now, I’m very, very concerned especially in light of the recent events 
where the Malaysian stock market whereby two of Malaysia’s 
well-known companies such as Transmile and Megan Media have 
shown that corporate governance has not been executed to 
satisfactory level… I’m not talking about perfection, I mean 
satisfactory level cause this company that I have mention… 
 
...recently reported that they have some accounting fraud. Yeah, and 
with respect to receivable and stuff... and inflated their earnings as 
well as crowding the eyes of the... investment community such as the 
analyst as well as the retail investors. 
 
The extract above raises the possibility that governance may matter more when 
publicly-listed company fraud happens often, especially when these are reported in 
the press (as predicted and argued in the earlier chapters of the study). Hence, this 
factor is included in the list of differing general investment conditions.  
 
The relative importance of governance to individual investors under the identified 
situations amongst the main questionnaire respondent sample is explored below.  
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Table 7.15 Importance of Governance under Differing General Investment  
        Environments 
General Investment Environments No. of Respondents % of Overall 
Sample 
In times of general economic uncertainty 453 40.96 
In a bearish/declining stock market 382 34.54 
In a bullish/rising stock market 106 9.58 
When company fraud happens often 232 20.98 
None of the Above 415 37.52 
Others 5 0.45 
 
Considering the figures in Table 7.15, corporate governance, when described as 
the long-term proper management of publicly-listed companies, is deemed to be 
more of a concern for about 41% of sampled investors in times of general 
economic uncertainty. It is likely that economic uncertainty dampens investor 
sentiment/expectations and also adversely affects operations and revenues of 
public-listed companies. The diminished business prospects for corporations in 
times of economic crisis coupled with negative and cautious investor outlook on 
corporate performance would adversely impact the stock prices of these 
companies. A close link therefore exists between general economic uncertainty 
and capital market performance 
 
In fact, governance is found to matter more for about 35% of respondents (broadly 
comparable to the percentage reported for general economic uncertainty) in a 
declining stock market. As well-run companies are seen to be more resilient, do not 
take excessive business risks and are more transparent, they are comparatively 
less affected by economic downturns and crises than their less well-governed 
peers. Empirical evidence from the governance literature (see, for example, 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Baek et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2000) generally 
supports the individual investor opinions quoted above.  
 
Conversely, the study found that only less than 10% of sampled investors are more 
concerned with governance when the Malaysian capital market is rising. 
Importance of governance generally does not increase in such a circumstance. 
 
Next, the study found that when corporate fraud happens often, around 21% of 
investors would pay more attention to governance. It is assumed that such 
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incidences are widely reported in the press which act as a reinforcement 
mechanism to remind investors of the importance of governance. This is a clear 
indication that major incidences involving weaknesses/failings in corporate 
governance do make individual investors more aware and governance-concerned. 
Subsequently, this compels individual investors to scrutinise the publicly-listed 
companies whose shares they are considering buying more closely.  
 
Lastly, about 38% of respondent investors do not feel that the long-term 
management of publicly-listed companies matters more under all of the scenarios 
listed above.  
 
The reported findings generally support the study‘s contention that governance 
matters relatively more to some investors under certain specific circumstances. 
 
 
7.3.2  Investor Tendencies When Governance-related Concerns are 
Acute 
 
In this section, the study reports results pertaining to a generic but extreme 
governance scenario involving a clear absence or blatant violation of the tenets of 
good governance. Such a scenario is posed to respondents to explore their likely 
behavioural responses. This is regarded to be the best strategy to gauge individual 
investors‘ likely reactions in situations where governance becomes the primary 
issue as most of them have never actually experienced such extreme investment 
situations in real life. Justification for such a treatment is that it would provide vital 
indicative behavioural tendencies of investors when governance-related concerns 
are acute.  
 
 
7.3.2.1  Treatment of Shares Post-Scandal 
 
The first issue that is of particular interest to the study is the likelihood of individual 
investors disposing of/selling off the shares of the scandal-ridden company whose 
price has dropped significantly. The responses in Figures 7.25 and 7.26 are 
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reported as they are found to be typical of the opinions of interview respondents as 
a collective group regarding this issue. 
 
Figure 7.25 Interview Extract Regarding the Treatment of Shares Post-Scandal (1) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Investor 02: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 02: 
Imagine yourself owning some shares in a publicly-listed company that is 
involved in a major scandal/fraudulent activity and the share price dropped 
significantly as a result... before you get the chance to sell your shares, 
what would you do next? Sell the shares or keep it? 
 
Keep it. 
 
Why? 
 
With hope that it will go back up... less loss. 
 
Figure 7.26 Interview Extract Regarding the Treatment of Shares Post-Scandal (2) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Investor 01: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 01: 
 
Imagine yourself owning some shares in a publicly-listed company that is 
involved in a major scandal or fraud and the share price dropped 
significantly as a result... before you get the chance to sell your shares, 
what would you do after that? Will you sell the shares or keep it? 
 
Keep it since it already dropped 50%. It is pointless to sell. Perhaps 
the company will have good announcement. 
 
Are you not afraid that it will fall further? 
 
If everyone also sell the shares maybe you lose more than the big 
drop, why not keep it? 
 
Figures 7.25 and 7.26 suggest that individual investors are more inclined to keep 
the shares of scandal-ridden companies whose values have dropped significantly. 
It seems that these investors are mostly hoping for a future recovery of the share 
price. Loss-aversion (the general unwillingness of investors to realise their 
investment losses) is regarded as the most likely explanation. Even so, a few 
interview respondents have offered a differing position (please refer to Figures 
7.27 and 7.28).  
 
Figure 7.27 Interview Extract Regarding the Treatment of Shares Post-Scandal (3) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Investor 06: 
 
Imagine yourself owning shares in a publicly-listed company involved in a 
major scandal or fraud and the share price dropped significantly as a 
result... before you get the chance to sell your shares, what would you do 
after? Will you sell the shares or keep them? 
 
Definitely sell out as quickly as possible. If I wait any longer, the price 
may drop even more... may never recover also, the share... can’t 
afford to take the risk. 
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Figure 7.28 Interview Extract Regarding the Treatment of Shares Post-Scandal (4) 
Researcher: 
 
 
 
 
Investor 13: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 13: 
 
 
Imagine yourself owning shares in a publicly-listed company that is involved 
in a major scandal/fraudulent activity and the share price dropped 
significantly as a result... before you get the chance to sell out, what would 
you do next? Sell the shares or keep it? 
 
Sell. 
 
What is the main reason for selling? 
 
I invest in companies with good management... consistently 
performing and gives good returns. If such activities are discovered, 
the company is no longer a good investment. I don’t see the reason to 
keep the shares. 
 
Interview respondents seem to exhibit different tendencies regarding this issue as 
some are found to prefer selling out while others opt to hold on to the shares. 
Essentially, the study is unable to ascertain which position is the more likely 
indicative tendency. As such, the prevalence of the two opposite treatments 
amongst survey respondents is investigated. 
 
Table 7.16 Treatment of Shares Owned Post Scandal/Fraud 
Treatment of Shares Owned Post 
Scandal/Fraud 
No. of Respondents % of Overall Sample 
Hold/Keep the Shares 434 39.24 
Exit/Sell the Shares 672 60.76 
Total 1106 100.00 
 
Indications from Table 7.16 are that individual investors in the sample have a 
higher tendency to dispose of shares that have registered a significant decrease in 
value post-scandal. Specifically, around 61% of respondents have expressed the 
inclination to sell out while the remaining 39% tends to hold on to their shares. 
However, taking into account the sizeable minority who opt to keep the shares, it 
seems that investors are not of one mind when evaluating the prospects of their 
shares post scandal. Furthermore, the extracts above show that both groups have 
logical reasons behind their respective actions. On balance, however, individual 
investors are slightly more inclined to sell out. 
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7.3.2.2  Individual Investors’ Initial Reponses Post Scandal/Fraud 
 
Next, the study considers the initial responses of investors post scandal/fraud. 
Essentially, the study intends to explore whether investors who are directly 
affected would remain silent or complain to people who are close to them. One 
must bear in mind that the primary aim of shareholder activism-related initiatives is 
to have one‘s voice/opinions heard and to seek redress and/or accountability when 
such scandals happen. Hence, this initial propensity to complain is viewed as an 
important indication of the propensity to subsequently undertake governance- 
related action under such a circumstance. 
 
Table 7.17 Individual Investors‟ Initial Responses Post Scandal/Fraud 
Individual Responses Post 
Scandal/Fraud 
No. of Respondents % of Overall Sample 
Keep Quiet and Suffer in Silence  482 43.58 
Complain about it to family/friend 624 56.42 
Total 1106 100.00 
 
Table 7.17 reveals that, collectively, individual investors exhibit a higher likelihood 
to complain about the scandal to family and friends rather than remaining silent. 
This is a key finding from the viewpoint of governance as it shows that a majority of 
individual investors have the desired natural inclination to speak up, make 
complaints and seek redress when they are being mistreated. It also suggests that 
individual investors can play a part in governance, at the very least, under certain 
extreme situations. 
 
Elaborating further, one of the study‘s main predictions is that an investor‘s relative 
propensity to complain (hence, the relative propensity to undertake governance- 
related initiatives) is significantly influenced by cultural considerations (as 
suggested by the arguments made by Pye, 1985). In this instance, the focus is on 
investors‘ race/ethnicity. As posited in Chapter 3, ethnic-Chinese investors are 
assumed to be more likely to stand up for their ownership rights and also more 
likely to complain/to seek redress when being mistreated.  
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A Chi-Square value of less than 0.01 confirms the significant link between 
investors‘ race/ethnicity and tendency to complain with 99% confidence (please 
refer to Appendix 7). 
 
The results (Appendix 7) show that 63.5% of ethnic-Chinese investors exhibit an 
inclination to complain to family/friends compared to just 34.6% for ethnic-Malay 
investors. Conversely, 65.4% of ethnic-Malay investors prefer to keep quiet and 
suffer in silence while only 36.5% of ethnic-Chinese respondents choose to do the 
same. Respondents who are ethnic-Indian are found to exhibit a fairly balanced 
tendency with 53.8% complaining and 46.2% keeping quiet.  
 
Ethnic-Chinese investors do show a greater latent propensity to undertake 
governance-related initiatives. Their ―complain and make sure that my grievances 
are heard‖ mindset (Crouch, 1996) makes them more closely mirror the ―ideal 
shareholder‖ (as conceptualised by governance proponents) as compared to 
investors from the other two ethnic groups. 
 
This set of findings shows that governance researchers should not view individual 
investors as generic economic agents with similar propensities/behavioral 
tendencies worldwide. An individual investor‘s propensity/latent potential to 
undertake shareholder activism and/or play a proactive role in advancing corporate 
governance may be significantly different from their peers due to cultural norms/ 
distinctiveness (for example, see the cultural distinctiveness arguments put forth 
by Kim and Nofsinger, 2003).  
 
 
7.3.2.3 Individual Investors’ Formal Reponses Post 
Scandal/Fraud 
 
After exploring their latent potential for undertaking proactive governance and also 
their initial/informal responses to the scenario, the study now investigates 
respondent investors‘ likely formal responses.  
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Table 7.18 Individual Investors‟ Formal Responses Post Scandal 
Formal Responses Post-Scandal   No. of 
Respondents 
% of Overall 
Sample 
Do Nothing (take no formal/official/legal action) 873 78.93 
Send formal complaint letter to company 
management 
87 7.87 
Attend the company’s AGM/EGM 106 9.58 
File a formal complaint with market regulators 100 9.04 
Use the media to highlight protest 74 6.69 
Other 2 0.18 
 
From Table 7.18, the study found that most respondent investors (approximately 
79%) would opt to take no formal/official/legal action even after such a marked 
destruction of their respective individual wealth. The underlying reasons and 
justifications for such a passive reaction are addressed in the next subsection.  
 
As for the remaining 21% of investors who opt to take more pro-active redress 
actions, it is found that a range of alternatives are pursued. In this regard, 
respondents are given the flexibility to choose any combination of answers that 
best apply to them. Hence, all percentages given are of the total sample size to 
highlight their relative popularities. 
 
Approximately 10% of respondent would attend the AGM/EGM of the fictitious 
scandal-ridden company to protest and demand accountability from its 
management. Also, some 8% of investors would send formal complaint letters to 
company management to demand accountability and/or for redress action to be 
taken; 9% of respondent investors would file a complaint with market regulators so 
that the appropriate steps would be taken to implicate those who are involved in 
such scandals. Using the media as a tool to highlight their plight/protest is the 
preferred response for 7% of individual investors sampled.  
 
Comparing the indicative proportions of investors attending AGMs and undertaking 
various forms of governance-related shareholder initiatives under normal 
circumstances to those post-scandal, investors do exhibit a higher tendency for 
proactive initiatives under differing circumstances. This tendency again supports 
the argument that investors are myopic (Keasey et al., 2005). 
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7.3.2.4  Justifications for Taking No Official Action 
 
Due to the pervasiveness of this particular option amongst respondents, an entire 
subsection is devoted to reporting findings aimed at explaining the underlying logic 
behind such a tendency. The study begins by presenting relevant quotes from 
interviews conducted (given in Figures 7.29 and 7.30). 
 
Figure 7.29 Interview Extract Regarding Taking No Official Action (1) 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 02: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 02: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
Investor 02: 
Next, do you take any official action or do nothing? 
 
Do nothing. 
 
How come? 
 
No one cares, I think. 
 
So, you mean the management or the authorities won‟t bother to take 
action? 
 
Yes, my assumption and it is too much trouble to complain too. 
 
Figure 7.30 Interview Extract Regarding Taking No Official Action (2) 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 18: 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor18: 
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Investor 18: 
I see. Next, do you take any official action or do nothing? 
 
Do nothing... Bad luck and cause can do nothing. 
 
What do you mean exactly by saying nothing can be done? 
 
For example, by complaining, the chances of management closing 
their ears are high... demonstrate also no use... 
 
Means they won‟t even listen or respond to such complaints? 
 
Chances are high. 
 
As shown, justifications given by individual investors opting to do nothing include 
lack of co-operation and support from capital market authorities and company 
management; the perception that involvement in such incidents is simply down to 
bad luck; and complaining as being too counter-intuitive and also too troublesome.  
 
In addition, the researcher has been in correspondence with the Malaysian 
Institute of Corporate Governance to solicit their opinions/expertise with regards to 
this issue. Other factors suggested by the Institute as likely reasons for investor 
passivity include investors being (i) unsure what to do/how to complain, (ii) fearful 
of getting some form of revenge and (iii) highly tolerant of being mistreated. The 
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table below illustrates the prevalence of each of the justifications identified for 
taking no action post-scandal amongst survey respondents.  
 
Table 7.19 Justifications for Not Taking Action 
Justifications for Doing Nothing (taking no official 
actions) 
No. of 
Respondents 
% of Overall 
Sample 
Just bad luck, fated to be involved 352 31.83 
Don’t usually complain (not used to it) 260 23.51 
Unsure what to do/how to complain 197 17.81 
Fear of revenge 56 5.06 
The authorities would not take any action 412 37.25 
Can still tolerate such treatment 19 1.72 
Company management would not 
respond/change 
443 40.05 
 
Table 71.19 shows that around 32% of sampled investors have a rather fatalistic 
perspective by attributing the overall situation, their perceived chance involvement, 
and also subsequent losses incurred, to bad luck. Consistent with earlier findings, 
individual investors seem to be irrational (as suggested by proponents of 
behavioural finance such as Subrahmanyam, 2007; Hirshleifer, 2001; Barberis and 
Thaler, 2002; Daniel et al., 2002; Statman, 1999). It remains unclear whether this is 
mainly due to investors‘ general lack of financial sophistication or simply a cultural 
response or both. A review of past literature suggests, however, that cultural norms 
are likely to have at least some influence in fostering this fatalistic view amongst 
ethnic-Malay investors (Crouch, 1996; Pye, 1995).  
 
Second, 24% of respondents have expressed reluctance to take any formal action 
as they are simply not used to complaining or voicing their grievances. Similar to 
the propensity to complain post-scandal, this is seen to be a culturally-influenced 
tendency. This response is predicted to be more prominent among ethnic-Malay 
investors as they usually avoid trouble, the authorities and also controversies 
where possible (Pye, 1995). A related contention is that Malaysian investors have 
a high level of tolerance in terms of being exploited as they are used to political and 
economic discrimination and repression but with only 1.7% of them reporting being 
tolerant of such mistreatment, the predicted tendency does not fairly reflect this 
investor group.  
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Third, about 18% of individual investors take no formal/official action as they are 
unsure what to do or how to complain. Since some of them belong to a culture that 
shies away from making complaints, a proportion of the wider investor population 
presumably have got no prior experiences of complaining and are thus unsure as 
to what to do when the need arises. Taking into account the presumption that 
Malaysian investors are culturally unaccustomed to make complaints, the 82% of 
respondents reporting being aware of the avenues of complaint is much higher 
than expected. Again, as shown by the study on a few earlier occasions, individual 
investors seem to be more sophisticated in some respects than previously thought. 
 
The findings thus far have mainly pointed towards inaction as a consequence of 
different combinations of (i) lack of governance-related experience and knowledge 
such as attending AGMs or activist-related initiatives and (ii) real and perceived 
cultural barriers and irrational psychological biases.  
 
The following sets of reasons, however, are given by apparently more 
well-informed, relatively knowledgeable or cynical investors. Specifically, 37% of 
respondents opted to take no action because they presume that the relevant 
authorities/regulators would not take any concrete action while 40% of investors 
reasoned that even if they complained, company managers would not respond or 
change anyway. These two justifications are important as they clearly indicate that 
a significant proportion of investors tend not to take any concrete action even when 
they presumably know the avenues/means/mechanisms to seek redress. This is 
due to negative perceptions as to the effectiveness and/or viability of pursuing 
governance-related initiatives 
 
In summary, a rather persuasive overall indicative tendency is detected. 
Regardless of the justifications reported, the end result is still a disproportionate 
overall individual investor inclination towards inaction. 
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7.3.3  Interim Summary (Q2) 
 
The study found that individual investors assign more weight to firm governance in 
their investment decision-making under particular differing circumstances such as 
(i) in times of general economic uncertainty and bearish stock markets (when 
investment risks are presumably higher) and (ii) to a lesser extent, when corporate 
fraud happens often. Even so, it must be noted that approximately four out of ten 
investors are unaffected (a significant minority).  
 
Therefore, the fact that governance becomes more important to some individual 
investors under differing general market conditions or post exploitation must be 
factored in when addressing the question of whether corporate governance 
actually matters to individual investors. For example, even if an average 
shareholding period of one year or less decreases the likelihood of active 
governance monitoring, it does not exclude the consideration of governance under 
a few of the specific circumstances considered.  
 
Another important finding is that an overwhelming proportion of individual investors 
in Malaysia cannot actually tolerate blatant corporate abuses but at the same time, 
a significant majority choose to remain silent and not take any follow up formal 
action/initiatives even after being directly exploited. This is because most investors 
are either too inexperienced in pursuing shareholder activism-related initiatives, 
simply not used to speaking up, too indifferent (mainly pertaining to the 
effectiveness of redress mechanisms and regulator enforcement) or have a lack of 
confidence in regulators to pursue any remedial/redress action. Taken together, 
approximately eight out of ten investors sampled opt to take no official/formal 
actions (i.e. do nothing). 
 
Lastly, the study convincingly demonstrated that certain personal demographic 
and psychological characteristics, ethnicity in particular, exert considerable 
influence on investors‘ latent propensities to engage in governance-related 
initiatives. Particular groups of individual investors and their behavioural 
tendencies between different countries and even subgroups within countries are 
probably not generic.  
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7.4  Corporate Governance and Investors’ Primary 
Investment Strategies 
 
In Chapter 6, the study demonstrated that an investor‘s general investment 
strategy provides a fairly good indication of his/her dominant set of 
investment-related attributes/action/tendencies. These strategies are then argued 
to form good reference/anchor variables that (i) provide an easier means of 
gauging the underlying general attributes of the wider individual investor 
population and (ii) enable researchers to make sense of the many investor 
inclinations/actions in a more integrated and holistic manner.  
 
In a similar manner, certain strategies are seen to be more naturally inclined 
towards governance (be it considerations and/or action) while others are more 
compelled to disregard it. Hence, in order for the study to better appreciate the 
importance of corporate governance amongst the individual investor population in 
Malaysia and also the means/mechanisms by which governance features in their 
investment practices, primary investment strategies are once again utilised.  
 
Essentially, the study explores the relative importance of certain firm-level 
governance attributes to individual investors who are segregated by their primary 
investment strategies.  
 
 
7.4.1  Ability, Qualifications and Experience of Directors/Managers 
and Primary Investment Strategies 
 
The study begins the evaluation by examining the degree of importance that 
investors attach to the abilities, qualifications and experience of directors/ 
managers. As the Chi-Square test yields a value of less than 0.01, significant 
associations exist between general investment strategies and this particular 
attribute with 99% confidence (Appendix 7). 
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The full set of cross-tabulation results for investors‘ primary investment strategies 
and the corresponding degrees of importance that they attach to the abilities, 
qualifications and experience of directors/managers is presented in Appendix 7.  
 
The study expects most fundamentals-based investors to consider this firm-level 
attribute seriously when making share investment evaluations. This is because 
fundamental analysis is based on the notion of generating superior investment 
returns by selecting companies that are stable, well-run, have solid performance 
and also bright future prospects. Indeed, it was found that an overwhelming 
majority of this investor subsample (more than 90%) do attach different degrees of 
importance to this firm-level attribute with only 1.7% of them completely 
disregarding this governance attribute201.  
 
Next, investors utilising technical analysis are assumed to disregard this particular 
attribute as their investment decisions depend solely on the trends/patterns 
detected in stock charts 202 . As the old adage goes ―it is all in the charts‖. 
Surprisingly, only 60% of investors in this subsample completely ignore this 
governance attribute. One potential explanation for this unexpected trend is the 
fact that many investors in real life situations, while possessing a primary 
investment strategy, may make use of some other methods some of the time. By 
the same logic, while these investors are assumed not to consider the abilities and 
experiences of managers/directors while utilising technical analysis, some of them 
may consider this factor at other times (when they are using other techniques/ 
strategies).  
 
For investors pursuing a combination-based strategy, fundamentals are typically 
used as a threshold criterion to select companies that are not overly risky while 
technical analysis is used to determine entry/exit (buy/sell) points. The study found 
that 87.7% of respondents in this group regard managerial capability as either 
Important or Very Important which is only slightly lower compared to the 
corresponding percentage for fundamentals-based investors. 
 
                                                 
201
 Even though this finding may not necessarily be counter-intuitive as, even though 
managerial capability is one of the main attributes of interest, some fundamentals-based 
investors may consider and/or pay more attention to other governance-related attributes. 
202
 As all relevant information is assumed to be reflected in the chart patterns. 
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Apart from its brand name, a firm‘s reputation can be derived from the reputation of 
its top managers/directors. Hence, reputation-based investors are predicted to 
consider the reputations of prominent managers, especially famous company 
founders who are highly respected in Asian countries. In fact, some 
managers/directors assume the role of being the public face of such firms (notable 
examples include Teh Hiong Piaw, the founder of Public Bank Bhd. and Lim Goh 
Tong, the late founder of Genting Bhd; both are household names and also 
majority shareholder/founders of two of the biggest publicly-listed companies in 
Malaysia). The argument here is that investors make heuristically-simplified 
evaluations by equating perceptions of good manager reputation to managerial 
ability. Indeed, the study found that 81.5% of reputation-based investors attach 
various degrees of importance to this firm-specific attribute when making 
investment decisions.  
 
For investors opting for both attention- and reliance-based strategies, they are 
more inclined towards attaching lesser importance to managerial capability or even 
disregard it. This tendency is based on the assumption that these investors make 
their decisions based on whatever kind of information is available pre-purchase 
(that either catches their attention or is given by their advisors). Hence, whether or 
not governance is considered is partly dependent on (i) whether 
governance-related information is available or grabs their attention each and every 
time a particular share is evaluated and (ii) whether they specifically enquire about 
such a factor. It is found that 37% of attention-based and 33% of reliance-based 
investors rated this attribute as Irrelevant. In addition, higher than expected 
numbers of investors using these strategies (32.1% and 33.9% respectively) also 
claim that they attach only slight importance to managerial capability.  
 
The indicative tendencies identified are generally consistent with the intrinsic 
nature of each investment strategy, as described in Chapter 3. Primary investment 
strategies do seem to be good indicators of investors‘ general governance 
propensity/inclination.  
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7.4.2  The Degree of Management Transparency and Accountability 
and Primary Investment Strategies 
 
In order to enhance the credibility of the investment strategies‘ indicative properties 
in terms of individual investors‘ distinctive governance-related behavioural trends 
found above, the degree of management transparency and accountability is now 
used as the proxy for general firm-related governance. With a Chi-Square value of 
less than 0.01, significantly distinct associations exist between general investment 
strategies and this particular attribute with 99% confidence (Appendix 7).  
 
The full set of cross-tabulation results for investors‘ primary investment strategies 
and the corresponding degrees of importance that they attach to the the degree of 
management transparency and accountability is presented in Appendix 7.  
 
Distinctive trends/indicative tendencies that are remarkably similar to those 
identified for the managerial capability attribute can be detected for investors using 
each of the six investment strategies. The similarities even extend to the more 
distinctive results found earlier. For example, only 44.6% of investors making use 
of technical analysis do not consider speed and quality of disclosures at all instead 
of the expected ideal of 100%.  
 
Overall, in terms of individual investors‘ governance-related inclinations, individual 
investors who opt for fundamental analysis are collectively the most inclined to 
take aspects of firm-level governance into account and this is followed by those 
using a combinations-based strategy. Investors who utilise a reputations-based 
strategy, by merit of their heuristically-simplified assumptions, do take certain 
governance factors into account but more through mere perception rather than 
basing such assumptions on actual information.   
 
As for individual investors utilising attention-based and reliance-based strategies, 
concern for governance is ad hoc and highly dependent on the kinds of information 
that attracts their attention in particular instances (i.e. whether or not such 
information happens to be governance-related) and the kinds of factors that they 
are dependent on for investment decision-making. Finally, a majority of those who 
opt for technical analysis either disregard governance or attach slight importance 
to such factors.  
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Most importantly, the analysis above demonstrates that primary investment 
strategies serve as ideal indicators of the inherent characteristics of major investor 
subgroups within a larger individual investor population. Instead of providing a 
fairly effective means of describing and viewing investors in terms of their likely 
attributes/tendencies/action, primary investment strategies may also act as a basis 
for comparisons between different investor populations. Specifically, the 
approximate proportions of investors opting for governance-inclined strategies as 
opposed to those who tend to disregard governance is likely to be a good 
preliminary indicator of the general importance of corporate governance to that 
particular population of investors. 
 
This set of findings also highlights the consistency of the study‘s various results 
thereby enhancing the credibility of the contention that the findings presented 
provide, at the very least, partially representative indicative tendencies of individual 
investors in Malaysia that lay the foundation for further research.  
 
 
7.5  Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter 7 is devoted to the reporting of individual investors‘ various governance- 
related actions/tendencies over the stages of the typical share investment cycle. 
Most investors are found to be aware or have formed opinions regarding the likely 
motivations/actions of various capital market participants. These opinions/ 
perceptions, in turn, lead to subsequent, consistent sets of governance-based 
actions/tendencies. 
 
In evaluating whether governance matters to individual investors, the study 
concluded that certain firm-level governance attributes are considered by a 
majority of investors. These attributes are mainly related to different aspects of 
corporate management (such as their capability, quality and also degree of 
transparency) and matters pertaining to corporate disclosures. Even though 
governance is relevant to most investors, it is typically of secondary importance.  
 
It was found that most individual investors make use of these governance 
attributes in the form of investment criteria, both in a general and also firm-specific 
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manner. More importantly, they form the mechanisms by which investors 
determine the thresholds for the potential treatments of either (i) avoiding 
poorly-governed firms or (ii) investing only in well-governed ones. 
 
Next, the study found that only a very small percentage of investors are involved in 
shareholder activism type of governance-related initiatives. Governance active 
investors are generally concerned with corporate performance or other factors that 
directly impact such performance. For investors who are inactive, they are either (i) 
unaware, unsure what to do, lack the required sophistication, (ii) pursuing 
strategies that do require or disinclined towards governance and/or (iii) of the 
opinion that involvement is not worth the time/effort or futile when considering the 
institutional constraints faced.  
 
A significant proportion of seemingly governance active/interested investors 
actually carry out such initiatives for reasons that are not actually relevant to 
governance suggesting that certain assumptions made by academics must be 
verified and interpreted with caution. In general, a significant majority of individual 
investors do not view governance as a concern requiring and/or meriting continual 
monitoring or active participation. 
 
Most individual investors are also affected by rumours and speculative information 
to varying degrees. This applies to both buying and selling decisions. Investors 
seem to prefer the ―perform or explain/abandon‖ approach when it comes to firm 
performance or governance. Instead of being wholly uninformed and/or 
disinterested, individual investors in Malaysia seems to be more sophisticated than 
first envisaged in certain respects – specifically, their apparent awareness of 
general governance concerns and constraints within the Malaysian capital market 
environment.  
 
When a clear distinction is made between governance and performance, most 
investors are more concerned with corporate performance than governance proper. 
Essentially, they view governance as factors that lead to improved corporate 
performance and less the proper structures and processes to run publicly-listed 
firms in an appropriate manner. Even so, a proportion of respondents who take 
governance into account do prefer managers to be more transparent and 
accountable for their actions. 
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Most investors are found to have fairly short average shareholding periods which 
further reduces the overall relevance of long-term governance to them. Overall, 
most investors are involved in differing degrees of speculative and rumour-induced 
trades and are primarily geared towards making short-term, quick profits. 
 
As a variation of the themes above, the study found that governance does become 
more important under certain specific differing general circumstances (for example, 
in a declining/bearish stock market). Even so, a sizeable minority does not 
consider governance to be more important under all the differing circumstances 
being evaluated.  
 
Most individual investors find blatant corporate abuses intolerable but at the same 
time, they usually choose to remain silent and take no formal action/initiatives even 
after being directly exploited. This is because of a variety of reasons that include (i) 
lack of experience and knowledge in seeking proper redress and making their 
voices heard, (ii) certain cultural and psychological barriers and, (iii) the perception 
that any such initiatives would be futile given the prevailing constraints/ 
weaknesses plaguing the effectiveness of corporate governance in the country. 
 
Eight out of ten investors‘ investment decisions (proxied by the decision to dispose 
of shares) are affected to differing degrees by irrational, emotional and 
psychological states. Certain personal demographic characteristics are also found 
to exert considerable influence on investors‘ latent propensities to engage in 
governance- related initiatives. Hence, individual investors should not be seen as a 
big, generic subgroup of investors regardless of context. This lends good support 
to the behavioural finance research tradition that subscribes to assumptions 
arising from departures from investor rationality. 
 
Finally, investors‘ primary investment strategies serve as good indicators of their 
respective predispositions toward considering corporate governance and also 
undertaking governance-related initiatives. The overall conclusion to the study is 
presented in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 8  Conclusion 
8.1  Chapter Outline 
 
The many conclusions reached by the study are summarised in this chapter. The 
researcher firstly revisits the different aspects of corporate governance that are 
relevant to individual investors. The agency theory conception of governance is 
outlined briefly as well as the various firm-level and country-level factors that 
collectively make up the major aspects of the concept of corporate governance. 
 
The study then reiterates the justifications of why individual investors in Malaysia 
merit attention. Next, the benefits of governance to individual investors are outlined. 
This is followed by revisiting the major arguments pertaining to the apparent 
disconnect between academic, regulator and practitioner perspectives in relation 
to individual investors‘ roles and involvement in governance.   
 
Subsequently, the different ways and means by which individual investors may 
take governance into account are summarised alongside the motivations/reasons 
for each compiled tendency. This leads the study back to its main research 
questions and aims. Revisiting of research objectives is next where the specific 
chapters addressing each set objective are outlined. Details regarding the study‘s 
research philosophy and also methodology are revisited next.  
 
The study then summarises the key findings of the empirical research undertaken. 
This is followed by the study‘s various original contributions to knowledge. These 
are segregated into distinctive additions in terms of (i) academic and theoretical 
understanding, (ii) research methodology and (iii) actual practice. Lastly, a brief 
outline of the study‘s limitations and suggestions for future research are provided. 
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8.2  Corporate Governance and Individual Investors 
 
One of the primary aims of corporate governance is to reconcile the interests of 
investors/shareholders (as owners of the publicly-listed firms) with those of their 
agents (corporate managers who run such entities on their behalf). In fact, many 
academics, policymakers and practitioners view the main purpose of governance 
as being to safeguard the interests of shareholders and the sole/ultimate corporate 
objective is wealth maximisation (Berglof and Von Thadden, 1999; Thompson and 
Davis, 1997). The described agency theory perspective is adopted by the current 
study as the Malaysian governance system is heavily modelled on the 
Anglo-American system (Kean and Cheah, 2000). 
 
The subsequent arguments presented by the study can be summed up by the 
following statement – that the individual investor subgroup merits particular 
attention. This is because of the many classes of minority shareholders, they are 
usually the most prone to exploitation/mistreatment largely due to their relatively 
tiny shareholdings. This is further exacerbated by the presence of many politically 
well-connected majority shareholder/manager-controlled firms typical of East 
Asian capital markets such as Malaysia where the scope for executive abuse is 
inherently wider (Low, 2004; Arsalidou and Wang, 2005).  
 
More importantly, the individual investor subgroup has been largely ignored in past 
governance studies since they are predicted to play no role in corporate 
governance. As a consequence, not much is actually known about these investors 
in terms of their governance-related behavioural tendencies. 
 
The study then outlined the many reasons why governance may be relevant to 
individual investors, including (i) claims, and also certain empirical studies showing 
that good governance results in superior firm performance and also better 
investment returns to investors (Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Bauer and Guenster, 2003), (ii) increasing trust and confidence that the firms that 
they own are managed in a proper and accountable manner (Monks and Minow, 
2004) and (iii) lowering the likelihoods of incidences of corporate fraud (see, for 
example, Uzun et al., 2004; Farber, 2004).  
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Notwithstanding such benefits, the study subsequently highlighted differing 
perspectives and also conflicting evidence regarding the desired, expected and 
actual governance-related roles/behaviours of individual investors. Academics 
theorise that individual investors have no active governance role due to the 
prohibitive costs involved; practical impediments to collective investor action; the 
free-rider problem and the general design of capital markets (see, for example, 
Monks and Minow, 2004).  
 
On the other hand, government regulators have envisaged, encouraged and also 
seem to expect individual investors to be more governance pro-active, especially 
in exercising their ownership rights and seeking redress when being mistreated 
(see, for example, The Securities Commission Development Centre Quarterly 
Bulletin [Malaysia], 2002). In fact, resources have been expended in educating 
investors regarding their rights and responsibilities as owners and making use of 
mechanisms that enable them to impose corporate discipline more effectively (The 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): Corporate 
Governance (Malaysia) by the World Bank, 2005). Bearing in mind utilitarian 
academic predictions, whether the government/regulators‘ expectations of how 
investors should act are reasonable or otherwise is subject to some contention.  
 
A third perspective is derived from anecdotal evidence in the popular press, 
practitioner accounts and also casual observations of actual individual investor 
behaviour. Specifically, at least some individual investors are shown to actually 
undertake governance-related initiatives (see, for example, Jaafar Sidek, 2005). 
Observations and claims that individual investors dominate attendance at AGMs is 
a good example (Allen, 2004b; Schacht et al., 2009).  
 
Another possibility is that investors may take governance into account through 
certain means that are distinct and less costly compared to active monitoring. 
Additionally, they may undertake the various actions/behaviours that are regarded 
as governance-related for yet-to-be-identified reasons/motivations that may or 
may not actually be connected to governance.  
 
Individual investors were also portrayed to be myopic (Keasey et al., 2005) in the 
sense that, when the companies that they partly own are registering good growth, 
performance, profits and/or the share prices are on an upward trend; governance 
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is of little concern. Potential weaknesses in the running of such entities and even 
abuse/misuse of corporate assets are tolerated or ignored. Conversely, when 
things go wrong, they start questioning, where is the governance?  
 
The scenario above led to the study‘s main research questions. They are: 
 
 Q1: Does corporate governance matter to individual investors? If it does: 
o What aspects of it are taken into account in their share investment 
practices?  
o How are the relevant governance aspects taken into account? 
 Q2: When or under what circumstances does governance start to 
matter/matter more? 
 Q3: What are the reasons/justifications and also influences underlying 
individual investors‘ propensities to consider governance, undertake 
particular governance-related action and/or exhibit governance-related 
tendencies? 
o What country-specific environmental and institutional factors 
influence and also explain observed behavioural tendencies? 
o What personal investment-related attributes, preferences and 
stylistics influence and also explain observed behavioural 
tendencies?  
 
Essentially, the study set out to investigate (i) the actual prevalence of each 
possible means by which individual investors could take governance into account. 
Even though the range of possible governance-related treatments is explored in 
the extant literature (for example, avoid investing in poorly-governed firms, invest 
only in well-governed firms, sell out whenever governance problems arise, 
amongst others), the relative importance and prevalence of each amongst 
individual investors in developing capital markets such as Malaysia in reality 
remain unexplored empirically.  
 
All country-level and firm-level aspects of governance that (i) are relevant to 
individual investors and (ii) feature in their investment practices over the typical 
share investment cycle are considered (as variables forming the basis of the listed 
possible treatments). It was predicted that individual investors are likely to take 
some of aspects of corporate governance into account in the forms of (i) 
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firm-specific investment criteria, (ii) general investment criteria, (iii) concerns 
requiring continuous monitoring/active participation and (iv) investment criteria 
under differing general circumstances.  
 
Subsequently, each identified governance-related behaviour/tendency/treatment 
is made sense of by considering (i) the various environmental (contextual) 
influences that investors are being subjected to and (ii) investors‘ personal 
investment-related preferences/stylistics. These factors are derived from further 
reviews of relevant literature streams (for example, (i) behavioural finance, (ii) 
political and economic history, (iii) institutional complementarities, path 
dependence and contextual governance streams, amongst others). It is argued 
that these environmental and personal attributes are likely to profoundly influence 
individual investors‘ propensities to consider governance and/or undertake each of 
the actions/exhibit each of the tendencies considered. Selected variables are 
briefly re-iterated below. 
 
In terms of the environmental and institutional factors potentially explaining the 
observed individual investor tendencies/actions, they include (i) substantial 
political involvement in business and relationship-based business culture, (ii) the 
country‘s general political environment, (iii) race and ethnic-based distinctiveness 
and, (iv) effectiveness of corporate governance enforcement and/or reforms.  
 
As for investors‘ personal attributes, the potentially relevant ones are inclusive of 
the (i) primary investment strategies pursued, (ii) main investment objectives/ 
motivations, (iii) amount of financial knowledge/expertise, (iv) typical shareholding 
timeframes and, (v) susceptibility to rumour-driven and attention-based trading.  
 
The study also aimed to uncover all yet-to-be-documented, potentially important 
underlying motivations for all identified governance-related behavioural tendencies 
by approaching the individual investors on a firsthand basis through the use of 
semi-structured interviews. The conceptual framework developed by the 
researcher which integrates the many elements of the study is given below: 
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Figure 8.1 Conceptual Framework of Study 
 
The Malaysian Governance Institutional, Cultural and Political Environment 
 
. 
                                                 The Share          Investment Cycle 
 
Stage 1: 
Pre-Purchase 
 
Stage 2: 
Post-Purchase 
 
Stage 3: 
Exit/Sell Off 
 
Stage 4: 
Post-Investment 
 
Individual Investors’ Propensities to Consider Governance and/or Undertake 
Governance-related Actions/Initiatives 
 
 
 
Investors’ Personal Attributes 
Motivations/Objectives/Preferences/Stylistics 
. 
 
 
8.3  Revisiting of Research Objectives 
 
At this point, the study provides a brief summary of its primary research objectives 
and points out the specific chapters where each was addressed. The achievement 
of these aims and objectives is essential in providing a suitable and also adequate 
response to the research questions posed. They are as follows: 
 
 To review the different literature streams that are relevant to the study such 
as corporate governance, individual investor behaviour, path dependence/ 
institutional complementarities, economic and political history (elaborated 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4); 
 To examine the Malaysian institutional and corporate environment as well 
as certain investment-related cultural norms and subsequently, to gauge 
their influences on the governance-related behavioural tendencies of 
individual investors who operate within this particular context (addressed in 
Chapter 3); 
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 To explore selected investment-related tendencies, preferences and 
stylistics exhibited by individual investors in terms of how each may 
influence each investor‘s relative propensities to consider governance 
and/or undertake certain governance-related actions (addressed in 
Chapter 4); 
 To carry out a pragmatic, sequential mixed methods procedure in order to 
obtain the necessary data for the study (described in Chapter 5); 
 To explore, analyse and report the various investment-related 
demographic attributes, psychological tendencies and investment-related 
preferences/stylistics of individual investors (dealt with in Chapter 6); 
 To analyse, uncover and report the interplay between individual attributes 
and also the national institutional, cultural and corporate environment in 
terms of how each may affect investors‘ governance-related behavioural 
tendencies (dealt with in Chapter 7); 
 To synthesise and also draw conclusions regarding the interplay between 
individual investors and corporate governance (presented in Chapter 8).  
 
 
8.4  Research Methodology 
 
The study is informed by the philosophy of pragmatism. It is argued that the 
research is on certain kinds of actions in a certain context (i.e. the ordinary 
situations and conditions in which actions occur) (Thayer, 1968, as cited in Crotty, 
2003). In this regard, the study explores the governance-related behavioural 
tendencies of individual investors within the Malaysian capital market taking into 
account major attributes of the Malaysian institutional and investment 
environment. 
 
As pragmatists place emphasis on practicality of research (Lewis-Beck et al., 
2004), understanding of the phenomenon of governance as it is being practiced is 
achieved by considering it from the standpoint of individual investors (viewpoint of 
the actor). Furthermore, the researcher accepts the perceptions and meanings 
offered by respondents at face value (the subjective meaning actors impute to their 
actions) (Mitchell, 1977, as summarised by Crotty, 2003). This is because such 
perceptions/understanding (i.e. of meanings) are argued to result in a set of 
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governance-related behavioural tendencies that fairly reflect such views/ 
comprehension. 
 
Essentially, the study made use of a two-stage, sequential mixed methods 
procedure where individual investors are interviewed to uncover the key issues/ 
tendencies/actions and the underlying motivations for each. Subsequently, a 
questionnaire based on the obtained feedback was distributed to explore the 
indicative prevalence of each potentially important tendency/action/motivation 
identified.  
 
Rather than sophisticated statistical models, simple contingency tables and 
cross-tabulations enriched by extracts of investors' firsthand accounts of the 
governance phenomenon are utilised, partly to enable easier dissemination to the 
wider investing public. Such attempts to improve investment knowledge and actual 
practice are consistent with the study‘s pragmatic philosophy.  
 
 
8.5  Key Empirical Findings and Analyses 
 
The study found that a sizeable majority of sampled investors are aware and/or are 
opinionated with regards to the likely action/motivations of key market participants. 
Most reported perceptions are found to be negative on balance, that other market 
participants are inclined towards harbouring intentions and undertaking action that 
are detrimental to their welfare/interests.  
 
The suppressive Malaysian political environment, pervasive political involvement 
in public-listed firms (as documented by Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Verma, 2004; 
Searle, 1999; Crouch, 1996; Wang, 1998; amongst others) and also 
relationship-based business culture that benefit politically well-connected, 
powerful vested interests such as majority shareholder/managers with minimal 
sanctions (La Porta et al., 2000) are posited to be major perception-influencing 
factors. The study can thus conclude that investors‘ unfavourable opinions seem 
reasonable and well-entrenched.  
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Even so, most individual investors do not adequately account for the governance 
concerns that they report being aware of in their share investment decisions/ 
action203. Put simply, they typically do not adopt any circumventive or mitigating 
measures. One exception is that around half of respondents report only investing 
in firms that are well-run204.This led the study to conclude that many individual 
investors in Malaysia are credulous (along the lines of Daniel et al., 2002).  
 
The study then explored the importance of governance to individual investors in a 
more firm-specific context (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). It was found that most 
individual investors do take governance into account when proxied by the (i) 
abilities and qualifications of company managers/directors, (ii) quality and speed of 
information disclosure and, (iii) degree of transparency and accountability shown 
by managers. These governance-related variables are mainly utilised as one-off 
share investment criteria during the pre-purchase evaluation stage of the 
investment cycle. They form the basis of investors‘ evaluations that subsequently 
lead to general governance-related treatments such as to (i) avoid investing in 
poorly-governed firms and/or (ii) only invest in well-governed ones.  
 
When evaluated along the dimensions above, the study found that firm 
governance does matter to most individual investors at least some of the time but 
not very much on average (implying slight/secondary importance).This leads the 
study to conclude that, as predicted earlier, corporate governance does feature in 
many individual investors‘ investment considerations through more passive, less 
costly ways compared to active monitoring (a possibility proposed by Giannetti and 
Simonov, 2006). 
 
As for governance featuring in the form of concerns requiring continual 
monitoring205 (as described by Gillan and Starks, 1998 and Becht et al., 2003), it 
was found that the percentage of investors who reported having undertaken 
                                                 
203
 This is based on the study‘s earlier contention that investors‘ concerns regarding the 
various governance environmental and institutional attributes that are distinct to Malaysia 
are reflected in their opinions of the various actions/motivations of other key market 
participants.  
204 In this instance, the term ―well run‖ is taken to mean ―well governed‖. Even this criterion 
is a qualified one from a governance perspective as investors are actually more concerned 
with performance rather than governance per se. More explanation will be provided later in 
the section. 
205
 Primarily the form governance features in at the second stage of the typical investment 
cycle (post-purchase). 
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proactive governance actions is very small. In fact, most respondents regard such 
initiatives as either (i) being too costly and time consuming or (ii) irrelevant to their 
investment style.  
 
Widespread passivity in governance is partly explained by investors‘ general 
disposition toward short-term share price increases (being the most popular 
investment objective) and the resultant short shareholding timeframes. With about 
seven out of ten investors reporting average shareholding periods of one year or 
less, even if they exercise their ownership rights or campaign for good governance, 
these investors would have sold out long before any benefits or changes could 
materialise 206 . Proactive governance is therefore simply irrelevant to these 
short-term investors.  
 
A key finding of the study is that even for many of those seemingly proactive 
investors who undertook ―governance-related‖ actions, it was for reasons that are 
unrelated to governance. For example, many of these ―active‖ investors attend 
AGMs just for the free food/gifts that these firms offer and some attend at the 
insistence of their employers mainly to second any resolutions proposed by 
corporate managers without question. Other forms of activism besides AGM 
attendance are even rarer. Hence, another conclusion reached is that few 
individual investors regard, and/or consider, governance as a concern requiring 
continual effort and monitoring. Having said that, the fact that 3% of the total 
number of individual investors sampled has attended AGMs to exercise their 
ownership rights adds credibility to the study‘s claim that individual investors 
can/do have an important governance role to play and should not be ignored by 
academics in the field of corporate governance. 
 
Contrary to contentions that most investors in developing capital markets such as 
Malaysia lack knowledge or are uninformed when it comes to corporate 
governance as well as do not know their basic ownership rights (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Low, 2004), only 3% of respondents report being unaware of their 
right to attend AGMs. Furthermore, only about one in every six investors is unsure 
of what to say or do during AGMs. This led the study to conclude that the 1997 
Asian Crisis and subsequent governance reforms, investor education programmes 
                                                 
206
 Since the benefits of good governance are agued to manifest and also be sustained 
over the long-term. 
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as well as extensive press coverage of the many incidences of corporate 
frauds/scandals in Malaysia and around the world have indeed improved investors‘ 
general knowledge of major corporate governance issues and awareness of their 
basic ownership rights.  
 
Second, the academic utilitarian agency perspective description of individual 
investor behaviour/motivation seems persuasive after all (as propounded by 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is because, besides the pervasive ―too costly 
and time consuming‖ justification for their passivity in governance, even previously 
unknown motivations such as taking advantage of free food/gifts point to 
economics-based considerations, albeit being rather misguided ones. Weber‘s 
(1949) (as cited by Crotty, 2003) argument that rational goal-oriented products are 
driven by dominant imperatives is well supported by the evidence at hand. 
 
The study can also conclude that investors‘ propensities for governance typically 
decrease the more they engage in rumour or speculation-fuelled investments 
which focus mostly on share price fluctuations. This runs counter to governance 
ideals of making decisions based on firm fundamentals and substantiated 
information. In addition, attention-grabbing speculations/rumours also trigger 
impulsive buy and sell investment decisions (as discovered by Barber and Odean, 
2006) thus promoting short-termism. On the contrary, governance proponents 
encourage long-term stable shareholdings. Hence, these are seen as 
―distractions‖ from the governance standpoint.  
 
Investors also reported heightened propensities to sell out as a result of 
unsubstantiated rumours predicting an imminent fall in share prices, deterioration 
of company fundamentals as well as due to irrational emotions, even at the 
expense of potential longer-term value arising from a well-governed firm. This 
lends good support to the investor irrationality view adopted by behavioural finance 
(see, for example, Daniel et al., 2002 and Subrahmanyam, 2007). In addition, 
individual investors in Malaysia typically lack investment sophistication, as 
indicated by the finding that approximately seven out of ten of them pursue 
heuristically simplified investment strategies. 
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Another important conclusion is that investors are actually much more concerned 
with corporate performance rather than corporate governance per se (as explained 
by Gillan and Starks, 1998). Put simply, these investors view governance as 
factors that lead to improved corporate performance and less as being the proper 
structures and processes to run publicly-listed firms in an appropriate manner. This 
is evident in the importance attached to the three firm-specific governance-related 
factors mentioned earlier as they are important elements that directly impact 
corporate performance and also investors‘ ability to make timely investment 
decisions. More importantly, some investors are of the opinion that as long as their 
investments are profitable, the actual manner in which a firm is actually run is of 
lesser concern. 
 
Further supporting evidence is the finding that some investors report even being 
able to tolerate corporate abuses such as managerial expropriation as long as they 
are making good returns and/or when corporate performance is satisfactory. 
However, some of them will question the absence of good governance when things 
go wrong. Most also prefer to sell out whenever governance problems arise rather 
than campaign for better governance or seek redress. Therefore, in conclusion, 
individual investors in Malaysia are indeed myopic (as per Keasey et al., 2005) and 
seem to prefer the ―perform or explain/abandon‖ approach when it comes to firm 
performance and/or governance problems. 
 
Next, the propensities of individual investors in Malaysia to consider governance 
and/or undertake governance-related actions are also partly influenced by certain 
different general investment circumstances. In this regard, the study found that 
governance starts to matter/matter more for some investors when (i) the stock 
market is on a bearish/declining trend, (ii) the country‘s economic conditions is 
deteriorating and (iii) when public-listed company fraud happens often.  
 
On a more firm-specific basis, some investors are also more likely to engage in 
proactive governance when a firm that they invest in is embroiled with massive 
fraud/scandal (that was portrayed to subsequently result in significant destruction 
of shareholder value or huge investment losses borne by these investors), 
presumably to demand accountability and seek redress.  
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The general propensities to take proactive and/or redress initiatives are found to be 
significantly influenced by the ethnic background of individual investors involved 
(vindicating Pye‘s, 1985 description of Malaysian investors‘ distinctive ethnic 
characteristics). Specifically, ethnic Chinese investors possess much greater 
latent potential for undertaking proactive governance initiatives compared to ethnic 
Malay investors. 
 
In addition, based on investors‘ subsequent responses to the said hypothetical 
scenario where governance concerns are acute, most investors choose not to take 
formal/official redress actions due to:  
(i) lack of governance-related experiences, knowledge and norms such as 
attending AGMs or involvement in activist-related initiatives,  
(ii) the expectation that no concrete actions will be taken or they may even be 
ignored by the authorities/corporate management even if they protest or 
lodge formal complaints,  
(iii) real and perceived cultural and psychological barriers (which includes 
ethnic-based norms) and/or,  
(iv) irrational reasoning/emotions. For example, blaming involvement on sheer 
bad luck.  
 
Consistent with the responses above, most investors opt to take no formal action 
even though an overwhelming majority of them found such a situation intolerable 
privately. This also improves our understanding of general investor passivity in 
proactive governance under normal circumstances at the second stage of the 
typical share investment cycle. 
 
The study concludes that individual investors‘ general passivity, rather than being 
a consequence of being wholly disinterested in or indifferent of governance in the 
first instance, are also partly due to conscious/considered decisions (i.e. having 
considered perceived or actual governance constraints). Such a finding is 
consistent with the earlier observation that many investors are aware of certain (i) 
country-specific environmental and institutional governance concerns/ constraints 
and (ii) basic ownership rights such as attending AGMs but yet choose to remain 
passive. 
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In addition, investors seem to be able to discern between truly effective reforms as 
opposed to window dressing measures. In this particular sense, they are more 
sophisticated than previously envisaged (in a common-sense manner) while at the 
same time remaining largely credulous and unsophisticated in their other share 
investment practices.  
 
A majority of individual investors are influenced by and also engage in differing 
degrees of speculative, rumour-driven share investments. Most adopt relatively 
short-term investment timeframes on average and are primarily in the market to 
make quick profits (as evidenced by their focus on corporate performance and 
investment returns). 
 
As predicted by the study, whether or not an investor considers a firm‘s 
governance characteristics is also found to be considerably dependent upon the 
natures of their chosen investment strategies. In this regard, the researcher found 
that those who opt for fundamentals-based, combination-based and 
reputation-based strategies are more inclined to consider governance and/or 
undertake governance-related actions.  
 
Overall, primary investment strategies are fairly good indicative/anchor variables in 
predicting investors‘ general governance-related tendencies over the entire share 
investment cycle.  
 
 
8.6  Original Contributions to Knowledge and Practice 
8.6.1  Contributions to Academic Understanding and Theory 
 
The study contributes to knowledge by improving current understanding of the 
range of governance-related behaviours/tendencies that are specific to individual 
investors, a subgroup of investors that has been ignored by past empirical 
corporate governance studies (with the exception of Strickland et al., 1996). This 
focus is vindicated by the study‘s findings that certain aspects of governance do 
feature in the actual investment practices of many individual investors.  
 
337 
 
More specifically, even though most individual investors are not involved in 
activism-style governance-related behaviours, some investors are shown to take 
corporate governance into account in their investment decision-making in ways 
that are less costly, mainly in the form of pre-investment evaluation criteria. 
Therefore, individual investors can and actually do play a role in governance by 
discerning between well- and poorly-governed firms along a few company-specific 
dimensions (as defined by the investors themselves) when making investments. 
Put simply, individual investors have a part to play in promoting better corporate 
governance primarily through more passive, less ―active‖ ways. 
 
The study also makes a distinct contribution by exploring and affirming the general 
validity of certain agency theory assumptions in a developing capital market setting. 
In particular, the self-interested motives of economic agents such as corporate 
managers and also individual investors are clearly detected in Malaysia. Even 
though some individual investors do undertake certain proactive governance- 
related initiatives which run contrary to the predictions of the academic utilitarian 
perspective such as attending AGMs, they are certainly rare exceptions to the rule.  
 
A closely related addition to knowledge made by the study is the discovery of new 
justifications/motivations for undertaking initiatives that are typically interpreted to 
be governance-related, especially those reasons that are found to be unrelated to 
governance in reality. Investors attending AGMs to get free food/gifts is one such 
example. Interestingly, no amount of theoretical predictions and statistical 
modelling could reasonably have unearthed such factors and their indicative 
prevalence amongst investors. 
 
A key finding presented earlier was the discovery that most individual investors 
seem to be aware and/or opinionated with regards to the major governance 
concerns/issues within their investment environment. Furthermore, a notable part 
of their passivity in governance is caused by indifference, a lack of confidence in 
the effectiveness of governance enforcement, cultural norms and/or other 
governance-related constraints. In addition, investors seem to be able to see 
through reforms that are merely window dressing/cosmetic measures.  
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The original contribution to knowledge made above is the realisation that instead of 
being wholly disinterested, indifferent and uninformed when it comes to corporate 
governance in the first place, individual investors‘ non-participation/ passivity are 
also due to the consequences of (i) understanding of their limitations of being very 
small shareholders (for example, insignificant voting clout), (ii) a lack of confidence 
in the effectiveness of the country‘s political and corporate governance systems 
and (iii) the impact of certain institutional constraints such as political involvement 
in business which protect powerful majority shareholder/ owners from sanctions. 
This is a contribution as it shows that, as a collective group, individual investors are 
somewhat more sophisticated than previously envisaged in this narrow sense. 
This is because the study also considered the counterargument that their 
understanding of governance is in a broad, generalised, common-sense and 
intuitive manner. 
 
Improvements to understanding are also derived by being the first governance- 
focused individual investor study that takes into account both environmental and 
personal influences concurrently in order to make sense of investors‘ governance- 
related behavioural tendencies. Essentially, investors‘ behaviours/tendencies 
have been clearly shown to be distinctive, rational outgrowths of (i) the investment 
environment and context within which they operate and (ii) their individual 
investment preferences/stylistics207.  
 
Further contribution to knowledge is also achieved by the study‘s very own 
distinctive approach in attempting to view and also interpret the many individual 
investor behaviours/tendencies from a unifying perspective, that of corporate 
governance. Even though previous studies did take into account a number of 
variables at once, they are treated as combinations of somewhat disparate factors. 
Through the use of the governance lens, the study was able to portray investors‘ 
tendencies/actions over the typical share investment cycle as interlinked, 
integrated sets of behaviours. This provides better insights into the progressive, 
underlying logic of investors‘ actions across the entire cycle.  
                                                 
207
 As compared to the traditional ―rational economic agent‖ view that assumes investors 
behave in a generic, non context-specific manner. On the other hand, even though 
behavioural finance does focus on non-rational biases and tendencies, the variables that 
this literature stream considers are actually rather generic. Essentially, behavioural finance 
does not investigate context-specific or actual justifications/reasons for observed 
behaviours/tendencies but instead concentrates primarily on the implications of such 
behaviours/tendencies. 
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Closely related to the above, the conceptual framework developed by the 
researcher is another contributory aspect of the study. This is because it explicitly 
establishes the various links between the many individual (internal) and 
environmental (external) variables and behavioural tendencies of individual 
investors throughout the entire share investment cycle. Clearly, most of the 
environmental and institutional variables considered are country-specific.  
 
The specificity above leads to yet another extension to knowledge, that is, in 
demonstrating that the governance-related behavioural tendencies and 
inclinations of investors are not only distinct between countries but even within a 
particular country. This is because a number of distinctive sets of behavioural 
tendencies are found to exist within Malaysia itself. This runs counter to the 
conventional assumption that investors behave in a rational and generic manner 
largely free of context.  
 
The findings that (i) some investors tailor their investment practices to account for 
country-specific governance constraints and (ii) their behavioural inclinations are 
partly influenced by personal demographic characteristics such as ethnic 
background, lend good support to the contention above. A fitting illustration is the 
significantly higher latent potential of ethnic-Chinese investors in undertaking 
proactive governance as compared to ethnic-Malay investors. Such findings 
vindicate Kim and Nofsinger‘s (2003) call to explore the behaviours of investors 
from cultures that are distinct from the West. Distinctiveness also stems from the 
differing investment circumstances facing different investors at particular points in 
time. 
 
More generally, various first-hand accounts of investors‘ departures from 
rationality and inherent emotional/psychological biases also contribute to better 
understanding of certain phenomena that is are interest to scholars within the 
behavioural finance tradition. Also, instead of mainly focusing on investors‘ buy 
and sell decision frameworks, researchers in the behavioural finance tradition 
should take into account investors‘ motivations, stylistics and preferences. 
 
Considering the many contributions above, the study generally adds to knowledge 
by actually designing a study to demonstrate empirically the aptness of the 
arguments and recommendations by authors such as Daily et al. (2003), 
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Gabrielsson and Huse (2004), Huse (2005), Aguilera and Jackson (2003), 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2005), amongst others; of the need to view governance in a 
path-dependent, contextualised, holistic and embedded manner while retaining the 
principal-agency relationship as the core (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005).  
 
From the new insights obtained by the current study, it is clear that such new 
approaches to empirical governance research (i) are able to deepen our 
understanding of how governance actually works/features in reality rather than just 
depending on theoretical conceptions and explanations and (ii) are shown to be 
promising new avenues for future governance research. Further elaboration is 
given in the following section on the study‘s contribution to research methodology.  
 
In terms of the analytical framework developed by Brennan and Solomon (2008) 
intended to guide governance researchers to new frontiers of research within the 
field, this study contributes to the areas of (i) new methodological approach and 
techniques applied (mixed methods), (ii) globalisation (developing economy study 
and also exploration of the influence of culture), and (iii) theoretical framework (that 
includes both environmental/institutional factors as well as investors‘ individual 
characteristics). 
 
 
8.6.2  Contributions to Research Methodology  
 
Viewed from a methodological angle, the study contributes to knowledge by 
heeding the calls by Daily et al. (2003), Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) and Huse 
(2005) to adopt new methodological approaches in governance research and by 
empirically showing (i) that the assumptions regarding investors‘ motivations for 
exhibiting certain behavioural tendencies provided by previous studies relying on 
statistical models and/or aggregated market data are far abstracted from reality, (ii) 
that there are indeed important variables that those statistical models fail to identify 
and (iii) the empirical benefits of approaching individual investors on a first-hand 
basis.  
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In particular, the study‘s findings show the advantages (in terms of insights gained) 
of conducting a governance study in the pragmatic tradition emphasising 
appreciation of governance (i) as it is being practised and (ii) from the standpoint of 
the practitioners themselves. Indeed, the study has shown that to better 
understand the governance phenomenon, it is crucial for academics and 
regulators to not only take into account observed individual investor actions but 
more so their underlying motivations for exhibiting such behaviours.  
 
In addition, it demonstrates the advantages of pragmatic research where flexibility 
is key in coming up with the best research designs (as conceived by the researcher) 
to address the particular research questions posed. Hence, a related contribution 
is the study‘s use of a two-stage, sequential mixed methods procedure to address 
the questions pertaining to individual investors‘ corporate governance inclinations 
and practices.  
 
It must be noted, however, that as the nature of the current study is exploratory and 
broad-based, extensive future empirical work is required to understand each of the 
various phenomena, trends and key findings in a more detailed manner. 
 
 
8.6.3  Contributions to Practice 
 
Some of the study‘s findings entail certain practical implications and thus, 
contributions, to actual governance-related practices/initiatives of practitioners and 
policymakers.  
 
First, the study showed that Malaysian policymakers‘ expectations that individual 
investors can be encouraged to be proactive, while not wholly unreasonable, are 
rather misplaced (at this stage). Perhaps, this is simply a sign that a culture of 
active shareholding is still in its infancy.The important contribution to practice, 
however, is the fact that governance is taken into account by a proportion of 
individual investors in a number of less costly, harder to observe, ways.  
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This also suggests that the Malaysian government and capital market regulators 
can and should, for now (i.e. at this stage), encourage more individual investors to 
play a role in governance by making their investment decisions 
governance-influenced rather than concentrating on promoting more proactive, 
expensive forms of shareholder activism.  
 
Once a sizeable proportion of individual investors in Malaysia become more aware, 
knowledgeable and also experienced in taking into account corporate governance, 
the active shareholding culture can then be cultivated more easily. Indeed, Allen 
(2000: 8) argued that “and as small shareholders become more aware of their 
rights, they may... form investor action groups and publicize their activities (as 
some in Korea do already). These ideas may seem radical today, but could 
become commonplace tomorrow”.  
 
Even so, for now, the establishment of cost effective, easily understandable and 
widely available firm-specific governance-related sources of information merits 
consideration. Considering this suggestion, in terms of effective strategies to 
promote corporate governance amongst the individual investor group, the study‘s 
findings vindicate the Malaysian government‘s move to establish the independent 
Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG). This is because individual 
investors can make use and take advantage of MSWG‘s regular write-ups and 
summaries of governance issues and also material developments specific to many 
Malaysian publicly-listed firms (especially pre-AGMs, mainly to highlight 
substantive governance concerns) to be more informed (For a detailed description 
of MSWG‘s various initiatives/services/activities that are targeted at individual 
investors, please refer to Appendix 3).  
 
Moreover, investor education programmes, especially those conducted by the 
Securities Commission (mainly through the Securities Industry Development 
Centre) and MSWG, are seen to be good complements as better educated 
investors should demonstrate better understanding and appreciation of the 
different governance issues being raised. In short, the policy is suitable for 
Malaysia as it aims to enhance the general sophistication of the individual investor 
group. The need for such initiatives is also well reflected by the indicative tendency 
where seven out of ten individual investors make use of heuristically-simplified 
investment strategies. 
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Investors can also opt to become members (or, more specifically, fee-paying 
subscribers) of the MSWG to:  
(i) gain access to much relevant governance-related information and ratings 
pertaining to Malaysian publicly-listed firms and  
(ii) be informed of any significant governance concerns relating to any 
publicly-listed firms that they partly own (being a watchdog, the MSWG is 
able to alert investors to any significant lapses in governance, as and when 
such issues arise).  
 
Put simply, the study contends that the MSWG indeed provides (i) a suitable 
platform to increase investors‘ interest and attention on various corporate 
governance issues and, (ii) a practical, cost effective governance monitoring and 
sounding mechanism for individual shareholders. Furthermore, investors are 
better able to participate in relatively costly activism-related initiatives, if not during 
normal times then, when governance problems are acute (since they are being 
alerted/advised of such a need beforehand).  
 
Even for the majority of investors who are not likely to engage in proactive 
governance activism, increased awareness of governance and also the wealth of 
governance information available at little cost are argued to be able to considerably 
increase the likelihood of them considering the corporate governance aspects of 
the firms that they invest in. Again, investor education programmes generally 
support such developments. 
 
For individual investors who are more proactive, since representatives of MSWG 
do attend and speak up during the AGMs of many such firms both as shareholders 
or representatives/proxies of shareholders, these investors could lend support and, 
at the same time, be guided and encouraged to participate more actively during 
these meetings. It has been noted that most attending investors do not speak up 
during AGMs or find those who do a hassle but a culture of active shareholding can 
only be fostered through time and with much perseverance and effort. Even for 
individual investors who do not attend, their collective welfare will also be better 
championed by the attending ones as a result of such an initiative. 
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As shown by cases such as the United Shareholders Association (Strickland et al., 
1996) and Securities Investors Association (Singapore) (Pulses, 2006), monitoring 
by small individual investors is indeed possible and, if developed in the right ways 
and given the right ingredients, can be fairly successful. Once again, individual 
investors can play a significant role in corporate governance. 
 
Another one of the study‘s contributions to practice is mainly to draw attention and 
emphasis to the importance of:  
(i) ensuring that governance reforms are both rigorous and  practically 
effective, especially given the fact that investors seem to be able to see 
through window dressing measures,  
(ii) strong political will for real improvements since substantive reforms are 
closely linked to political reforms, and  
(iii) the government assuming a leading role in promoting governance and also 
undertaking public enforcement since private enforcement, by itself, is 
mostly inadequate to impose corporate discipline.  
 
Closely related to the factors summarised above is the key finding that a bigger 
proportion of individual investors would seriously consider corporate governance in 
their share investment if only they had more confidence in the actual effectiveness 
of its various mechanisms in the Malaysian capital market. This suggests that 
individual investors can and will play a role in governance if they are sufficiently 
confident in both country-level and firm-level governance institutions and 
mechanisms. 
 
As for the individual investors themselves, the study is practically useful in terms of 
increasing these investors‘ understanding of their own governance-related 
behavioural tendencies and practices. A key lesson is for them to realise and 
address their apparent credulity in claiming/reporting to be aware of general 
governance concerns pertaining to the firms that they invest in but yet, not 
adopting any measures to mitigate or circumvent them. In this sense, many 
individual investors in Malaysia seem to fail to apply adequate prudence and/or do 
not make full use their understanding/skills in their investment decision making.  
 
 
345 
 
Perhaps they are unwilling to spend the time and resources needed to make such 
evaluations. It is hoped that, with greater awareness of the importance of good 
governance and also the potential negative implications of poor governance, such 
credulous norms in investment practice can be changed. Related to this, individual 
investors must also realise the negative implications of engaging in speculation, 
rumour as well as emotionally-driven share investment decision-making. 
 
A further contribution is the study‘s findings that ethnic-Chinese investors have a 
greater latent potential for proactive governance (especially in seeking redress 
post-exploitation) as this suggests that certain subgroups of individual 
shareholders/investors can be targeted to lead the intended cultural/habitual 
changes necessary for the practice of shareholder activism to become more 
mainstream. More generally, this finding clearly demonstrates the fact that cultural 
considerations are central to the understanding, and in itself is an integral part, of 
any system of corporate governance. 
 
Overall, the various contributions point to the suitability of the pragmatic approach 
in (i) better appreciation of the phenomena of corporate governance as it is 
understood and practised by investors themselves and (ii) discovering which of the 
public policies adopted are more effective practically and/or have aims that 
complement other effective initiatives to advance corporate governance.   
 
In the course of conducting this research, the study found that ―corporate 
governance‖ is indeed a highly complex, all-encompassing yet elusive and 
hard-to-define concept. The intention was very much to delve into and unravel 
certain components of this complex phenomenon holistically in order to shed some 
light on how (and also, why) it features in reality. Here, the researcher posits that it 
is important to explicitly acknowledge the complexity of researching corporate 
governance. Even though the study has made certain contributions to our 
understanding, investigating the many different aspects of the phenomenon in real 
life remains difficult and much ambiguity persist. At the very least, this exploratory 
attempt has clearly demonstrated the sheer amount of future research that is still 
required in this subject area.  
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8.7  Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future 
Research 
 
One of the limitations of the study mentioned towards the end of Chapter 5 is the 
lack of access to investors‘ buy/sell transactions history. Such a data set could 
significantly increase the credibility and also reliability of the inferences made by 
the study. As such, future studies should endeavour to obtain such information 
besides negotiating direct access to the individual investors themselves. One 
possibility is to conduct the studies in countries, regions and/or jurisdictions that 
allow access to retail client records/information. 
 
Another one of the study‘s limitations is that the researcher was not able to carry 
out a systematic sampling procedure and also only certain/select branches of 
different   local brokerages actually participated in the main data collection stage. 
The design and also size of the study‘s sample is partly due to the limited amount 
of resources available, especially time and cost constraints. Even though the study 
did attempt to address a number of potential and likely biases, better access and 
fuller participation could have improved the quality of findings of the study as well 
as increased the overall number of participants.  
 
Since the study has initiated preliminary exploration of the various governance- 
related tendencies and inclinations of individual investors across the entire share 
investment cycle, future studies could focus on specific governance treatments, 
aspects and/or stages of the cycle for more in-depth empirical scrutiny. Hence, 
instead of broad-based understanding of each behaviour/tendency within a set of 
related tendencies/action, the finer nuances for each could be explored in detail.  
 
Future studies could also be an expanded version of the current one, perhaps with 
a much bigger individual investor sample to reaffirm the study‘s many findings and 
interpretations. Alternatively, they could repeat the researcher‗s methodological 
procedures for group(s) of investors based in another country or region (thus 
enabling out-of-sample comparisons). This would undoubtedly produce result sets 
that offer new insights and understanding since differing contexts are like to result 
in unique sets of behaviours/tendencies. 
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Governance researchers could also extend the study to other investor groups such 
as institutional investors in order to compare their investment inclinations and 
tendencies with those of individual investors. Another possibility is to make sense 
of the tendencies/action of other key market participants using a similar approach 
rather than only focusing on shareholders/investors. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Case 1: Transmile. 
 
 
MSWG Comments on Securities Commission (SC) Charges on Three Former 
Executives at Transmile. 
16 July 2007  
 
SC has matched its words with deeds. We congratulate SC on its swift action in charging 
three former executives of Transmile for abetting Transmile in making misleading 
statements.  
 
SC also offered compounds of RM500,000 each to two Independent Non-Executive 
Directors of Transmile who are also members of the Audit Committee for knowingly 
permitting the making of misleading statements to Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.  
 
Those who are would-be perpetrators or are prone to wrongdoings, should now take heed 
to expect tougher regulatory controls and swift enforcement as a result of all the recent 
scandals that have sprung up with surprises to many investors‘ dismay and 
disappointment.  
 
It is the view of MSWG that no one single company worth the mantle of true and fair 
performance will be making the headlines next for all the wrong accounting reasons.  
 
SC‘s swift actions demonstrated that it will come down quickly on transgressors and will not 
tolerate abuses from market players. Nevertheless MSWG urges that other gatekeepers, 
such as management, external auditors, internal auditors and shareholders must continue 
to play their respective roles effectively to protect and enhance the credibility of our capital 
market.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
 
Dated: 16 July 2007 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
 
 
 
MSWG Comments on Securities Commission (SC) Charges on Three Former 
Executives at Transmile. 
16 July 2006  
 
SC has matched its words with deeds. We congratulate SC on its swift action in charging 
three former executives of Transmile for abetting Transmile in making misleading 
statements.  
 
SC also offered compounds of RM500,000 each to two Independent Non-Executive 
Directors of Transmile who are also members of the Audit Committee for knowingly 
permitting the making of misleading statements to Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.  
 
Those who are would-be perpetrators or are prone to wrongdoings, should now take heed 
to expect tougher regulatory controls and swift enforcement as a result of all the recent 
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scandals that have sprung up with surprises to many investors‘ dismay and 
disappointment.  
 
It is the view of MSWG that no one single company worth the mantle of true and fair 
performance will be making the headlines next for all the wrong accounting reasons.  
 
SC‘s swift actions demonstrated that it will come down quickly on transgressors and will not 
tolerate abuses from market players. Nevertheless MSWG urges that other gatekeepers, 
such as management, external auditors, internal auditors and shareholders must continue 
to play their respective roles effectively to protect and enhance the credibility of our capital 
market.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
 
Dated: 16 July 2006 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
 
 
 
Transmile Fiasco: MSWG Intrigued By Deloitte Statements. 
26 July 2007  
 
―SHAREHOLDERS, WAKE UP AND UNITE TO DEMAND ANSWERS TO 
MISMANAGEMENT OF THE COMPANY‘S AFFAIRS BY PREVIOUS MANAGEMENT OF 
MP TECH‖  
 
MSWG is intrigued by the press statements attributed to Mr Chaly Mah, who is both Senior 
Partner of Deloitte Singapore and head of Deloitte Asia-Pacific, in which he defends the 
work of Deloitte Malaysia in the audit of Transmile.  
 
Whilst some of Mr Mah‘s points are well considered, Deloitte has not appropriately 
addressed the importance of auditing and that poor auditing can hide flaws that have the 
potential to bring a company to its knees. The market confidence has been marred by these 
scandals. Companies, directors and auditors need to work diligently to make sure that their 
books are accurate and audits are conducted with due skill and care. Anything short of this 
requires swift and effective actions, not from someone outside Malaysia telling us that we 
are going through ―the process of growing up‖. Let‘s not forget what happened in Barings 
and China Aviation Oil. Unless Mr Mah has found Harry Potter‘s magic wand, it will take 
more than statements to explain the firm‘s Transmile situation.  
 
It is good that Deloitte should speak up. We would however have preferred to see the 
Deloitte senior partner in Malaysia clarify the matter. He is close to the situation. He could 
have put more thoughts and needs on issues surrounding improving financial reporting and 
audit quality. All too often, this has not been addressed head-on: QUALITY.  
 
Quality is the hallmark of an auditors‘ trade and competence/integrity. With a number of 
‗strikes‘ involving Deloitte including Transmile, Nasioncom and Pasaraya Hiong Kong, isn‘t 
the market justified in being wary of the firm‘s practical commitment to quality?  
 
In practical terms, a commitment to quality means huge investments in dollars and cents: 
flying in trainers, and flying out trainees; people seconded to overseas etc in numbers; 
independent quality reviews which can make or break careers; investment beyond 
technical training to develop industry skills; investment in specialist technical and 
methodology teams who do no client-facing work; and yes disciplined partners. In short, 
any audit firm which has not changed beyond recognition in the last 10 years has not got its 
quality under control.  
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All the major audit firms must realise that they often confer a certain amount of 
respectability on their clients by their very presence. Like it or not, less diligent analysts and 
shareholders continue to do less due diligence of their own if a major firm is on the job. 
Therefore, these firms must be careful, especially whilst integrity levels amongst certain of 
our businessmen seem to remain at ‗developmental‘ levels. They must be careful to 
choose their clients carefully, and to charge the fees which allow them to do excellent work. 
If the fee is too small, then market-watchers need to beware.  
 
Mr Mah really should not lecture ―countries like Malaysia‖ that we place too much emphasis 
on the duties of auditors and not enough on the Directors. Anyone who has studied the 
matter will be aware that Malaysian laws and regulations are very similar to those of the UK 
and Singapore in this respect, and place the primary responsibility for the running of 
companies and for the accounts on the Directors. He should also be aware that several 
Directors/Senior Management of Transmile have been charged by our Securities 
Commission. Our Code of Corporate Governance is similar to that of Singapore, and has 
been in place a year longer.  
 
It will be very hard for any audit firm to regain the public‘s trust after being associated with 
several bad client episodes. However, it is not impossible.  
 
Instead of waving Harry Potter‘s wand around in a vain attempt to ―magic away‖ the Quality 
issue, we recommend a more serious approach. We would like to suggest that the major 
accounting firms adopt, if they have not done so, a simple 5-Point Plan for Quality:  
1. Call in a Quality Review of all aspects of the firm - not just Audit Quality, but Tax, 
HR, Risk Management, Independence and overall Firmwide Management. The 
benchmarks should be Global standard.  
2. Implement the recommendations in full. Penalise partners and staff who do not 
measure up. The modern accountancy firm is not a collection of individuals doing 
as they please. The partners follow rules and adhere to strict standards, or face the 
consequences.  
3. Import 2 or 3 partners to bring up the day-to-day quality. Staff secondments are 
normal in the large firms. They cost money, but fines and loss of reputation cost 
many times more.  
4. The firms should keep the market abreast of the steps taken. We all know it is a 
journey, but openness will be more believable than denial.  
5. Repeat 1-4 for two years. That should do it.  
 
Harsh? Perhaps, but realistic too. For in MSWG‘s view, it is intriguing to say the least for the 
shareholders of Transmile who have lost many millions resulting from the financial fiasco 
going back a number of years to read the press statements attributed to Mr Mah. The 
current high profile of governance issues/failures governing irregular accounting will not 
necessarily last forever and audit could slip back towards being a commodity service sold 
on price. The profession itself can and should do what it takes to ensure that the value of 
audit judgement is not undervalued.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
 
Dated: 26 July 2007 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my  
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Case 2: KFC Holdings Bhd. 
 
 
 
MSWG Comments On Mandatory Offer for the Control of QSR The Solution to the 
Tussle? 
20 October 2005  
 
The greatest tension between management and shareholders may arise when a company 
is the target of a take-over bid. The rival groups will feel an added tension when they view 
Kulim (Malaysia) Bhd‘s (Kulim) take-over bid to be unfriendly.  
 
The boardroom tussle has come under close scrutiny by various parties including the 
regulators, given that the publicity had generated anxiety, uncertainty or even confusion 
among shareholders not involved.  
 
Kulim‘s mandatory offer ought to be seen as a solution to the long term problems of QSR 
Brands Berhad (QSR) and KFC Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd (KFCH). It is not a smash and 
grab bid undertaken by Kulim for quick financial gain but it is essential to ensure order and 
control for the common good of all stakeholders.  
 
Broadly, Kulim‘s mandatory offer is to provide for the possibility that, after its take-over of 
QSR and KFCH, which would be likely to involve a change of control and direction, certain 
directors or even employees, either in its own view or in that of the companies concerned, 
might not fit into the new organization.  
 
However, questions arise in relation to the fiduciary duties of the directors as such:-  
 
How far incumbent directors could and should do to prevent the take-over bid for QSR?  
 
What is the best course of action and conduct for directors in this particular situation?  
 
Should they enter into some schemes which, in effect, can block the take-over?  
 
Are they obliged to inform shareholders, particularly minority shareholders about the facts 
and let them decide or determine just what they should do?  
 
How far could the directors-shareholders involved in the boardroom tussle interfere or 
meddle with the day-to-day management and the Company‘s affairs while the take-over bid 
is in progress?  
 
To consider whether or not their actions are valid, they would have to look after the 
interests of the company and shareholders as a whole. Their rationale is not only to retain 
control but to justify their intentions in order not to cause the company deteriorate further. It 
is a matter of attitude that is quite different from directors seeking to retain control because 
they think they are better quality directors than their rivals would be.  
 
All their attempts to retain control would test the outer limits of their powers to face the 
take-over bid fairly and squarely. Indeed, it is perhaps important to note that directors need 
to have total regard to the interests of the present and future members of the company on 
the grounds that QSR and KFCH are a going concern.  
 
MSWG is of the view that as Kulim has more than 50 per cent of QSR‘s share capital, it will 
likely make its mandatory offer to be unconditional.  
 
Rival groups and parties in concert may stay put not to accept the offer but will they be able 
to stop the take-over bid? This question will be answered in the coming weeks.  
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Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
 
Dated: 20 October 2005 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
 
 
 
Board Tussle in QSR for Control of KFCH 
Real Minority Shareholders - The Pitiful Lot? 
7 October 2005  
 
The events and meetings taking place between different groups (or parties) to get the 
control of KFCH Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd (KFCH) are so dramatic that shareholders not 
involved are either left in the lurch or confused. The groups are Kulim (Malaysia) Bhd 
(30.64%), Wisdom Innovative Technology Sdn Bhd (20.79%), Eagle Option Sdn Bhd 
(19.73%) and Delta Armada Sdn Bhd (10.24%) in QSR Brands Berhad (QSR).  
 
Each group (or party) has a substantial stake in QSR in a fashion significantly frightening to 
convince one another that a mandatory take-over could be imminent and it might win in the 
race. However, this may or may not be the actual intention. Perhaps, one party might hope 
to persuade another to buy him up with a promise that it would not bid and join the fray for 
KFCH.  
 
The board tussle might lead to a proxy battle between one group and some of its own 
interested shareholders. It may start with some dissident shareholders soliciting proxies in 
order to force a bid for KFCH and to obtain a shareholder resolution for control. In any 
eventuality, a friendly party might appear, willing to offer more for QSR‘s shares or KFCH‘s 
shares than any existing contesting shareholders.  
 
In all cases, the groups (or parties) are minority shareholders who are instrumental in trying 
for control of KFCH via QSR. They are not the first such instances nor will they be the last. 
However, much scepticism is cast on the term ―minority shareholders.‖ Some might 
suggest that the term ―minority shareholders‖ is probably a euphemism for directors‘ 
proxies. One cannot be faulted for concluding that the shareholders who called for the 
meetings were working for some of the directors especially when the main agenda of the 
EGMs were removal of certain other directors.  
 
After all, the real minority shareholders are those with a few lots each and who normally will 
not have the strength or support needed to call for EGMs. On the other hand, can they 
muster enough funds to pay for the EGMs or the frequent visits to the courts especially 
when it involved protracted battles to remove directors. They normally will not have enough 
votes to pass a resolution or a proposal through without the support of major shareholders. 
This move at times may be healthy but at other times, it is not.  
 
One obvious thing has emerged. It gives rise to rather unpleasant thought that the term 
―minority shareholders‖ be bandied about or that their importance be emphasized only 
when it suits some certain parties. Often times, when this happened, the real minority 
shareholders are the ones who really suffer whether for all intents and purposes, from 
actions rival groups or their directors are taking. In the current quagmire of QSR/KFCH 
board tussle, respect for the real minority shareholders is sadly lacking.  
 
Questions then arise. How many companies have minority shareholders represented really 
on their boards? In how many more companies can the votes of minority shareholders be 
enough to determine the way their companies are run ? How many times have there been 
cases when resolutions or proposals are passed through despite vocal opposition from 
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minority shareholders?  
 
Even in cases where only minority shareholders are allowed to vote, skepticism is still 
abound on the sanctity of the voting process with many minority shareholders may not be 
the real minority shareholders but proxies of directors or the extension of some directors‘ 
interests.  
 
In the case of QSR/KFCH board tussle, what is the position of the real minority 
shareholders? The outcome of any board tussle is the need for competent and quality 
directors as this will ensure that both majority and minority shareholders get fair and 
equitable returns on their shareholder value. However, the common factor among many, if 
not most, is the absolute and total control by a few, often acting in concert for the benefit of 
himself or themselves and pushing their wishes irrespective of the views of the real minority 
shareholders or at their expense. The real minority shareholders who do not have 
significant influence among board members, should be consciously aware of this fact. 
These real minority shareholders could be indeed be a pitiful lot!  
 
However, do the real minority shareholders have to be in this position - a pitiful lot? The 
answer is in the negative - a categorical no! The Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
(MSWG), an independent as well as non-profit making organisation and funded by the 
Capital Market Development Fund will continue its level best to enhance shareholder 
activism and protect minority interests.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
 
Dated: 7 October 2005 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
 
 
 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER WATCHDOG GROUP (MSWG) COMMENTS ON TRIAL 
BY THE MEDIA? PUBLIC RELEASE OF PWC REPORT ON KFC HOLDINGS 
(MALAYSIA) BHD 
12 July 2005  
 
KFC Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd (KFCH) had on 11 July 2005 announced that its Board of 
Directors has suspended the Group Managing Director, Datuk Johari Abdul Ghani (DJAG) 
for 21 days to enable DJAG to respond to the findings of the PriceWaterhouse Coopers 
High Level Business Review (PwC Report).  
 
MSWG is of the view that good corporate governance practice calls for a thorough review 
and discussion of the PwC Report by the Board of KFCH to understand the findings and 
issues raised in the PwC Report. Next, proper procedures must be accorded to DJAG to 
enable him to respond to the findings as requested by the Board.  
 
Although DJAG has been given time to respond to the findings of the PwC Report, MSWG 
is concerned that the summary of the PwC Report have been released to the media by 
KFCH immediately upon suspension of DJAG and not until DJAG has reverted to the Board 
with his response. The Board of KFCH may be seen as engaging in a â€œtrial by 
mediaâ€• tactic, which has the potential to cause significant damage to the reputation of 
the Company, the Board and the individual concerned who is the subject of the query 
before the person has had the opportunity to respond appropriately. The Board of KFCH 
must also be mindful of possible legal and financial implications as a result of the 
publication of the findings to the public if some findings and deliberations turn out to be 
inaccurate.  
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The Board of Directors is the ultimate authority for full and effective control of and 
responsibility of a company. This includes the overall responsibility of ensuring good 
corporate governance and ethics to be observed by the directors of the company. The 
Board of KFCH should have in good faith given DJAG the opportunity to respond to the 
Board members first, and following that the directors to deliberate on the appropriate 
actions to be taken for the best interest of KFCH and its shareholders. For the integrity of 
the board and the company, there must always be a strict observance of obligations 
between the directors, which is important to maintain confidence and accountability for 
each other‘s actions.  
 
MSWG is also concerned over the discharge of the Board of Directors‘ duties and 
responsibilities whilst the alleged wrongdoings were happening. For ultimately, the ones to 
suffer are the various stakeholders including minority shareholders.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
 
Dated: 12 July 2005 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
 
 
 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER WATCHDOG GROUP (MSWG) COMMENTS ON 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN KFC HOLDINGS (MALAYSIA) BHD 
5 July 2005  
 
The chicken at KFC Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd (―KFCH‖) is indeed feeling the heat of the 
frying pan. This is shown by the tussle for control in QSR Brands Berhad (―QSR‖), the 
holding company of KFCH which is increasing in intensity and complexity.  
 
The announcement by Kulim (Malaysia) Bhd (―Kulim‖) on 20 June 2005 that it has acquired 
6.3% stake in QSR via a direct business transaction and that it has signed conditional Sale 
& Purchase agreements to buy an additional stake of 36.7% in QSR had given some clarity 
to the identity of the party controlling QSR. Nevertheless, the recent announcement that 
Tan Sri Dato‘ Nik Ibrahim Kamil (―TSDNIK‖), a director of QSR since March 2005 had 
raised his stake in QSR from 13.5% to 19.7% raises a question mark as to who will 
ultimately control the QSR/KFCH Group. To add intrigue to the tussle is the court injunction 
by TSDNIK.  
 
The board of directors of QSR currently comprise of fifteen (15) directors. Kulim has also 
applied for the appointment of three (3) directors and a joint company secretary to the QSR 
board. If these nominations are accepted, this would result in a total of eighteen (18) 
directors on the board of QSR. KFCH currently has fourteen (14) directors on its board.  
 
Minority shareholders should be worried as to the level of corporate governance in the 
QSR/KFCH Group. Firstly, the number of directors on the board of QSR and KFCH keep 
increasing. Where does this end? The large numbers of directors brings to question the 
effectiveness and efficiency of decision making in the board room. This will ultimately affect 
the running of the QSR/KFCH Group and have a detrimental effect to the shareholders, in 
particular the minority shareholders. Secondly, the Articles of Association of KFCH allow 
important decisions affecting the company be passed through a circular resolution 
approved by majority of the directors, without any meeting or discussion. Thirdly, the 
remuneration level of some directors may need to be reviewed when bench-marked 
against the performance of the group. Total directors‘ remuneration for QSR and KFCH in 
respect of the financial year ended 31 December 2004 totalled RM1.459 million and 
RM3.637 million respectively.  
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Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) is of the view that it is now time for the 
Institutional Shareholders of KFCH collectively to step up and take actions to ensure that 
the Group is being run properly with good corporate governance. The institutional 
shareholders of KFCH include the Employees Provident Fund, Great Eastern Life 
Assurance (Malaysia) Bhd, Lembaga Tabung Haji, Malaysia National Insurance Berhad, 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad, Takaful Nasional, Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, 
Petroliam Nasional Bhd, Tenaga Nasional Bhd, ING Insurance Bhd, Kumpulan Wang 
Amanah Pencen, to name a few. Based on KFCH‘s annual report for year 2004, the 
abovementioned institutional shareholders collectively hold over 33% of the shares in 
KFCH.  
 
MSWG as a body for shareholder activism and protection of minority interest would be 
more than happy to be the platform to initiate a collective shareholder activism for these 
institutional shareholders. We also call for the institutional shareholders to collectively take 
the necessary actions to improve the running and corporate governance of the QSR/KFCH 
Group, which may include re-looking at the relevant Articles of Association and the 
composition of the board. This will lead to the development of vibrant and effective minority 
shareholders which will create greater confidence of investors in the capital market.  
 
Institutional shareholders represent extensive stakeholders and hence have the duty and 
responsibility to ensure that that their investments are not only being protected but also 
enhanced to the best of their abilities. In this case, it will be very disheartening if the 
institutional shareholders do not take any action to ensure that KFCH is being run properly 
and maximising shareholder value. Minority shareholders, acting together can have a 
strong influence on the way things are done and will lead to a better performance for the 
QSR/KFCH Group. Otherwise, the chicken may not be that finger-licking good.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
 
Dated: 5 July 2005 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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Case 3: Padiberas Nasional Bhd. 
 
 
 
MSWG COMMENTS ON INSIDER TRADING CASE OF PADIBERAS NASIONAL BHD 
(BERNAS) SHARES - A LESSON TO BE LEARNT 
25 August 2006  
 
MSWG welcomes the Securities Commission (SC)‘s civil enforcement programme which 
has enabled 41 other investors to claim their entitlement under the compensation scheme 
by which the 275 investors were earlier compensated.  
 
Please refer to SC‘s press release on 90% aggrieved Bernas investors compensated on 24 
August 2006.  
 
Besides a significant milestone for the SC, their civil enforcement programme has also 
made it easier for aggrieved investors to take legal action and to recover their losses. 
Previously, the laws stated that such action by aggrieved parties against insider trading 
could only be taken through the court which would need to be proven, costly and time 
consuming..  
 
The SC‘s civil enforcement programme has cast the net wider without fear or favour in 
search of the culprits or guilty ones and punish them appropriately. Effectively, the civil 
enforcement programme has extended the scope of the law to deal with insider trading 
offences and to remove abuses on what constitutes improper conduct or abuses of insider 
information. Insider trading is not only unfair to genuine investors but it also undermines 
investor confidence for fair dealing.  
 
MSWG is of the opinion that the more astute the recourse to civil enforcement processes 
the more effective it will be to expedite the prosecution and conviction of insider traders. 
The civil enforcement programme will make the SC more effective and useful to track down 
errant directors and CEOs who have indulged in insider trading.  
 
In line with the saying ―Do what you preach,‖ MSWG endorses that the SC has kept truthful 
to its words from the time when the Securities Commission Act 1993 and the Securities 
Industry Act 1983 have been broadened significantly to empower them to disqualify and 
remove errant directors and CEOs from office since January 2004.  
 
The advice of MSWG to be cautious and accountable is:  
 
Do not trade while in possession of confidential price sensitive information unless you 
disclose the information to the public  
 
Do not trade if confidentiality of the information does not allow disclosure.  
 
When in doubt, always disclose.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
 
Dated: 25 August 2006 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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Case 4: FCW Holdings Bhd. 
 
 
 
AGM OF FCW HOLDINGS BERHAD - IS THIS WAY TO CREDIBILITY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
22 December 2006  
 
On 22 December 2006, the Fifth-First (51st) Annual General Meeting (AGM) of FCW 
Holdings Bhd continued despite the strong objections of substantial number of minority 
shareholders against the absence of the Non-Independent, Non-Executive Chairman for at 
least the last three (3) consecutive years.  
 
MSWG pointed out that the continuing absence of the Chairman and he was away 
overseas, was unacceptable and the continuation of the AGM indicated that minority 
shareholdersâ€™ rights could have otherwise been better served. Certain shareholders 
and proxies present, who voted for the AGM to continue, could be interpreted to have not 
acted in the interest of all shareholders.  
 
An important aspect of corporate governance is shareholdersâ€™ rights. Often, provisions 
that move away from one share for one vote, and to vote by show of hands, contribute to 
weak shareholdersâ€™ rights. The greater number of certain shareholders and proxies 
came prepared for the AGM and voted against their fellow other shareholders and in 
disunity, they have failed to protect their interest collectively.  
 
MSWG is of the view that often much of the shareholder democracy is focused on the rights 
of retail shareholders. However, when the result of voting is carried by votes of certain 
shareholders and proxies, shareholder democracy is no longer practised, but is an illusion.  
 
It is important that retail shareholders understand their rights correctly and effectively. The 
AGM is the most important event and an opportunity for shareholders to see their Directors 
and Chairman in person, and to gauge their attitude and responsibility towards them. 
Generally, in most AGMs, shareholders are bemused by the silence of other directors 
throughout the meeting while the meeting is largely conducted by the Chairman. In this 
particular case, it is odd that the Chairman has been absent for the three consecutive 
years. Shareholders can question his commitment and sincerity towards shareholders. 
Oddly, one independent director openly defended him, trying to explain his absence 
unconvincingly.  
 
MSWG took to account the conduct of certain directors to get certain shareholders and 
proxies to support the continuing absence of the Chairman. This did not augur well for our 
capital market, detracting from the spirit of good corporate governance for directors to 
exercise collective responsibility of the Board for company performance and prospects. 
Why did the Chairman not face shareholders, met them and openly explained matters to 
them that affected the company.  
 
The absence of the Chairman for three consecutive years reflected his lack of 
accountability for his role and a serious breakdown for shareholder comfort. This is even so 
especially now that the Company is classified as an affected issuer under PN17. Although 
the AGM continued, the Chairman had failed to offer himself to be questioned and subject 
to scrutiny, while the Executive Director took the blunt from aggrieved shareholders as the 
Chair of the AGM on his behalf.  
 
In trying to enhance shareholders activism and protect minority interest, MSWG takes a 
serious view of the absence of Board chairman and directors from general meetings. 
MSWG will not hesitate to have these meetings adjourned and even move not to reelect 
these directors. Only in this way, can we protect the credibility and sustainability of our 
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capital market.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
 
Dated: 22 December 2006 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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Case 5: Megan Media Holdings Bhd. 
 
 
 
The Star Online > Business  
Thursday June 14, 2007 
Megan Media defaults on RM894m bank facilities 
By KATHY FONG 
PETALING JAYA: Megan Media Holdings Bhd, which is being investigated by the 
Securities Commission, and its subsidiaries have defaulted on RM893.97mil in maturing 
banking facilities (principal only).   
The optical disk maker, which has been found to be involved in fictitious trading, said it had 
defaulted on all facilities granted by its bankers.   
The company was unable to repay the debts due to the constraints to its current cash flow 
from its manufacturing operations, it told Bursa Malaysia late last night.   
Megan Media‘s problems are not confined to the mounting debts, but also the fictitious 
transactions that might have involved more than RM500mil cash.    
The creditor banks hired Ferrier Hodgson MH Sdn Bhd to conduct investigations on 
Megan Media‘s unit Memory Tech Sdn Bhd (MTSB).    
The interim findings of Ferrier Hodgson show that MTSB‘s suspect transactions included a 
RM211mil deposit paid for 13 production lines that could be fictitious, in addition to the 
fictitious trading that resulted in receivables totalling RM334.3mil.   
It also revealed that MTSB‘s assets could potentially fall short by RM456mil.   
Ferrier Hodgson said the value of MTSB‘s fixed assets of RM585mil needed to be 
investigated further while the net realisable value was unknown.   
The investigation discovered that the payments to all trading creditors were actually made 
to other parties in a move to channel cash out of MTSB.   
Megan Media‘s balance sheet as at Jan 31 shows that borrowings stood at RM888mil.   
Its receivables grew to RM430.3mil from RM319mil a year earlier. The cash flow 
statement showed a negative net cash of RM57.9mil generated from operating activities.   
Megan Media said it would engage the creditor banks to formulate the debt restructuring 
scheme and regularisation plan in ―ensuing weeks.‖   
It will also initiate legal action to recover all amount lost due to the irregularities.   
The statement said Megan Media‘s state of solvency would ultimately depend on the 
outcome of the debt restructuring and regularisation endeavour.   
However, the company pointed out that the report on interim findings of Ferrier Hodgson 
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indicated that it had sufficient short-term cash flow based on its current modus operandi.    
It may incur a net loss of RM552mil for the fiscal third quarter ended Jan 31 after 
adjustments for fictitious transactions, instead of a profit of RM10.5mil as per the 
published unaudited accounts.   
Media Megan shares were dragged down to a record low of 14.5 sen on Tuesday. It 
closed at 15 sen yesterday.  
Source: www.thestar.com.my  
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Appendix 2 
 
 
A RISING VOICE AND POWER - THE VOCIFEROUS MINORITIES AT THE ANNUAL 
GENERAL MEETING OF MALTON BERHAD ON SATURDAY, 15 DECEMBER 2006 
18 December 2006  
 
On 16 December 2006, Encik Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek, the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of MSWG and minority shareholders of Malton Berhad dressed down the board for 
the absence of their executive chairman and executive director for two consecutive annual 
general meetings (AGMs) as well as their excessive remuneration when shareholders 
received no dividends. At several points during the three-hour shareholders‘ meeting, the 
aggrieved shareholders put pressure on the board, demanding the whereabouts of the 
Executive Chairman and the executive director. In the annual report, they are both 
substantial shareholders via a private limited company, Malton Corporation Sdn Bhd which 
has a 37.91 per cent stake.  
 
Encik Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek pointed out that their absence did not reflect well on their 
attitude and their responsibility for not taking minority shareholders seriously at once a 
year‘s shareholders‘ meeting. He and minority shareholders present at the AGM found that 
the Deputy Chairman, chairing the AGM (also an independent director)‘s explanation is 
totally unacceptable by saying that they were overseas and that he would convey 
shareholders‘ sentiments to them. As he tried, chairing the AGM not even passing the first 
resolution in tabling the company‘s financial statements, the CEO of MSWG and 
shareholders viewed their absence with skepticism and the chairman‘s explanation 
unconvincing. Also noted in the directors‘ profile in the annual report, the Executive 
Chairman has been described as the executive director‘s spouse.  
 
MSWG then brought up several critical issues to the board‘s attention and shareholders 
followed up vociferously, demanding for answers. The most critical ones, among others, 
are as follows:- 
 The Group‘s five-year summary showed that year-on-year comparison, the group‘s 
profit before taxation shrank by 88.7 per cent although turnover was rising by 36.2 
per cent. The Group‘s profit margins declined to as low as 2.6 per cent from 4.1 per 
cent on the back of rising operating expenses, that eroded earnings of the Group 
while executive directors‘ remuneration kept rising; 
 For two consecutive financial years ended 30 June 2005 and 2006, the Company 
paid tax penalties of RM3.67 million and RM3.35 million when it made a net loss of 
RM14.10 million in 2005 and a net profit of RM2.44 million in 2006 respectively. 
Shareholders could not believe their eyes that such tax penalties happened and 
questioned the competence of tax agents/tax advisers doing the Group‘s tax 
computation even though the board tried to explain and relate these payments 
back to 2001. 
 Two related party transactions comprised the insurance premium of RM800,000 
paid to a company controlled by one Lim Bin Hooi, a sister of the Executive 
Chairman and the purchase of corporate gifts (or hampers) of RM400,000 from a 
company controlled by the Executive Director (i.e. the Executive Chairman‘s 
spouse), both were absent from the AGM. The directors tried to clarify that even if 
such transactions were given to outside parties, the same amount of expenses 
would still be incurred and it made no difference whether related or not. However, 
the shareholders doubted, especially the purchase of corporate gifts (or hampers) 
whether it was necessary to be so much. 
 The Executive Chairman and Executive Director were both retiring under the 
Company‘s articles and had offered themselves for re-election while both were 
absent from the AGM. Their absence fumed shareholders present at the AGM to 
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question their remuneration, demanding to slash down their remuneration to below 
the net profit of RM2.44 million for the year attributable to shareholders. 
 MSWG also asked for clarification as to the duties and responsibilities of Executive 
Chairman, three Executive Directors (one of whom is his spouse) and one 
Managing Director in the context of corporate governance principles and best 
practices for the Board comprising one Deputy Chairman (an independent director) 
and two independent directors. 
 
The AGM got heated, with shareholders refusing to accept the explanation for their 
absence and inappropriate answers provided by the board to the above issues. At this 
juncture, Encik Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek virtually advised the board to consider the 
necessity to adjourn the AGM which was well supported by the shareholders. He hoped 
that the adjourned AGM would enable both the executive chairman and executive director 
be present at the AGM to meet shareholders. At this stage, the Chairman (supposed to be 
an independent director) asked for a poll instead of a show of hands.  
 
MSWG then took to account whether or not the chairman had conducted himself 
appropriately as an independent director chairing the AGM while faced with mounting 
objections from shareholders. The shareholders gathered that the board wanted to get over 
the AGM with probably proxies and the poll to see to their success easily over the 
aggrieved shareholders. Much arguments, persuasions and exchange of words between 
shareholders and the Chairman of the AGM prevailed, culminating with directors 
requesting to meet among themselves for ten minutes. Only then, they reluctantly decided 
to adjourn the AGM to another date.  
 
MSWG is of the view that the affairs at Malton Bhd‘s AGM have, if nothing else, shown that 
minority shareholders have ‗teeth‘ and will bite whenever their patience is over-tried or 
over-tested. In this case it is the unsatisfactory absence of both Executive Chairman and 
Executive Director (his spouse) for two consecutive AGMs and their high remuneration 
besides other critical issues as mentioned above.  
 
The recent AGMs of public listed companies (PLCs) have indicated that shareholders‘ 
meeting is no longer an anachronism or a dull event which, at times, could often result in 
varying degrees of excitement, trepidation or glee. We believe rising shareholder activism 
is healthy and in many ways, can make PLCs more accountable to shareholder democracy 
which is now a real challenge and no longer a mirage.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
 
Dated: 18 December 2006 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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MSWG COMMENTS ON FLEXING MUSCLES OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
8 March 2006  
 
Minority Shareholders flexed their muscles and forced the withdrawal of all the three 
resolutions at the recent EGM of Bandar Raya Developments Bhd (or BRDB) on 23 
February 2006.  
 
The Board of BRDB had to withdraw these three resolutions when it failed to obtain the 75 
per cent majority. The three resolutions were the share split, the amendment of BRDB‘s 
Articles to allow the share split, and the divestment of BRDB‘s 56.7 per cent-owned 
subsidiary, Mieco Chipboard Bhd (or Mieco) to make capital repayment to its shareholders.  
 
Voting against the resolutions included an institutional shareholder with a significant equity 
stake in BRDB.  
 
MSWG is of the view that the resolutions were bad timing attributed to BRDB‘s and its 
subsidiary, Mieco‘s deteriorated performances and weak share prices.  
 
For the current financial year ended 31 December 2005, BRDB reported an unaudited net 
loss after taxation and minority interests of RM66.80 million. Mieco also reported an 
unaudited net loss after taxation and minority interests of RM8.18 million.  
 
In addition, Mieco is now facing a lawsuit claim of RM2.14 million taken by RB Project 
Resources Sdn Bhd for alleged breaches of contract on installation works done including 
the supply of labour, material and equipment.  
 
Over the last one year, MSWG noted that minority shareholders have grown in strength 
either in persons or as proxies to vote against resolutions which are against their interests. 
Never has this growing power of minority shareholders been truer and effective at the EGM 
of BRDB to make the board accountable.  
 
Public listed companies are only well governed if minority shareholders take their role and 
voting seriously without fear or favour.  
 
Minority shareholders must test their courage to stand against unfair treatment, not to 
waste their votes but stay united and to appoint proxies to act if need be on their behalf.  
 
Minority shareholders and other shareholders have three fundamental rights i.e. the right to 
information, the right to express opinion and the right to seek redress. Voting is a 
responsibility for one‘s rights and protection as shareholders and ownership.  
 
In this context, MSWG‘s mission is to enhance shareholder activism and protect minority 
interest.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
 
Dated: 8 March 2006 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
 
 
26-05-2008: Tasek minority unhappy over HLA deal 
by Cindy Yeap 
Email us your feedback at fd@bizedge.com 
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KUALA LUMPUR: A minority shareholder of Tasek Corp Bhd has written to the authorities, 
voicing his dissatisfaction over the company‘s proposed purchase of Hong Leong Asia 
Ltd‘s (HLA) building materials business for S$323.5 million (RM773.6 million) to be 
satisfied by new Tasek shares. 
 
The shareholder complained to the company‘s independent directors, major shareholders 
such as Lembaga Tabung Haji and the regulators, seeking a better deal for the minorities. 
 
Describing himself as a long-time value investor, the shareholder said he does not question 
the value of HLA‘s assets but reckons Tasek‘s shares are ―worth much more‖ and should 
be issued ―at a much higher price‖ than the proposed RM3.54 per share. 
 
The transaction is tied to a 54-sen special dividend, which means the Tasek shares are 
valued at RM4.08. The value was based on the average market price when the deal was 
proposed. 
 
―A fair ball park estimate to Tasek minorities would be about RM1 net cash dividend and to 
issue the new shares at RM5 to RM6.50,‖ the dissident Tasek minority wrote. 
 
He gave several reasons why the new Tasek shares should be issued at a higher price. For 
one, the net tangible asset per share of RM4.29 as at March 31, is higher than the 
proposed issue price. 
 
A higher issue price for the new Tasek shares would mean that HLA gets fewer Tasek 
shares in exchange for the assets it is selling. Both HLA and Tasek are companies under 
the Hong Leong Group which is controlled by Tan Sri Quek Leng Chan. 
 
Based on the proposed issue price of RM3.54, 212.25 million new Tasek shares, or 53.5% 
of its enlarged share capital, are to be issued for the purchase. This would more than 
double the HLA group‘s stake in Tasek from 31.92% to 68.34%, making the latter its 
subsidiary. 
 
HLA is seeking a waiver from undertaking a mandatory general offer. 
 
The minority shareholder also said Tasek‘s cement operations alone would be worth close 
to RM1 billion or RM5.39 per share. This was arrived at by pricing Tasek‘s cement plant 
capacity of 2.3 million tonnes at RM434 per tonne. As such, he reckons Tasek minorities 
would be better off if there were competing bids for its cement mill. 
 
―Many reputable foreign parties like French-owned Vicat SA, which made an unsuccessful 
bid for Cement Industries Malaysia Bhd (CIMA), and Swiss-owned Holcim could be 
interested in the Tasek cement plant,‘‘ the minority said. 
 
In the letter, he asked that Tasek‘s independent non-executive chairman Datuk Dr Hussein 
Awang table the points he raised in his letter at a board meeting. 
 
―Tasek is basically exchanging solid steel and mortar cement mill for essentially a group of 
related companies trading in building materials. Hopefully, the approving authorities will 
ask for profit guarantees from HLA for at least two to three years,‖ he said. 
 
theedgedaily.com 
http://www.theedgedaily.com/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_231d1138-c
b73c03a-18bbf550-3d07d736 (1 of 2)28/05/2008 05:09:04 
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Appendix 3 
 
All materials presented in Appendix 3 are extracted from the official website of the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG). Available at: www.mswg.org.my  
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An Example of MSWG Initiatives to Encourage and also Increase Retail 
(Individual) Investor Participation in Corporate Governance: Retail Investor 
Subscription Service. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RETAIL SUBSCRIBER 
 
Joining Fee :  RM20 per annum or 
                        RM100 one-off payment as Life Retail Subscriber 
 
Value Proposition 
 Special 30% discount for the investor education programmes 
organised by MSWG annually 
 Special 30% discount for MSWG publications 
 Free one month access to MSWG Tracker - password given upon 
signing 
 
 Special fee at RM160 for one year access to MSWG Tracker (normal 
price for MSWG Tracker = RM360) 
 
 
MSWG Tracker includes the following services :- 
 
(i)        MSWG Monitoring of AGMs/EGMs 
 MSWG Letters 
 Reply from PLCs 
 
(ii)       MSWG Publications 
 MSWG-NUBS Corporate Governance Survey 2008 
 Shareholdings Analysis Report 1997-2006 
 
Complimentary Tracker Services 
 
(iii)      Corporate Actions on all PLCs in Bursa 
 Mergers & Acquisitions and Privatisations 
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 Related Party Transactions for the last one year 
 Dividend payout 
 Boardroom Changes 
 
(iv)      MY Watchlist - Alerts 
 Latest company announcements 
           (each user will receive alerts on PLCs) 
 
(v)       Financials of PLCs 
 Including financial ratios for 10 years 
 
(vi)      Benchmarking by Sub-Sector for Comparison 
 
 
 
 
Examples of Other Retail (Individual) Investor Education and Engagement 
Programmes/ Initiatives: 
 
 
 
MSWG Organised a Dialogue with the Retail Shareholders 
30 December 2008  
 
MSWG organised its Fourth (4th) Dialogue with the Retail Shareholders on 30 December 
2008 at its premises.  
 
The objectives of the dialogue were to obtain feedbacks/suggestions/views from these 
retail shareholders to enable MSWG to play a more effective and efficient role in enhancing 
shareholder activism and protection of minority interest that will help improve the credibility 
of the capital market for all stakeholders. 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
 
 
 
MSWG Participated as a Speaker and Set Up a Booth at the National Investors 
Symposium 2008 
7 September 2008  
 
MSWG participated as a Speaker at the Inaugural National Investors Symposium which 
gathers stock analysts, listed companies and traders as well the general investing public.  
 
A booth was also set up at the event which was held at the Kuala Lumpur Convention 
Centre.  
 
This activity is part of MSWG‘s investor education programmes. The objective of this 
activity is to promote MSWG‘s activities and services, in particular the Subscriber Services, 
which are targeted at the retail shareholders. 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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MSWG Organised a Seminar on “Getting Behind The Figures” 
30 June 2008  
 
A one-day workshop on ―Getting Behind The Figures‖ was held on 30 June 2008 at the 
Conference Room, Bursa Malaysia Berhad. This Workshop is part of MSWG‘s investor 
education programmes for the Retail Shareholders. It was to enable the participants to 
acquire a thorough knowledge and skills on the accounting concepts and terms used in 
annual reports & financial statements and to assess the overall financial performance of a 
public listed company – whether it is profitable and financially sound.  
 
Each participant was charged RM120 for the seminar materials and refreshment as well as 
lunch. MSWG Subscribers were given 30% discount on the fee, i.e. RM70 per person. 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
 
 
 
MSWG Organised a Workshop on “How to Read, Analyse and Interpret Annual 
Report and Financial Statements” (Basic Level) 
28 May 2008  
 
MSWG organized a one-day workshop for the Retail Shareholders on ―How to Read, 
Analyse and Interpret Annual Report and Financial Statements (Basic Level)‖. This 
Workshop was a ‗repeat‘ program of the Workshop held on 27 December 2007 as 
requested by the Retail Shareholders. It is aimed to guide the Retail Shareholders to 
acquire a comprehensive understanding of Annual Report and Financial Statements.  
 
This Workshop was held at the Conference Room, Bursa Malaysia Berhad. Each 
participation was charged RM100 for the seminar materials and refreshment as well as 
Lunch. Subscribers were given 30% discount on the fee, i.e. RM70 per person. 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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NEWS AND COMMENTARIES BY MSWG AND NEWSPAPERS 
(NOTE: Samples of Write-Ups and Press Articles for June 2009) 
 
Date 
 
Title 
 
29 June 2009 
22 June 2009 
19 June 2009 
15 June 2009 
10 June 2009 
10 June 2009 
10 June 2009 
10 June 2009 
10 June 2009 
 
10 June 2009 
 
10 June 2009 
10 June 2009 
10 June 2009 
9 June 2009 
8 June 2009 
8 June 2009 
3 June 2009 
3 June 2009 
1 June 2009 
 
MSWG AGM/EGM weekly watch June 29-30  
MSWG AGM/EGM weekly watch June 22-26  
Non re-election of KUB audit committee chairman raises questions 
MSWG weekly watch June 15-20  
MSWG launches corp governance index  
MSWG introduces Malaysia Corporate Governance Index 2009  
MSWG introduces Malaysia Corporate Governance Index  
Corporate Governance Index to pick top 100  
MSWG introduces Malaysia Corporate Governance Index – To 
ensure PLCs to follow the best practises  
Malaysia Corporate Governance Index helps minority shareholder 
to better comprehend the quality of PLCs  
MSWG: Media plays key role in corporate governance  
 Indeks MCG 2009 diperkenal  
Shareholders are effective enforcers in corporate governance  
 A gauge for investors  
Heightened vigilance against corporate transgressions  
MSWG AGM/EGM Weekly Watch June 8-12  
MSWG cari pengarah baru  
You can join MSWG’s pool if you have the right skills  
MSWG AGM/EGM weekly watch June 1-5 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
Enforcement Related Press Releases 
 
2009 
 Former MIH Operations Manager sentenced to 3 years jail and fined RM1 million - 
25/3/2009    
 Former Multi-Code directors charged with CBT and securities fraud - 13/3/2009    
 SC charges former Welli Multi CEO - 11/3/2009   
 Court upholds conviction for short-selling of shares - 2/3/2009   
2008 
 Gensoil Director pleaded guilty for submitting false information to SC - 26/12/2008   
 SC charges director for defrauding FX Capital investors - 17/12/2008   
 High Court dismisses Nasioncom's judicial review application - 23/10/2008  
 SC completes restitution to Powerhouse investors - 15/10/2008   
 Swisscash: Landmark judgement for the SC- Monies overseas to be traced and 
repatriated - 29/9/2008  
 SC welcomes ACA's action against Chee Kok Wing - 21/5/2008    
 SC investigates FX Capital Consultant - warns public against unlicensed 
investment activities - 9/5/2008   
 Be on guard: SC warns against 'CSI' Investment Product and Beneficence 
International Investment (Group) Co Ltd - 7/5/2008   
 Misleading revenue figures - SC charged ex-Welli Multi MD and ED; compounded 
former CEO - 15/4/2008   
 Iris share manipulation: SC files landmark civil suit - 9/4/2008  
 Duo fined RM150,000 for breach of securities laws - 25/3/2008   
 Multiple share application accused pleads guilty and fined RM70,000 - 11/3/2008  
 SC charges perpetrator of internet investment scheme-filed civil forfeiture action 
against another internet investment scam - 29/2/2008  
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2007 
 SC charges two more directors of GP Ocean - Dato' Lim Kim Ming and Lim Kim Hai 
for submitting misleading information in GP Ocean listing proposal - 22/5/2007   
 Soh Chee Wen pleads guilty, maximum fine imposed - 14/5/2007   
 SC charges Tan Siok Wan and Lee Sin Teck for falsifying information in GP Ocean 
listing proposal - 18/4/2007   
 SC raps Nasioncom and directs company to re-issue 2005 financial statements - 
Ensures investors have true financial figures - 15/2/2007   
 SC charges Dato' Ng Kim Weng for falsifying information in Polymate Holdings 
Berhad's 2003 Annual Report - 7/2/2007  
Source: http://www.sc.com.my  
 
 
 
Enforcement Milestones in 2008 
Civil Action against Market Manipulators 
The SC, on 9 April 2008, filed a civil action against 8 foreign and 2 local defendants, 
seeking the following : 
 Declaration that all the defendants conspired to manipulate the market and the 
share price of Iris, and defrauded investors;  
 Declaration that all profits earned by the defendants are held in constructive trust 
for the affected investors benefit;  
 Orders that all the assets and properties of each defendant be paid to SC after 
being traced and followed in order to compensate the affected investors;  
 Permanent injunction restraining the defendants from trading in said shares;  
 Permanent injunction restraining the defendants from trading in any counter on 
Bursa Malaysia or Mesdaq; and  
 General and exemplary damages. 
Source: http://www.sc.com.my 
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Kuala Lumpur, 21 August 2009 
SC appeals against RM350,000 fine imposed by Sessions Court in Megan Media 
case 
The Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) today filed an appeal against the Kuala Lumpur 
Sessions Court's sentence on Kok Hen Sen @ Kok Liew Sen for furnishing false 
information on the revenue of Megan Media Holdings Berhad (MMHB). The SC views 
seriously all offences involving breaches of securities laws, and will continue to seek 
heavier penalties to serve as a deterrent in order to maintain investor confidence in the 
integrity of the Malaysian capital market.  
Kok, aged 63, pleaded guilty in the Sessions Court for abetting the public-listed MMHB in 
submitting false revenue figures of over RM1 billion ringgit in its Financial Statement for the 
year ended 30 April 2006. He also admitted to three other outstanding charges of falsifying 
MMHB's revenue figures for the first three quarterly financial statements of 2007. Sessions 
Court Judge Encik Asmadi Hussin had on 18 August 2009 sentenced Kenneth Kok to a fine 
of RM350,000 to be paid the next day in default of a year's imprisonment.  
At the material time, Kok was the personal assistant to the Executive Chairman of MMHB. 
The Executive Chairman, Dato Mohd Adam Che Harun was also charged under the same 
section as Kok, for furnishing false information on the revenue figure for MMHB's third 
quarter 2007 financial figure. 
This fraud made a significant impact on the market price of the company as the share price 
dropped by 85% over a period of 3 months after the news of the false statements became 
known to the public.  
The SC had earlier urged the Sessions Court to mete out a deterrent sentence, taking into 
account the fact that Kok had played a key role in the creation of fictitious invoices to 
support the false revenue figures. Furthermore, several financial institutions had been 
deceived into providing to the company trade facilities which were then used to resemble 
payments for the sales that did not take place.  
SECURITIES COMMISSION MALAYSIA 
http://www.sc.com.my/main.asp?pageid=379&linkid=2272&yearno=2009&mod=paper 
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MSWG Comments on Securities Commission’s RM2.5 Million Restitution Suit 
Against FTEC Resources Managing Director 
1 October 2007  
 
The Securities Commission stands ready to take restitution actions against the managing 
director of FTEC Resources Berhad (FRB) for his wrongful utilization of cash proceeds 
raised from the Company‘s Initial Public Offering (IPO) is to be applauded.  
Research and development RM3,200 
Working capital 13,046 
Estimated listing expenses 1,700 
 
17,946 
 
Based on the issue price of RM0.45 per share of RM0.10 each under its prospectus for a 
public listing, the Company raised a total of about RM17.946 million from its IPO, which 
were expected to be used as follows: 
The Managing Directorâ€™s utilization of RM2.496 million for his personal purpose (not 
reflected in FRB Groupâ€™s unaudited quarterly results ended 31 March 2004, accounted 
for 13.9% of the total proceeds.  
 
SCâ€™s restitution actions against the Managing Director would strongly remind 
companies to abide by regulation. A director of a company owes certain fiduciary duties to 
the company and shareholders. One of the foremost fiduciary duties that a director owes is 
the duty to act bona fide and in the interest of the company. This duty is referred to as the 
duty of trust and diligence, which is also referred to a director as a trustee over the 
companyâ€™s funds. In a strict legal sense of certain proven legal cases, directors could 
be liable as trustees for breach of trust, if they misapplied the funds of the company.  
 
Any misuse or misapplication of funds should have been detected by members of audit 
committee where qualified, committed, independent and tough-minded independent 
directors representing the most reliable guardians of the public interest, would have spotted 
it and queried. Audit committeeâ€™s duties should not be limited to a perfunctory function; 
it should be much more to raise tough questions on management (in this case, the 
managing director/executive director heading the management team) internal and external 
auditors, if not how could investorsâ€™ interest be served.  
 
The SC whose duty it is to bring dubious directors to book, has done its part well, without 
fear or favour. The general interest of all shareholders and stakeholders is to request SC 
and the Government to be tough and weed out bad and unethical directors. As generally 
many investors feel such directors need to be subject to a thorough, exhaustive 
investigation to determine whether they are still worthy of directorship.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
 
Dated: 1 October 2007 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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MSWG Comments on Securities Commission (SC) Charges on Three Former 
Executives at Transmile. 
16 July 2007  
 
SC has matched its words with deeds. We congratulate SC on its swift action in charging 
three former executives of Transmile for abetting Transmile in making misleading 
statements.  
 
SC also offered compounds of RM500,000 each to two Independent Non-Executive 
Directors of Transmile who are also members of the Audit Committee for knowingly 
permitting the making of misleading statements to Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.  
 
Those who are would-be perpetrators or are prone to wrongdoings, should now take heed 
to expect tougher regulatory controls and swift enforcement as a result of all the recent 
scandals that have sprung up with surprises to many investors‘ dismay and 
disappointment.  
 
It is the view of MSWG that no one single company worth the mantle of true and fair 
performance will be making the headlines next for all the wrong accounting reasons.  
 
SC‘s swift actions demonstrated that it will come down quickly on transgressors and will not 
tolerate abuses from market players. Nevertheless MSWG urges that other gatekeepers, 
such as management, external auditors, internal auditors and shareholders must continue 
to play their respective roles effectively to protect and enhance the credibility of our capital 
market.  
 
Abdul Wahab Jaafar Sidek 
Chief Executive Officer 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG)  
 
Dated: 16 July 2007 
 
Source: www.mswg.org.my 
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Appendix 5 
 
 
 
Individual Investor Interview Schedule 
 
Investment Motivation and Objectives 
 
1. Do you actively invest in the Malaysian stock market? 
2. How many years have you been buying shares in the Malaysian stock market? 
3. What are your main objectives investing in shares? 
4. Do you aim for short- or long-term returns? 
5. Are there other important reasons why you actively invest in shares? Besides 
making profits, what else do you get out of it? 
6. In terms of returns, do you compare your share account performance with any 
standard, target or benchmark? 
 
 
Psychological Tendencies and Investment Preferences/Stylistics 
 
1. What proportion of shares in your portfolio is long-term and what proportion of it is 
short-term, generally? 
2. What is your typical investment horizon? Do you normally invest in terms of days, 
weeks, months or years? 
3. How do you normally identify which stocks to consider buying? Sources of 
information.  
 
 
Investment Cycle Stage 1 
 
1. When buying a share, what aspects of a share or the company that it represents do 
you consider? 
 
2. Are there any other factors or aspects that you normally consider when making 
your decision on whether to invest or not?                    
             Possible probes:- Anyway, do you consider:  
 The quality and capability of company management? 
 How transparent, accountable and honest management are of their actions? 
 The structure and composition of the board of directors? 
 The existence of majority shareholder/managers? 
 How much directors/managers are being paid? 
 What about how quickly the company publishes/announces latest important 
information? 
 Who the auditors are? 
 The company‘s internal risk controls? 
 The basic ownership rights accorded to investors? 
 
3. Are any of your investment decisions made on the basis of speculations, rumours 
or perceived insider information? 
 
4. For a typical Malaysian public-listed firm, what would you say are the chances of: 
 Mismanagement? 
 Managers‘ involvement in illegal acts like fraud? 
 Exploitation or unfair treatment of small shareholders? 
 
5. Are you aware that some public-listed companies are linked to certain political 
parties and/or politicians?  
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6. How do you think that affects the running of these companies? 
 
7. Do you think that your personal brokers give fair and unbiased investment advice 
to you? 
 
8. When buying shares, do you set any general rules for yourself in terms of what 
kinds of shares/companies you would consider investing in?  
(Possible probes: Well-run/managed companies, politically-connected ones, non-politically 
connected ones, no general criteria, etc) 
 
9. Under what situations or market conditions will you be more concerned about the 
long-term management of companies when buying shares? 
(Possible probes: general economic uncertainty, bearish stock markets, when fraud 
happens often, etc) 
 
 
 
Investment Cycle Stages 2 and 3 
 
1. For those companies where you do own shares, do you attend any of their Annual 
General Meetings? Why? 
 
2. For those companies where you do own shares, have you tried any one of the 
following activities: 
 Communicating with company management via emails or letters or 
shareholder relations department? 
 Submitting shareholder proposals? 
 Using the media to highlight your concerns regarding the company? 
Why? 
 
3. Imagine yourself owning some shares in a company that is involved in a big 
scandal (e.g., management fraud) and the share price dropped more than half 
overnight, before you get the chance to sell your shares, what would you do next? 
 Sell the shares or keep them? 
 Would you keep quiet and suffer in silence or complain about it to family and 
friends? 
 Next, do you take any official action to complaint or do nothing? Why? 
 
4. Generally, if the performance of the company that you've invested in is declining/ 
worsening, would you rather sell your shares than pressuring management to 
improve performance? 
 
5. As long as the share price/operating profits/dividends go up, how the company is 
actually run doesn't really concern you. Do you agree or disagree? 
 
6. Lastly, as long as your investment is profitable, you can tolerate managers abusing 
their power (even stealing company assets) .Do you agree or disagree? 
7. If such a situation was discovered in one of the companies that you have invested 
in, would you take any action, assuming that your investment in that company is 
still profitable? 
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Broker Interview Schedule 
 
1. Could you please describe the nature of your involvement with the Malaysian stock 
market?  
 
2. Taking your role as a stock broker into account, do you offer investment advice or 
discuss trading/investment strategies with your clients? 
 
3. What are some of your clients‘ main objectives investing in shares? 
 
4. Besides making profits, are there other important reasons why retail investor 
clients actively invest in shares? 
 
5. What is the typical investment horizon of these investors? Do they normally invest 
in terms of days, weeks, months, or years? 
 
6. Do they tend to hold on to loss-making investments for longer? 
 
7. Based on these exchanges, do individual retail share investors generally display 
any awareness or interest in particular aspects of corporate governance? 
 
8. Are they generally concerned with any of the following aspects of firm 
governance? 
Possible probes:- 
 the quality and capability of company management? 
 how transparent, accountable and honest management are of their actions? 
 the structure and composition of the board of directors? 
 the existence of majority shareholder/managers? 
 how much directors/managers are being paid? 
 what about how quickly the company publishes/announces latest important 
information? 
 who the auditors are? 
 the company‘s internal risk controls? 
 the basic ownership rights accorded to investors? 
 
9. Are company fundamentals important? Is it important to the valuation of the 
companies? 
 
10. What are some of the general investment criteria or rules that they normally apply? 
(Possible probes: Well-run/managed companies, politically-connected ones, non-politically 
connected ones, no general criteria, etc) 
 
11. Would it be fair to suggest that most of the trades being made in Malaysian stock 
market by retail investors are based on rumours, speculations and perceived 
insider information? 
 
12. What can you tell me about your retail clients with regards to the nature of their 
involvement in shareholder activism-related activities? For example, do they 
attend any AGMs? What are the reasons for attendance/non-attendance? 
 
13. Next, do any of your clients: –  
 Communicate with company management (emails/letters/investor relations 
department)? 
 Submit shareholder proposals? 
 Publicly criticize company managers/directors through the media? 
14. Why? If yes, do you know what governance issues they normally raise? 
 
15. The Malaysian government has been aggressively promoting better corporate 
governance standards and awareness since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, is 
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this having any impact at all? 
 
16. Do you think that corporate governance in Malaysia is effective? Why? 
17. What are the main problems and impediments to better corporate governance in 
this country? 
 
 
 
 
Company Secretary Interview Schedule 
 
1. By taking your specific role as company secretary into account, just to reconfirm 
[Note: The participant has detailed her nature of involvement in earlier 
correspondence] - you are charged with the collection and presentation of all 
shareholder and management proxy resolutions annually. You are also given 
AGM attendance records and handling all other manners of correspondence such 
as emails and letters with outside shareholders, is that so? 
 
2. Since you are charged with the safekeeping of all such information over the years, 
what is your observation with regards to the general levels of minority shareholder 
involvement or participation in the affairs of the company? We will start by 
exploring shareholder attendance numbers and voting at AGMs. Is there a 
noticeable rise in the numbers of minority retail shareholders attending AGMs in 
recent years? 
 
3. What kinds of shareholders or proxies of shareholders typically attend these 
AGMs? 
 
4. Do these people form the majority of the numbers or are there some other proxies 
of shareholders that are supposed to be there for different reasons? 
 
5. Are other forms of communication initiated by minority shareholders such as 
writing letters or emails to management or attempting to hold informal discussions 
with the top management, rare occurrences? 
6. Why do you think this is so?  
7. What are the main impediments to such activities? 
 
8. The Malaysian government has been aggressively promoting better corporate 
governance standards and awareness since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, is 
this having any impact at all? 
 
9. Do you trust that corporate governance in Malaysia is effective? Why? 
10. What are the main problems and impediments to better corporate governance in 
this country? 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Insider Interview Schedule 
 
1. Could you please describe the nature of your involvement with the Malaysian stock 
market?  
 
2. Taking your role as a stock broker into account, do you offer investment advice or 
discuss trading/investment strategies with your clients? 
 
[Note: Questions 3 - 14 outlined under the Broker Interview Schedule are posed to 
interviewee at this point] 
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3. Now, I am now more interested in your role as a former member of the top 
management of a certain public-listed firm. What is your observation in regards to 
minority shareholders involvement or participation into the affairs of the company? 
For example, attendance at AGMs. 
 
[Note: Questions 3 - 7 listed under the Company Secretary Interview Schedule are 
posed to interviewee at this point] 
 
4. The Malaysian government has been aggressively promoting better corporate 
governance standards and awareness since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, is 
this having any impact at all? 
 
[Note: The participant has briefly detailed his nature of involvement in earlier 
correspondence – specifically, he alleged to being directly involved in market- 
based activities that are manipulative in nature and also provided firsthand 
accounts of (i) window dressing measures adopted by the government in terms of 
governance reforms, and (ii) lapses in enforcement of capital market rules/ 
regulations. Subsequent questions are designed with such information at hand in 
order to capture the richer details] 
 
5. What are the main problems and impediments to better corporate governance in 
this country? 
 
6. Can you please provide examples of these window dressing measures and 
―insincerity‖ (Note: the descriptive term used by the interviewee in earlier 
correspondence) in terms of enforcement? 
 
7. How did you come to know about these? Do you have any personal experiences 
with regards to market manipulation? 
 
8. Can you briefly describe how these ―market operators‖ work? How do they 
manipulate share prices? 
 
9. Does the Securities Commission know or suspect such activities are going on in 
the background? 
 
10. After being personally involved in these alleged activities, what was the Securities 
Commission‘s response? 
 
11. So, which scenario is it? Are regulatory agencies simply turning a blind eye or do 
they simply allow these activities to take place or are they colluding or are involved 
themselves? 
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Appendix 6  
SECTION A: PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Age (Tick ONE) 
  18 – 25 years   26 – 35 years    36 – 45 years    46 – 55 years    56 – 65 years   Above 65 years 
 
 
Gender (Tick ONE)  
  Male   Female 
 
 
Race (Tick ONE)  
  Malay   Chinese   Indian   Other (Malaysian)   Other (Foreign) 
 
 
Years of Share Investment Experience (Tick ONE)  
  0 – 2 yrs   3 – 5 yrs   6 – 8 yrs   9 – 11 yrs   12 – 15 yrs   More than 15 yrs 
 
 
Your MAIN Share Dealing Brokerage:       
 
 
State of Residence (e.g., Johor, Kuala Lumpur):      
 
 
SECTION B: INVESTMENT MOTIVATIONS & OBJECTIVES 
1) What do you mainly seek from your share investments? Please rate the following in terms of their importance (Tick ONE for EACH) 
 Very Important Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Irrelevant 
(Not Important) 
Short term share price increase.     
Long-term share price increase.     
Dividend Income.     
Fun/Excitement (like casino gambling).     
Pride/Ego (to show people that you own shares).     
 
 
 
2) What do you use to compare your share account performance with? (Tick ONE) 
 Interest rate of savings/fixed deposit (FD) accounts.   Returns of KL Composite Index (KLCI) or similar Index. 
 My own personal target of returns.   Investment returns achieved by family/friends. 
 No standards, simply hope for the best.  Other, please specify       
 
 
 
SECTION C: RISK, KNOWLEDGE & CONTROL 
1) The extent to which you agree/disagree with the following (Tick ONE for EACH) 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
I am willing to take high risk in exchange for high expected share returns.       
I feel comfortable investing in shares that are considered risky.      
My past profitable investments were mainly due to my specific investment skills      
My investment losses have often resulted from factors beyond my control (e.g., 
unexpected economic downturn).      
I am fully responsible for the results of my investment decisions.      
I make all the important share investment decisions myself.      
I am more knowledgeable in share investments compared to the average investor      
 
 
 
2) How well can you explain the following terms to a friend? (Tick ONE for EACH) 
 
Can explain 
very well 
Can explain 
partly 
Cannot 
explain well 
Cannot 
explain at all 
I DON’T 
KNOW myself 
Price earnings (PE) ratio of a particular share.      
A Share Bonus Issue or Stock Split.      
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SECTION D: INVESTMENT STRATEGY, EVALUATION, INFO SEARCH & DECISION-MAKING 
1) Which approach do you USUALLY take in deciding which stocks to buy? (Tick ONE) 
      Just select shares of companies with established reputations (e.g., Genting, Maxis). 
      Just select shares that catch your attention in the media or stock market (top volume/heavily traded). 
      Rely on Others – tips/recommendations of your own broker/brokerage/family/friends. 
      Fundamental Analysis (e.g., company earnings, management quality). 
      Technical/Chart Analysis (e.g., share price movements, volume). 
      Both Fundamental & Technical Analyses. 
      Other, please specify       
 
 
 
 
2) When considering buying a share, how important are the following? (Tick ONE for EACH) 
 
Very 
Important Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Irrelevant 
(don’t consider) 
Unconfirmed tips/insider info/speculation predicting a rise in share price soon.     
The qualifications, abilities & experience of company directors/managers.     
Quality & speed by which the company publishes latest/important information.     
How transparent & accountable company managers are of their actions.     
 
 
 
 
3) Will you be more concerned with the long-term management of companies under any of the situations below? (TICK ALL relevant 
options) 
 In times of general economic uncertainty (weak economy).  In a bearish/declining stock market. 
 In a bullish/rising stock market.  When public company fraud happens often. 
 None of the above.   Other, please specify        
 
 
 
 
 
4) How USEFUL are the following information sources to you? (Tick ONE for EACH) 
 Always Usually Sometimes Never 
A company’s annual reports & website (company published material).     
Your brokerage/broker.     
The financial press, non-Internet (e.g., The Star Business).     
The Internet (investment-related websites, blogs & chat forums).     
Family & friends.     
 
 
 
 
5) Which ONE of the following would you most likely refer yourself as? (Tick ONE) 
 Long-term Shareholder/Owner/Investor.  Short-term Trader/Investor.  Punter/Speculator/Gambler. 
 
 
 
 
SECTION E: PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION & CHANGES 
1) On average, how many trades do you make per month? (Tick ONE) 
 0 – 2 trades  3 – 5 trades  6 – 8 trades  9 – 11 trades  12 – 15 trades  More than 15 
 
 
 
 
2) On average, how many different companies’ shares do you hold in your share account? (Tick ONE) 
 0 – 2 companies  3 – 5 companies  6 – 8 companies  9 – 11 companies  12 – 15 companies  More than 15  
 
 
 
 
3) On average, how many % of shares that you own in your share account is for speculation/gambling/punting? (Tick ONE) 
 0%  20%  40%  60%  80%  100% 
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SECTION F: EXTERNAL FACTORS 
1) Based on your investment experience, the chances of the following incidences happening are (Tick ONE for EACH) 
 
Highly 
Likely Likely Unlikely 
Highly 
Unlikely 
DON’T 
KNOW 
Managers run the company poorly resulting in disappointing overall performance      
Managers make decisions that are against shareholders’ interest (e.g., taking on 
unprofitable pet projects).      
Managers exploit small shareholders (secretly transfer assets out of the company)      
Managers involved in illegal acts (self dealing & share manipulation).      
Managers providing insufficient important company information.      
Political parties/leaders using certain companies to raise political funds through 
share price manipulation & other corrupt practices.      
Market regulators* are independent (free from political influence) in carrying out 
their duties.      
Market regulators* carry out effective enforcement all the time.      
Brokers can be trusted not to give biased/self interested advice to clients (honest & 
proper conduct).      
Auditors can be trusted not to approve fraudulent/misleading financial statements 
(honest & proper conduct).      
*Market regulators include Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
2) When buying shares, do you set any of the following rules for yourself? (TICK ALL relevant options) 
 Only invest in well-run companies.  Only invest in govt/politically linked companies. 
 Only invest in companies run by professional managers rather than       
big shareholder/managers. 
 Only invest in non-govt/non-politically linked companies. 
 
 Only invest in speculative/penny stocks.  I do not set any fixed criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION G: ACTIVE SHAREHOLDING 
1) For those companies where you do own shares, do you attend any of their Annual General Meetings (AGMs)?  
 YES  NO 
If YES, WHY? (Tick ONE) If NO, WHY? (Tick ONE) 
 To ask questions, vote or have a say in how the company is run.  I didn’t know I am entitled to attend. 
 For the free food/free gifts that they hand out.  Too costly & time consuming. 
 Just for the experience.  I am unsure of what to say/do. 
 Only to protest after being mistreated/cheated/exploited.  Not relevant to my investment style. 
 My employer’s request (for the company where I work).  My vote/presence won’t change management decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
2) For those companies where you do own shares, have you tried doing any one OR more of the following? 
i) Communicate with company management (emails/letters/investor relations department).              ii) Submitting shareholder 
resolutions. 
iii) Publicly criticizing company managers/directors through the media. 
 YES  NO 
 
 
 
 
 
3) If you have answered YES to ANY of the activities above, what kinds of issues do you focus on? (TICK ALL relevant options) 
 Long-term underperformance (share price or profits).  Improving amount & speed of company disclosures. 
 How much/how directors/managers are paid.  Reducing the power of big shareholder/managers. 
 Unfair/questionable business decisions; mismanagement; fraud; 
negligence; etc. 
 Company strategy-related issues & other important corporate 
decisions such as mergers/takeovers. 
 Changing board of directors’ structure & composition.  Shareholder voting-related. 
 Appointment of company Auditors.  Other, please specify       
 
388 
 
4) Imagine yourself owning some shares in a company that is involved in a big scandal (e.g., management fraud) and the share price 
dropped more than 50% overnight, BEFORE you get the chance to sell your shares, what would you do next? 
 Keep the shares.  Sell the shares. 
AND (Tick ONE) 
          Keep quiet & suffer in silence.               Complain about it to family/friends. 
AND (TICK ALL relevant options) 
 Do nothing - take NO formal/official/legal action.   Send a formal complaint letter to company management. 
 Attend the company’s AGM or demand an EGM to voice your 
dissatisfaction & demand accountability. 
 File a formal complaint with market regulators (e.g., Securities 
Commission) and demand them to take action. 
 Use the media (e.g., newspapers) to highlight your protest.  Other, please specify       
 
 
 
 
5) IF you choose to Do nothing - take NO formal/official/legal action above, what are the main reasons? (TICK ALL relevant options) 
 It was just my bad luck, fated to be involved.  I don’t usually complain – not used to it. 
 I am not sure what to do/how to complain.  I fear getting some form of revenge. 
 Even if I complain, the authorities will not take action anyway.  I can still tolerate being mistreated this way. 
 Even if I complain, company management would not 
respond/change anyway.  
 
 
 
6) The extent to which you agree/disagree with the following (Tick ONE for EACH) 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
As long as the share price/operating profits/dividends go up, how the company is 
run doesn’t really concern me.       
As long as my investment is profitable, I can tolerate managers abusing their 
power (even stealing company assets).      
I’d rather sell my shares than pressuring management to improve performance.      
Company operations/fundamentals are less important in a speculative market.      
 
 
 
SECTION H: EXIT & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
1) How often is your decision to sell a particular share due to (Tick ONE) 
 Always Usually Sometimes Never 
Tips/Insider Information that you’ve received predicting a fall in the share price soon.     
Negative rumours you’ve heard regarding the company’s business operations.     
Company’s recent operating performance/fundamentals are worsening.     
Whenever you feel like selling.     
 
 
 
2) On average, how long do you hold on to shares of a particular company? (Tick ONE) 
 Less than 1 day  1 – 4 weeks  2 – 6 months  6 months to 1 year  1 to 2 years  More than 2 years 
 Less than 1 week  1 – 2 months 
 
 
 
3) What are the average yearly returns on your share investments? (Tick ONE) 
Profit  0 to +5%  +5% to +10%  +10% to +15%  +15% to +20%  More than +20% 
 OR  
Loss  0 to -5%  -5% to -10%  -10 to -15%  -15 to -20%  More than -20% 
 
 
 
4) Are the following statements (Tick ONE for EACH) 
 True False Don’t Know 
Companies must send annual reports to shareholders every year.    
Shareholders can vote during the election of company directors through the post (postal vote).    
All shareholders have the right to tour company’s head office at anytime & hold meetings with managers.    
 
Thank you for your help. If you have any queries/comments or would like to receive this survey’s results, please send an email to 
ken.yeoh@unn.ac.uk
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Appendix 7 
 
Cross-tabulation results for General Investment Strategy/Average Risk Propensity 
   Average Risk Propensity 
   1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Total 
General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approa
ch 
Based on 
Company 
Reputation 
Count 4 14 51 41 53 23 13 6 0 205 
Expected Count 3.9 7.4 29.8 28.7 53.6 36.1 26.7 12.0 6.7 205.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approa
ch 
2.0
% 
6.8
% 
24.9
% 
20.0
% 
25.9
% 
11.2
% 
6.3% 2.9% .0% 
100.0
% 
Catch 
Attention 
Count 4 4 29 29 88 61 56 30 23 324 
Expected Count 6.2 11.7 47.2 45.4 84.7 57.1 42.2 19.0 10.5 324.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approa
ch 
1.2
% 
1.2
% 
9.0% 9.0% 
27.2
% 
18.8
% 
17.3
% 
9.3% 
7.1
% 
100.0
% 
Rely on 
Others 
Count 3 9 30 34 70 47 32 11 6 242 
Expected Count 4.6 8.8 35.2 33.9 63.2 42.7 31.5 14.2 7.9 242.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approa
ch 
1.2
% 
3.7
% 
12.4
% 
14.0
% 
28.9
% 
19.4
% 
13.2
% 
4.5% 
2.5
% 
100.0
% 
Fundament
al Analysis 
Count 4 10 36 42 50 26 9 2 2 181 
Expected Count 3.4 6.5 26.3 25.4 47.3 31.9 23.6 10.6 5.9 181.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approa
ch 
2.2
% 
5.5
% 
19.9
% 
23.2
% 
27.6
% 
14.4
% 
5.0% 1.1% 
1.1
% 
100.0
% 
Technical 
Analysis 
Count 1 0 2 4 15 16 16 8 3 65 
Expected Count 1.2 2.4 9.5 9.1 17.0 11.5 8.5 3.8 2.1 65.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approa
ch 
1.5
% 
.0% 3.1% 6.2% 
23.1
% 
24.6
% 
24.6
% 
12.3
% 
4.6
% 
100.0
% 
Combinatio
n of 
Fundament
al and 
Technical 
Analysis 
Count 5 3 13 5 13 22 18 8 2 89 
Expected Count 1.7 3.2 13.0 12.5 23.3 15.7 11.6 5.2 2.9 89.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approa
ch 
5.6
% 
3.4
% 
14.6
% 
5.6% 
14.6
% 
24.7
% 
20.2
% 
9.0% 
2.2
% 
100.0
% 
Total Count 21 40 161 155 289 195 144 65 36 1106 
Expected Count 21.0 40.0 161.0 155.0 289.0 195.0 144.0 65.0 36.0 1106.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approa
ch 
1.9
% 
3.6
% 
14.6
% 
14.0
% 
26.1
% 
17.6
% 
13.0
% 
5.9% 
3.3
% 
100.0
% 
1=the lowest average risk propensity category, 5 = the highest risk propensity category. 
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Cross-tabulation results for Degree of Perceived Knowledge/General Investment 
Strategy 
   More knowledgeable than the average investor 
   Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Total 
General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
Based on 
Company 
Reputation 
Count 14 39 97 49 6 205 
Expected Count 16.1 34.3 91.3 49.9 13.4 205.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
6.8% 19.0% 47.3% 23.9% 2.9% 100.0% 
Catch Attention Count 40 51 135 76 21 323 
Expected Count 25.4 54.1 143.8 78.6 21.0 323.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
12.4% 15.8% 41.8% 23.5% 6.5% 100.0% 
Rely on Others Count 27 69 114 28 4 242 
Expected Count 19.1 40.5 107.8 58.9 15.8 242.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
11.2% 28.5% 47.1% 11.6% 1.7% 100.0% 
Fundamental 
Analysis 
Count 2 16 82 60 21 181 
Expected Count 14.3 30.3 80.6 44.1 11.8 181.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
1.1% 8.8% 45.3% 33.1% 11.6% 100.0% 
Technical 
Analysis 
Count 0 5 32 20 8 65 
Expected Count 5.1 10.9 28.9 15.8 4.2 65.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
.0% 7.7% 49.2% 30.8% 12.3% 100.0% 
Combination of 
Fundamental and 
Technical 
Analysis 
Count 4 5 32 36 12 89 
Expected Count 7.0 14.9 39.6 21.7 5.8 89.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
4.5% 5.6% 36.0% 40.4% 13.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 87 185 492 269 72 1105 
Expected Count 87.0 185.0 492.0 269.0 72.0 1105.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
7.9% 16.7% 44.5% 24.3% 6.5% 100.0% 
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Chi-Square Test results for Race/Tendency to Complaint 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 63.417
a
 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 63.419 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 32.615 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1106   
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .87. 
 
 
Cross-tabulation results for Race/Tendency to Complaint 
   QuiComp 
   1 2 Total 
Race 
Malay Count 159 84 243 
Expected Count 105.9 137.1 243.0 
% within Race 65.4% 34.6% 100.0% 
Chinese Count 285 496 781 
Expected Count 340.4 440.6 781.0 
% within Race 36.5% 63.5% 100.0% 
Indian Count 37 43 80 
Expected Count 34.9 45.1 80.0 
% within Race 46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 
Other (Foreign) Count 1 1 2 
Expected Count .9 1.1 2.0 
% within Race 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 482 624 1106 
Expected Count 482.0 624.0 1106.0 
% within Race 43.6% 56.4% 100.0% 
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Chi-Square Test results for General Investment Strategy/Ability, Qualification and 
Experience of Directors/Managers   
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.946E2 15 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 412.351 15 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 64.266 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1106   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.58. 
 
 
Cross-tabulation results for General Investment Strategy/ Ability, Qualification and 
Experience of Directors/Managers 
   Ability, qualification and experience of 
directors/managers  
   Irrelevant 
(don't 
consider) 
Slightly 
Important Important 
Very 
Important Total 
General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
Based on 
Company 
Reputation 
Count 38 55 77 35 205 
Expected Count 52.3 51.0 62.1 39.7 205.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
18.5% 26.8% 37.6% 17.1% 100.0% 
Catch Attention Count 120 104 77 23 324 
Expected Count 82.6 80.6 98.1 62.7 324.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
37.0% 32.1% 23.8% 7.1% 100.0% 
Rely on Others Count 79 82 69 12 242 
Expected Count 61.7 60.2 73.3 46.8 242.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
32.6% 33.9% 28.5% 5.0% 100.0% 
Fundamental 
Analysis 
Count 3 11 71 96 181 
Expected Count 46.2 45.0 54.8 35.0 181.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
1.7% 6.1% 39.2% 53.0% 100.0% 
Technical Analysis Count 39 15 8 3 65 
Expected Count 16.6 16.2 19.7 12.6 65.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
60.0% 23.1% 12.3% 4.6% 100.0% 
Combination of 
Fundamental and 
Technical Analysis 
Count 3 8 33 45 89 
Expected Count 22.7 22.1 27.0 17.2 89.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
3.4% 9.0% 37.1% 50.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 282 275 335 214 1106 
Expected Count 282.0 275.0 335.0 214.0 1106.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
25.5% 24.9% 30.3% 19.3% 100.0% 
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Chi-Square Test results for General Investment Strategy/The Degree of 
Management Transparency and Accountability 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.236E2 15 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 337.571 15 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 86.510 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1106   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.46. 
 
 
Cross-tabulation results for General Investment Strategy/The Degree of 
Management Transparency and Accountability 
   The degree of management transparency and 
accountability 
   Irrelevant 
(don't 
consider) 
Slightly 
Important Important 
Very 
Important Total 
General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
Based on 
Company 
Reputation 
Count 63 61 52 29 205 
Expected Count 66.5 58.2 47.3 33.0 205.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
30.7% 29.8% 25.4% 14.1% 100.0% 
Catch Attention Count 151 107 45 21 324 
Expected Count 105.2 92.0 74.7 52.1 324.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
46.6% 33.0% 13.9% 6.5% 100.0% 
Rely on Others Count 89 90 49 14 242 
Expected Count 78.6 68.7 55.8 38.9 242.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
36.8% 37.2% 20.2% 5.8% 100.0% 
Fundamental 
Analysis 
Count 14 29 65 73 181 
Expected Count 58.8 51.4 41.7 29.1 181.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
7.7% 16.0% 35.9% 40.3% 100.0% 
Technical Analysis Count 41 16 5 3 65 
Expected Count 21.1 18.5 15.0 10.5 65.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
63.1% 24.6% 7.7% 4.6% 100.0% 
Combination of 
Fundamental and 
Technical Analysis 
Count 1 11 39 38 89 
Expected Count 28.9 25.3 20.5 14.3 89.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
1.1% 12.4% 43.8% 42.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 359 314 255 178 1106 
Expected Count 359.0 314.0 255.0 178.0 1106.0 
% within General 
Investment 
Strategy/Approach 
32.5% 28.4% 23.1% 16.1% 100.0% 
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